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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the liberalisation of the European Community's civil aviation 
industry and attempts to measure how effective this process has been in achieving 
its goal of increased competition and greater efficiency.
Using the experience in the United States following deregulation of domestic air 
transport services as a template, the study employs Easton's model of political 
analysis and Porter's model of competitive forces as a framework for empirical 
research. This research was carried out with a representative sample of EC airlines, 
of their suppliers and customers, of providers of substitute services and of the 
industry's regulators. The results of the research were validated by personal 
interviews with leading stakeholders in the industry.
The main Conclusions drawn from the research are that:
i. liberalisation of the European Community air transport market has resulted 
in an influx of new entrants, an increase in the number of routes operated 
and a wider availability of discounted fares;
ii. to the extent that competition has nevertheless been less fierce than 
anticipated, this is because the aims of liberalisation have been frustrated by 
a resistance to change on the part of certain Member States and by the 
European Commission's inability to prevent further grants of State aid to 
loss-making flag carriers. Inadequate infrastructure has also acted as a 
brake on competition;
iii. customer choice is strongly influenced by frequency of service and by price. 
Those airlines which have set out to gain market share and which have 
pursued low price strategies have benefited most from liberalisation;
iv. airlines benefit from selling to a large number of buyers and from having a 
wide choice of suppliers;
v. the only threat of substitution to air travel within the European Community is 
from the High Speed Train and then only over comparatively short distances.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
Traditional regulatory structures in many industries have, since the 1970s especially, 
been subject to the pressure of powerful economic, technical, political and ideological 
forces which they have been unable to resist. This process and the resultant changes 
are often termed 'deregulation*. However, although there are some examples of 
complete deregulation, in general there is a continuum of deregulation ranging from 
mild liberalisation of a national industry to international free competition.
In every case, however, irrespective of the degree of deregulation, those working for 
change have aspired to stimulate competition through liberalising the legal framework 
and encouraging new players to enter the market to reduce monopoly or duopoly 
markets. Observation by The European Community (hereafter referred to as the 
Community or the EC: A note defining this term and explaining its use can be found in 
Appendix I) of American experience led to a view that deregulation effected by the 
simple removal of old controls was an inappropriate model. The view remains that for 
deregulation to be effective, the process must include new, and often detailed, 
structures to give it more impetus and direction than the market-place alone would 
provide, as evidenced by Majone's observation:
W hat is observed in practice is never total deregulation but a 
combination o f deregulation and  re-regulation
(Majone, 1992, p2).
Majone defines this apparently paradoxical process as 'regulatory reform1. This 
observation is complemented by Kay and Vickers (1988, p178):
One purpose o f regulation m a y  be  to promote and maintain conditions 
for effective competition: liberalisation m ay  alter the type o f regulation 
needed, not the n eed  for regulation.
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The process is well illustrated by the privatisation of the UK telecommunications 
industry. Regulatory power was shifted by legislation from central government to an 
independent statutory body, Oftel. The aim of regulation changed from maintaining a 
market monopoly to creating competition by executive action.
Deregulation of the US aviation industry, beginning with the Aviation Deregulation Act 
(1978), has been taken further than in any other country. It was achieved by a 
progressive rundown in the powers of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), culminating 
in the extinction of the Board in 1984. However, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) has continued to regulate safety and has found it necessary to increase its 
regulatory activities over time to keep pace with the rapid growth of services resulting 
from economic deregulation. The stages of this deregulation are shown in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Deregulation in the US Aviation Industry
DATE DEREGULATORY ACTION
31.12.1981 CAB authority over domestic fares expires.
31.12.1981 CAB authority over interlocking relationships and domestic mergers is 
transferred to the Department of Justice.
01.01.1985 CAB goes out of existence.
01.01.1985 CAB subsidy authority is transferred to the Department of Transportation 
(DOT).
01.01.1985 DOT receives the authority over foreign air transportation and must 
consult with the Department of State in that area.
01.01.1985 Postal Service assumes power over domestic mail rates and the Justice 
Department takes authority over agreements, foreign mergers, and 
interlocking relationships.
01.01.1985 The CAB's Bureau transfers the responsibility for policing unfair and 
deceptive trade practices to The Federal Trade Commission.
(Source: Present author's table using data from the Airline Deregulation Act 1978.)
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With the completion of the single market in 1993, the aviation industry of the 
European Community has also undergone a 'deregulatory process' but of a different 
kind. Whereas in the USA the CAB was dismantled in three years, the process in 
Europe was in three stages spread over five years and took the form of a transfer of 
authority from individual Member States to Community institutions rather than a 
removal of regulation per se.
The difference in approach results more from underlying political differences than 
from differences in motivation. One of the primary motives for deregulation in the 
USA was emerging evidence that the regulatory systems in operation were inefficient. 
It was believed that by subjecting carriers to market pressures, deregulation would 
lead to improved efficiency, indeed, the Airline Deregulation Act states specifically that 
the encouragement of competition is one of its primary aims:
To am end  the Federal Aviation Act o f 1958, to encourage, develop, and attain 
an air transportation system  which relies on competitive m arket forces to 
determine the quality, variety, and price o f air services and  for other purposes.
(The Airline Deregulation Act 1978, Public Law 95-504, 95th Congress).
This aim was closely paralleled by a 1989 European Commission memorandum 
which stated:
The elaboration o f a com prehensive Community policy on air transport which 
will encourage the developm ent o f a strong, healthy and competitive civil 
aviation sector capable o f making its full contribution to the economic growth 
o f the Community and the attainment o f its objectives, m ust encom pass more 
than a package o f liberalisation m easures covering fares, capacity, market 
a ccess  and competition.
(Commission Communication on the Development of Civil Aviation in the Community, 
Com 89, 373 final, p1)
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Among the other objectives identified by the Commission was the need for
...users to have a wide choice o f services at a s low a cost a s  possible while 
maintaining satisfactory sa fe ty  standards.
(Commission Communication on the development of civil aviation in the Community, 
Com 89, 373 final, p1)
Thus in Europe as in the USA, there was a recognition that lack of competition had 
resulted in a situation where airlines were inefficient, there was lack of customer 
choice and fares were uncompetitive. However it must be stressed that the 
Commission had a far wider ambition than merely improving the iot of passengers. As 
the memorandum made clear, it saw the aviation industry as having a major role to 
play in the economic growth of the Community and regarded liberalisation of the 
cargo sector as making an important contribution to the process.
Although it proved much more difficult to achieve deregulation in the EC than in the 
USA, as the great majority of Member States were initially reluctant to surrender 
powers to the European Commission, the process once started was unstoppable. 
The Treaty of Rome (1957) provided for the creation of a common transportation 
policy for the Member States. Although air and maritime transport were initially 
excluded, it was implicit in the Treaty's objectives of free circulation of people, goods 
and services within a common market that the exclusion would only be temporary. 
The first of three'packages' of liberalisation agreements between the Member States 
was adopted and took effect in December 1987. Hastened by the coming into force 
of the Single European Act on 1 July 1987, with its commitment to complete the single 
market in 1992, the second and third 'packages' were introduced in 1990 and 1992. 
This resulted in a situation from 1 January 1993 where EC airlines had in theory 
almost total freedom to fly where and when they liked within the territory of the 
Community, providing whatever capacity and charging whatever fares they wished. 
Liberalisation of air cargo service had meanwhile been achieved in one step in 1990. 
The timing and extent of this deregulation is shown in Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2 Deregulation in the EC Aviation industry
DEREGULATORY Inter-regiona! 1 st Package 2nd Package Cargo 3rd Package
ACTION Services 1983 1987 1990 1990 1992
G e o g r a ph ic a l S c o pe
Regional airports x X X X X
Regional/main airports X X X X
Main airports X X X
Domestic X
T raffic  R ights
Multiple Designation X X X X
3-4 Freedoms x X X X X
5 Freedom X X X X
6 Freedom x X X X X
7 Freedom X X
8 Freedom X
9 Freedom from 1997
Public Service X X
T ariffs
Close Relatedness X X X X X
Flexibility Zones X X
Double Disapproval - X
Matching X X
Free Pricing X X
Capacity
(60-40) X
60-40+ X
Free x X X
A ir Carrier  L icensing
Economic Fitness X
Technical Fitness X
Ownership X
Leasing Rules X
Carrier  R ights Ag ainst
Foreign  State
Tariffs X X X X v
Capacity X X X X A
Access X X X X X
Licensing X
A gainst H om e  S tate
X
x
Tariffs X X X X
Capacity X
Access X
Licensing X
(Source: Present author's table using data from the ‘three packages’ of aviation liberalisation 
and other European Community legislation.)
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1.2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
This study examines the liberalisation of the EC aviation industry and attempts to 
measure how effective this process has been in achieving its overriding aim of 
increasing competition. The research problem is to examine the extent to which 
liberalisation of the EC airline industry has affected the intensity of competition in the 
industry, the influence of stakeholders on air transport liberalisation policies and the 
competitive strategies adopted by those competing in a newly liberalised environment.
A three dimensional approach is used to investigate the research problem. The 
increases in the number of new entrants, discounted fares and routes available are 
regarded as indicators of increased competition in the US post-deregulation. These 
outcomes are used as a template to measure if competition in the EC aviation industry 
has increased post-deregulation. Secondary data is used to measure this aspect of 
the research problem and is complemented by interviews with members of the 
Federation of Air Transport User Representatives in the European Community 
(FATUREC).
Using the Eastonian (1965a) political system as a framework, the study investigates 
the influence of stakeholders on the outcomes of the liberalisation process and how 
by responding to feedback the authorities can revise the system of deregulation to 
ensure that it is maintained. This aspect of the research is investigated by interviewing 
key stakeholders in the industry and a statistical test is carried out on the findings.
The intensity of competition pre- and post-deregulation in the EC air transport industry 
is investigated by utilisation of Porter's (1980) model of competitive forces. The model 
affords a mechanism by which to examine the competitive strategies adopted by 
airlines operating in a deregulated 'competitive' environment. A survey administered 
to a stratified random sample of EC airlines is used to investigate this aspect of the 
research.
The main findings from each of the three dimensions are validated by interviews with 
experts in the industry.
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1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
The objectives of this study are to:
• Examine regulation of international aviation and its effects in the USA and 
the EC.
• Examine the changes in regulatory regimes and their power in the USA and 
the EC.
• Analyse changes in the regulation of the aviation industry in the USA and in 
the EC using political and market competitive theoretical models.
• Assess the intensity of competition in the post-deregulation era in the USA 
and the EC.
• Use the effects of deregulation upon the airline industry in the USA as a 
benchmark to measure the intensity of competition in the EC post­
deregulation.
• Investigate the effects of deregulation upon the various stakeholders in the 
industry.
• Analyse the post-deregulation strategies that have been followed by EC 
airlines.
• Postulate appropriate generic strategies for particular types of carriers.
More specifically, the research will cover the following issues. Part of the study will 
examine the economic regulation of domestic air transport in the USA and analyse the 
effects of regulation on the industry. It will also consider the regulation of international 
civil air transport and the stakeholders - the regulatory bodies of civil aviation. Finally, 
the motives and outcomes of international regulation will be examined.
The study will also analyse the aviation industry using two theoretical approaches, 
namely Easton's (1965a) model of systems and Porter's (1980) model of competition. 
An analysis will be made of the aviation industry as a system and of the effects which 
deregulation has had on competition in the industry. The models will be used to 
rationalise the structural changes in the aviation industry resulting from deregulation.
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The two models will provide the operational framework for an empirical examination of 
the competitiveness of EC airlines in the post-liberalisation era, the general hypothesis 
being that the removal of regulatory constraints in the EC airline industry has led to an 
increase in competition. This hypothesis will be tested by assessing the increase in 
intensity of competition in the post-deregulation era in the USA. The measurable 
outcomes from US deregulation will provide the benchmark for the EC study.
The immediate post-deregulation strategies that have been followed by EC airlines 
and the operational and strategic developments among these airlines in response to 
regulatory liberalisation will be analysed.
Conclusions on the future development of the regulatory and competitive environment 
for the airline industry and on the appropriate generic strategies for particular types of 
carriers will be presented.
1.4 OUTLINE METHODOLOGY
There are two major elements: library based research and empirical based research:
The library based research is divided into two parts. The first covers the literature 
pertaining to regulation and deregulation and is non industry-specific. It examines the 
economic and political arguments for deregulation and the processes and expected 
outcomes post-deregulation. In the second part, the literature concerned with airline 
deregulation is reviewed with a view to examining the measurable outcomes of 
deregulation in a specific industry and in a specific country, the USA. This information 
will provide the benchmark against which to compare the outcomes of deregulation in 
the same industry in another geographical area, the European Community.
The empirical research is founded on an examination of two models which provide the 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the industry. The models are Porter's (1980) 
competitive forces framework and Easton's (1965a) systems model. The conclusions 
drawn from analysis of each model are used to examine the aviation industry and to 
provide the operational framework for the empirical analysis.
8
Chapter 1 - Introduction
A general hypothesis is derived from the literature review and the two theoretical 
models to provide the basis for the empirical research itself. Data is derived from 
responses to questionnaires to stakeholders in the European aviation industry, 
namely airlines, tour operators, aircraft manufacturers, travel agents, consumer 
representatives, regulators and operators of substitutes forms of travel. The results of 
the analysis allow conclusions to be drawn on:
• The expected outcomes of liberalisation in the EC.
• The actual outcomes of liberalisation in EC.
• A comparison of the outcomes of aviation deregulation in the USA and the 
EC.
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1.5 STRUCTURE OF THIS WORK
This study is organised into eight chapters (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1 Organisation of the Thesis
CHAPTER 1
Overview of the Research
T T
CHAPTER 2
Regulatory Framework 
of Global Air Transportsf
CHAPTER 3
Literature on Regulatory 
Reform of Air Transport
I
H
CHAPTER 4
Literature on the Concepts of 
Regulation and Deregulation
CHAPTER 5
Theoretical Scaffolds for 
Examination of Regulatory 
Reform of Air Transport
CHAPTER 6
Research Approach and Methodology 
Secondary Sources. Indepth Interviews 
Industry Survey. Expert Validation.
L
CHAPTER 7
Analysis and Findings 
of Research
CHAPTER 8
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
<-
< -
Chapter Two describes the regulatory framework in which giobal air transport has 
operated. It pays particular attention to regulation of the US air transport system and 
the international agreements and organisations which have impacted on the industry.
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Chapter Three examines the literature on the theory of regulation and regulatory 
reform and covers the following points:
• The concept of regulation and why as a form of control it was deemed 
necessary and accepted over such a long period.
• The initiatives for and progress towards deregulation in the USA and in 
Western Europe.
• The concept of deregulation as a continuum. The term 'deregulation' is 
widely used without precision to cover regulatory reform. This ranges from 
the elimination of a regulatory authority, such as the CAB in the USA, to the 
creation of a new authority such as Ofwat in the UK following privatisation 
of the water industry. Thus deregulation can mean a process ranging from 
the ending of a state monopoly to an unfettered and totally free market 
system. Irrespective of the degree of deregulation, it is concluded that the 
desired outcome is always increased competition.
• The theory of competition is examined and an analysis made of the so- 
called theory of contestability developed by US economists, such as 
Baumoi, in the early 1980s.
• The theory of competition as presented by Porter in 1980 is outlined.
• An analysis is made of the political perspectives of the re-regulatory 
process, highlighting the fact that some regulatory and re-regulatory 
processes are directly influenced or indirectly influenced by political 
decision.
Chapter Four continues a review of the literature in the USA and the EC in an 
industry-specific way. Although the processes were given different labels - 
'deregulation' in the USA and 'liberalisation' in the EC - and the legislation and the 
procedures differed in each case, the reforms shared an overriding objective of 
increasing competition in the industry. This chapter examines the measurable 
outcomes of deregulation in the USA and the predicted outcomes of liberalisation in 
the EC.
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Chapter Five presents a combined theoretical framework which supports the analysis 
of the changing regulatory processes in the aviation industry. It has the following 
sections:
• An examination of the inter-action of the various components of the aviation 
sector using Easton's (1965a) model for analysing systems. The feedback 
loop of Easton's model helps explain the dynamism of the aviation industry. 
For example, the feedback from the various stakeholders reinforces and 
drives change.
• An analysis of Porter's (1980) model of competitive strategy is used to 
explain the regulatory changes in the aviation industry and the impact these 
changes might have on the competitiveness of the industry.
Chapter Six examines the conclusions that are derived from the analysis of the 
industry using the theoretical frameworks and the literature. The salient issues that 
result from the analysis provide the basis for the hypothesis and an operational 
framework is devised in order to conduct the fieldwork. The research questions are 
examined and the research objectives are outlined. The nature of the fieldwork is 
explained and the methodology employed is examined.
Chapter Seven comprises an analysis and findings of empirical data to support or 
refute the hypotheses and Chapter Eight presents the overall findings and expert 
validations from the research and makes recommendations to stakeholders in the 
industry for future research.
1.6 SUMMARY OF STUDY
The economic and political arguments in favour of deregulation gained momentum 
and support in the United States in the 1970s. The airline industry was deemed to be 
one of the first industries suitable for deregulation in the USA in 1978.
12
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Economists argued that if certain preconditions existed within a certain industry, and 
these conditions apparently did prevail in the airline sector, then a particular market 
pattern would develop once the complex web of national/transnational/international 
government control on market access, on capacity offered, on frequencies and on 
pricing structures was removed. The market was predicted to follow a pattern of 
competition: all airlines would compete on prices, on quality and frequency of 
services, on departure times, and on the points served. The intensity of competition 
would increase at first as new start-up carriers entered the market or incumbents 
moved onto new routes or routes which they had not previously served or had been 
prohibited from serving. Inefficient airlines unable to gain a sustainable portion of the 
market because of their competitive disadvantage, or because they were unable to 
bring their prices in line with the new entrants, would inevitably make losses and 
eventually withdraw from the market. The remaining carriers would be efficient and 
price conscious in the interests of the consumer and the power of the consumer-buyer 
would be increased once they were provided with choice.
The theory of contestability was employed to sustain this argument. This theory holds 
that once it was established that there were no longer any real barriers to market entry 
or exit, then the fear of new entrants would be enough to keep prices in check, even if 
monopoly or duopoly operations continued in reality. The argument was reinforced by 
the decision of the European Community to create a single market where all would 
compete on an equal basis, without the obstruction of artificial barriers or restrictions 
to trade.
Both in the USA and in the European Community it appears that increased 
competition was the overriding objective of reforming the respective regulatory 
regimes. This thesis examines the intensity of competition in the post-deregulation 
airline industry of the USA and uses these measurable outcomes to provide a 
benchmark to assess the intensity of competition in the airline industry following 
deregulation in the EC.
13
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Chapter 2 - Regulatory Framework of Air Transport
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an account of the regulatory framework within which global air 
transport systems have operated. It examines the various international agreements 
and organisations that have regulated the aviation industry. Bilateral agreements were 
once a dominant feature of the international air transport system: the impact of this 
form of regulation and the effects of relaxing such a system between Member States 
of the EC is described. This chapter also examines the controls operated in the United 
States and their impact on the US air transport system before American regulatory 
reform in 1978.
2.2 REGULATION OF TRANSPORT
Traditionally, the transportation industry has been characterised by government 
intervention to control and regulate market entry and/or price. Governments have 
endeavoured to meet many objectives by such regulation including protecting the 
interests of consumers and of those working in the industry and the provision of 
sen/ices to remote communities. Button (1991, p1) suggests that:
...in m any countries, and especially in Continental Europe, transport has  
traditionally been  se en  a s  an input into a wide socio-political-economic 
process embracing regional, social and industrial policies.
Regulation has thus been used by governments to accomplish objectives going far 
beyond the provision of an economically efficient transport system. Regulatory 
systems that originated in the 19th century still dominated transportation systems well 
into the 1970s. Regulators were particularly active during the 1930s (Button and 
Gillingwater, 1986, p1) and much of the reform of regulation that started in the 1970s 
revoked the legislation of that period. The USA is often cited as being the pioneer of 
transport deregulation.
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Within a six year period the USA liberalised inter-state transport and eventually 
effected reform of intra-state regulation by a series of legal acts:
• the Airline Deregulation Act (1978);
• the Staggers Rail Act (1980);
• the Motor Carrier Act (1980); and
• the Bus Regulatory Reform Act (1982).
Other industrialised countries followed this lead but at a different pace and at different 
levels of reform. Button (1991, p2) suggests that this is explained by the
...differing starting points from which liberalisation began, but equally one m ust 
consider the nature o f the political system s involved.
2.3 REGULATION OF AVIATION
All transport systems have experienced government regulation to some degree but it 
has been suggested that the aviation industry has been more regulated than any 
other. Lissitzyn (1968, p12) writes:
Probably no other world-wide economic activity o f comparable magnitude is 
more thoroughly regulated, less  free o f official constraint and  guidance, than is 
world air transport.
Regulation of international aviation can be traced back as far as 1919. The 
International Air Convention (1919) signed in Paris by most European countries and 
the USA gave states sovereign rights over the air space above their territory. 
Governments immediately set about regulating the industry and controlling their own 
air space, negotiating bilateral agreements as the need arose. Sawers (1987, p11) 
argues that this regulation was established to satisfy governments' desire
...to increase their share in air traffic o f their country's (generally state-owned) 
airlines rather than to promote an efficient industry that m e t the dem ands of 
the consumer.
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Governments and airlines continued to have a very close relationship as evidenced by 
the fact that many carriers were heavily dependent on state subsidies during their 
formative years (see Table 2.1). European governments thought it worthwhile to 
subsidise civil aviation, encouraging airlines to operate scheduled services in the 
1920s and 1930s which they perceived to strengthen their political influence in the 
countries served and to maintain vital links with their overseas territories.
Table 2.1 Direct Subsidies as % of the Revenue of Airlines, 1933:
France 79%
Great Britain 39%
The Netherlands* 24%
* on European services.
(Source: Henri Bouche, Economies of Air Transport in Europe, League of Nations, 1935.)
However, similar subsidies were not available in the USA until 1930 when Post Office 
contracts were introduced to encourage the development of the air transport system. 
This ended in 1934 when the mail contracts were put out to open tender, bringing 
about vigorous competition. This competitive environment encouraged rapid 
technological development of commercial aircraft in the USA. By 1936, this 
development had equipped the industry with a carrier capable of carrying passengers 
at a profit and marked the beginning of US domination of the civil aviation industry.
Modern regulatory reform of international aviation was shaped by the Chicago 
Conference of 1944. The US government wanted free access to international routes, 
but this was opposed by many of the European governments represented at the 
Conference. Opposition was perhaps not surprising, given the circumstances of the 
time.
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The United States, whose civil aviation industry had been relatively unscathed by the 
Second World War, had liberal ambitions: it sought price and capacity freedom and a 
free exchange of traffic rights. Some of the European countries with a small home- 
base supported this approach, seeing that it would provide their carriers with the 
opportunity to expand in the post-war period. The majority of the Europeans, on the 
other hand, with their airlines needing to be rebuilt from scratch and thinking that it 
was essential for strategic reasons to have a strong domestic industry, had other 
views.
Consequently, the pre-war system of bilateralism became the pattern also for the 
post-war world. Nevertheless, it was clear from the start that some international 
coordination would be required if air transport were to fulfil its potential for contributing 
to the rebuilding of the world economy. From this realisation came an acceptance by 
governments that the industry itself had an important role to play; and the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA), reformed in 1945 from a pre-war association of 
similar name, developed to provide a forum in which the airlines could coordinate their 
commercial activities and agree on fares.
The USA was the only country that wanted open competition on international routes 
and consequently, the only bilateral agreements that were flexible enough to allow 
some degree of competition were those with the United States. Flowever, the 
Administration did exercise control over entry into and exit from the industry and it 
regulated fare setting. New entrants to the industry were not permitted to operate any 
type of scheduled service but were restricted to operating charter/non-scheduled 
services. Thus, airline competition on a fares basis was non-existent and was based 
on elements that the airlines themselves could control, primary quality of service and 
frequency of flights.
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To summarise, air transport has been dominated by state regulation from its inception. 
Except in the USA since 1978, competition between airline operators has been largely 
prevented and free competition has been restricted to non-scheduled services. The 
aviation industry has been controlled by the government regulators and not by airline 
management.
2.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW AND REGULATION
There is general agreement that the first legislation relating to aviation was the 
regulation made by the Paris police in 1784 prohibiting balloon flights without special 
permits (Johnson, 1965, p10). Similar enactments followed in other European cities. 
However, the concept of an international air law did not become a reality until the 
beginning of the twentieth century.
Article 2 of the Regime juridique des Aerostats, written by a French lawyer Paul 
Fauchille and submitted to the Brussels meeting of the Institute of International Law in 
1902, required
...all aircraft to carry the national colours in som e convenient form, 
whilst in 1911 the UK Parliament passed the Aerial Navigation Act which stated:
A Secretary of S ta te may, for the purpose o f protecting the public from danger, 
from time to time by  order prohibit the navigation o f aircraft over such areas as  
m ay be  prescribed in the order.
The Act had a limited purpose, namely the prevention of accidents during the 
Coronation procession of that year, but the subsequent Aerial Navigation Act of 1913 
was drafted in much broader terms. This empowered a Secretary of State to prohibit 
the navigation of aircraft which failed to comply and stated that the prescribed areas
...m ay include the whole or any part o f the coastline o f the United Kingdom 
and the territorial waters adjacent thereto.
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The Act of 1913 was a first attempt to assert national sovereignty in air space. A 
Professor of International Law in the University of Oxford, lecturing in 1912, claimed 
that the rights of States over the air were 'already fixed and determined by admitted 
principles of International Law' (Richards, 1912, p14). Conceding that there was no 
convention on air law, Richards nevertheless said:
In m y  judgem ent the matter is covered, or, a s I would rather say, is concluded  
by  a principle o f international law which is fundamental in the determination o f 
the extent o f S ta te Sovereignty and  m ust apply a s  much to the air space  
above State Territory a s  to the Territory itself. This principle is that Sovereign 
S ta tes are entitled to all those rights which are necessary for the preservation 
and  protection o f their territories
(Richards, 1912, p15).
In Richards' view, sovereignty over the superjacent air space was even more essential 
for this purpose than was sovereignty over territorial waters and he goes on to say
...the fact is that the users o f the air cannot be treated a s  a thing distinct from 
the users o f the territory beneath it; the two things are inseparably connected, 
and can never be disassociated until the law o f gravity cea ses  to have effect
(Richards, 1912, p15).
The absence of any international convention at this date reflected a failure to reach 
agreement at the Paris Conference of 1910 on the very point which Richards held to 
be self-evident. At the Conference, the British Government strongly argued the 
sovereignty case and would not even concede the right of innocent passage to foreign 
aircraft. They were opposed by the French and the Germans, who pressed for 
freedom of the air. Johnson (1965, p23) argues that the principal reason for the 
breakdown of the Conference was disagreement on the extent to which States could 
refrain from giving foreign aircraft the same rights of aerial navigation as they gave to 
their own aircraft.
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The French and German Governments subsequently agreed in an exchange of notes 
on 26 July 1913
...en attendant la conclusion d'une convention sur cette matiere entre un plus 
grand nombre d'Etats e t ... d'une maniere provisoire et a charge de 
reciprocite...
to admit to their own territory aircraft coming from the others territory. Notwithstanding 
that the agreement was enveloped in a labyrinth of security restrictions, it is 
noteworthy in the history of civil aviation regulation that this bilateral agreement 
opened, to a certain extent, the skies of one country to the aircraft of another.
The Paris Conference was not a total failure. Much influenced by Fauchille and the 
Institute of International Law, the Conference prepared a draft convention which 
proved useful when the Versailles Peace Conference took up the problem of 
sovereignty nine years later. Articles 2-8, 9, 11-14 and 18 were considered and 
recognised as imperative. Consequently, similar regulations are to be found in 
virtually all subsequent international aviation agreements.
2.4.1 International Regulation of Civil Aviation During World War I
Events during World War One did much to settle the dispute on the status of the air 
space. On 3 August 1914, The Netherlands government banned flights above their 
territory, the Swiss government followed their example on 8 August and other neutrals 
did the same. Generally, the belligerents accepted the right of neutrals to take this 
firm action, but this was not always the case. In 1914, following a violation of Swiss 
territory by British aircraft during a raid on Friedrichshafen, the British Government 
expressed their regret at the violation, but stated that their regret was not to be 
interpreted as recognition of any sovereignty over the air.
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Johnson (1965, p32) states that the early action of neutrals to protect their air space 
against violation was so firm that it was almost considered to be their right. This 
notion was reinforced by Sir Frank Richards in his lecture of 1915:
The practice o f the presen t war se e m s  definitely to have established the right 
o f every State to sovereignty over the air space above its territories. There has  
been  som e diversity o f opinion on this point and it m ay be  within the 
recollection o f the m em bers o f the University that, on a former occasion, I had  
the honour o f addressing them  upon it. In the presen t war the claim to 
sovereignty has been  continuously asserted  by neutral S ta tes over whose  
territories belligerent aircraft have passed , and the claim has been  sanctioned  
by acquiescence if not b y  express admission.
2.4.2 The Paris Convention of 1919
An Aeronautical Commission was established at the end of the war to advise the 
Peace Conference at Versailles on all aviation matters and also to draft a convention 
for the general regulation of post-war international aviation. Article 1 of the Paris 
Convention of 1919 recorded the High Contracting Parties' recognition
...that every pow er has com plete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space  
above its territory*
(Paris Convention, Article 1).
* territory: including adjacent territorial waters.
This historic step in the evolution of air law and civil aviation regulation was followed in 
Article 2 by a provision that
...each contracting State undertakes in time o f peace  to accord freedom of 
innocent passage above its territory to the aircraft o f the other contracting 
States, provided that the conditions laid down in the presen t Convention are 
observed
(Paris Convention, Article 2).
Thus, whilst sovereignty over the air space above their territory was asserted as a 
right of all States under customary international law, freedom of passage for foreign 
aircraft was granted only as a contractual right under the Convention, to which 
Germany was forbidden to become a party for the time being (Article 42).
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Provision was made under Article 3 of the Convention for contracting States to have 
the right
...for military reasons or in the interest o f public safety to prohibit the aircraft o f 
the other contracting S ta tes from flying over particular areas o f their territory, 
provided no discrimination was exhibited in favour o f their own aircraft.
There were further restrictions. Each contracting State was given
...the right to establish reservations and restrictions in favour o f its national 
aircraft in connection with the carriage o f persons and goods for hire betw een  
two points on its territory
(Paris Convention, Article 16).
This established the so-called 'cabotage' right, named after the similar right which 
coastal States enjoy as regards maritime traffic.
Johnson (1965, p35) nevertheless asserts that there was a liberal spirit at work. A 
scheme was established whereby all aircraft should possess a nationality through 
being on the register of a contracting State (this followed ideas already outlined in 
Fauchille's Code of 1902 and in the abortive draft Convention of 1910). The 
Convention also provided that the State where the aircraft was registered should be 
responsible for issuing certificates of competency and licences to crew, and that these 
certificates should be recognised as valid by the other contracting States and that 
aircraft thus certificated should be permitted certain rights in the territory of each 
contracting State.
An International Commission for Air Navigation was also to be constituted - usually 
known as the CINA after its French title 'Commission Internationale de Navigation 
Aerienne'. Its main task was to keep up to date the technical provisions of the 
Convention. Embodied in the Annexes, these technical provisions were declared to 
have the same effect as the Convention itself (Article. 39).
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The Paris Convention was ultimately accepted by 38 States, including Great Britain 
and the Dominions, 19 European States, eight Latin American States, Iran, Iraq, 
Japan and Siam. Absentees of significant importance included Germany, the Soviet 
Union and the United States of America.
Although the Paris Convention did not succeed in guaranteeing effectively the right of 
flight, and the number of signatories it attracted was somewhat limited, it did have 
some degree of lasting success. By recognising that States had sovereign rights in 
the air above their territory, it made government intervention in air transport inevitable 
(Doganis, 1991, p26) and gave States
...an agreed right to control what was rapidly becom ing a valuable natural 
resource.
(Button and Swann, 1991, p92)
Its prime importance lies in the fact that it provided a framework in which international 
aviation was able to develop between the two World Wars. The Paris Convention was 
followed by a Convention signed in Madrid in 1926 by Spain and some Latin American 
States, and another in Havana in 1928, signed by the USA and Latin American 
States. The Madrid Convention was ratified by only seven States, and the latter by 
only sixteen. Although neither of these Conventions produced an organisation as 
productive as the CINA, Johnson (1965, p36) argues that at a time when the range of 
aircraft was limited, these regional Conventions
...p layed a useful, if limited role in the elaboration o f air law.
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2.4.3 The Chicago Convention of 1944
The pattern for the development of international civil aviation after World War Two 
was set by the Chicago Convention of 1944.
Even before hostilities ended, President Roosevelt realised the necessity of providing 
a sound basis for the organisation of civil aviation after the war. It was already clear 
that there would subsequently be dramatic expansion of civil air services made 
possible by the huge technological advances in aircraft manufacture and design since 
1939. In 1944, although Europe was still torn by war, it seemed right for the Allied 
governments to determine the principles for the management of an expanding post­
war air transport industry. Over 50 states met at the Chicago Conference in an 
attempt to establish an international system that would accommodate this growth, 
aiming at agreement on the exchange of air traffic rights, the control of fares and 
freight tariffs, and the frequencies and capacities of services. Doganis (1991, p26) 
suggests that from an economist's perspective these aspects together effectively 
determine the nature of any industry, since 'they regulate the entry of carriers into 
each market (through traffic rights), the degree of pricing freedom and the nature of 
controls on productions, if any'.
At the Conference the United States campaigned for the principle of 'the freedom of 
the air'. According to Johnson (1965, p65), this principle was not proposed as an 
attempt to undermine the doctrine of the sovereignty of each State over its air space, 
but merely to modify that sovereignty by subjecting it to certain restrictions. These 
restrictions, ironically defined as 'freedoms', were expressed as follows:
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Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms 
of the air in respect of scheduled international air services:
1. The privilege to fly across its territory without landing;
2. The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes;
3. The privilege to pu t down passengers, mail and cargo taken on in the 
territory o f the S tate w hose nationality the aircraft p o ssesses;
4. The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the 
territory o f the State whose nationality the aircraft p o ssesse s ;  and
5. The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the 
territory o f any other contracting State and the privilege to pu t down 
passengers, mail and cargo coming from any such territory.
This proposal was strongly resisted by the UK, as it feared that acceptance would
quickly lead to American dominance of international air services. The USA had both a
large fleet of civil aircraft and a huge manufacturing capacity, whilst the UK and most 
European states had lost their fleets during the war and lacked the resources to 
replace them with new production (Doganis, 1991, p26). The strategic position of the 
UK and the USA were also very different (Rosenburg, 1970, p27). At the time, the UK 
was little more than a through-traffic area between North America and Europe, whilst 
the USA was an area including many terminal points for international airlines. Doganis 
(1991, p27) notes that in consequence, the UK and most other European countries 
represented at the conference were 'protectionist' and supported tight controls on 
tariffs and capacity, and the limitation of 'fifth freedom rights'. The USA did, however, 
have the support of smaller countries including The Netherlands and Sweden
...w hose airlines would have to depend on varying traffic betw een  other
countries because their hom e base  was so  small.
(Doganis, 1991, p25)
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In the event, it proved impossible to reconcile these divergent views and the ensuing 
Convention was silent on the matter. Johnson (1965, p65) notes, however, that the 
United States and its supporters went ahead with the 'Five-Freedoms' Agreement - 
from which the USA withdrew on 25 July 1947 and which has since been of little 
practical importance. The nearest approach to a compromise lay in an International 
Air Services Transit Agreement ('Two Freedoms' Agreement) which was accepted by 
many more countries (including the UK) than the 'Five Freedoms' Agreement. Since it 
covered the first two freedoms only - those concerned with 'transit', as opposed to 
'traffic' rights - it did not really get to the heart of the controversy. The result was a 
situation whereby
...the separate s ta tes o f Europe continue to exercise total sovereignty over the
control o f their airspace.
(Button and Swann, 1991, p92)
Faced with a situation in which agreement on the 'freedoms of the air' were 
impossible, the US delegates proposed the creation of an international organisation 
which would exercise regulation over technical matters only. This proposal also met 
opposition from the UK which counter-proposed the establishment of an international 
authority to control the frequency of flights, capacities offered and fares, whilst leaving 
the routes to be flown to be decided by bilateral agreement.
Eventually a compromise was reached in the form of a Convention on International 
Civil Aviation, known thereafter as the Chicago Convention and described by Doganis 
(1991, p27) as
...the m o st significant result o f the Chicago Conference.
The Convention provided for the principle of national sovereignty to be reinforced, 
giving each State exclusive and complete sovereignty in the airspace over its territory 
and thus total freedom to set the conditions on which the airlines of other States might 
use that airspace.
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Confirming this principle first laid down in 1919, and long since strengthened by 
uniform State practice, Article 1 of the Chicago Convention provided that
...the contracting S ta tes recognise that every S tate has complete and  
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
(Article 1, Chicago Convention, 1944).
In practical terms, each country had the right to decide which aircraft could fly over its 
country and which were allowed to land or take off in it:
This sovereignty has been  exploited in Europe, and the com panies in the two 
countries which are connected by  a certain route split the traffic betw een  
them selves. In m ost cases, they have succeeded  in preventing any extension  
of 5th freedom traffic rights; i.e. that a certain route can be  served  by  an airline 
o f a third country.
(Rosenberg, 1970, p16).
Notwithstanding its limitations, the Chicago Convention does evidence a real 
appreciation of the part which civil aviation could play in post-war development, as its 
preamble indicates:
W hereas the future developm ent o f international civil aviation can greatly help 
to create and preserve friendship and understanding am ong the nations and  
peoples o f the world, y e t its abuse can becom e a threat to the general 
security, and  W hereas it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that 
cooperation betw een  nations and peoples upon which the peace  o f the world 
d e p e n d s ....
(Excerpt from the Preamble to the Text of the Chicago Convention 1944).
Moreover, by agreeing to cooperate in an International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO), the contributing States provided the instrument by which that institution could 
develop and change throughout the next fifty years.
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2.5 BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
An inevitable outcome of the Chicago Convention's confirmation of the principle of 
national sovereignty over airspace was that the pre-war system of bilateralism 
became the pattern for the post-war world (O'Reilly, 1993, p11). Article 6 of the 
Chicago Convention provides that:
No scheduled  international air service m ay be operated over or into the 
territory o f a Contracting State, except with the special permission or other 
authorization o f that State, and in accordance with the terms o f such  
permission o f authorization.
Furthermore, Article 7 provides that:
Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the aircraft 
o f other contracting S ta tes to take on its territory passengers, mail and  cargo 
carried for remuneration or hire and destined for another point within its 
territory. Each contracting State undertakes not to enter into any arrangements 
which specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other 
Sta te or an airline o f any other State, and not to obtain any such  exclusive 
privilege from any other State.
It is from these bases that a vast outburst of bilateral international agreements linking 
individual pairs of states has been created over the past fifty years (Bin Cheng, 1962, 
p26). Many of these agreements are between countries of very different size and 
economic development and having airlines of unequal strength. Nonetheless, the 
general principal they share is:
There shall be  fair and equal opportunity for the airlines o f both Contracting 
Parties to operate the agreed service on the specific routes betw een  their 
respective territories.
(Martin et al, 1984, p.35).
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Although there are many variables, the vast majority of bilateral agreements contain 
three parts. The first two deal respectively with the capacity to be offered and the 
fares to be charges by the two countries' airlines and with the routes to be operated, 
whilst the third consists of a memorandum of understanding or 'exchange of notes' 
This third part, often confidential in nature, elaborates upon or even alters particular 
aspects of the agreement itself. (Sampson 1985, p91).
These bilateral agreements are often very protectionist. As Doganis highlights:
M any bilateral agreem ents reflect protectionist attitudes. They insist on prior 
agreem ents on the capacity to be  provided on the routes and  also specify that 
the agreed capacity should be  shared equally b y  the designated carriers o f the 
two states. Som e go further, and specify that sen/ices m ust be operated in 
"pool" by  the airlines concerned. A t the sam e time, few  if any fifth freedom  
rights are granted.
(Doganis, 1991, p29)
2.5.1 The Bermuda Agreement of 1946
The global idealism at Chicago was soon followed by  realistic hard bargaining, 
a s  the Am ericans negotiated with individual nations to ensure landing rights 
abroad.
(Sampson, 1985, p90)
Early in 1945, Washington reached agreement with Ireland in whose territory lay 
Shannon, the strategic refuelling point on the edge of the Eastern Atlantic.
During World War Two, the Irish remained neutral, and as a result Churchill resented 
them and tried to exclude them from the air talks. Rooseveit, who sympathised with 
Churchill, nevertheless insisted that the air agreement was a 'post-war matter' and 
warned Churchill that whilst Britain had stopped multilateral agreements in Chicago, it 
was in no position to hinder bilateral agreements:
I think it is only fair to tell you, that aviation circles in this country are becoming  
increasingly suspicious that certain elem ents in England intend to try to block 
the developm ent o f international flying in general until the British aviation 
industry is further developed.
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The British were in no position to block the bilateral agreements. Sampson (1985, 
p91) suggests that their dependence on a US loan of $3.75 billion also played a part 
in their radical change of policy. They invited the USA to a meeting in February 1946 
at Bermuda, which concluded with an agreement by which each country granted to 
the other
...rights to the extent described in the A nnex to this A greem ent for the purpose  
o f the establishm ent o f air services described therein.
'Fifth-freedom' rights, as well as third and fourth freedoms were outlined in the Annex. 
These enabled UK carriers to fly from London to Hong Kong via New York, San 
Francisco and Manila; whilst US carriers were able to fly from Chicago to Frankfurt via 
Shannon and London. Doganis (1991, p29), sees the 1946 Bermuda Agreement 
between the USA and UK as
...significant because  it represented a compromise betw een  the extrem e  
positions taken a t the 1944 Chicago Convention.
He describes it as a 'more liberal' type of bilateral agreement and consequently less 
protectionist. Such agreements are often referred to as 'Bermuda' type agreements. 
Barrett (1985, p11) sees the subsequent pattern of bilateral agreements as being set 
by the Bermuda Agreement, whilst Sampson (1985, p91) sees it as important 
because
...the British relented from their extrem e protectionism and  agreed to 
exchange the first three freedom s with the Americans.
Of further significance was the fact that the British were not the only country to relent. 
The USA moved away from the hostile position it adopted at Chicago to the control of 
tariffs. It accepted the principle that tariffs could be fixed - subject to final Government 
approval - by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), even though under 
US domestic anti-trust law such price fixing was illegal.
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As a consequence, most bilateral agreements contained wording to the effect that 
rate setting should
...where possible be reached b y  the use o f the procedures o f the International 
Air Transport Association for the working out o f tariffs.
The Bermuda Agreement had further significance in that it allowed the IATA tariffs 
system to become established in the majority of bilateral agreements, even when the 
national airline was not an IATA member.
It was this that gave the IATA tariffs machinery such force until deregulation 
se t in from 1978 onwards.
(Doganis, 1991, p29)
Approximately 1200 other bilateral agreements in international aviation followed, most 
of which provided for service by only one carrier from each country (Barrett, 1985, p7). 
For example, by 1970 Sweden had no less than 47 air transport agreements with 
other countries (Rosenberg, 1970, p29).
2.5.2 The Effects of Bilateral Agreements
Sitting in 1980, the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 
summarised the result of the bilateral system as follows:
...the main consequence o f this system  for allocating routes, fixing fares, 
pooling revenue and so  on has been  until recently the virtual elimination of 
competition in fares on scheduled services.
Coupled with this, all governments regulated and controlled their own domestic 
aviation to the extent that in many instances, particularly in Europe, the national flag 
airline had monopoly rights on internal services.
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Nevertheless, Button and Swann (1991, p93) have argued that the importance of 
these restrictions has often been exaggerated. Given the nature of the industry, it 
attracted management personnel who were able to bypass many of the restrictions 
imposed by bilateralism. Moreover, 'alternative1, non-scheduled markets began to 
develop outside the highly regulated scheduled system.
It is nevertheless a fact that the granting of 'fifth freedom' rights has been very 
uncommon and instances of multiple designation (two or more carriers from one 
country on any route) have also been very rare (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 Intra-EC Scheduled Air Services, 1987
Country Routes With Multiple With 'Fifth
Designations Freedom' Rights
France 153 2 11
Greece 39 0 6
Italy 99 1 9
Spain 108 2 5
Belgium 45 1 4
Denmark 37 0 7
Eire 43 2 3
Luxembourg 15 0 2
The Netherlands 65 7 9
Portugal 33 2 1
United Kingdom 178 24 14
Germany 173 7 17 !
(Source: Complied by the present author using data from The European Commission.)
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2.5.3 The European Civil Aviation Conference
In March 1953, at the request of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
ICAO was requested to convene a conference to examine the following issues:
• Methods of improving commercial and technical cooperation between the 
airlines of States participating in the conference; and
• Possibilities of securing a closer cooperation by the exchange of
commercial rights between the European States.
In April 1954, a conference met in Strasbourg to discuss the coordination of air
transport in Europe. The conference was attended by representatives from 19 ICAO 
members, one non-member (Yugoslavia) and 13 international organisations. The 
conference was not a total success but it did lead to the creation of a permanent 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).
ECAC's main objective is to harmonise and coordinate the civil aviation policies of its 
Member States:
Originally, this objective was confined to economic policy and  facilitation, but 
now extends to all sectors o f civil aviation where multilateral coordination is 
useful.
(Moss, 1992, p5)
Rosenberg (1970, p62) suggests that the most noted success of ECAC has been the 
liberalisation of charter flights. During the latter part of the 1980s, however, the 
organisation began progressively to exert an influence over a much broader front. 
Membership has also greatly increased, particularly since 1989 with the admission of 
several Central and East European States.
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As the European Community started to legislate not only for the liberalisation of 
scheduled air transport services within the single market but also on such issues as 
the regulation of computer reservation systems and the allocation of slots at 
congested airports, the risk became obvious that those ECAC Member States outside 
the Community would be denied any influence over the development of aviation policy 
across Europe as a whole. Perhaps more importantly, the EC Member States, seeing 
their own autonomy being eroded by the Community, became more aware of the 
need, as they perceived it, to establish ECAC as a rival power base.
The most striking manifestation of this was ECAC's decision to hold a Ministerial 
meeting in Frankfurt in October 1988 to decide on action to improve air traffic control 
over Western Europe as a whole. Increasing traffic had put an increasing strain on 
the system (in fact nothing more than a series of individual national systems of widely 
differing efficiencies) which had barely survived the summers of 1987 and 1988. First 
suggestions by the Commission that corrective action was necessary on a Community 
basis had met with a predictably frosty response from governments, largely on the 
grounds that it would represent an erosion of national sovereignty, yet it was clear that 
something had to be done. ECAC was chosen for the purpose and for the first time in 
the organisation's history Ministers met to initiate the work.
It was only with the greatest reluctance that they allowed the Commission, never 
present at ECAC meetings in other than an observer capacity, to make a statement 
claiming a role for the Community in what subsequently developed as a multi-stage, 
pan-European programme. Surprisingly, the very obvious attempt to exclude the 
Community from any role in the process proved not to be a step along a path to ever 
greater rivalry but a turning point.
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It seems to have been recognised at around this time that cooperation would be much 
more productive than veiled confrontation. ECAC had a small but efficient secretariat 
and a highly developed consultation machinery - its decisions have never had a 
binding character; the Community, with resources in the Commission severely 
stretched and reliant on the cumbersome procedures of the Council of Ministers for 
making progress, nevertheless could enforce those decisions ECAC was able to take. 
Thus, it has become increasingly commonplace for both to work on the same issues 
at the same time, on a collaborative basis, with the detailed negotiations taking place 
in ECAC, and the agreements reached there being given legislative force by the 
Community whenever this has been considered appropriate. The members of ECAC 
outside the Community have apparently found no problem in bringing their own 
practices into line.
2.5.4 Relaxation of Bilateral Agreements
Since deregulation in 1978, the United States have been determined to extend their 
airlines' 'competitiveness' around the world by liberalising America's bilateral 
agreements with the principal countries of Western Europe (Kasper, 1988; Gomez- 
Ibanezand Morgan, 1984).
Button and Swann (1991, p42) suggested that the United States adopted a 'beach­
head' strategy which acted as a speeding-up mechanism for liberalisation in Europe. 
The approach was designed to penetrate individual national markets one by one and 
then impose liberal agreement on others by threatening traffic diversion, in trying to 
'open the skies', in this way, the USA found themselves knocking on many closed 
doors. Their principal target was the UK, as almost two-thirds of North Atlantic 
passengers passed through Heathrow and Gatwick and it was judged that any 
agreements with Britain would serve as a template for others. Nevertheless, despite 
considerable relaxation over the years, total liberalisation of trans-Atlantic routes 
between the UK and the USA has not been agreed at the time of writing.
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As the USA made its first moves towards liberalisation of international services, similar 
moves began to appear in Europe. These can be partly attributed to the 
developments on the trans-Atlantic routes but partly also to internal reasons. The UK 
was to the fore in the liberalisation of intra-European bilateral agreements and took 
positive action by initiating a campaign to renegotiate its agreements with individual 
States thought likely to be sympathetic.
The breakthrough negotiation was signed with The Netherlands and came into force 
on 1 July 1984. This provided for any airline in either country to fly between their 
respective countries without the need to seek government approval. British and Dutch 
airlines were allowed to take independent decisions - without consulting other airlines - 
on the frequency and capacity of their services, subject only to their own 
government's approval. Regulation on fares was relaxed, making it no longer 
necessary to negotiate fares. These could be decided in the originating country. 
Control over fares was further relaxed the following year when it became permissible 
for airlines to set their own fares unless there was 'double disapproval' by both 
governments.
The immediate results of the UK-Dutch new bilateral agreement were substantial fare 
reductions and new carriers entering the market (Barrett, 1985, p32). Perhaps the 
most significant of these was a newcomer, not just to the route but also to the 
business of civil aviation, Virgin Airways. Virgin put pressure on the fares from 
London to Brussels and Dusseldorf by charging £77 and £80 return respectively and 
also offered a £25 single fare between Gatwick and Maastricht.
Whilst it undoubtedly made a significant contribution to improving flight frequencies 
and capacity, making it easier for new carriers to enter the market and resulting in 
lower fares, Button and Swann (1991, p42) state that the growth of services on 
UK-Netherlands routes was not as great as Barrett suggests but actually slowed 
following liberalisation. They show that the growth of services on the UK-Netherlands 
route was only 10.8% in 1986, compared with a range of 6.4 to 17.5% on the other 
UK-European routes.
36
Chapter 2 Regulatory Framework of Air Transport
However, the number of services on the London-Dublin routes increased dramatically 
when the UK-1 reland bilateral was renegotiated in 1986 and traffic doubled over the 
period from 1985 to 1988 (see Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Dublin - London Passenger Numbers Before and After 
Ireland - UK Bilateral Liberalisation (in '000s of Passengers)
MONTH 1985 1987 INCREASE
January 63.2 87.4 38.2%
February 59.4 89.0 49.9%
March 80.8 108.4 34.2%
April 76.4 124.0 62.3%
May 82.0 118.4 44.4%
June 92.3 147.0 59.3%
July 97.2 . 177.6 82.7%
August 106.7 204.5 91.7%
September 93.3 168.7 80.8%
October 85.3 157.6 84.7%
November 75.8 122.3 61.4%
December 78.9 130.7 65.7%
(Source: Barrett, S.D. 1990, p33)
The liberalised London-Dublin route also attracted new entrants, Ryanair in 1986, 
Virgin Airways in 1987, British Midland in April 1989 and Capital Airways in July 1989 
when Virgin withdrew.
2.5.5 Non-Scheduled Air Services
The growth of scheduled services since 1945 has largely been in response to the 
needs of the business community. The route networks have developed accordingly, 
with an emphasis on links between capital cities and other important centres of 
commerce and industry.
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The growing number of passengers travelling for leisure purposes have largely carried 
by non-scheduled services, normally operated as part of inclusive package tours. 
Non-scheduled services were defined by the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) in 1952 as
...services which do not operate according to a published schedule or on a 
regular basis so  that a schedule is clearly definable.
Although these sen/ices are agreed on a bilateral basis, the agreements have in 
general not been nearly as rigid as those for scheduled services:
Each State has decided its own rules for market entry for both its own and  
foreign airlines. The result has been  wide differences in charter regulation 
from country to country. Many nations - for example, India, Brazil and South  
Africa - permit very little, if any, entry by  charter airlines. Others have allowed 
such entry, usually in response to consum er pressures for the low fares which 
charter can provide, or for reasons relating to tourism development.
(Shaw, 1982, p62)
This less rigid approach was in no small way due to the fact that the non-scheduled 
services were provided by a new breed of airline - independents in the case of the 
United Kingdom or subsidiaries of state-owned flag carriers elsewhere - operating in 
parallel with but not as part of the business-dominated scheduled sector.
For this reason, governments have not seen it as necessary to try to regulate the non- 
scheduled sector to anything like the same extent as they have regulated traditional 
markets. It is true that in its formative years, IATA made some attempt to control 
charter fares - for obvious reasons - but by its own account in 1974, its interest in this 
area
...has evaporated with the p a ssa g e  o f time.
Likewise, governments have from time to time intervened where they have seen a 
need to protect national carriers from unwelcome competition. During the 1960s, for 
example, UK scheduled airlines were protected by tight regulatory controls on charter 
operations.
38
Chapter 2 Regulatory Framework of Air Transport
A quasi-govemmental agency - the Air Transport Licensing Board (ATLB) - restricted 
the total number of independent services and flights. Price controls guaranteed that 
independent operators could not undercut scheduled carriers. The majority of the fare 
and capacity controls remained in place until 1972, when they were abolished or 
abandoned by the newly created Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) the regulatory 
organisation which replaced the ATLB.
Strict controls of this kind were the exception rather than the rule in Europe to the 
extent that by 1981 the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) was able to say 
that
...m ost M em ber States, irrespective o f their approach towards the regulation o f 
scheduled  services, have a comparatively liberal approach towards the 
regulation o f non-scheduled operations.
(ECAC, 1981, p46)
The result was that by 1984, nearly two-thirds (64% of passenger-kilometres) of traffic 
in the West European air-transport system was handled by charter carriers 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986, p39).
To quote the European Commission:
...non-scheduled services are an important competitive elem ent in the total air 
transport system  which to som e  extent acts as a control and a stimulus to the 
sen/ices provided and fares charged on scheduled services.
(European Commission, 1984, p45)
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2.6 ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT IN THE USA
2.6.1 The early days of the American Industry
After World War One circumstances were partly responsible for the more rapid 
development of air transport in Europe than in the United States despite the fact that 
the first commercial air service had been provided in the USA in 1914. In 1918, the 
powers on both sides of the Atlantic possessed a plentiful supply of surplus military 
aircraft and trained, pilots. However, the fast and efficient American rail system 
obviated the need to consider aviation as a serious, commercial form of 
transportation, whereas in Europe much of the rail system had been destroyed by war 
and
...at the sam e  time had acquainted Europeans at first hand with the airplane's 
potential.
(Allen, 1981, p17)
By contrast, the only willing passenger in the USA seemed to be the mail. In the early 
1920s
European governm ents supported commercial aviation for reasons o f national 
prestige, but in American politics 'subsidy' was a dirty word.
(Allen, 1981, p52)
Whilst European air carriers developed with the help of government aid, US operators 
tried to provide scheduled passenger and cargo services but their revenues failed to 
match the costs. However, this was not to be the case for long, as the Air Mail Act of 
1925 (also known as the Kelly Act) introduced radical change.
2.6.2 The Air Mail Act, 1925: The Start of US Regulation
The P ost Office operated the mail flights, until 1924 inspite o f protests from the 
railways in the early 1920s regarding governm ent support for competition in 
the transportation of mail. As a result o f these protests, the Air Mail A ct o f 
1925 was p a sse d  to encourage commercial aviation and to transfer the air 
mail operation to private carriers on the basis o f competitive bids.
(Taneja, 1976, p1)
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The Air Mail Act directed that the carriage of air mail be transferred from army aircraft, 
operated at the request of the Post Office, to private carriers. However, the Act’s 
impact had far wider effects. The generous contracts awarded under the Act 
encouraged the development of commercial air transport. Civil aviation grew from 
thirteen operators and 1.3 million passenger-miles in 1926 to thirty eight operators 
and 85.1 million revenue passenger-miles in 1930 (CAB 1971, pp9-23).
The most significant contracts that emerged under the competitive bidding system 
were awarded to Boeing Air Transport for the San Francisco-Chicago route and to 
National Air Transport for the New York-Chicago route, but the transcontinental route 
was joined by about a dozen feeder routes, with the result that almost every major city 
had mail services (Taneja, 1976, p12).
Richmond (1971, p4) argues that the Air Mail Act of 1925 launched the beginning of 
US regulation of civil aviation because the award of airmail contracts largely controlled 
the development of, and in practical terms 'regulated' the commercial air carriers.
2.6.3 The Air Commerce Act, 1926
Douglas and Millar (1974, p28) suggests that the beginning of federal regulation for all 
aviation was marked by the Air Commerce Act of 1926. The Act provided that:
• all aircraft had to be registered;
• pilots had to be certificated;
• the Secretary of Commerce was to establish air traffic rules;
• lighted civil airways and beacons for navigation were to be established; and
• non-conformity with the act's provisions would induce civil penalties.
The Act split regulatory responsibility between three agencies:
• Air safety was administered by the Department of Commerce;
• Mail contracts were let by the Post Office Department; and
• Airmail rates were controlled by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Alleged collusion between the mail carriers and postal officials resulted in the 
withdrawal of air mail contracts in 1934 and the introduction of new legislation.
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2.6.4 The Air Mail Act, 1934
The Air Mail Act of 1934 provided for the return of air mail contracts to civil carriers 
and introduced a revised three-tier regulatory system. Responsibility for awarding 
contracts remained with the Post Office whilst charges at 'fair and reasonable rates for 
the transportation of mail' continued to be set by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. The development of air transport infrastructure was entrusted to a new 
Bureau of Air Commerce, the forerunner of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA).
2.6.5 The Civil Aeronautics Act, 1938
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
...placed the development, regulation and control o f air carriers under the 
jurisdiction o f a single, independent administrative body, the Civil Aeronautics 
Authority. This A ct broadened the scope o f sa fe ty  regulation and for the first 
time subjected  airlines, all the airlines to economic regulation. The carriers 
received certificates o f public convenience and necessity, specifying points to 
be served.
(Taneja, 1976, p5)
Douglas and Millar (1974, p29) offers three reasons for the passing of the 1938 Act. 
First, the Air Mail Act of 1934 had given powers to three agencies, thus creating great 
administrative confusion and a total lack of policy coordination. Caves (1962, p124) 
states:
In the years 1934 through 1938, no agency was a staunch defender of the 
existing arrangements.
In 1935, the Federal Aviation Commission recommended a 'wholesale revision that 
would centralise authority in a single new Commission' (Caves, 1962, p125).
Secondly, the act of 1934 provided for airmail subsidy through contract bidding and 
this proved 'unworkable'. The established pattern was that air carriers would submit 
excessively low bids in order to 'buy' a route with the hope that it would eventually 
prove profitable through 'monopoly exploitation of non-mail service'. Swann (1991, 
p6) suggests that the Interstate Commerce Commission actively encouraged carriers 
to accept mail at rates below cost by awarding them new routes.
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Thirdly, the Act of 1938 was passed because the bidding structure had resulted in a 
chaotic financial situation in the industry. The established airline operators regarded 
investment in air transportation as high risk and the unsettled nature of the industry 
was attributed to 'irresponsible' elements within it which perpetuated 'over 
competition'. Douglas and Miller (1974, p1) argue that the airlines were brought under 
federal regulation to protect the incumbents on established routes from open 
competition and free market forces. This was achieved by the inclusion of a 
'grandfather clause' whereby the sixteen established operators were issued with 
‘certificates of public convenience and necessity’ and were granted the right and the 
duty to operate their existing routes.
In 1940, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) superseded the CAA, also taking over the 
functions of the Air Safety Board.
2.6.6 The Federal Aviation Act, 1958
Two mid-air collisions in 1957 prompted further changes in the regulation of the US 
aviation industry. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 separated economic regulation, 
which remained the responsibility of the CAB, from safety regulation which was 
entrusted to a newly created Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). The CAB was at the 
same time charged to ‘promote’ the industry.
The FAA was renamed the Federal Aviation Authority and became part of the 
Department of Transportation established by Congress in 1966. The CAB remained 
an independent regulatory agency.
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2.7 EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON THE US AVIATION INDUSTRY
2.7.1 Regulators as Promoters of the Industry
The CAB took its promotional responsibilities extremely seriously, in a document 
published in 1968 entitled The Civil Aeronautics Board Promotes and  Regulates the 
Airline Industry, its Chairman, Charles S. Murphy stated:
I wish to em phasise the fact that we are charged with the responsibility to 
promote as well a s  regulate air transportation. W e regard the promotional 
aspects o f our work as very important
(CAB, 1968, p.iii).
Although it may appear anomalous for a body such as the CAB to promote the 
industry it regulates, it must be remembered that one of the fundamental reasons for 
establishing the Board was to rationalise the government's support of civil aviation, 
primarily its airmail subsidy scheme. In addition to providing subsidies, the CAB 
promoted airlines in a more general fashion, its policy originating primarily from the 
legislative 'Declaration of Policy' which comprises Section 102 of the Federal Aviation 
Act. The Board’s mandate covered many areas:
• the encouragement and development of an air transportation system;
• the regulation of air transportation in such a manner as to recognise and 
preserve its inherent advantages [and] assure the highest degree of safety;
• the promotion of adequate, economical and efficient services by air carriers 
at reasonable charges; and
• the encouragement of competition to the extent necessary to assure the 
sound development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the 
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the 
Postal Sen/ice, and of the national defence.
As Caves (1962, p126) points out, these objectives are ambiguous and mutually 
contradictory. A system of air transport specifically geared towards the domestic 
market would not necessarily make a contribution to national defence.
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2.7.2 The Effects of Regulation on Route Entry
Section 401 (a) of the Federal Aviation Act states:
No air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is in force a 
certificate issued  by  the Board authorising such air carrier to engage in such  
transportation.
Section 401(e)(i) continues:
Each certificate... shall specify the terminal points and intermediate points . . . i f  
a n y ... and  there shall be attached to the exercise o f the privileges granted b y  
the certificate ... such  reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations a s  the 
public interest m ay require.
Since the Board controlled entry into city-pair markets, it effectively controlled entry 
into the industry. Since its inception, the CAB had not issued a single certificate for a 
new trunk carrier, although many of the local service carriers developed into small 
trunk carriers (Douglas and Miller, 1974, p200).
Therefore, by 1972 almost 88% of domestic revenue tonne-miles were serviced by a 
total of ten trunk carriers. All of these carriers had been operating in 1938 when the 
Board was established and were in receipt of 'grandfather rights'. This group of ten 
also accounted for a very high portion of industry investment and annual revenues. 
These carriers had traditionally been divided into two categories, the 'big four1 and 'all 
the others'. American, Eastern, Trans World and United made up the 'big four', 
sharing 67.3% of the industry's total revenue in 1970. With the exception of Delta 
(which had 12.4% of the total revenue in 1970), none of the other trunk carriers 
approached the size of the smallest of the 'big four', Eastern, by any measure (see 
Table 2.4).
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Table 2.4 Revenue Tonne-Miles, Investment, and Revenue 
from Domestic Operation, US Trunk Carriers, 1970
Carrier & 
Group
Revenue Tonne Miles Investment Revenue
Millions % of 
Total
Total
($mn)
% of Total Total
($mn)
%of
Total
American 2,202.0 17.9 1,023.1 17.9 1,071.7 17.4
Eastern 1,417.9 11.5 752.0 13.2 808.3 13-1
TWA 1,592.1 13.0 751.5 13.2 771.6 12.5 |
United 3,285.0 26.7 1,243.0 21.8 1,501.7 24.3
'Big Four* 8,497.0 69.1 3,769.6 66.0 4,153.3 673
Bra niff 426.7 3.5 207.0 3.6 233.7 3.8
Continental 698.9 5.6 335.1 5.9 289.4 4.7
Delta 1,377.0 11.2 480.6 8.4 763.2 12.4
National 301.8 2.5 226.1 4.0 192.0 3.1
North West 453.9 3.7 443.3 7.8 267.1 4.3
Western 542.5 4.4 246.7 4.3 273.7 4.4
'All the Others' 3,791.7 30 0 1,938.8 34.0 | 2,019.1 0£. /
TOTAL 12,288.7 100.0 5,708.3 100.0 6,172.4 100.0
N o t e :  Due to rounding, figures may not add up to totals.
(Source: US Civil Aeronautics Board, Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, December 1971, pp11 -16.)
Overall, approximately 25% of domestic trunk traffic was carried in markets where 
there was no more than token competition. About one-half of the traffic was in 
markets characterised by competition between only two trunk carriers. The 
remaining quarter of the traffic was generated in markets where there were three or 
more carriers, each receiving at least 10% of the traffic (CAB, Docket 22916).
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Where two at least of the 'big four' were involved, there was vigorous competition. 
Almost 30% of the top 135 city-pair markets were serviced by both TWA and 
United. Among the other trunk carriers, Delta, National, Northeast and Northwest, 
experienced a comparatively high degree of competition, whereas Western was 
relatively free from competition.
In its attempts to determine which applicants should receive certificated authority to 
serve a particular market, the CAB listed many different factors. Only a small 
number of these were actually directed at protecting the interests of the consumer, 
whilst it appears the others were designed to control competition, and consequently 
protect the interests of the incumbents. Even established carriers experienced 
difficulty in obtaining authority to serve on new routes. Most applications were 
denied and those that succeeded only did so after lengthy hearings during which 
the carrier had to prove how the proposed service would benefit the public without 
endangering the financial position of any incumbent carrier (see Table 2.5).
Table 2.5 Factors Weighed by the CAB in Determining Which 
Air Carriers Should Serve on the Miami - Los Angeles Non-stop Route
1. route integration as evidenced by the ability to convenience beyond 
segment traffic;
2. frequencies to be operated over the involvement segment;
3. the type of equipment to be employed;
4. the fares to be charged;
5. the identity of the involved points;
6. the historic participation in the involved traffic;
7. the efforts to promote and develop the involved market;
8. the need of the applicant for route strengthening;
9. the profitability of the route for the applicants and the existing carriers; and
10.the potential diversion of traffic from existing carriers.
(Source: Louis Giailoreto, Strategic Airline Management - The Global War Begins, Ahman, 
London, 1989, p11.)
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Only the first four factors involved consumers interests while the latter six factors 
sought to reduce or minimise competition and, to a greater or lesser extent, protect 
the incumbent carriers.
However, some air carriers were exempt from such regulation. Following World War 
Two, the CAB experimented with the provision of feeder air services and granted 
temporary operating certificates to local service airlines (a new concept). From 1952, 
airlines wishing to escape the CAB's economic regulation had to ensure that their 
aircraft had a maximum gross takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or less. Typically, such 
aircraft had twenty seats or less.
In July 1972, there was a relaxation of this restraint and the maximum passenger 
seating capacity was increased to thirty. The majority of such aircraft were air taxis, 
providing services on demand. However, as early as 1970 there were 174 commuter 
airlines offering regular scheduled services, and in many instances offering direct 
competition with trunk or local service carriers. Nevertheless, their traffic measured 
less than 1 % of the total commercial revenue tonne-miles in 1970.
As well as controlling entry into the market, the CAB effectively controlled the exit of a 
carrier from a particular route, regardless of whether this was the desire of the carrier 
or not. Section 401 (j) of the Federal Aviation Act states:
No carrier shall abandon any  route, or part thereof, for which a certificate has  
been  issued  b y  the Board, unless .. .th e  Board shall find such abandonm ent to 
be in the public interest.
Notwithstanding this provision and the fact that the CAB made every attempt to 
protect financially weak carriers by certificating them to serve profitable routes, the 
sixteen certified carriers in 1938 had shrunk to eleven when the Board began to 
deregulate in the mid-1970s.
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2.7.3 The Effects of Regulation on Fares
Section 404(a) of the Federal Aviation Act requires carriers:
...to establish, observe, and enforce ju st and reasonable individual and joint 
rates, fares, and ch a rg es ...
Section 1002(d) states:
W h en ever ... the Board shall be o f the opinion that a n y ... rate, fare or charge 
... is or will be unjust or unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly 
preferential, or unduly prejudicial, the Board shall determine and prescribe the 
lawful rate, fare, or charge (or the maximum or minimum thereof) thereafter to 
be charged.
The CAB demanded that any proposed fare change be filed at least thirty days before 
the intended dates of introduction. The Board then decided if the proposed changes 
were lawful. This involved choosing one of four courses of action:
• Let the changes go into effect, thus implicitly finding them lawful;
• Let the changes go into effect but schedule an investigation which 
ultimately would resolve the issue of lawfulness;
• Suspend the charges and initiate an investigation to resolve the issue; or
• Find the charges unlawful per se.
Fare changes were seldom granted without an investigation. All increases in price 
were likely to be challenged by the CAB, whilst decreases were likely to be challenged 
by other air carriers and subjected to litigation.
Thus, the CAB mechanism to change fares, coupled with the possible exposure of a 
carrier's strategies to criticism and challenge from another carrier, led to a situation 
where airlines did not compete with each other on fares. Where competitive price 
reductions were sanctioned, they usually reflected the interests of the industry as a 
whole against competing modes of transport, e.g. buses and automobiles (Douglas 
and Miller, 1974, p42).
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This notion is reinforced by an examination of the fare patterns. They have a spatial 
uniformity and do not reflect the fluctuations that might be expected, given the 
seasonal nature of the demands in the aviation industry.
By contrast, airlines operating services solely within a single state were exempt from 
CAB regulation. In California, for instance, the only regulation of carriers on 
intra-state routes was an upper limit on fares set by the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) and there was free entry and exit to and from the market. Some 
comparisons between fares in California intra-state markets with those in inter-state 
East Coast markets under CAB regulation are outlined in Table 2.6 below.
Table 2.6 Comparison of Air Fares in California Intrastate Markets 
with Fares in Similar East Coast Interstate Markets - July 1970
Market Distance
(Miles)
Annual
Passengers
Coach Fare 
($)
Fare/Mile
(Cents)
CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles - San Francisco 340 3,023,341 16.20 4.76
San Diego - San Francisco 449 359,025 22.63 5.04
San Diego - Los Angeles 109 637,447 7.97 7.31
EAST COAST
Boston - New York 186 1,985,680 21.60 11.61
Boston - Washington 413 435,920 35.64 8.63
New York - Washington 228 1,663,850 23.76 10.42
(Source: William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America: Effects and Imperfections,
John Hopkins Press, 1970, p105.)
The legislative framework of CAB regulation did not prevent fare competition as 
such. However, the detailed processes utilised to bring fare changes and the 
Board's record of decisions did nothing to encourage air carriers to compete on the 
basis of price.
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Additionally, since there were so few carriers operating in each market, airlines 
actively chose to resist competition on the basis of price, acknowledging that most 
fare decreases would not be advantageous to any of them. Competition, therefore, 
grew in other areas, such as frequency and quality of service, aircraft type, interior 
design, and reservation systems. It would appear that for many who operated in the 
regulated world of US aviation, it was more important to please the regulator than to 
please the customer.
2.8 SUMMARY OF US DOMESTIC REGULATION
The reasons for controlling the US aviation industry may have varied over the forty 
year period of regulation, including promotion of a nationwide air service, 
establishment of a new up-and-coming industry and the protection of economic 
investments of individual air carriers. However, the outcome remained the same 
throughout: control of entry, price-fixing, a reduction in the commercial freedom of 
market participants, in reality suppression of any real competition. Consequently, 
instead of developing their own services, US airlines became very experienced at 
blocking new developments by others.
From 1938, when comprehensive federal regulation of aviation came into force until 
deregulation in 1978, the impact of technological advance far outweighed 
management innovation. However, the technical innovations which helped increase 
aviation productivity and efficiency had all been incorporated into the air transport 
system by the 1970s and the emphasis switched to developing management 
practices as a means of continuing the successful growth of the industry. At the 
same time government was reconsidering the concept of rigid regulation of an 
industry which had grown from infancy into a dependable and adequate form of 
public transport. The promotional and organisational goals that were paramount in 
shaping past regulatory policies were seen to be no longer appropriate.
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Regulation had served to protect the industry since 1938 and many in Congress 
thought that it was time to leave it to compete in an open market like any other 
economic sector. Thus, for the first time in forty years the industry was faced with 
the prospect of real competition from within.
2.9 CONCLUSION ON THE REGULATION OF AVIATION
This chapter has traced the development of regulation as it has been applied to air 
transport, both internationally and within the United States of America. It has shown 
that aviation has traditionally been more thoroughly regulated than perhaps any 
other sector of economic activity and that so far from creating an economically 
efficient industry, regulators over a long period accepted, and even fostered, 
inefficiency and suppressed all real competition. The chapter also refers, however, 
to the first moves towards liberalisation of international aviation and the first stirrings 
of deregulation in the United States, thus setting the scene for the analysis for 
regulatory reform which follows in chapters three and four.
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Chapter 3 - Regulation and Regulatory Reform
3.1 THE CONCEPT OF REGULATION.
Generally, definitions of regulation highlight the imposition of controls and restraints 
and the application of rules (Swann, 1988, p14; Francis, 1993, p4; Selznick, 1985, 
p363). More specifically, Selznick (1985, p363) views regulation as a specific type of 
policy making, referring to sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency 
over activities that are generally regarded as desirable for society.
This rather narrow perspective is developed by Francis (1993, p5) who defines 
regulation in a more extensive manner as
...state intervention in private spheres o f activity to realise public purposes.
This inclusive definition goes further than the traditional view that regulation is State 
intervention in the market place. Francis' definition suggests that regulation happens 
when the State aims to restrict private activity in order to promote the public interest.
Justification for regulation is presented mainiy in economic terms as a response to 
m arket failure (Blankart, 1992, p211; Swann, 1988, p61; Francis, 1993, p79 and 
Dempsey and Gotez, 1992, p4) designed to protect the public interest. Market failure 
occurs when there is an absence of effective competition and a particular market fails 
to produce goods and services at appropriate prices. Historically much regulation was 
aimed at controlling monopolies, where the consumer had no choice and the industry 
concerned could charge what it chose. Swann (1988, p57) develops this idea and 
notes that in the absence of competition some form of surrogate mechanism has to 
be devised that 'hopefully' will achieve the appropriate welfare maximising prices and 
ensure that the monopolist is efficient in terms of productivity and technical 
progressiveness. Demands for State intervention against monopolies or potential 
monopolies are not limited to consumer representation; often competitors or potential 
competitors want monopolies to be 'regulated' (Francis, 1993, p79).
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Regulation as a response to market failure is often justified by the ciaim that it is in the 
public interest to create - through regulatory rate structures - production patterns that 
would exist if free-market conditions were present. This justification assumes that a 
free market and consequent competition is fair in a way in which monopolies or quasi­
monopolies are not. Swann (1988, p57) concurs with this assumption and highlights 
the virtues of competition, in that it forces producers to be as productively efficient as 
possible, and later notes that
...econom ic regulation m oderates or even eliminates the forces o f competition.
(1988, pp62-62)
From an industry perspective, it has been suggested (see Petersen, 1985, p184; 
Scherer, 1980, pp192-8 and Kahn, 1970, p198) that intervention may be necessary to 
protect particular industries against destructive or excessive competition. This 
argument was often advanced in favour of the regulation of the aviation industry. 
However, Breyer (1990, p29) considers that this justification is no longer valid.
3.1.1 Forms of Regulation
It is generally accepted (see Kay and Vickers, 1992, p233; Swann, 1988, p14; 
Blankart, 1992, p211) that regulation can take many forms. Swann (1988, p14) for 
example divides regulation into two categories:
• self-regulation; and
• external regulation.
Self-regulation can occur for many reasons: one of the most important is when 
competition laws exempt some area of activity from control, thus resulting in industries 
being left to exercise self-discipline. An example of this is provided by the airline 
industry where the International Air Transport Association (IATA) was allowed to fix 
fares and cargo rates.
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External regulation can be divided into three categories:
• economic;
• social (sometimes called ‘quality'); and
• competition.
Current examples of regulatory frameworks in the UK are shown below in Table 3:1 
Table 3.1 Regulatory Authorities, 1993
AGENCY FORMED INDUSTRY STATUTE REGULATOR
ECONOMIC REGULATORS
Civil Aviation Authority 1971 Airports Airports Act 1986 Commission
Office of Telecommunications 1984 Telecom. Telecom Act 1984 DG
Office of Gas Supply 1986 Gas Gas Act 1986 DG
Office of Water Services 1989 Water Water Act 1989 DG
Office of Electricity Regulation 1990 Elec. (Eng., 
Scot. & Wales)
Electricity Act 1990 DG
Office of Electricity Regulation 1992 Elec, Electricity Nl Order DG
(N.I.) (N.Ireland) 1991
QUALITY REGULATORS
National Rivers Authority 1989 Water Water Act 1989 Commission
HM Inspectorate of Pollution 1987 Ail Environmental Chief
Protection Act 1990 Inspector
Independent Television 1991 Terrestrial, Broadcasting Act
Commission
1991
Cable & 
Satellite TV
1990 Commission
Radio Authority 1990 Radio Broadcasting Act Commission
Broadcasting Standards Council Broadcasting 1990
Broadcasting Act 
1990
Commission
COMPETITION REGULATORS
Office of Fair Trading 1951 All* Fair Trading Act DG
Monopolies & Mergers 1948 All 1973 CommissionCommission Fair Trading Act
1972 All** 1973, Competition
European Commission (DGIV) Act 1980 
Treaty of Rome 
1957, Articles 85, 86 
& 90
Commission
Limited exceptions which includes air navigation services and provision of a licensed cable 
programme service.
To the extent that trade between Member States is effected.
(Source: Lexecon, The Future of Industry Regulation in the United Kingdom, 1993.)
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Traditional definitions of regulation concentrated on what may be described as 
economic regulation: market failure restricts choice and regulation intervenes as a 
corrective.
The concept of social regulation (Blankart, 1992, p211 and Swann, 1988, p17) has 
developed in recent years and is regarded as a 'new style' of regulation, extending the 
traditional view of regulation to include unsafe products or services as characteristics 
of market failure. Social regulation covers:
• the provision of information;
• prescription of standards; and,
• rights of redress.
Social regulation often reduces the risk of State intervention through development of 
standards for products and processes or by informing consumers of risks associated 
with particular activities. Such regulation may focus on the quality of the product or 
service (Kay and Vickers, 1992, p235) and is intended to raise and maintain 
standards. Lack of information about what consumers had a right to expect and 
quality of sen/ice were two of the principal motivations for regulation of this type.
Regulations of this nature do have a price, which in the first instance is paid by the 
industry concerned but is often ultimately paid by the consumer. Two public regulatory 
devices employed in this form of regulation are licensing and certification.
B y licensing, a public agency se e k s  to impose a minimum standard on the 
market: products or services which do not m ee t the licensing requirements 
m ay not be  sold.
Certification occurs where the regulatory authority provide consum ers with 
information about the levels o f com petence of suppliers.
(Kay and Vickers, 1992, p235).
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3.2 TYPES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
Generically, economic regulation exists to regulate the structure or conduct of the 
industry or industries concerned.
3.2.1 Structural Regulation
Structural regulation includes:
•  restrictions on entry;
• restrictions on exit; and
• statutory monopoly.
3.2.2 Conduct Regulation
Conduct regulation includes:
• measures to guard against anti-competitive behaviour by dominant 
incumbents; and,
• price control.
Frequently, structural and conduct regulations can be alternatives to one another. 
Structural regulation focuses on removing the possible incentives for undesirable 
behaviour while conduct regulation aims to promote more desirable behaviour 
patterns.
3.3 ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF REGULATION
An alternative to regulation is State ownership of enterprises and State provision of 
services. Historically, many States have opted for direct ownership of natural 
monopolies such as utilities and some forms of transport. The rationale for public 
ownership of a natural monopoly is based on economies of scale which dictate the 
need to have only one supplier. It is assumed that once State ownership is present, 
nationalisation will inevitably bring about the realisation of both social and regulatory 
goals.
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Swann (1988, p84) offers alternative reasons to the economic rationale for public 
ownership:
• national security;
• need for secrecy; and
• political ideology.
Public ownership as a product of political ideology is clearly illustrated by ownership of 
the ’flag-carrier' airlines of the European Community where 14 of the 15 Member 
States either wholly or partially own a national airline.
3.4 REGULATORY REGIMES
There is a variety of regulatory regimes. Their nature is particularly influenced by 
where the responsibility for regulation lies, for example:
• local government;
• central government;
• transnational regulatory authorities, e.g. the institutions of the European 
Community;
• state agencies;
• professional organisations; and/or
• combinations of the above.
3.5 STAKEHOLDERS IN REGULATORY REGIMES
Stakeholders of varying significance can be identified in nearly all regulatory regimes 
as:
• state policy-making authorities at national, trans-national and sub-national 
levels;
• producer groups, industry or service organisations that are subject to 
regulation but also formulate regulation;
• competitors or potential competitors, offering similar goods or services and 
which are subjected to similar regulation;
• consumer groups; and
• advocacy groups.
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3.6 ACCEPTANCE OF REGULATION
Regulation acts as a compromise formula to unify the competing goals of the various 
stakeholders in a market or regulatory regime (Blankart, 1992, p211). The 
stakeholders in an industry will each have their own goals and each will want to 
change the result of the market process in their own favour.
Regulation aims to satisfy all the stakeholders, for instance in the following ways:
• Regulation may erect market entry barriers, thus allowing an increase in 
prices of those goods and services which are high in demand on the 
market place. The monopoly profits thus created primarily serve 
incumbents' interests.
• Consumer groups may be cross-subsidised.
• Other input suppliers may earn monopoly profits with their labour force 
receiving higher wages and salaries.
3.7 REGULATION IN CONTEXT
From the 1950s to the mid 1980s, economists have published a comprehensive body 
of literature critical of economic regulation, for examples see Caves (1967) and 
Jordan (1970). Francis (1993, pp24-26) summarises the literature into four main 
criticisms of regulation:
• State regulation cannot realise its goals because it is intrinsically ineffective.
• Regulation homeostatically serves the interests of the regulated, rather 
than the public interest - the capture critique.
• Regulation is costly and burdensome for producers and leads to declining 
competitiveness.
• The steady enlargement of regulatory objectives leads to over-regulation, 
by seeking to reduce a wide variety of risks. On the other hand, the steady 
rise in economic and social regulatory objectives may so overburden 
regulators that the outcome is inadequate control, or under-regulation, even 
in areas where there is considerable agreement about the value of 
regulation.
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It is Francis' second criticism - 'capture critique'- that is most widely supported by 
other critics of regulatory systems (see Baumol, 1982; Stigler, 1971, pp3-21; Douglas 
and Miller, 1974).
3.7.1 Capture Critique
Stigler (1971, pp3-21) provides a theoretical explanation of why regulators are 
captured, namely that the regulated industry has self-protection as its primary 
objective and that the regulators lack an independent basis for judgement and 
gradually become allies of the industry. Peacock (1984) supports the concept of 
regulatory capture and notes that in reality regulation is often considered desirable by 
the industries themselves, safe in the knowledge that regulation will secure or protect 
the stability of their market share. Douglas and Miller (1974) explain that regulatory 
capture happens when an agency comes to equate the public good with the interests 
of the industry itself, whilst Kolko (1965) has argued that early railway regulation in the 
USA was to the advantage of the owners who successfully used the compelling power 
of the state for their own gain. Swann (1988, p72) identifies four ways in which the 
State can use such coercive power:
• Extraction of money from its citizens to pay subsidies to others.
• Restriction of entry.
• It can benefit specific producers by affecting the goods which are
substitutes for or which complement the ones they are producing.
• It can fix prices.
The capture hypothesis is well illustrated by the case of the aviation industry in the 
United States. It was argued that the regulatory body, the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) which was established to protect consumer interests, had over time come to 
operate a cartel on behalf of the incumbents.
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Criticisms of this nature coupled with changing economic and political conditions in the 
1970s and 1980s led to dissatisfaction with state regulatory intervention and calls to 
deregulate in both the USA and in Europe.
3.8 THE CONCEPT OF DEREGULATION
Deregulation can be considered to be the opposite of regulation, i.e. the removal of 
legal impediments to free-market competition. In practice it can be concerned with the 
total abolition of controls, a reduction in their scope and intensity or the modification of 
controls on entry, exit, prices, outputs, services supplied, markets served, 
consolidations and profitability in particular industries (see Breyer 1990, p2 and 
Majone, 1992, p6 for a fuller discussion). The effect of deregulation can vary from 
mild liberalisation to free and open competition. Therefore, the term 'deregulation' is 
used in this thesis in a generic fashion to mean any regulatory reforming process that 
has the promotion of competition as its objective.
3.8.1 Forces for Change
The extensive expansion of regulation - particularly social regulation - in the 1970s 
and the 1980s has been observed to have had a major negative impact on many 
Western economies. This regulatory expansion, coupled with the complex regulatory 
apparatus necessary to implement it, led critics such as Weidenbaum (1979) and 
Hershey (1992) to argue that
...regulations not only had become burdensome and sometimes arbitrary, but 
had frustrated economic innovation, efficiency, and continued competitiveness 
in both domestic and international markets.
(Francis, 1993, p29)
Additionally, a reason often used for the shift to deregulation is improvement of 
technologies or changing market conditions (see Navarro, 1989).
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Since the 1970s, political controversy about the disadvantages of regulation and the
merits of deregulation has been lively in many political systems: v
The argument that regulation harms economic competitiveness was a 
recurring theme of the Reagan administration in the United States and the 
Thatcher government in Britain.
(Francis, 1993, p29)
...only through deregulation and privatisation could the preconditions of 
economic growth be reestablished in advanced industrial economies.
(Francis, 1993, p33)
3.8.2 Deregulation as a Mechanism for Allocative Superiority.
Brittan (1984) argues that the loosening of the relationships between State, regulators
and industries by the dereguiatory process is the key factor in obtaining greater 
productive and allocative efficiency. Blankart (1992, p218) suggests, however, that 
the 'allocative superiority' which might result from a policy of deregulation is not an 
automatic recipe for success. Decision-makers from the regulated sector need to be 
led into the competitive world. The results of deregulation, privatisation or 
liberalisation must be seen to offer 'greater advantages' than the maintenance of the 
status quo.
3.9 THE CONTINUUM OF DEREGULATION
Deregulation is neither industry nor country specific. Francis (1993, p260) and Swann 
(1988, p10) both recognise that the interest in deregulation has not been restricted to 
an individual country or sector. Francis (1993, p.260) notes that:
The past two decades have witnessed movements towards deregulation in 
many areas and in many nations.
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Deregulation is a misleading word, capable of being defined in a variety of ways to 
cover a wide range of activities. There is general agreement (Breyer, 1990, p7; 
Swann, 1988, p1 and Majone, 1992, p6) that the term 'deregulation' is extremely 
imprecise. It might suggest an absolute abolition of control, whereas in practice it has 
been the introduction of varying degrees of change which collectively may be 
described as regulatory reform. Thus, it can consist of the reforming of a system 
and/or the removal of controls.
As already noted, strictly defined it can be taken to mean the removal of all regulation. 
However, this situation is rarely, if ever, reached in practice. Even the decision of the 
US Congress in 1978 to deregulate internal airline operations - generally regarded as 
one of the most radical deregulatory policies - did not mean that all forms of regulation 
which impinged upon airlines were to be abandoned. Rather, Congress was formally 
disposing of the economic regulation which had been operated by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) whilst aircraft safety standards were still to be regulated by 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Thus, rather than consider deregulation as a single issue, it is more precise and 
comprehensive to consider it under three categories:
Deregulation: The USA embraced deregulation in many sectors by the abolition of
many existing regulations or the significant restructuring of regulation.
Liberalisation: The European Commission set about to liberalise the European 
Community by the removal of internal economic market barriers.
Privatisation: Privatisation of state-owned business demanded the creation of a
regulatory system that would gain the necessary political approval and guarantee the 
confidence of other economic sectors, so that the transfer of ownership from the 
public to the private sector could take place without causing undue disruption.
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3.10 VARYING APPROACHES TO DEREGULATION
Although the overall aspiration behind the various dereguiatory processes tends to be 
common, there are significant differences in the
• mechanisms;
• structures;
• processes; and
• outcomes
in the major arenas throughout the world where a form of deregulation has been 
achieved. Deregulation in each of these 'arenas' is now considered.
3.10.1 USA: Deregulation
The aim of deregulation in the USA was to obtain free markets, it was assumed that 
deregulation would lead to the
...dismantling of as many economic controls as possible, allowing free market 
forces to reign.
(Williams, 1993, p8)
Kahn (1971) highlighted the fact that because of regulation, competition in some 
industries, e.g. the aviation sector, did not exist:
...these cost-inflating service improvements have not been subjected to the 
test of having to compete with lower cost alternatives.
(Kahn 1971)
Airline deregulation provides a good example of the influence of academics and 
politicians on the dereguiatory process. Breyer (1990, pp317-40) suggests that the 
United States adopted deregulation because of convincing arguments based on 
technological progress and industry capture.
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Free market Republicans and Democrats joined together and supported the 
arguments that deregulation would allow more new entrants, encourage competition 
and reduce prices that had been kept artificially high because of State intervention. In 
essence, those favouring deregulation saw regulation as imposing costly constraints 
on industries and companies, thereby reducing their competitiveness.
A plethora of inter-state deregulation occurred at the end of the 1970s and at the 
beginning of the 1980s. By the mid 1980s, the USA had executed a programme of 
deregulation in sectors where competition was deemed to be a possibility:
...significant progress had been made in deregulating those industries where 
the economic case for free markets is strong and that for regulation weak.
(Breyer, 1990, p 19)
3.10.2 United Kingdom: Privatisation
By the 1980s, nationalisation in Europe had reached its peak and was beginning to 
decline. Vickers and Yarrow (1988, p98), and Swann (1988, p56) have suggested 
that what had previously been seen as the solution to the problem of economically 
troubled industries was increasingly perceived as having failed to promote economic 
efficiency.
Privatisation was not exclusive to any one country. Although some movement 
towards privatisation had taken place in Europe in the post-war period, Swann (1988, 
p10) and Alyen (1987) show that it was on the increase throughout the world in the 
1980s. Francis (1993, p86) supports this view as regards Europe. Significant regions 
of privatisation at this time included Austria (Platzer, 1986 pp277-8), Canada (Ohashi 
etal, 1980) and Italy (Stefani, 1986, p234).
65
Chapter 3 - Regulation and Regulatory Reform
A body of writers, Beesiey and Littlechild (1992, p23) and Peacock (1984, p3), 
suggest that 'privatisation' is generally considered to mean the formation of a 
Companies Act company and the subsequent sale of at least 50% of the shares to 
private shareholders. Swann (1988) views this idea as being too narrow. He 
suggests that privatisation is the introduction into the public sector, or what has 
previously been the public sector, of conditions which are traditionally linked to the 
private domain. Regardless of the transference of ownership question, Beesiey and 
Littlechild (1992, p21) and Swann (1988) agree that the underlying idea of 
privatisation is to improve industry performance by increasing the role of market 
forces.
In the UK, the Conservative government elected in 1979 was in favour of privatising 
state-owned industries to improve economic growth. In 1983 the Prime Minister cited 
the creation of free markets that would allow competition as one of the aims of the 
privatisation programmes:
Privatisation, through exposing former state-owned companies more fully to 
the disciplines and opportunities of the m arket... improves the efficiency of 
businesses that are crucial to our overall economic performance. As such it 
forms an important part of the Government's overall strategy for long-term 
economic growth.
(Thatcher, 1983)
Moore (1978) also cites economic benefits as being the main objectives of 
privatisation; included were enhanced efficiency, free market principles and 
intensification of competition.
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The Governement privatised the following industries in the 1980s:
• British Telecommunications (1984);
• British Gas Corporation (1986);
• British Airports Authority (1986);
• National Bus Company, by the sale of its constituent companies (1986-88); 
and
• Water Authorities (1986)
Veljanovski (1993, p45) notes that in each of the above industries
...the goal of privatisation was to encourage competition through radical
restructuring of the industry.
However, the privatisation of effective monopoly services without regulation could not 
guarantee that they would ever become economically efficient. The Government 
therefore established a series of regulatory regimes and enlarged and reformed 
regulatory agencies to achieve this goal. Although there are variations from industry 
to industry, each of the privatisation acts required the new 'regulator' to encourage 
greater competition. However, only the electricity regulator has the primary duty to 
'promote effective competition1; in all the other privatisation statutes, competition is a 
secondary duty. The telecom regulator has the duty to 'promote and sustain' effective 
competition. Under the Gas Act 1986, the regulator originally had the duty to 'enable ' 
competition in the contract gas market, but this was replaced by a duty to 'secure 
effective competition' under the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act 1992. 
Although the different wording evidently indicates differing degrees of commitment to 
competition as a privatisation goal, it is significant that competition features as a 
desired outcome in each of the privatisation processes.
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The rationale of the privatisation drive was the belief that increased economic growth 
and efficiency would result if industries and services were transferred to the private 
sector. Privatisation challenged the single nationalised authorities which had come to 
wield almost exclusive dominance over their markets for products or services. 
Veljanovski (1993, p46) highlights this competitive element:
...as a result of privatisation all the previously nationalised industries face 
increased competitive pressures even if they do not face the maximum 
feasible competitive pressures.
According to Veljanovski (1993 p27), the Conservatives were not in favour of the US 
regulatory model of command-and-controi which they deemed to be inefficient.
Stagnation was deemed to be the ultimate outcome of regulation aimed at controlling 
the revenues earned by monopolies. Therefore the Government adopted price- 
capping as a new regulatory mode; it was viewed as likely to promote competition and 
efficiency. The preferred method of determining permissible price increases was to 
apply a formula known as Retail Price Index minus Efficiency Factor (RPI - X), see 
Littlechild (1988, pp40-68). However, in practice price controls have proved to be 
much more complex (see Figure 3.1).
68
Chapter 3 - Regulation and Regulatory Reform
switched services service basket
Supplementary control 
franchise market onlyOverall supply price
RPI - Xs + Y + cf
Xs=0
Distribution price control '
RPI + Xd + cf
Xd varies between 0 & 2.5
Figure 3.1 Increasing Complexity of Price Regulation
Littlechild In Theory
In Practice
REC’s
Water & Sewerage
British Gas pic
. Exchange line rental
BT pic /  * 7.5 and connections R P I +  0
Average price of Rp| +  2 Each item in switcher
BAA pic
(Source: Lexecon. The Future of Industry Regulation in the United Kingdom, 1993.)
Key: X = efficiency factor cf = correction factor
RPI = retail price index S = additional security costs factor
K = investment factor Y = cost pass through
GPI = gas cost index F = fossil fuel levy
E = energy efficiency factor
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3.10.3 European Community: Liberalisation
In his definition of privatisation, Heald (1983, p299) includes liberalisation as the 
relaxation of state monopolies or licensing arrangements which had hitherto excluded 
some firms from markets which had been the exclusive domain of the public sector. 
As the USA and many Western European countries were deregulating to establish 
free markets that would allow competition, so too was the European Community 
implementing liberalisation programmes that would allow for free trade between its 
Member States:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to 
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic 
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an 
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the 
States belonging to it.
(Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957, Article 2)
Recognising the significance of competition in a free market, the Treaty also 
specifically called for
...the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is 
not distorted.
(Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957, Article 3(f))
This process was given an additional momentum by the adoption of The Single 
European Act of 1987.
3.10.4 Differing approaches to a Common Goal
Although the processes and mechanisms cited above all differ to some extent they 
are congruent in their aim of promoting competition. Figure 3.2 provides a graphic 
representation of these relationships.
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Figure 3.2 The Relationship Between the Regulatory Reforming Process
DEREGULATION PRIVATISATION LIBERALISATION
OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE
FREE MARKETS 
ALLOWING COMPETITION
(Source: Compiled by the present author.)
3.11 FREE MARKETS AND COMPETITION
Each of the regulatory reforms on the continuum of deregulation has the aim of
encouraging and establishing free markets and competition. However, the term
'competition1 has different meanings in different contexts. In one context, it refers to a
\
number of firms supplying alternative products or services to the same customer 
groups. Alternatively, it can be a measure of the way a particular market is divided 
between several firms. It is also useful to differentiate between natural and strategic 
competition.
Natural competition refers to the survival of the fittest in a given environment. It is an 
evolutionary process that removes the weakest rivals. Applied to the business world, it 
means that each firm competing in the same market must have something uniquely 
superior to offer in order to survive. Henderson's (1981a) definition of strategic 
competition involves
...studying the deployment of resources based on a high degree of insight into 
the systematic cause of effect in the business ecological system.
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Henderson (1981b) further identifies the basic elements of strategic competition as 
follows:
1. The ability to understand competitive interaction as a complete dynamic 
system that includes the interaction of competitors, customers, money, 
people, and resources.
2. The ability to use this understanding to predict the consequences of a given 
intervention in that system and how that intervention will result in new 
patterns of stable dynamic equilibrium.
3. The availability of uncommitted resources that can be dedicated to different 
uses and purposes in the present even though the dedication is permanent 
and the benefits will be deferred.
4. The ability to predict the risk and return with sufficient accuracy and 
confidence to justify the commitment of such resources.
5. The willingness to deliberately act to make the commitment.
3.12 TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC THEORY
Economic theory includes several models that provide explanations of the nature of 
competition in specified market structures. Two that are of particular relevance to the 
study of deregulation are summarised below.
3.12.1 Perfectly Competitive Markets
Classic economists, such as Friedman (1962), assert that in a classic free competitive 
market many firms compete with each other to supply their goods or services while 
customers search for goods or services at the lowest prices and/or of the highest 
quality. When consumers have an effective choice, the quantity of goods sold by a 
particular firm may change quickly with relatively small changes in their price and/or 
quality. An individual company's profits and market share will be highly sensitive to 
the collective decisions of consumers. The market sets the level of price that can be 
charged, hence firms have a strong incentive to operate efficiently.
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A market is free and perfectly competitive if the following characteristics prevail:
• Large numbers of sellers and buyers.
• Product homogeneity.
• Free entry and exit of firms.
• Profit maximisation.
• No government regulation.
• Perfect mobility of factors of production.
• Perfect knowledge (for both buyers and sellers).
Although from a theoretical perspective, this model may provide useful constructs in 
understanding the competitive dynamics of an industry, it does not reflect commercial 
reality since no industry structure meets all the above conditions.
3.12.2 The Theory of Contestable Markets
Baumol's (1982) theory of contestable markets is particularly relevant in markets 
where there are few competitors. The theory suggests that it is possible to have a 
competitive effect even if there is only one company in the industry, provided that the
firm is influenced by the threat of competition as much as actual competition. This
theory, like that of perfect competition, is reliant on the removal of all entry and exit 
barriers to potential competitors:
1. Ease of market entry (i.e. no economic or other barriers to market entry of 
new suppliers).
2. Ease of market exit (no sunk costs as barriers to exit).
One example of the theory not working can be found in the aviation sector. Once the 
regulatory barriers to entry and exit had been removed in the post-liberalisation 
European Community, fares might have been expected to come down as the mere 
threat of competition should have been enough to force the incumbents to respond to 
consumer demands. In practice, however, fares only came down where the traditional 
duopoly had been broken and a third carrier was able to enter the route. Although it 
appeared that free market entry existed in practice, competition existed only in theory.
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Swann (1988, p2) is sceptical about the emergence of post-deregulation competition 
whilst the industries concerned remain in state ownership. Whilst competition may be 
expected to drive inefficient suppliers out of the market place, public or state 
ownership of whatever degree may enable them to survive because they can rely on 
state operating subsidies.
The assumption here is that if deregulation were coupled with the privatisation of the 
industry in question, a more pro-competitive system might emerge, i.e. firms would be 
less able to frustrate desirable outcomes.
3.13 INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION PERSPECTIVE OF COMPETITION
The main interest of the industry manager is to retain exclusive rights to the market by 
adopting appropriate strategies to create and sustain competitive advantages over 
one's rivals. Competition and strategy cannot be separated - competition provides the 
rationale for defining strategy while strategy determines the basis for competition. 
Systematic analysis of competition within industry provides a vital input for the 
strategy process. Perhaps the most frequently cited analytical model in the structural 
analysis of industry was developed by Porter (1980) as reviewed below.
3.13.1 Competitive Structural Analysis
Classical economics sees competition and contestability (Baumol, 1988) as the inter­
play between supply and demand with price being the regulatory device which 
determines economic equilibrium. However, a more robust and well proven indicator 
of genuinely competitive markets is provided by Porter's model (1980) for competitive 
structural analysis of an industry. This identifies five distinct competitive forces:
1. Entry;
2. Threat of Substitution;
3. Bargaining Power of Buyers;
4. Bargaining Power of Suppliers; and
5. Rivalry Among Current Competitors.
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These forces reflect the fact that competition in an industry goes well beyond the 
established players and that stakeholders in an industry are numerous. Customers, 
suppliers, substitutes, and potential entrants are all ‘competitors’ to firms in the 
industry and may be more or less prominent depending on the particular 
circumstances. Competition in this broader sense might be termed extended rivalry.
Porter (1980) described some characteristics of these forces:
1. All five forces jointly determine the intensity of industry competition and 
profitability, thus its attractiveness.
2. Different forces take on prominence in shaping competition in the industry.
3. The strengths of the five forces reflect the underlying structure of an 
industry and differ from the short-run factors.
As shown in this model, the degree of rivalry among different firms is a function of the 
number of competitors, industry growth, assets intensity, product differentiation, and 
exit barriers.
The first step in the structural analysis is to diagnose these forces and their causes, 
followed by analysis of the firm's own strengths and weaknesses. An effective 
competitive strategy is oriented to create a defendable position against the five forces. 
Porter also suggested a range of generic industry environments so that an industry 
can be defined as either fragmented, global, or at a particular stage in the industry life 
cycle. In each setting, the industry-defining variables will be different.
3.13.2 The Practicability of Competitive Structural Analysis
Although the Porter model has been widely accepted, there remain some serious 
reservations about the model and the role of the five competitive forces.
First, and most importantly, Porter failed to distinguish sufficiently between the effects 
of rivalry within an industry and those of the other four forces. It can be argued that 
these five forces are not equally important and are quite different in nature.
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The fundamental causes of competition in an industry lie in incumbent firms 
competing for market share. The competition among these firms in the inner-tier of 
the industry is internal and direct, and a major concern of strategists, whilst the 
'competition' from other forces in the outer-tier of the industry environment is external, 
indirect and has only secondary effects.
For example, in the aviation industry, the power of the suppliers of essential 
operational services such as fuel and Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) will 
influence an airline's competitive strategy but a more direct influence will come from 
another airline operating on the same route and offering lower fares.
Secondly, Porter did not differentiate between competition and competitiveness. If a 
firm enjoys competitive advantages against its rivals in terms of the four factors, these 
advantages will be reflected in its market position. The four external forces do not 
influence the competition process but the firm's competitiveness.
Thirdly, Porter did not differentiate between 'current' competition and 'potential' 
competition. For example, before entry actually occurs, potential entrants pose only a 
threat and not real rivalry. This is obvious in the European air transport sector post 
liberalisation where fares only decreased when a new airline actually entered onto a 
route and not when it threatened to do so. Moreover substitute products or services 
usually create a 'competition' between different industries or industrial sectors, not 
individual firms. When facing the threat of substitutes from other industries, the 
incumbent firms are expected to take co-operative counteractions.
Fourthly, it should be emphasised that not all the five forces exist in all industries. 
One or more forces may be missing: for example, it is difficult to find any realistic 
alternative mode of travel for air transport on the basis of speed. The only practical 
substitute for European air transport is the high speed train, the French TGV (Train a 
Grande Vitesse).
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The structure of an industry may nevertheless be shaped by three or four forces 
depending on its economic and technical characteristics. Finally, Porter's statement 
(1980) that
Every industry has an underlying structure, or a set of fundamental economic 
and technological characteristics, that gives rise to these competitive forces
may be only partly true. The industry structure has a dominant impact on the rivalry 
among incumbent firms but may be of little relevance to the other four forces.
In summary, it may be more appropriate to call these four external factors 'influence 
forces' rather than 'competitive forces'.
3.14 COMPETITION AS A REGULATOR
Foster (1992, p158), Kay and Vickers (1992, p224), Baumol (1986, p142) and 
Beesley & Littlechild (1992, p26) all state that competition arising from the free-market 
acts as a regulator in industries. Companies are forced to respond to consumer 
demands, otherwise they will lose their business to another competitor. There is 
general agreement in the literature that competition and regulation can be viewed as 
substitutes or as inter-changeable:
Competition where possible; regulation where not
(Kay and Vickers, 1992, p224)
This view is confirmed by Foster (1992, p158):
Not regulation, but competition and potential competition should, as far as 
possible, be the policeman.
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The removal of restrictions to create a free market may itself act as an effective 
competitive discipline even if it does not result in new entrants coming into the market: 
the threat of potential entry disciplines incumbent firms against abusing their dominant 
position. The theory has been the cause of much discussion, see Baumol and Willig 
(1986); Schwartz (1986), Sharkey (1982); Shepherd (1984); Spence (1983); and 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988).
3.15 THE DESIRABILITY OF FREE MARKETS AND COMPETITION
industry will not always feel that free markets and the subsequent competition are 
desirable:
It is a striking feature of regulatory history that industries are generally 
opposed both to the introduction of new regulation and to the dismantling of 
old regulation. Industries dislike the prospect of regulation but frequently find 
comfortable ways of living with it in practice.
(Kay and Vickers, 1992, p232)
This 'dislike' for dismantling regulatory regimes that had prevented free market access 
is clearly illustrated by airlines subjected to regulatory reform in the European aviation 
industry.
Competition in the airline industry, as in most industries, goes beyond that provided by 
direct competitors. Following Porter (1980), these additional competitive forces can 
be regarded as stakeholders whose political and commercial interests are heavily 
influenced by the competitive terrain of the airline industry.
Stakeholders of the same nature in an industry may not always welcome free markets 
even if they are feasible. Because of the heterogeneity of these stakeholders and 
their interests, competition in the airline industry is complex and dynamic with often 
apparently similar stakeholders adopting different strategies, e.g. the UK government 
promoting free competition while the French government is promoting re-regulation.
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The shake-up of long standing policies dictated by deregulation led to a wide variety 
of outcomes. The balance of stakeholders' interests, carefully built up over decades, 
had always been a delicate one and once dislodged, it was inevitable that a new 
consensus would be difficult to reach.
There were strong interest groups which ran with the deregulatory tide because they 
saw no alternatives but when faced with the consequences, did all they could to 
preserve the status quo. This was particularly noticeable in the European Community 
during the months immediately following the completion of the internal market for air 
transport in January 1993. A number of State owned airlines had been kept afloat for 
years only because their owners, the national governments, had seen political 
advantage in continuing to fund inefficiencies with public monies to maintain 
employment at a time when structural change throughout the economy was making 
the employment situation the principal issue. Once the subsidies were challenged, 
these motives - hitherto often unquestioned - assumed a new importance. The 
European Commission had a clear duty under the Treaty of Rome to reject all new 
injections of State aid. However, the difficulties in reaching a common position quickly 
became obvious. It was revealed that on one occasion President Jacques Delors had 
abstained in a vote on State aid for Air France and that Christine Scrivener, the other 
French member of the Commission, had voted against it. For their part, the French 
unions were also bitterly opposed to stopping State aid and on a number of occasions 
resorted to physical measures, including the grounding of all flights from the Paris 
airports, to make their opposition felt. Meanwhile, the long-term benefits to customers 
of forcing Air France to face up to competition within the single market went largely 
unnoticed.
This case illustrates clearly the diversity of attitudes within a group of stakeholders 
and it highlights that there are inter and intra-disagreements at all levels of the 
airlines' hierarchical political structures.
79
Chapter 3 - Regulation and Regulatory Reform
3.16 CONCLUSIONS ON REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM
3.16.1 The Meaning of Deregulation.
This chapter has taken a wide, non industry-specific and non country-specific view of 
regulation and deregulation. It has concluded that the term deregulation is too broad 
to reflect the variety of initiatives that have been undertaken with this label. When 
examined in different geographic, political and industrial contexts, 'deregulation' is 
observed to have a variety of interpretations including:
• the complete abolition of ali regulation on business;
• the privatisation of state monopolies and the re-regulation of the resultant 
private monopolies or duopolies;
• the re-regulation of industries in which the state regulator is replaced by a 
private regulator; and
• the removal of national regulation and re-regulation by a supra-national 
authority.
3.16.2 The Outcomes of Deregulation
There is clear agreement in the literature that irrespective of where a process appears 
on the spectrum of 'deregulation', all attempts at deregulation harbour the same 
objective: namely increasing the intensity of competition in the hope of lower prices 
and increased consumer choice as shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 The Universal Aim of the Regulatory Reforming Processes
DEREGULATORY PROCESS PRINCIPAL LITERARY SOURCES OBJECTIVE OF REGULATORY REFORM
DEREGULATION Kahn (1993) 
Breyer (1990) 
Williams (1993)
FREE MARKETS ALLOWING 
COMPETITION
PRIVATISATION Beesley (1992) 
Littlechild (1992) 
Veljanovski (1993)
FREE MARKETS 
ALLOWING COMPETITION
LIBERALISATION Sorensen (1991) 
Van Miert (1992)
FREE MARKET ALLOWING 
COMPETITION
(Source: Compiled by the present author.)
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Although this aim is universal, the measurable effects of deregulation initiatives - in 
terms of actual outcomes and industry structures - are not consistent: thus the effects 
vary from little change in industry structure, prices and consumer choice to dramatic 
changes in all three. One of the challenges in assessing deregulation, which has not 
been adequately and comprehensiveiy addressed, is measuring the actual outcomes. 
This is a major issue which is addressed in the empirical aspects of this thesis.
3.16.3 Measuring the Outcomes of Deregulation
This chapter provides one of the major building blocks for this thesis, namely the 
necessity for gauging the intensity of competition in the post-deregulation era. In 
order to assess changes in competitive intensity, a number of research hypotheses 
need to be developed. These hypotheses will be of the form:
• US experiences provide benchmarks for EC performance.
• Particular firms have adopted particular strategies which have led to 
superior performance.
•  Various stakeholders have been affected in a variety of ways by 
deregulation.
• The degree of competition has increased since deregulation.
• The Porter Model (1980) of competitive forces will provide a framework to 
measure competitive intensity.
These hypotheses, which are generic and apply to all industries, will be refined and 
made more specific later.
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CHAPTER 4 - Regulatory Reform of Air Transport:
A Literature Review
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the literature on regulatory reforms of air transport in the United 
States and in the European Community. Button (1990, p141) suggests that these 
should be seen in the wider context of the general global trend towards regulatory 
reform which was occurring simultaneously in many other sectors of the economy.
Me Kie (1989) agrees that the late 1970s and early 1980s experienced a general 
relaxation of regulation in a wide variety of markets. Button is careful to make 
reference to the term 'deregulation' which is often used to describe these changes, 
but he also warns:
care must be taken in interpreting the events that have occurred.
(Button, 1990, p141)
The implication is that not all the changes that have occurred since the 1970s have 
been 'deregulation' if strictly defined, but rather that in each instance there has been, 
to a greater or lesser degree, some type of regulatory reform.
4.2 DEREGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORT IN THE USA
4.2.1 Industry Support
Brenner, Leet and Schott (1985, p8) view the key issue of deregulation of air transport 
as being the promotion of free competition, as opposed to tight government control of 
entry, exit and pricing. In the 1970s and 1980s, support for a reduction of regulation 
and the desire for free competition in the transport sector were very wide-spread. The 
highly regulated aviation sector was unsatisfactory for both the industry and the 
consumer.
82
Chapter 4 - Regulatory Reform of Air Transport: A Literature Review
Gialloreto (1988, p22) argues that the US industry had become so tightly regulated 
that managerial freedom to make any major decisions was steadily being eroded and 
that the most important decisions to be made by airline managers were how to 
present a case for expansion to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) or the interior 
colour scheme of the aircraft. Customers' needs were secondary to satisfying the 
CAB. The primary motive for regulatory reform was the growing evidence that the 
regulatory framework in situ was inefficient.
The tight regulation of the industry was first seriously questioned in the 1970s. Pickrell 
(1991, p7) suggests that increased costs of labour, fuel and other operating inputs 
were eroding the cost savings made in the switch from propeller to jet aircraft in the 
1960s. Applications from the airlines for fare increases were the natural consequence 
which ultimately forced the CAB to reappraise its fare-setting policies. The immediate 
result was even tighter regulation. All fares were set on the basis of the distance 
covered - a formula which guaranteed the carriers profits over long distances but 
turned short routes into loss-makers - and discount fares were abolished as 
discriminatory. Furthermore, the CAB instituted a moratorium (see Dempsey and 
Gotez, 1992, p173) on awarding new services while simultaneously allowing the 
largest carriers to collude in reducing frequencies on their busiest routes.
Subsequently, the Board imposed minimum fares on charter carriers as a means of 
further protecting the regulated airlines. Meyer and Oster (1981, p64) note that a 
general fare increase was then permitted which, along with previous increases and 
the banning of discount fares, resulted in an average increase of approximately 20 per 
cent in a year. Button (1990, p146) argues that there was industry support for 
regulatory reform, noting that United and Pan American, two of the major US airlines, 
viewed regulation as an obstacle in dealing with the high fuel prices and depressed 
markets resulting from the Arab oil embargo of 1973.
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4.2.2 Empirical Support
Breyer (1990, pp317-40) argues that empirical research which produced evidence of 
the anti-competitive harm of regulation was critical in gaining political support for 
deregulation. The empirical work of Caves (1962), Douglas and Miller (1974), Levine 
(1965) and Jordan (1970) produced evidence that pointed to the high 'costs' of 
regulation. Because CAB regulation did not extend to intra-state carriers, Keller 
(1972, pp399-424) shows that carriers operating within individual American states 
were able to offer much lower fares than on comparable inter-state routes. Gialloreto 
(1988, p 20), Button (1989, p7) and Moore (1986, pp1-29) agree on the importance 
such empirical work played in the regulatory reform process. Moore (1986, pp11-29) 
argues that such studies were probably the greatest stimulus for reform of the CAB 
regulatory framework, while Gialloreto (1988, p23) suggests that deregulation in 
practice was modelled on the studies in three areas:
• the intra-state markets in California and Texas;
• the complete deregulation of all cargo carriers many years previously; and
• the deregulation of commuter services.
Although this empirical evidence laid the foundation, it was not sufficient to bring 
about change in itself.
4.2.3 Political Support
Political support was necessary to bring about legislative change and can be traced 
back to President Ford. Anti-regulation sentiment was strong when, in 1975, the Ford 
Administration sponsored the first deregulation bill. This was the beginning of the 
legislative process that culminated in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. An 
influential report released at the time also attracted political support.
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A Report on Civil Aeronautic Board Practices and Procedure, given by a US Senate 
Committee headed by Senator Edward Kennedy, also attracted much support when 
released in 1975. It noted that airline prices should and would be lower with a more 
competitive system and that the CAB had violated relevant statutes, employed 
inadequate or improper procedures, inappropriately concentrated on increasing profits 
for the airlines rather than reducing fares, prevented - sometimes unlawfully - new low 
fares entering onto routes, and endeavoured to prevent service as well as price 
competition (Breyer, 1990, p48). There is general agreement in the literature; Doganis 
(1991, p51); Breyer (1990, p48); Sawers (1987, p16) and Meyer et a /(1981, p37) that 
pro-deregulation pressure gained momentum from this report.
Gialloreto (1988, p18) suggests that the political environment was ready and receptive 
to regulatory change. High costs for consumers did not augur well for the Carter 
Administration. Gialloreto (1988, p19) reports that 1978 was apparently the 'right 
time' for deregulation of the domestic airline industry in the USA: as the Carter 
Administration had reached its half-way point it was searching for public policies that 
would satisfy and prepare the electorate for the next election.
Stenier (1983, pp285-306) argues that much of the support for deregulation emanated 
from outside as well as from within the government: there was general dissatisfaction 
with high prices and frustration at the government's failure to control inflation. Whilst 
deregulation of air transport was the stated aim, the true objective was to win air 
transport users' votes. Swann (1988, p129) argues that the concept of political 
convenience cannot be ignored as the reason for strong political support for 
deregulation. He suggests that regulation was used as the scapegoat and 
deregulation was the politically convenient method of addressing the issue. Gialloreto 
(1988, p20) suggests that the potential savings that could be made from the abolition 
of the CAB was another important political consideration in promoting deregulation. 
Therefore, President Carter's appointment of chairmen and commissioners in favour 
of regulatory reform was not surprising. The appointment of Alfred Kahn, an advocate 
of deregulation, to the chairmanship of the CAB played a significant cole in the 
regulatory reform process (Swann, 1988, p169).
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4.2.4 CAB Support
While empirical research laid the foundations for reform, Pickrell (1991, p8) suggests 
that the results of the Kennedy Report had a dramatic effect on the CAB itself, 
causing it to question the appropriateness of its regulatory framework. This led to 
recommendations to relax capacity limitation agreements and to reducing the Board's 
rigorous control over fares and new entrants into the market.
In a special report on regulatory reform in July 1975, the CAB concluded that:
...protective entry control, exit control, and public utility-type price regulation 
under the Federal Aviation Act are not justified by the underlying cost and 
demand characteristics of commercial air transportation. The industry is 
naturally competitive, not monopolistic.
(CAB Report 1975)
Pickrell (1991, p8) suggests that the CAB's subsequent first step towards deregulation 
was initiated in 1975 by John Robson, its newly-appointed Chairman. Robson 
suggested, by way of experiment, that new and incumbent carriers should be able to 
start and stop services on selected routes without prior CAB approval; this radical 
proposition was not implemented. However, later in 1975 the CAB for the first time in 
five years permitted other carriers on a number of routes, including some already 
satisfactorily served by established carriers. Doganis (1991, p52) suggests that these 
changes in direction were not driven by altruism but were largely influenced by the 
threat of forthcoming legislation.
4.3 THEORIES AND ASSUMPTIONS OF DEREGULATION IN THE US 
AVIATION INDUSTRY
4.3.1 The Theoretical Rationale for Deregulation - Contestability Theory
The arguments in favour of reforming the air transport regulatory framework were 
many and concentrated mostly on the economic benefits that would emerge. The 
pro-deregulation lobby embraced competition and lower prices as the overriding policy 
objectives.
86
Chapter 4 - Regulatory Reform of Air Transport: A Literature Review
Deregulation would create, at least theoretically, a more competitive environment in 
commercial aviation (Levine, 1987, p394). In addition, the emerging 'Chicago School' 
of economic theory argued that regulation tended to be 'captured' by either the 
regulated or the regulator. This theory was supplemented by the hypothesis of 
creating 'contestable markets' (see Chapter 3.12.2) which could achieve both 
economic efficiency and avoid problems of regulatory capture. The air transport 
sector was deemed to be a contestable market. The theory and its proponents held 
that as long as a market had open entry and exit the threat of competition would be 
enough to ensure that the incumbents acted in a competitive fashion, regardless of 
the actual number of competitors. Kahn (1978 Speech) embraced this theory and 
was convinced that:
...the ease of potential entry into those individual markets, and the constant
threat of its materializing, could well suffice to prevent monopolistic
exploitation.
4.3.2 Support for Deregulation
Influenced by the theoretical rationale, the economic arguments in favour of 
deregulation of aviation were many. Kahn (cited in Dempsey and Gotez, 1992, p87) 
was critical of the CAB regulatory framework of domestic aviation in the USA and 
argues that it:
•  caused air fares to be considerably higher than they otherwise would be;
• resulted in a serious mislocation of resources;
• encouraged carrier inefficiency;
• denied consumers the range of price/service options they would prefer; and
• created a chronic tendency towards excess capacity in the industry.
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The predictions of what deregulation would bring were positive. The US Department 
of Transportation argued that increased competition would lead to lower prices and 
improved services without subjecting the industry to destructive competition or 
excessive concentration and without subjecting passengers to the dangers of unsafe 
operation (DOT, 1978, Doc. 28848). Kahn (1978) and Dempsey (1988, p197) 
asserted that the consumer would benefit. Dempsey (1988, p8) argues that:
...increased competition among air carriers will lead to improved quality and an 
increased variety of services available to the public at competitive prices...
The CAB no longer saw the protection of air carriers as part of its remit. The air 
transport industry would be subject to market forces. In other industries inefficient 
firms were allowed to fail if they could not endure the competition, the air transport 
industry in the USA was now similarly regarded. If incumbents suffered financially 
due to competition, the CAB was confident that they would improve their 
competitiveness or withdraw (see Dempsey and Gotez, 1992, p185). The CAB 
makes it clear that in a competitive market airlines should be allowed to fail:
In healthy competition producers who are inefficient or make bad decisions 
may fail, but efficient and well-managed producers can operate profitably... 
The occasional failure can serve a useful purpose, not only by eliminating the 
inefficient or imprudent operator, but also by flashing yellow lights to others.
(CAB, 1978, 78-4-121 at 25).
Thus deregulation was viewed as a means of ensuring either that airlines allocated 
resources more efficiently, became more competitive and offered the consumer what 
they wanted or that they could exit. By contrast, Dempsey and Gotez (1992, p173-4 
observe that none of the sixteen carriers 'grandfathered' by the CAB had been 
allowed to fail.
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V
4.3.3 Opposition to Deregulation
As highlighted by Kay and Vickers (1992, p232,) regulatory reforms that can bring 
about free markets and subsequent competition are not always desired by those who 
have been regulated. Peacock (1984); Douglas and Miller (1974) and Stigler (1971) 
cite this unwillingness to change as evidence of regulatory capture the phenomenon 
by which regulations established to protect consumer interests come over time to 
protect the regulated from competition (see Chapter 3.7.1 for a discussion on 
regulatory capture). Brenner, Leet and Schott (1985, p10) have shown that there was 
initially substantial opposition from most airlines to any significant relaxation of 
regulation. There was also opposition from the airline labour unions and financial 
institutions which had investments in the airlines. Brenner, Leet and Schott (1985, 
p10) summarise their opposition as follows:
•  possible deterioration of the industry's excellent safety record;
• probable concentration of service on dense traffic routes, with a 
consequent deterioration of service on others, especially those serving 
small communities;
• impairment of the air transport 'system', with its convenience of through 
baggage, interline ticketing, etc...;
• destructive and predatory price competition, resulting in earnings 
deterioration and ultimately increased industry concentration;
• reduced ability to re-equip and to finance other available technological 
advances; and
• an adverse impact on airline employees.
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4.4 THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
The Airline Deregulation Act came into effect in 1978 and provided for the eventual 
disbanding of the CAB by 1985, allowed free route entry by 1979 and permitted 
airlines to vary their prices above and below the standard set fare by 1980. The Act 
applied only to domestic aviation and the overriding theme was competition:
To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, to encourage, develop, and attain 
an air transportation system which relies on competitive market forces to 
determine the quality, variety, and price of air services, and for other purposes.
(Public Law 95-504-Oct. 24, 1978, 92 Stat. 1705, 95th Congress)
There would be a gradual erosion of all economic regulation and by December 1981 
the only requirement to entry would be that the applicant be 'fit, willing and able'.
4.5 THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON AIR TRANSPORT
This new liberty produced a variety of reactions from the airlines. Some carriers 
rapidly expanded their route networks whilst others consolidated and concentrated on 
what they considered to be their most profitable routes. The result was a major 
restructuring of the linear route networks that had necessarily existed pre-deregulation 
when most airlines had been signatories to a multilateral agreement which required 
them to honour tickets of the other participants.
Before deregulation, interlining between carriers was prolific, involving approximately 
one passenger in four. By 1984 this number had decreased to one in ten, principally 
because airlines began to develop their own feeder networks. The creation of hub 
fortresses gave established airlines a significant advantage over new entrants, who 
were unable to match their variety of services.
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However, Williams (1990, p3) sees new entrants as being attracted to trunk routes 
and as having distinct advantages over incumbents in that they had lower operating 
costs, whilst in terms of image building they were considered to be putting the 
customer first. The outcome was fierce competition between carriers, resulting in 
many players failing and many established carriers incurring very heavy losses 
(Gialloreto, 1988, p18). Since the Deregulation Act came into force, the US civil 
aviation industry has experienced the following major changes:
• intense competition in the immediate post-deregulation era, resulting in 
numerous mergers, bankruptcies and high losses;
• development of marketing strategies, such as Computer Reservation 
Systems (CRS) and Frequent Flier Programmes (FFP) by the established 
carriers to retain market share; and
• the creation and expansion of hub-and-spoke networks.
Sawers (1987, p17) argues that these changes may not be solely due to the impact of 
deregulation, but may also be the result of US experience in the world recession. He 
adds that whatever the reason for these changes, they have not affected the real 
benefits of deregulation, namely lower fares for the consumer. Many commentators 
on the other hand did not consider the resulting lower fares a great advantage as they 
were not universal (see section 4.6.1 below).
4.6 DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION
The promotion of competition was the overriding objective of the deregulatory 
process. There was general agreement among the pro-deregulation lobby that entry 
into the air transport sector needed to be liberalised for competition to function 
properly. The measurable outcomes of increased or intensified competition are the 
number of new entrants and their impact on fares. Liberal market entry would allow 
new or innovative carriers to provide the competitive impetus. The UK Civil Aviation 
Authority (1984, p1) noted that the US domestic air transport market was deregulated 
because it was believed that an efficient, innovative and low priced system would 
emerge by placing maximum emphasis on actual or potential competition.
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4.6.1 Intensity of Competition and New Entrants
There is general agreement (Moore, 1988, pp8-9; Morrison & Winston, 1986, p69 and 
CAA UK, 1984, p2) that deregulation did increase the scope and intensity of 
competition. However, it is also recognised that the level of competition was not 
uniform.
Intensity of competition increased where two or more airlines came into competitive 
conflict, the most obvious example being head-to-head competition on thick and 
profitable routes. As predicted by the proponents of deregulation, once competition 
was possible, new entrants did enter the market. From 1978 to 1985 new airlines, 
and intra-state carriers enjoyed an increased share of the aviation market. Gialloreto 
(1988, p25) confirms that this was at the expense of the incumbent trunk carriers. In 
the first three years following deregulation, 55 new carriers were registered and in the 
following four years another 65; while some of these were simply domestic, others 
had international aspirations (see Table 4.1).
Intense rivalry, starting in the mid-1980s, was manifested by fare wars which 
eventually led to high losses (Brenner, Leet and Schott, 1988, pp131-133). Dempsey 
and Gotez (1992, p186) suggest this as a reason for the consolidation of airlines 
which commenced in 1986.
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Table 4.1 New Entrants and Survivors Between 1979 and 1992
Date of Entry No. Certificated No. Stiii Flying
1979 22 3
1980 17 2
1981 16 2
1982 10 0
1983 18 6
1984 19 5
1985 18 3
1986 7 2
1987 5 3
1988 4 3
1989 5 5
1990 7 4
1991 5 3
| 1992 15 15
TOTAL 168 56
(Source: US Department of Transportation, cited in The Avmark Aviation Economist, 
March 1933.)
Table 4:2 provides an example of a fare war between an incumbent and a new 
entrant on the New York - Buffalo route; it also highlights the increase in the number 
of services.
Table 4.2 Fares on the New-York - Buffalo:
Before and After the Arrival of a New Entrant
Date
USAir
(incumbent)
Fare
People Express 
(new entrant) 
Fare
Flights/Month
USAir
Flights/Month 
People Express
pre-Aug 1981 $97 - 325 -
Aug 1981 $97 $37 325 334
end Aug 1981 $37 $37 412 334
(Source: Compiled by author using data by Bailey etal, 1985, p106.)
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Eleven months after People Express entered the route, the two airlines were together 
offering 745 flights per month, traffic had increased threefold since the arrival of the 
new entrant and load factors were 85% and 69% for USAir and People Express 
respectively. People Express repeated this pattern when they entered other routes 
(see Bailey et al, 1985, p106 for a fuller discussion). Bailey et al (1985, p164) cite the 
fare wars as the reason for ticket prices on routes served by new airlines being 20% 
less in 1981 than on the same routes in 1979.
Kahn (1987, p317) argues that new entrants offering tickets at much lower fares 
served to highlight how competition can reduce fares, how regulation had allowed 
incumbents' fares to become inflated and how it also offered them a protective barrier 
against any form of competition. However, this theory seems unlikely to be totally true 
given that between 1979 and 1983 most large airlines experienced losses. 
Continuing intense competition resulted in an average fare reduction of nearly 10 per 
cent in relation to the consumer price index in 1985 and of more than 10 per cent in 
1986 (Sawers, 1987, p36).
Although there were general increases in load factors for both incumbents and new 
entrants, it is unlikely that either type of carrier made substantial profits. The 
unsuccessful carriers with debts and uncompetitive services sought security by 
merging with more successful carriers. Brenner (1988, Fig. 3R) shows high levels of 
consolidation nationally and Maldutis (1987, p6) highlights the high level of 
consolidation at major hubs.
The financial and economic bases of these mergers were the advantages of having 
control of a large number of routes because airlines holding a large network of routes 
can operate at higher load factors. Bailey et al (1985, p169) found that if 55% of 
passengers on one airline's flights were continuing their journey on the same airline, 
its load factor would be 35% higher than if only 10% of passengers were continuing 
on the same airline. Moreover, consolidation allowed dominant positions to be 
created.
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The consolidation of North West and Republic, and of Trans World and Ozark, meant 
that they controlled 75-80% of passengers at their major hub airports (Bailey and 
Williams, 1988, p195). Sawers (1987, p36) suggests that as the availability of 
departure and landing slots became a problem, the only way of obtaining airport 
facilities to service a certain route was to purchase an airline having that access, thus 
resulting in a small group of powerful carriers dominating the market.
Given the volatile situation, Williams (1990, p6) describes any attempt to establish a 
US domestic airline with the aim of operating mainstream scheduled services as 
'commercial suicide'. In I989, America West, Midway and Southwest airlines were the 
only independent national carriers operating in the mainstream US market. By 1991, 
only ten major airlines and ten national carriers were still operational (see table 4.3).
It appears that control of the industry had moved from the CAB to a select number of 
powerful airlines. Williams (1990, p8) suggests that competition had been eradicated 
and that the major carriers had rebuilt their protective barriers.
Table 4.3 The Survivors of Deregulation
MAJOR
AIRLINES
% of MARKET SHARE 
(RPKs) Jan-Sept 1991
NATIONAL
CARRIERS
% of MARKET SHARE 
(RPKs) Jan-Sept 1991
American 18.3 Air Wisconsin 0.1
America West 3.0 Alaska 1.1
Continental 9.4 Aloha 0.1
Delta 14.9 Hawaiian 0.1
Northwest 11.9 Horizon 0.1
Pan Am 5.0 Markair <0.1
Southwest 2.5 Midway 0.9
TWA 6.2 Midwest Express <0.1
United 18.4 Trump Shuttle 0.1
USAir 7.6 WestAir 0.1
(Source: Aviation Daily, 28 October 1991, p174.)
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However, since 1990 a second round of new entrants has entered the market. In the 
first three months of 1993, there were 15 new entrants with more than another 20 
applications pending. Nocella (1993, p5) suggests the changing competitive dynamics 
of the industry as the reason for the second wave of new entrants and that they have 
taken the 'no frills1, low cost, resource efficient Southwest airline as their role model. 
Bennet and Crain (1993, p1) agree that the Southwest model has influenced the 
structure and strategy of those currently entering the market. The new carriers are 
concentrating on high density markets, offering point-to-point services, low cost fares 
and 'no-frills' in-flight services. Tait (1993) and Williams (1993, p15) note that in 
addition to the model supplied by Southwest, there are other reasons why new 
entrants are joining an 'uneconomic environment':
• the inability of large US carriers to control their cost structures;
• the availability of low cost aircraft caused by the many bankruptcies and 
cancelled orders;
• cheap supply of specialised labour;
• easy access to capital; and
• the emergence of empty gates at some airports.
The two most significant reasons are the surplus of trained labour and the over supply 
of cheap aircraft. Stetzer (1993) indicates that the available aircraft can be leased at 
relatively little cost and that personnel made redundant by mergers and bankruptcies 
are prepared to accept non-union rates.
4.6.2 Intensity of Competition and Fares
Lower fares were the predicted by-product of the new competition. There is general 
agreement that competition did bring fares more into line with the structure of the 
industry's resource costs. However, the impact on fares levels was not uniform and 
varied from route to route and market to market. A study by the Federal Trade 
Commission (1988) showed that on average, inflation adjusted fares fell by 6% 
notwithstanding a 45% increase in fuel costs between 1979 and 1985, but that this 
decrease was markedly differentiated between long and short haul routes.
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Moore (1988, pp8-9) shows that the most notable price decreases occurred in long­
distance markets and large-city markets. In small city markets there was actually an 
increase in average fares over the same period. This increase demonstrated for the 
first time the high costs of serving such destinations and confirmed that pre­
deregulation short-haul market prices were set below costs, leading to an insufficient 
allocation of aircraft resources and high load factors. Douglas and Miller (1974) found 
that there was an inverse relationship between distance and load factor. The structure 
of fares did not represent the structure of costs; excess capacity was more obvious in 
long-haul markets than in short-haul markets. Deregulation has reversed this 
situation. Moore's study (1988, p9) also shows that 90% of passengers were flying 
long-distance, thus suggesting that short-haul routes can be more easily substituted 
by other forms of transport. Moore and Winston's (1986, pp8-9) study on the 
economic effects of deregulation shows a decrease in the price of the average 
discounted ticket alongside an increase in the fully flexible or 'coach' fare. Button 
(1990, p147) notes that not only did more discounted fares become available but that 
the discounts became deeper. In 1986 the average discount was 61% below the 
normal economy fare. Thus, those who benefited most from the deregulated fares 
were passengers flying on discounted tickets, while those travelling on fully flexible 
tickets did not benefit from a decrease. The percentage of passengers travelling at 
discounted fares increased enormously as shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4:4
Percentage of Passengers Travelling at Discounted Fares - 1978 & 1988.
Year % Travelling on Discounted Fares
1978 15%
1987 90%
(Source: Federal Trade Commission, January 1988.)
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4.7 INTENSITY OF COMPETITION AND MARKETING STRATEGIES
The intense competition that deregulation provided compelled airlines to engage in 
new competitive strategies. Two of the core strategies were the increased use of 
Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) and Frequent Flier Programmes (FFP), each 
of which is considered below.
4.7.1 Computer Reservation Systems
Williams (1993, p28 ) writes that it is difficult to exaggerate the influence of 
computer reservation systems (CRS) on the development of the air transport 
industry, both in the United States and progressively throughout the rest of the 
world. It is surprising that the value of a CRS as a marketing tool was not initially 
perceived, even though the lead came from American Airlines. American set out in 
the late 1950s
to establish a real-time data processing system which would enable it 
to access the flight details of any of its passengers at all the 
company's locations.
(Williams, 1993, p28)
Working with IBM, it developed SABRE (Semi-Automated Business Research 
Environment) over a six year period, introducing the system into three businesses in 
1964. Simultaneously, TWA and United were developing their own systems but 
neither of these carriers saw them as anything more than ways of handling more 
efficiently and with less labour the amount of data created by growing traffic.
Feldman (1987, p10) considers that one of the principal reasons for the failure of 
these attempts was a fear that the Government would consider a joint system to be 
anti-competitive. However, this is probably more a case of hindsight than a 
reflection of contemporary thinking. A more likely reason was that both American 
and United Airlines undertook to make their systems available to travel agents, thus 
apparently making the development of rival systems unnecessary.
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This judgment was incorrect. The first CRS to be installed in a travel agency was 
operational in 1975 and within a year, American had signed up 90 of the top 100 
companies (Harvard Business School, 1984, p3). Williams (1993, p29) notes that 
at this stage agents paid directly for the service and each received the same sales 
commission irrespective of the carriers's flights booked. However, as new airlines 
came into the marketplace and as fare options proliferated and alternative routings 
became commonplace, so passengers increasingly felt the need for independent 
advice as to the best choice. The result was that by the mid 1980s, all but a small 
minority of agencies were equipped with a CRS (Williams, 1993, p29).
Before deregulation, approximately two-thirds of bookings were made directly with 
airlines. However, by 1993, nearly 80% were made with travel agencies. Having 
one's own system in a travel agent's office ensured a bias in favour of one's own 
services and was increasingly recognised by airlines as a vital marketing tool. CRS 
probably would not have been so influential had each airline been abie to develop 
their own system, in practice, though, the market was dominated by American and 
United, and Williams (1993, p31) notes that until recently the two companies have 
accounted for over 70% of the revenues generated by agency CRSs. This is 
because they had targeted larger firms before the other competitors. Indeed, 
competitors
...had woken up to the fact that a very different game was now being played.
Levine (1987, p464) highlights the benefits which a CRS vendor gains from having 
formed exclusive arrangements with travel agents. These enable him to:
• track the effects of price changes;
• examine a competitor's seat inventory;
• find how many discounted seats rivals have allocated; and
• track changes in shares of inter-city traffic flows and of market segments.
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Williams argues that the manipulation and exploitation of such systems has helped 
to recreate for a few major airlines the protective barriers against competition that 
existed pre-deregulation. Williams (1993, p5) and Pickrell (1991, p30) agree that 
ownership of a CRS allows an airline to induce travel agents to divert some 
passengers to their flights who would otherwise travel on rivals' flights.
However, it must be noted that whilst the more blatant forms of bias in CRS 
information displays was banned by the CAB in 1984, they were quietly replaced by 
other, more sophisticated versions (Williams, 1993, p5). Airlines who were not CRS 
'hosts' remained at a distinct disadvantage. Levine (1987, p37) and Kahn (1988, 
p318) both recognise the importance of CRS for survival in the deregulated market 
and assert that the main reason for the rapid exit of highly competitive new entrants 
was that the larger incumbents had developed efficient CRSs.
4.7.2 Frequent Flier Programmes
Another marketing tool much used by airlines in recent years is the Frequent Flier 
Programme (FFP), designed to establish brand loyalty. It was initially introduced by 
American Airlines in 1982, providing travellers with rewards for continuing to travel 
with the same airline. Although passengers may belong to more than one FFP, the 
programmes are so designed that exclusive membership is more beneficial. Table
4.5 indicates the popularity of each airline's programme in 1990.
Table 4.5 Frequent Flier Programme (FFP) Membership -1990
Airline Carriers FFP Membership in Millions
American 14.2
United 13.3
Delta 10.1
Continental 9.1
Northwest 8.6
USAir 7.8
(Source: Humphreys, B.K. (1991), "Are FFPs Anti-competitive?", 
Avmark Aviation Economist, July/August, p12.)
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4.8 NEW INDUSTRY STRUCTURES: HUB-AND-SPOKE NETWORKS
There is wide agreement (Sawers, 1987, p29; Williams, 1993, p18; Brenner, Leet and 
Schott 1985, p76 ) that the most significant effect of deregulation has been the 
emergence of hub-and-spoke route structures.
Prior to deregulation, carriers did not have the freedom to choose which routes to 
operate, but following deregulation they have had complete freedom of choice. 
Consequently, a pattern has emerged whereby services from the smaller airports are 
fed into a larger airport - thus providing the spokes on the hub - and the hubs linked 
by direct flights with other hubs.
This system is highly advantageous from an operational perspective. Brenner, Leet 
and Schott (1985, pp75-96), Williams (1993, p18) and Button (1990, p149) note that 
airlines quickly realised the benefits of such operations, allowing them to consolidate 
their passenger load onto bigger aircraft and operate at higher load factors from hub 
to hub. Pickreli (1991, p22) writes that by the early 1980s nearly all pre-deregulation 
incumbents and new entrants had started to develop vigorously their operations to 
and from a major hub city. In some cases, this process involved developing a major 
route hub at a city that had been a relatively minor point in the carrier's pre­
deregulation operations.
Wassenbergh (1991, p72) highlights another advantage for airlines: US carriers could 
build US-hubs, through which they could link the entire domestic market to their 
international air services.
'Hubbing' is also claimed to benefit the passenger. Sawers (1987, p29) and Kahn 
(1988, p318) are both of this view, whilst Morrison and Winston (1986, pp8-9) note 
that passengers from small communities appear to have benefited the most because 
of the increased likelihood that they will be able to coordinate connections on one 
carrier from their origin to their destination. Bailey and Williams (1988, p186) add that 
lower fares are one of the by-products of 'hubbing' and another reason why it benefits 
the air traveller.
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However, the consequences of 'hubbing' have not always been of benefit to the 
passenger. Although frequencies increased post deregulation on the lucrative routes 
between major conurbations and on feeder routes into main airports, services on 
direct routes between secondary airports were often reduced or ceased completely. 
Since 1981, 120 airports have iost all scheduled services, whilst 30 new hub airports 
have emerged over the same period. At some of these airports a single carrier may 
account for more than 80 per cent of all traffic handled, in effect'owning1 the airport. 
Thus the hub-and-spoke system provides the opportunity for building a monopoly in a 
local market. Table 4.6 shows that 15 of the 19 major hub airports are dominated by 
one carrier, usually with more than 70% of passengers.
Table 4.6 Hub Airport Market Shares -1992
Hub Dominant Carriers Passenger Mkt. Share (Percent)
Atlanta Delta 84.1
Charlotte USAir 88.7
Chicago O’Hare United 45.7
Chicago O’Hare American 35.9
Cincinnati Delta 78.2
Dallas-Fort Worth American 61.2
Dailas-Fort Worth Delta 29.2
Denver United 46.4
Denver Continental 33.9
Detroit North West 74.1
Houston Intl. Continental 79.3
Minneapolis North West 79.3
Nashville American 70.2
Newark Continental 49.2
Philadelphia USAir 53.6
Phoenix America West 41.5
Phoenix South West 28.1
Pittsburg USAir 84.2
Raleigh/Durham USAir 75.5
St. Louis TWA 66.5
Salt Lake City Delta 82.0
San Francisco United 48.8
Washington Dulles United 64.2
(Source: Avmark Aviation Economist, February 1993 .)
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Bailey at al (1985, p171) in a study of 'ownership' of hubs calculated that an airline 
holding 50% of the departure market from one airport charged fares 7% higher than 
those charged by an airline with a 25% market share. Sawers (1987, p27) agrees 
with Baiiey et al, claiming that any airline controlling a higher percentage of the flights 
from a particular hub and consequently providing a more frequent sen/ice than its 
competitors can charge fares higher than an airline with a lesser percentage.
The formation of mega-carriers was encouraged by the economies of scale that 
resulted from operating a route system through several hubs. Thus new entrants onto 
routes encountered a fresh obstacle, that of trying to match the number of flights 
offered by incumbents. Sawers (1987, p30) supports this assumption, arguing that 
airlines which have a dominant position at a hub airport have control over the local air 
transport market. He goes on to link this dominance with levels of profitability:
...such local monopoly power appears to have become one of the most 
important influences on the profitability of airlines.
Thus, although the benefits of the developing hub-and-spoke system for the mega­
carriers and some consumers are clear, this new structure has also created barriers 
to new entrants, thus reducing competition.
4.9 REGULATORY REFORM IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY - 
LIBERALISATION
The term 'liberalisation' has been the focus of much discussion in the literature on the 
regulatory reform of the aviation sector in the European Community. Chataway (1992) 
refers to the regulatory reforming process as 'the path of deregulation'. Fitzsimons 
(1992, p102) does likewise, viewing the process as the
...EC's attempt to deregulate the industry by bringing it within the terms of the 
Treaty of Rome...
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Sorensen (1992, p252) says that this is a misnomer and claims that to describe what 
is happening in Europe as 'deregulation' is misleading. He argues that what the 
Commission is aiming to achieve is the removal of barriers between Member States 
and the creation of a common aviation policy. He sees the driving force as the 
movement towards the internal market, not deregulation, and thus uses the term 
'liberalisation1. In doing so, he is echoing a distinction between deregulation and 
liberalisation which the European Commission has long emphasised:
It is sometimes claimed that the Community should adopt a similar policy of 
deregulation for intra-Community air transport as the US has done for its 
domestic market. Whatever merits this policy may have in US conditions the 
Commission considers ...[that] there is no point in adopting it in the European 
context since a number of the underlying conditions which made deregulation 
possible in the US do not exist in Europe.
(European Commission, 1984, p26)
The Commission was making reference to the fact that the USA forms a large unified 
market reserved for US carriers, whilst in the EC the air transport sector was still very 
fragmented, being divided into a number of separate national markets within which 
there was a sharp distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled air transport. 
The EC has tried to overcome this fragmentation by progressively moving from a 
regime based on strict government control and reflected in mercantilistic bilateral 
agreements between Member States to the regime of commercial freedom introduced 
in January 1993.
However, most stakeholders in the EC aviation industry do not make the distinction 
between deregulation and liberalisation. Thus in its summary of evidence presented 
to the House of Commons Transport Committee on developments in European air 
transport, the committee notes that:
When asked what they saw as the main differences between deregulation and 
European Community liberalisation, witnesses answered that liberalisation 
would be deregulation without the drawbacks.
(House of Commons Transport Committee, Volume 1, Session 1991-02, p.vii)
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The view held by the UK stakeholders is probably explained by the fact that the 
desired outcome of both these regulatory reforming processes is similar, namely open 
and free markets allowing competition to take place.
4.10 THEORIES AND ASSUMPTIONS OF LIBERALISATION IN THE EC
The theory and philosophy of the regulatory reforming process in Europe are different 
from those that were used in the USA. The EC's philosophy stems from the Treaty of 
Rome with its promotion of open competitive markets in the interests of consumers 
and industry. Button (1991, p174), in highlighting the differences between the United 
States and Europe, explains why the reform of the regulatory frameworks could not be 
the same. On the one hand, the government of each of the Members States has an 
interest both as 'regulator' and (except in the United Kingdom) also as 'owner'. On 
the other hand, institutions of the EC have an obligation to achieve the objectives of 
the founding treaty of the Community, the Treaty of Rome. Sorensen (1991, p177) 
emphasises that the Community's basic philosophy towards civil aviation was totally 
different from that of the United States:
...we are not aiming for deregulation but for a market structure which will be 
able to sustain competition. This means that certain mergers should be 
stopped, predatory pricing should not be allowed, unfair and discriminatory 
market behaviour will be resisted, state aid will in certain circumstances be 
allowed... These are some of the areas where we feel that US deregulation 
has gone too far.
(Sorensen, 1991, p177)
Nevertheless, there is wide agreement in the literature (Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1990, 
pp 12-23; Williams, 1993, pp67-91; Doganis, 1991, p187; IATA, 1983) that the EC had 
many lessons to learn from the US experience of regulatory reform. Doganis (1991, 
p187) argues that the gradualist approach adopted by the Commission was in part 
due to the need to obtain agreement from each of its Member States at every stage 
but in addition, the US approach
...was the wrong way to achieve the benefits of sustained competition.
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As perceived by Brussels, the American authorities made a mistake in removing 
controls without providing any safeguards against market chaos and then in failing to 
use the powers available to them to control take-overs and mergers as the major 
airlines regrouped. By contrast the Commission's approach has always been a 
gradualist one:
... given the general preference for an evolutionary approach to the common 
air transport policy, the Community seeks to develop Community rules on how 
the existing system should be operated in relation to intra-Community 
services.
(European Commission, 1984, p27)
Thus the Community have moved to a single EC air transport market in three 
distinctive stages, spread over a five year period.
4.11 THE OBJECTIVES OF LIBERALISATION IN THE EC
One of the main objectives of the European Community was to bring the air transport 
sector into line with the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The objectives set out in 
the Treaty were reinforced in 1986 it was agreed by the adoption of the Single 
European Act to move towards the creation of a single European market, which the 
Act defines as
...an area without internal frontiers in which freedom of movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured.
The Act set the end of 1992 as the date by which this objective was to be achieved. 
The impetus for change was strong. The EC's main objective in the regulatory 
reforming process of air transport is to achieve competition within the aviation 
industry. If the pursuance of this goal meant that new rules had to be made, then this 
was the policy to be followed.
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Sorensen (in Bannister and Button, 1991, p185) insists that the EC is moving towards 
a competitive air transport sector and argues that deregulation is not the method, but 
rather that new regulations must be created in some areas. He promises outcomes 
similar to those promised by the proponents of US deregulation:
...the end result should be good for consumers and most carriers...
Pelkmans (in Bannister and Button, 1991, p201) also recognises that in order to 
achieve competition at national ievel, re-regulation at supranational level may have to 
be imposed.
4.11.1 Obstacles to achieving a Liberalised Aviation Sector
The Treaty of Rome provided for the free movement of capital and services but made 
specific provisions for only two sectors of the economy, namely transport and 
agriculture. Article 74 of the Treaty states:
The objectives of this treaty shall ...be  pursued by Member States within the 
framework of a common transport policy.
(The Treaty of Rome, 1957, Article 74)
However, Article 84 (i) limited this objective to transport by rail, road and inland 
waterway by stating:
...the Council [of Ministers] may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what 
extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea 
and air transport.
(The Treaty of Rome, 1957, Article 84)
Undoubtedly, the signatories of the Treaty failed to recognise the contribution which 
air transport could make to achieving one of the Community's main objectives, namely
...the abolition as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of 
movement for persons, services and capital.
(The Treaty of Rome, 1957, Article 3).
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The major philosophical difficulty in establishing an EC aviation policy acceptable to 
Member States was, as Wheatcroft and Lipman (1990, p1) highlight, that it had to 
contend with the guarantee of sovereign rights in the air reaffirmed by the Chicago 
Convention of 1944 as well with as the general reluctance of states to surrender 
sovereignty in other fields. Additionally, the Chicago Convention recognised the rights 
of any state to insist that air services within its own territory and on international routes 
established by bilateral air service agreements should be operated only by an airline 
'substantially owned and effectively controlled1 by its own nationals.
4.12 FORCES FOR CHANGE IN THE EC
The political force behind changing the regulatory framework of air transport in Europe 
was thus more complex than in the United States and the process of change was 
inevitably both long and difficult. Loader (1991, p117) notes that actions by Member 
States often disrupted or delayed achievement of EC objectives.
The first determined attempt by the Commission to bring air transport within the 
framework of an EC air transport policy was in July 1979 when it issued a 
memorandum on the contribution of the European Community to the development of 
air transport services. There was strong opposition to the Commission's proposals 
from the European Parliament's Transport Committee, which argued that liberalisation 
would result in a deterioration in services on thin routes and would not reduce fares. 
Williams (1993, p67) adds that the Member States themselves did not welcome EC 
intervention in an area which they regarded as their own preserve and that the 
industry was even less enthusiastic. O'Reilly noted in earlier research that the only 
positive result of the Commission's initiative was the adoption of a very diluted Inter- 
Regional Air Services Directive in July 1983 which proved to be an ineffectual tool with 
restricted influence (O'Reilly, 1993, p15).
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In March 1984, the Commission presented a second Memorandum suggesting that 
the growth of consumer criticism of the system, the effects of the recession on the 
industry and experience in the USA had combined to stimulate debate on the 
suitability of the system to serve the needs of the consumer and industry and had 
called into question the compatibility of the system with the Treaty of Rome (European 
Commission, 1984, p.ii). Attached to the Memorandum were proposals on:
• bilateral agreements;
• fares for scheduled air transport between Member States;
• application of competition rules to the air transport sector; and
• the appropriation of state aid to air carriers.
Williams (1993, p78) views the initial reactions to the proposals as varied according to 
vested interests. The Council of Ministers set up its own working party to consider 
how the recommendations could be implemented. Parr (1992) argues that its report 
failed to reveal agreement on any single issue of importance, with the Member States 
split into liberal and conservative factions and with no conclusions reached. 
Wheatcroft and Lipman (1990, p2) note that the memorandum was negated by the 
continuing insistence by many Member States that a common air transport policy 
could only be negotiated after the Council of Ministers had taken the necessary action 
under Article 84 of the Treaty of Rome to bring air transport formally within its scope. 
The only two Member States to show any real support for the Commission's proposals 
were The Netherlands and the UK. During the their Presidency of the Council in the 
first half of 1986, the Dutch managed to incorporate the following paragraph into the 
conclusions of the European Council at The Hague on 26-27 June 1986:
The European Council concluded that the Council of Ministers (Transport) 
should make a further effort to overcome the difficulties which have recently 
appeared in relation to the liberalisation and harmonisation of land, sea and air 
transport, in the light of the relevant judgements of the European Court of 
Justice. With regard to air transport, the Council of Ministers should without 
delay adopt the appropriate decisions on air tariffs, capacity and access to 
markets, in accordance with the rules of the Treaty.
(European Council, 1986, 34th Meeting)
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The UK Presidency which followed succeeded in getting agreement to all the major 
elements of a first liberalisation package by the end of 1986. The conclusions of the 
next European Council, held in London on 5-6 December 1986, state that:
The European Council welcomed the steady acceleration of progress on the 
internal market over the last year; and looked toward to still faster progress 
when the single European Act enters into force.
They called for substantial further progress in the Transport Council towards
...a Community policy for civil aviation encouraging greater competition 
between airlines and improved services to their customers.
(European Council, 1986, 35th Meeting)
This was achieved by a process of attrition, in July 1986, only the UK and The 
Netherlands were fully committed to liberalisation, with the Belgians giving less than 
full support. Notwithstanding the decision at Heads of Government level, all the other 
Member States were 'lukewarm' or hostile. The UK's success was achieved gradually 
by means of an informal meeting of Ministers in London that autumn, intensive 
negotiations at official level on an almost continuous basis in Brussels and a tour of all 
capitals by senior officials in the Department of Transport.
All the Member States, although for differing reasons, were determined that there 
should be no partial solutions and that the first steps towards liberalisation should take 
the form of a comprehensive, if limited, package. Those countries which favoured 
liberalisation were adamant that as well as making a first step towards the freeing of 
fares, the package should also include measures not just to relax the rigid sharing of 
capacity which had been negotiated bilaterally by all the Member States but also give 
airlines the freedom of market access which had hitherto been denied to them. It was 
this last point - which had not been included in the Commission's proposals but 
introduced by the UK - which proved to be the most difficult to resolve, as of course 
the opponents of liberalisation had anticipated, hence their insistence on a package. 
Their objections were, however, eventually neutralised by the introduction of a series 
of exemptions which excluded certain airports from the provisions of the relevant 
regulation for defined periods of time.
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There could be no quarrel about the application of the competition rules to the aviation 
sector since the Nouvelles Frontieres case in April 1986. Wheatcroft and Lipman 
(1990, p2) view this ruling of the European Court of Justice as being momentous with 
regards to changing the structure of European air transport. The Court ruled that 
competition rules had general application and specifically declared that air transport 
was not excluded from them by Article 84 of the Treaty of Rome. The implications of 
this decision were many. Article 85 specifically prohibits any anti-competitive 
agreements, decisions and practices which may affect trade between EEC Member 
States and Article 86
...prohibits abuse of a dominant position so as to affect trade between Member 
States.
Thus agreement on the complete package was achieved by June 1987, only to be 
frustrated at the last moment by a Spanish demand that it should be extended to the 
airport of Gibraltar This had nothing to do with aviation policy but everything to do 
with the dispute over Gibraltar's sovereignty. Only when the UK and Spain had been 
able to resolve this problem by a holding device was the package finally adopted in 
December 1987.
4.13 THE PROCESS OF LIBERALISATION IN THE EC
4.13.1 The First Package, 1987
The 'first package* of legislation in 1987 consisted of:
• One directive on air fares;
• One decision on market access and the sharing of capacity; and
• Two regulations on the application of the EC competition rules to the air 
transport sector.
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The Directive on air fares applied the principle, introduced by the inter-regional air 
services Directive in 1983, that Member States must approve fares which an airline 
showed were reasonable in relation to its own costs and allow other carriers to match 
fares introduced by its competitors; it included binding arbitration procedures for the 
resolution of disputes. The directive also created 'discount' and 'deep discount' 
zones, permitting airlines to charge lower fares to passengers meeting certain defined 
conditions without prior approval. These restrictions were so strict that in practice that 
there were few immediate user benefits. Nevertheless, this innovation, agreed only 
after protected negotiations, marked an important philosophical advance for the liberal 
cause.
Likewise, the decision on market access and capacity sharing was perhaps more 
important for future openings than for what it actually achieved. All but a few of the 
existing bilateral agreements in Europe provided for a 50/50 sharing of capacity on 
routes designated by both parties. The decision allowed for unilateral designation on 
new routes between regional and main (or hub) airports and for multiple designation 
on routes linking hub airports where traffic exceeded defined levels. It also introduced 
limited rights to operate 'consecutive fifth freedom' services, ie. services starting or 
finishing in the airline's home state which linked airports in two other Member States.
All this would have been of no value if the decision had not provided for some 
flexibility in capacity sharing. In the first year, the airlines of one Member State had 
the right to extend their share to 55% of the total capacity provided on services to and 
from the other country concerned; whilst in the second year this could be extended to 
60% unless it could be shown that the first step had created serious economic 
difficulties for the other country's carriers. A number of temporary derogations were 
also including as the price for getting agreement, including the exclusion of certain 
airports in Denmark, Greece, Italy and Spain from the market access provisions.
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The two competition regulations created detailed rules for the application of Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty to the air transport sector and provided 'block exemptions1 
from the provisions of these articles for defined cooperative practices accepted as 
providing significant user benefit. With few amendments, these regulations have 
been carried through into the second and now the third stages of liberalisation.
Three points in particular should be noted about the first package:
• it applied only to intra-Community scheduled services and left Member 
States entirely free in their relationships with third countries.
• By ignoring relations between individual governments and their own 
airlines, it allowed Member States to suppress ail internal competition for 
their flag carriers.
• Most importantly, it was founded on principles of liberalisation which it did 
little to promote in practice.
Argyris (1988, cited in Williams 1993, p81), Head of Division in the Commission's 
Directorate General for Competition, notes that the Commission would like to have 
achieved more in the first phase, but was willing to settle for the agreed package on 
the basis of a commitment by the Council of Ministers to adopt further measures by 
30 June 1990.
The Air Transport Users Committee (AUC), representing the interests of users in the 
UKwas also less than wholly enthusiastic (AUC Annual Report, 1987/88, pp13 - 14). 
The Committee viewed the package as a modest first step for liberalisation and called 
for the Commission to adopt a more robust stance to ensure the stimulation of 
competition. The AUC also added a further caveat: in order for competition to be 
successful, the necessary infrastructure must be provided. This paradox was to be a 
constant theme of the debates underlying the two succeeding stages of the 
liberalisation process.
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4.13.2 The Second Package, 1990
Even the Member States with the strongest reservations had to recognise that the 
'first package' did not lead to market disruptive developments and the Council of 
Ministers was able to reach agreement on a 'second package1 in 1990 without great 
difficulty. This 'second package1 consisted essentially of two major regulations on 
fares and on market access/capacity sharing. A third new regulation simply made 
minor adjustments to the existing 'block exemptions' regulation.
Only two features of the package warrant particular mention:
Feature 1
Fares above 100 per cent of the 'reference level’ became subject to a 'double 
disapproval' regime, whereby they would be automatically approved if not disapproved 
by the authorities at both ends of the route concerned. The principle seemed obvious: 
in a more competitive environment, the authorities could afford the controls to be 
relaxed in the knowledge that market pressures would provide their own disciplines. 
However, there was another possible outcome which was not foreseen by the 
Commission, namely that airlines would collude, implicity or otherwise, to take 
advantage of double disapproval to push through excessive price increases in ways 
not hitherto available. Perhaps recognising this potential danger, the Council, 
although adopting the Commission's proposals, did include the following passage in 
the preamble to the fares regulation:
Whereas a system of double disapproval of air fares remains an 
objective to be achieved by 1 January 1993, whereas an important 
element in achieving further liberalisation consists of gaining 
experience of this system during the interim period...
(Council Regulation [EEC] No. 2342/90 of 24 July 1990 on fares for 
scheduled air services, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
No L. 217 of 11.08.90, p1)
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Thus the double disapproval regime was put on trial and had exactly the results 
predicted by the AUC (AUC Annual Report, 1988/89, p7). Predictably, not one fare 
increase on routes to and from the UK was challenged by the other country involved 
and fares to and from the UK rose nearly 20% in eighteen months. The UK 
government appealed to the Commission against over 100 increases but no decisions 
were announced for almost two years as compared to the two months period 
prescribed in the regulation. As a result, although the Commission did find against a 
third of the increases, its decisions had no practical effect because few if any of the 
fares concerned were still in effect when the decisions were announced.
Feature 2
The Council accepted that uniform licensing criteria should be adopted for the EC as 
a whole by 1 July 1992. This gave Member States' airlines the right to operate 
wherever they chose within the Community and, more importantly in the long term, 
removed Member States' power to prevent the creation of new airlines to compete 
with their own flag carriers. Otherwise, the reforms were couched in terms of a further 
progressive relaxation of existing bilateral restrictions.
4.13.3 The Third Package, 1992
The 'third package' was adopted by the Council of Ministers in July 1992 and took 
effect on 1 January 1993. It consisted of five regulations:
• One regulation established a common system of airline licensing.
• Two regulations on fares and market access replaced corresponding 
regulations in the 'second package1.
• Two regulations made a small but nevertheless important number of 
charges to the existing competition regulations, removing the distinctions 
between scheduled and non-scheduled sen/ices and between national and 
international operations.
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With a few exceptions, and those for the most part of a temporary nature, the 'third 
package’ gives Community carriers complete commercial freedom within the EC air 
transport market. In theory it is now possible for any EC citizen or company to set up 
an airline in any Member State, subject only to complying with the new common 
licensing rules. Once established, that airline will be free to provide services on any 
route within the Community (except, until April 1997, between airports in another 
Member State) and to provide unlimited capacity at whatever frequencies and 
whatever fares it chooses.
4.14 THE PREDICTIONS AND FIRST FRUITS OF EC LIBERALISATION
The literature on the impact of liberalisation is predictable given its relatively short 
history at the time of writing. The majority of the literature reflects on what the 
liberalisation process might bring about as opposed to what it has actually achieved, 
although developments have occurred in the areas of state aid, fares, new carriers 
and merger agreements. It is therefore difficult at present to assess the impact of the 
regulatory reforms from a literature search.
4.14.1 Predicting the Impact of Liberalisation on the EC Air Transport Sector
Predictions on the impact of liberalisation have again predictably been the subject of 
conflicting views. McGregor, the UK Secretary of State for Transport, predicted that 
liberalisation would lead to fierce competition (Daily Telegraph, 23 June 1992). 
Sorensen (1992) agrees and claims that airlines will now be in the position to make 
competitive and commercial decisions without the intervention of national 
governments. Van Miert, the EC Transport Commissioner (Financial Times, 23 June 
1992) and Sorensen (cited in Bannister and Button, 1991, p177) stress that lower 
fares will be an inevitable result of this unleashed competition. Surprisingly, given the 
attention that was paid by the Commission to the US experience, Sorensen adopts 
the failed 'contestability theory' as the supporting hypothesis for his predictions 
regarding the advent of lower prices.
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He argues that "a sufficient number of competitors in the market or the threat of 
market entry" will be enough to produce lower fares. On the other hand, Abbot and 
Thompson (1991) in their study which reflects on the first 'two packages1 show that 
the threat of new entrants is not enough to provoke and sustain a competitive 
response, or bring about lower prices. They did find, however, that on those routes 
where liberalisation had resulted in the establishment of a new airline, customers had 
benefited from higher flight frequencies but that similar benefits had not materialised 
on routes were no new airline was operating. The study concluded that competition 
would not occur automatically because the route itself was liberalised, but that a third 
carrier needed to enter the route and break the traditional duopoly mould.
These findings confirm those of Bailey's (1985, p62) study of the results of US 
deregulation, which reports that fare reductions were substantially greater in markets 
where new entrants had competed than where new entry was merely threatened. 
Therefore, it seems clear that a free market does not automatically lead to greater 
choice and that without a carefully formulated safeguard policy, the strong may get 
stronger and the weak weaker.
This finding is given added weight by an examination of the UK domestic aviation 
market. The UK had operated a largely deregulated domestic market since 1982 but 
it is only on those routes which have experienced the addition of another carrier that 
fares have fallen. In 1982, British Airways had competition for the first time from 
British Midland on the Heathrow to Glasgow route. By 1985, the other two major trunk 
routes - Heathrow to Edinburgh and Belfast - had also been opened up by British 
Midland. The result of the new entrant actually flying on these routes led to fare 
reductions and improved service with both BA and BM forced to compete for market 
share, thus vindicating Bailey and Abbott & Thompson.
The general consensus in the industry (Marshall, B.A., Sunday Times, 28 June 1992; 
Parr, A.U.C., Financial Times, 24 June 1992) immediately after the introduction of the 
'third package' was that very little would happen quickly.
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Schmid (1992, p199) notes predictions concerning a low survival rate of airlines in the 
newly liberalised EC market. He argues that survival in the future will be determined 
by having the right slots at airports and secondly by the charging of attractive but 
economic fares. Gialloreto (1992, p39) agrees that economic fares and perceived 
customer value are all important. Those whose profit margins are dependent upon 
customer yield per seat as opposed to seats filled may find themselves in serious 
trouble. Airlines will either have to "provide a product that is far superior to others in 
actual and perceived customer value, or suffer poor bottom line performance".
Schmid (1992, p200) writes that airlines operating ‘inefficient management’ strategies 
will feel the threat of competition most keenly and Gialloreto (1992, p34) argues that 
despite the fact that the European carriers were able to learn from US experience, 
management strategies in Europe remain inefficient.
Lockwood (1992, p49) draws attention to the flag-carriers of the Member States which 
have been propped up by their national governments for over 40 years. These 
carriers have not needed to be, or to become, efficient because government subsidies 
or State aids have always been plentiful. He makes the point that new entrants and 
small carriers will find it difficult to survive in a market where the home carrier is 
financially protected by the State, irrespective of its efficiency. Schmid (1992, p203) 
also doubts the survival of small and new carriers, arguing that those not finding a 
niche will be merged with a big carrier. Fitzsimons (1992, p103) suggests that the 
mergers will go beyond the new or small carrier and that
Ultimately, Lufthansa, Air France, and British Airways, plus probably KLM, 
Swissair, SAS and Austrian are likely to emerge, in one grouping or another, 
among the major world-class airlines. The others will not necessarily fold, but 
the 1990s are likely to see strong competition for the US $100 billion that will 
be needed for fleet renewal over the next ten years.
Lockwood (1992, p50) suggests that the airlines are convinced that without major 
partnerships they will not survive. SAS, KLM, Austrian, Swissair, Iberia and Alitalia 
have all entered or are actively pursuing partnerships within and beyond Europe, 
whilst TAP (Air Portugal), and Olympic appear to be close to desperation.
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4.15 CONCLUSIONS ON THE LITERATURE REVIEW
4.15.1 Deregulation in the United States: Contestability Theory
The US experience of deregulation has disproved Bailey's and Baumoi's (1984) 
'contestability theory’. In particular, their assertion that costless entry and exit, the 
absence of sunk costs and complete abolition of all entry barriers would force 
incumbents into preemptive price competition irrespective of the degree of 
concentration, was not realised. Indeed the experiences of US airline deregulation 
has not validated any aspect of contestability theory but has instead led to a variety of 
largely unpredicted outcomes which are considered below.
4.15.2 Measurable Outcomes of Deregulation in the United States
There is general agreement in the literature that US deregulation did initially increase 
the scope and intensity of competition in the airline industry when the intensity of 
competition is measured by:
• the number of new entrants which entered the market;
• fare levels;
• customer choice; and
• carrier profitability.
However, in addition to these expected outcomes, there were other unpredicted and 
more significant outcomes which radically changed the structure of the industry and 
the strategies of the airlines.
Stimulated principally by the influx of new entrants, competition greatly intensified and 
resulted in:
• a redesign of route systems into hub-and-spoke networks;
• a large increase in the frequency of services;
• a major increase in the number of discounted fares;
• high losses and bankruptcies in the industry;
• an emerging oligopolistic structure; and
• a second round of efficient and cost conscious new entrants.
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Airlines were forced, because of these immense structural changes, to develop new 
strategies appropriate to the post-deregulation era. Among the main strategies 
adopted were:
• the aggressive pursuit of market dominance by a small number of large 
carriers;
• consolidation through mergers and acquisitions to give critical mass;
• the development of new marketing strategies, e.g. CRSs and FFPs to build 
market share and create barriers to entry; and
• the development of niche strategies by relatively small competitors.
Finally, there is general agreement in the literature (Shepherd, 1988, pp113-28 and 
Humphreys, 1987, pp7-8) that despite the consolidation and mergers that occurred 
and the resultant oiigopoiistic structure, competition has been and continues to be 
effective in keeping fares down and providing consumer choice: the hallmark of 
competition. Thus US deregulation experience provides a benchmark against which 
the results of liberalisation in the European Community can be compared.
4.15.3 Liberalisation in the European Community
The European Commission, because of contradictory national political agendas and 
because of scepticism concerning some aspects of deregulation in the USA, did not 
adopt a model or process that was identical to that used in America. The Commission 
wished to, and did, acquire a legal right to intervene in the market, believing that the 
consumer should not suffer if market mechanisms failed. Thus the EC agenda was 
much less laissez faire than that of the United States and far from decreasing 
regulation, the liberalisation process has in some respects increased it.
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The predictions on the outcomes of liberalisation in Europe largely concur, although 
there are differences of opinions on the impact that competition will have on fare 
levels. Hence not all the following are mutually compatible.
• an increase in the number of carriers on routes;
• an increase in the number of flight frequencies;
• lower fares will result automatically;
• lower fares will only result where traditional duopolies are challenged by a 
third carrier;
• airlines will be compelled to allocate resources more efficiently; and
• a competitive industry will develop.
Because of these changes, it is predicted that airlines will need to develop new 
strategies appropriate to the post-liberaiisation era. Among the main strategies 
predicted are:
• the aggressive pursuit of market dominance by a small number of large 
carriers;
• the consolidation of carriers through mergers and acquisitions to give 
critical mass;
• the development of new marketing strategies - CRSs and FFPs and code 
sharing - to build market share and to create barriers to entry; and
• the development of niche strategies by relatively small competitors.
Although EC liberalisation differs in some major respects from US deregulation, the 
predicted outcomes do have significant symmetry with the American experience. 
Thus, this experience can be used as a benchmark for an assessment of the likely 
outcomes of liberalisation in Europe.
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Chapter 5 - Theoretical Framework for Deregulation 
of the Aviation Sector
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Although there are many theoretical bases which have been used to promote and 
justify deregulation - see Baumoi (1982), Bailey (1986), Chapters 2, 3 and 4 above - 
the difficulty of selecting a particular approach for analysis is that no single theoretical 
approach is dominant in the study of regulatory reform of the aviation sector. 
However, scrutiny of aviation policy literature highlights that the two principal elements 
of regulatory reform of the industry are political and competitive. This suggests that 
two seminal approaches taken together can provide a comprehensive and 
complementary framework for the process. These approaches are Easton's (1965a) 
systems theory and Porter's (1980) competitive strategy. This chapter examines in 
detail how each of these approaches can be used to analyse and evaluate the 
process of airline deregulation.
5.2 THE SYSTEM THEORY APPROACH
A central concept which 'modern' political scientists such as Easton, Dahl, Almond, 
Aptor and Deutsch claim to have introduced into the study of politics, in an effort to 
create a more systematic discipline, is that all political life should be seen as a 
'system' or a set of interacting systems and that political analysis is a form of 
analysing systems - 'systems analysis'.
As the concept of system is borrowed from the natural sciences, difficulties arise when 
it is utilised for the analysis of social and political phenomena. In the natural sciences, 
the systems concept is usually used to refer to clearly defined sets of interactions 
around which recognisable boundaries can be drawn. However, the sets of 
interactions which constitute political systems cannot be so completely or clearly 
delineated since the operation of the system is much more open to influence, not only 
from internal interactions within the system but also from relationships and 
interactions which are external to it.
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Thus, utilising the systems concept demands an assessment both of interactions 
which properly constitute the political system and of the development of conceptual 
mechanisms capable of indicating the exchanges between a political 
institution/system and its environment. Indeed, to account for a system exclusively in 
terms of its internal activities, isolated from the influences of its environment, would be 
to take a superficial view of political life as a 'closed' system. The analysis must also 
take into account the part played by the non-political aspects of societal life.
Consequently, every political system must be viewed as an 'open' system, i.e. it is 
open to outside influences. Almond (1966, p869) suggests that this view was a vital 
step in the development of the science of politics. The aim of modern political 
scientists was the creation of a 'systematic theory' to help view how others looked at a 
social/political system and simultaneously clarify and focus the relationships among 
social science data. Easton (1953) argued that there had been a dearth of orienting 
concepts in political science in recent decades resulting in 'hyperfactualism': too much 
concentration on the accumulation of facts and a lack of rigour applied to the 
promulgation of theories capable of explaining their significance (Easton, 1953, p65). 
Easton was concerned with 'causal theory', which
...seeks to show the relationships between political facts.
(Easton 1953, p52)
The existence of such theory, Easton argues (1953, p53), is indicative of the 
development of any science, both social and physical, and a necessary prerequisite 
for the attainment of reliable knowledge. Easton created a method for ordering the 
various phenomena of political life, suggesting that knowledge gained about one 
sphere of politics and the concepts derived from examination of that specific sphere 
could be used both to understand other spheres and to predict likely occurrences 
within them.
123
Chapter 5 - Theoretical Framework for Deregulation of the Aviation Sector
Almond (1960, p.vii ) identified the properties which the interactions of a political 
system has as:
• comprehensiveness;
• interdependence; and
• the existence of boundaries.
In support of this notion, Easton (1965a, pp24-25) also highlights a number of 
definitive characteristics as a basis for the meaningful utilisation of the systems 
concept in political science. Political life is identified as a system of behaviour, 
differentiated from the environment within which it exists but simultaneously open to 
influences from that environment. Changes in the structures and processes of the 
system usually occur as a reaction to stress, and the mechanisms that a system uses 
to avoid this stress are the means of sustaining its identity over a period of time.
The systems theory organises all political data into four groups:
• inputs;
• the political system;
• outputs; and
• feedback.
This perspective (See Figure 5.1) shows that all political activities can be understood 
by analysing the inputs (e.g. voting, letter writing, lobbying), the political system (e.g. 
multi-party democracy) and the outputs (e.g. laws, regulations, directives), with a 
feedback loop to ensure that the system maintains its identity.
124
Chapter 5 - Theoretical Framework for Deregulation of the Aviation Sector
Figure 5.1 The Political Environment Feedback Loop
The feedback loop is the most original part of the systems theory in that it suggests a 
flow, a reaction to the outputs by those making the inputs. The feedback capacity 
provides mechanisms which can assimilate and then transmit to the system the 
information from its environment which is relevant to its continuing existence and 
activity (Almond and Coleman, 1960, p11).
All systems theorists also support the notion that all political life, and thus the societies 
of which they are part, are coherent systems with interdependent parts common to 
them all. By utilisation of only these four concepts, they argue that they can adequately 
simplify and explain all events.
Systems theory is considered to be a macro-level theory and is concerned, not with 
individuals as such, but rather with the roles that individuals play and their interactions.
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5.3 ASPECTS OF DAVID EASTON'S SYSTEMS THEORY
Easton provided political science with its first rigorous theory - the systems theory. 
Although Easton prefers to call it a framework, systems theory reflects one of the first 
conscious attempts to develop a theory of what is and what exists in contemporary 
political sciences as opposed to what society or political systems ought to be. Easton 
(1965a) perceived his task to be to
...identify a set of behaviours that... (can be described) as political, and in the 
process to construct an analytical system - a theory that would help to explain 
the behaviourial reality
with the primary objective of creating a general theory to
...establish criteria for identifying the important variables requiring investigation 
in all political systems.
(Easton, 1965a, p8)
Easton utilises the term political system to mean
...that set of interactions abstracted from the totality of social behaviour 
through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society.
(Easton, 1965a, p57)
Political interactions are differentiated from other interactions by virtue of the fact that 
they are primarily geared towards those authoritative allocations which are normally 
viewed as 'outputs' of the political system. Generally, outputs take the form of 
government policies, decisions and implementing actions.
Authoritative allocations of values are not restricted to the societal political system. 
Members of society may be compelled to adhere to the decisions taken in 
subsystems of the national social system: industries and the companies within them 
are examples of such systems. Easton refers to these as 'para-political' systems and 
they can be differentiated from the national political system because they have a 
narrower remit. Easton defines a system as follows:
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Any set of variables selected for description and explanation may be 
considered a system of behaviour. What commands attention is the need to 
decide whether the set of activities is an interesting one ... (or the inter­
relationship between its parts significant) ...in the sense that it is relevant and 
helps us to understand some theoretical problems.
(Easton, 1965a, pp30-31)
The political system's environment is made up of those other interactions in the 
society which it is responsible for regulating. Easton cites as examples the ecological, 
biological and social systems, along with all interactions in other national societies. 
The environment provides disturbances to the system, disturbances being
... all activities ... that can be expected to, or do, displace a system from its 
current pattern of operations, regardless of whether it is stressful for the 
system.
(Easton, 1965a, pp90-91)
Fig 5.2 exhibits the importance of the systematic feedback loop. Stress occurs when 
the system is disturbed by a new external stimulus which in turn necessitates new 
allocations and the seeking of compliance with them. Sufficient stress could bring 
about the downfall of the political system. However, the system has mechanisms to 
help it contend with stress, the principal device being feedback which equips the 
system with information about society members' reactions to allocations.
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Figure 5.2 The Systematic Feedback Loop
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The political system is primarily disturbed by the wants of members whose fulfilment 
appears to require an authoritative allocation. However, wants do not automatically 
become allocations as they are sieved at the point of entry into the system and also on 
their journey through it by gatekeepers. Easton (1965a, p90) views gatekeepers as 
playing a very valuable role in the filtering of wants to becoming allocations:
Even if many and varied wants are created in the environment of the systems 
and even if the political culture ... permits their conversion to demands, whether 
or not they gain admission will hinge on the characteristics and behaviour of 
these gatekeepers who straddle the channels of admission to the system.
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Gatekeepers can be interest groups, political parties and administrators. Wants which 
succeed in entering a system become 'demands', a distillation of many similar 
aspirations into a manageable political issue. Therefore, a demand is a want which 
has succeeded in becoming placed on the political agenda as a basis for a political 
decision.
In addition to wants and demands the other principal input into the system is support, 
which is concentrated in the three components of the system:
• the political community;
• the regime; and
• the authorities.
When this support fails, it is the result of 'output failure1 which is a consequence or a 
direct result of 'cleavage', social and cultural diversity and group conflict caused by:
• failure by the authorities to act to meet demands;
• failure to produce outputs to anticipate future demands; or
• failure to produce outputs of sufficient quality.
The system’s response to loss of support can take one or more principal forms:
• attempting to unify the membership of the system by reducing differences 
within the group (e.g. expelling dissident minorities);
• making structural changes in regime arrangements; and
• seeking 'specific' support, originating from specific outputs.
Such actions will prove insufficient unless there is sufficient 'diffuse' support, a more 
generalised attachment to the system flowing from outputs over time which create a 
store of sentiment/feeling which the authorities can utilise when necessary.
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Also significant is the fact that whilst outputs normally produce direct effects which are 
relatively easy to measure, indirect consequences - 'outcomes' - which are difficult to 
measure may emerge over time to become more important than the original outputs. 
Lastly, the effect which outputs have on the level of support is highlighted by the 
'feedback' loop which functions to regulate error. The feedback loop ensures that the 
system is always pointed in an established and purposive direction or purposive 
redirection.
5.4 A CRITIQUE OF EASTON'S MODEL
Criticism of Easton's model has centred on its lack of potential value to the study of 
policy making. Leslie (1972, p63) suggests that the notion of persistence is an 
insufficient basis upon which to construct a general theory of political activity. He 
goes on to suggest that systems analysis should be viewed as providing a general 
theory rather than a framework for an analysis of political authority. Silverman (1970, 
p32) also makes this criticism and further argues that systems analysis implies 
statements about organisations that cannot be reduced to statements about 
individuals. This an important weakness since
...any attempt to understand the pattern of interaction within one role-system 
must pay attention to the other role-systems in which its members are 
involved.
Systems analysis too often views organisations from the authorities' perspectives, 
ignoring the importance of motivation, differential perception and the distribution of 
power, and it makes possibly unwarranted assumptions about the degree of 
commitment and the consensus to be found in organisations:
The systems approach in assuming that organisations 'exist as instruments for 
the attainment of valued future states' has limited itself unnecessarily by 
tending to play down the political and status concerns of those concerned and 
by implying that goals and actions are largely conditioned by the problems of 
the organisation and by role-expectations as defined by the formal structure.
(Silverman, 1970, p41)
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While Silverman's observations on the limits of consensus and the scope for political 
conflict or action within a system are valuable, they are perhaps too generalised to be 
applicable to all organisations without considerable further development and 
differentiation.
Silverman (1970) is supported by Me Kenzie (1967), who argues that whilst systems 
analysis may be of use when analysing the political system globally, it is not useful 
when attempting to trace the origin of any one large complicated decision within a 
complex system. In fairness to Easton (1979, p89), this is not his purpose:
My approach to the analysis of political systems will not help us to understand 
why any specific problems are adopted by the politically reluctant members in 
a system.
Leslie and Nettl both support Silverman in the view that whilst systems analysis has 
some disadvantages as a general theory, it may have more to offer as a framework 
for analysis.
Nettl (1966) claims the stress which the systems concept inevitably lays on 
boundaries and on the autonomy of the system is not conducive to an analysis of 
inter-system relationships. He does accept, however, that the particular advantage of 
systems analysis is its stress on policy making as a process enabling /allowing 
/encouraging the system to adapt itself to new stimuli, a view which is also supported 
by Me Kenzie (1967).
The emphasis in the systems analysis is on how political life is perceived, rather than 
an explanation of how particular outputs are produced. Therefore, it does not explain 
the distribution of power as such or its consequences, nor does it highlight the impact 
of the overall allocation of power. Despite these limitations, systems analysis does 
offer a coherent theoretical framework with which to examine these aspects of the 
aviation industry.
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5.5 SYSTEMS THEORY APPLIED TO THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
Easton is concerned with the processes by which the authoritative value allocations 
are reached rather than the structures concerned and holds that
...our need to understand structures is vital. But they can be analyzed 
successfully ... only after we have thoroughly and unambiguously laid the 
kinds of functions characteristic of political systems. To do otherwise is to put 
the cart before a non-existent horse.
(Easton, 1965a, p126)
Analysing the system of the aviation industry involves identifying the component 
elements of the para-political system, tracing their relationships and following the 
policy-making process through the system. People operate within systems, whether 
they are aware of this or not, and whether or not they are aware of the implications.
The first step in the systems analysis of the aviation industry is to identify the 
stakeholders and consider them as components of para-political systems. They are 
numerous and varied and interact with each other on different levels and at different 
times depending on the external environment. They include:
• Regulators
• Buyers
• Suppliers
• Competitors
• Substitutes
Figure 5.3 displays the main stakeholders in the EC industry, who are in turn 
categorised into specific groups depending upon their wants or their part in the 
political system.
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Figure 5.3 Main Stakeholders in the EC Aviation Industry
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(Source: Compiled by the present author.)
Application of the system analysis to explain the interaction and relationships of some 
of these stakeholders can be viewed on various levels. One simple model that explains 
the system of the aviation industry is to view the regulators and customers as those 
providing the input and making demands on the system - the aviation industry (see 
figure 5.4).
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Figure 5.4 Interaction & Relationships of Stakeholders
INPUTS
(Source: Compiled by the present author.)
5.5.1 An Example of Regulatory Input
International safety standards are established in the framework of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) but are applied nationally.
ICAO comprises national aviation authorities within the framework of the United 
Nations' permanent international forum of 157 Member States. It is primarily 
concerned with issues of international safety regulations, technical equipment, air 
maps, identity markings, landing instructions, and airport standards. Doganis (1991 
p24) refers to these operations as non-economic regulations and goes on to identify 
five such categories:
1. Regulations which deal with the airworthiness of the aircraft not only in terms 
of design, production standards and performance but under different 
operating conditions.
2. Regulations covering the time, nature and supervision of maintenance and 
overhaul work and the training and qualifications of the engineers who carry 
out such work.
3. Regulations governing the number and types of flight and cabin crew, their 
duties, training and licensing and their workload schedules.
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4. Regulations covering both the way in which aircraft are operated (i.e. flight 
preparation and in-flight procedures) and also the operation of airlines 
themselves. In all countries, all air transport must be licensed by the 
relevant authority and must satisfy certain criteria and operating standards. 
In the case of the UK, this regulator is the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).
5. Regulations and recommended standards concerning aviation 
infrastructure, i.e. meteorological services, en route navigational facilities 
and so on.
In the United States, these regulations take the form of Federal Aviation Regulations 
and in the United Kingdom they are laid down in the Civil Navigation Order (CAA, 
1981). Whilst there may be variety of detail from country to country, they are 
generally based on a series of International Standards and Recommended Practices 
produced by ICAO as 16 annexes to the Chicago Convention of 1944.
Irrespective of where it is manufactured, certification of any UK registered aircraft will 
involve the Civil Aviation Authority in an examination of the aircraft to ensure that it 
reaches the safety standards required by the Authority. When the manufacturer is 
British, it is involved from the earliest stage of the project and, a regular and detailed 
technical dialogue is maintained with the manufacturer throughout.
When satisfied, the CAA issues a Type Certificate, and approves the flight manual. 
Each of the early aircraft is flown by a CAA pilot to ensure standards are being met 
and are consistent. The feedback highlights whether the certification is ill adapted or 
otherwise, and this in turn may lead to further inputs from the regulator resulting in a 
modified regulation. ‘Safe’ aircraft are the output.
5.5.2 An Example of Buyer Input
Another input in this model could be demands from customers regarding lower air 
fares or better quality of service (see Figure 5.3 above). In this instance the airlines 
within the system react and translate the demands into outputs in the form of lower air 
fares or better inflight service.
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The feed-back loop highlights the level of customer satisfaction with the outputs: 
increased loads indicate customer satisfaction, whilst a fall indicates dissatisfaction 
and a switch to substitute methods of transportation. The system receives these 
inputs and adjusts air fares and services accordingly.
Such simple applications of the systems are adaptable to any one of a limitless 
number of circumstances.
5.6 A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO AVIATION DEREGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES
A more detailed application of systems analysis can be used to explain the decision to 
deregulate the airline industry in the United States. Easton's theory accounts for how 
and why governments, authorities and specific systems work and satisfy those with a 
legitimate interest - the stakeholders. The specific stakeholders in this instance were:
• the Civil Aviation Board (CAB)
• the Carter Administration
• Politicians
• Consumer Lobbies
• Trade Unions
• Airlines
• Airport Operators
• Academics
The US aviation industry was transformed in the 1970s: it experienced numerous 
demands and many stresses but ultimately the system was maintained and worked to 
satisfy some of those with legitimate interests. By utilising systems analysis, an 
attempt will be made to discover how the industry survived and reacted to internal and 
external demands and stresses (see Fig 5.3).
5.6.1 The Intra-Societai Environment
In the early 1970s the intra-societal environment of the US aviation industry was 
characterised by tight regulation of market entry, services and fares. This regime 
created a very secure environment within which established airlines could operate 
without any real threat of serious competition.
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Meyer et al (1981, p36) judge that regulation by the CAB provided a shield more than 
a constraint for those airlines "lucky enough to be allowed into the certificated 
industry", whilst Sawers (1987, p16) notes that the CAB regarded the preservation of 
the 16 trunk airlines that existed in 1938 - which became the chief protagonists of 
regulation - as one of its main objectives. As Meyer et al (1981 p.36) note, protection 
in the form of rigorous control increasingly curbed managerial freedom as individual 
company strategies inevitably had to be "brought into line with the flock". The industry 
became more concerned with satisfying the regulators than with satisfying the 
customer.
5.6.2 Inputs
The inputs into this system can be categorised into:
• Political
• Academic
• Consumer.
Each one can be seen as being made up of two essential elements: demand and 
support.
The political input into the regulatory reform process was primarily demanding. 
Opposition to the policies of the CAB progressively intensified and peaked in late 
1974 during the hearings of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure under the Chairmanship of Senator Edward Kennedy. Breyer 
(1990, p48) notes that the Kennedy Report revealed that the CAB violated relevant 
regulatory statues, employed inadequate or improper procedures, inappropriately 
concentrated on increasing profits for the airlines rather than reducing fares, pursued 
incoherent route and award policies and directed its enforcement policies to stop 
charters and other low-flight fares.
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The political demand input was coupled with empirical support input Academic 
research on the regulatory framework and on unregulated intra-state aviation markets 
of comparable size in the USA concluded that these alternative markets were able to 
offer lower fares and that consequently regulatory reform was necessary. The 
research thus supported the demands for a change in the regulatory framework.
The effects on the CAB were dramatic. Pickrell (1991, p8) reports that the CAB 
"within which many of these measures had been controversial" instructed a dedicated 
group to examine possible reforms of its regulatory policies. Recommendations from 
this project team included CAB relaxation of capacity limitation agreements and a 
slackening of its rigorous control over fares and new entrants into the market.
Consumers dissatisfied with the high fares that resulted from rises in oil prices and 
high inflation also made an input to the system by complaining to their Congressmen 
and Senators. Aware of the volatility of their position and that a general election was 
forthcoming, the political system had a strong incentive to react to these demands.
5.6.3 The Extra-Societal Environment
The extra-societal environment at the time of deregulation was one of support for 
regulatory reform as strict controls were deemed responsible for inefficient allocation 
of resources and thus high prices. The Carter Administration was involved in his 
re-election campaign and needed to convince the electorate that the high level of 
inflation in 1977-78 could be brought under control. Another political concern was the 
high budget deficit which the Administration recognised would be reduced by the 
abolition of the CAB. Thus the extra-societal system was conducive to support and 
demand inputs were made by the relevant stakeholders.
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5.6.4 The Political System
The political system was thus 'open' to external influences. Interaction occurred 
between the Administration, the demands and the extra-societal environment. Easton 
argues that the demands are crucial because they produce stress and that the more 
demands a political system is prepared to accept, the greater the pressure on that 
system. In this instance, the demands were numerous, they were filtered and allowed 
by the gatekeeper to enter the political system. The demands provoked the political 
system into producing the following outputs:
• Creation of Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure which 
concluded that airline prices should be lower and that this would occur if the 
industry was made to be more competitive.
• Appointments of supporters of deregulation to important and influential 
office:
1. Appointment of John Robson to the CAB in 1975. Robson was in 
favour of allowing new and incumbent carriers to start and stop 
services without prior CAB approval.
2. Appointment of Alfred Kahn to the Chairmanship of CAB in 1978. 
Kahn, an advocate of relaxing regulation, has come to be regarded 
as the 'father' of deregulation.
• The Airline Deregulation Act passes through Congress in 1978.
The Airline Deregulation Act came into effect in 1978. It provided for the eventual 
dissolution of the CAB over a four year period ending in 1985, allowed for free route 
entry by 1979, and permitted airlines to vary their prices above and below the 
regulated fares by 1980. However, as Doganis (1991, p52) and Sawers (1987, p10) 
both note, the CAB moved more quickly and virtually completed deregulation by 1982. 
The decision making process which produced new authoratitative allocations is 
illustrated in figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5 Authoritative Allocation Process Making
INTRA-SOCIETAL
ENVIRONMENT INPUTS
(Source: Complied by the present author.)
5.6.5 Feedback From US Deregulation
According to Easton (1965a, p.vii) an effective feedback loop is vital to the success of 
any political system and Easton (1965b) notes that:
If a system of this kind is to persist through time, it must obtain adequate 
feedback about its past performances, and it must be able to take measures 
that regulate its future behaviour.
(Easton 1965b, p25)
In addition to "obtaining adequate feedback about its past performances", the system 
must also have feedback about the outcomes of its outputs. The feedback from US 
deregulation did not satisfy all stakeholders. Although some customers did benefit from 
lower fares, the airlines encountered massive consolidation and huge economic losses.
Generally consumers have been satisfied with the outputs of deregulation and the 
feedback has been positive. The level of their satisfaction can be measured by their 
increased use of services provided by this method of transport. Passenger numbers 
have risen by more than 70% since 1978.
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Full fares are one-third lower in real terms, and more than 90% of tickets are sold at 
discounts averaging two-thirds off the full price. People have 37% more flights from 
which to choose and smaller cities in particular have more flights to more places than 
ever before. The fight for customers has brought innovations such as frequent-flyer 
programmes and ultra-cheap, no frills flights, while the safety record remains first 
class.
The industry gave relatively negative feedback into the political system on the 
outcomes of deregulation. Deregulation allowed a flood of new entrants to enter 
traditionally closed markets. This resulted in intense competition and a reduction in 
fares of nearly 10 per cent in relation to the consumer price index in 1985 and by 
more than 10 per cent in 1986. Lower fares in turn also brought about lower profits 
and resulted in carriers with debts and uncompetitive services seeking security by 
merging with more successful carriers.
Although there were many highly competitive new entrants entering the market, most 
had a short life. Between 1979 and 1992 there were 168 new entrants, but at the end 
of 1992 only 56 of the newcomers were still operating (see 4.6.1 for a full discussion 
on new post-deregulation entrants). From 1978 to 1992, bankruptcy claimed 117 
carriers, including some of the well established incumbents such as Eastern Airlines, 
Trans World Airlines and Pan American World Airways. Other unsuccessful carriers 
were taken over. Table 5.1 shows some of the major mergers.
Table 5.1 US Airline Mergers in 1986
Texas Air (owner of New York Air and 
Continental)
with Eastern and People Express
American with Air Cal
Delta with Western
Northwest with Republic
TWA with Ozark
USAir with Pacific Southwest (PSA)
(Source: Williams, The Airline Industry and the Impact of Deregulation, 1993, p28.)
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By the late 1980s, the industry was thus characterised by
... the diminishing disciplinary effectiveness of potential entry by totally new 
firms, and the increased l ikel ihoodin consequence, of monopolistic 
exploitation.
(Kahn, 1988, p318).
5.6.6 Response to the Feedback
in 1992 the political system reacted to the feedback coming from the industry 
regarding the damage deregulation was perceived to have caused. Easton (1965b, 
p25) argues that a system's maintenance is dependent upon it receiving feedback 
and regulating its future operations accordingly.
The political system during President Clinton's Administration reacted to the 
information fed to it. Congress established the Airline Commission under Section 204 
of the Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity, Noise Improvement and Intermodal 
Transportation Act of 1992. The President appointed 15 voting members in 1993 with 
an additional five Senators, five Congressmen, and the Chairman of the President's 
Council of Economic Advisers who served as non-voting members. The statute 
instructed the Commission to investigate a comprehensive range of responses to 
deregulation.
The industry gave specific feedback to the political system, raising questions which 
formed the basis for the following Airline Commission investigations:
• Can the industry continue to provide fast and efficient domestic 
transportation?
• How can the financial solvency of carriers be improved and can the number 
of bankruptcies be reduced?
• Is the industry likely to show profits or losses over the next five years and 
does it appear that any carriers will become bankrupt during that period?
• Why has there been a declining number of competitors and increased 
concentration of market share among the largest carriers?
• Can the industry remain competitive globally?
• Can the industry accommodate growing aviation traffic?
• Are there legal impediments to improved competition within the industry?
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The Airline Commission issued its report in August 1993 with the following responses 
to the questions above:
Modernising the Air Traffic Control System : The Commission's first conclusion 
was that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), as a government agency, was 
unable to modernise and fully adapt to the technological needs of air travel. The 
Commission did not call for total privatisation of the FAA, but said that it must 'be 
reinvented'.
Reducing the Burden o f Regulation: While acknowledging the government's role in 
regulating safety and establishing standards, the Airline Commission strongly 
criticised the way the FAA had carried out this function. Adopting a more coherent 
approach to safety regulation, it noted, would produce sizeable cost savings to the 
industry and to the public.
Reducing the Tax Burden: The Commission's report stressed that financial 
weakness in the airline industry had primarily been brought about by the carriers 
themselves. Although the 1990-91 recession was a major factor, the report notes that 
the heavy debt burdens taken on during the long 1983-89 growth cycle caused the 
current financial weakness of the industry. The Commission rejected any proposals 
for government route or price controls to prop up the airlines. However, the 
Commission did attack the way in which federal taxes compound these problems and 
it did call for a reduction of the tax burden.
Moving B eyond Nationalism in Air Service: The Airline Commission report 
recommended that the United States work to create a multinational system both for air 
services and for ownership of aircraft. The Commission recommended negotiating 
regional multinational agreements first, then expanding negotiations to a worldwide 
basis.
Declining Production of General Aviation Aircraft: Whereas sales of small piston- 
engine airplanes averaged 13,000 per annum from 1965 until 1982, product liability 
insurance costs, among other factors, had reduced this to barely 500 per year in 
1992. Over 100,000 jobs had been lost in manufacturing, sales, service, and related 
industries. The Airline Commission recommended enactment by Congress of a 
'statute of repose'. This would bar claims against small-aircraft manufacturers for 
defective designs on aircraft more than fifteen years old.
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Airline Financial D istress: The report also called for the creation of a Presidentially 
appointed airline financial advisory committees to advise the Secretary of 
Transportation when an airline's financial condition posed risk to the public or to the 
industry.
5.6.7 Conclusions on the Application of Systems Theory to US Aviation 
Deregultion
Communications are fundamental to systems theory. The description of systems is 
distilled into an attempt to describe the flow of communications necessary for a 
system to work.
*
However, it must be recognised that 'communications' is a broad term. It covers not 
only transmissions in written or oral form but also acts to create a body of people to 
study a particular problem or even to impose additional taxes. The common element 
is that for a system to operate communications must be received, understood and 
where necessary acted upon. In other words, systems theory explains not only 
situations of perception but also situations of fact.
The Clinton Administration's reaction to the feedback has produced the desired 
objective of maintaining the system, at least in the short term. As yet there has been 
no feedback to these proposals and the political system remains unperturbed.
5.7 A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO AVIATION LIBERALISATION IN THE EC
The Eastonian system of analysis can similarly be applied to an examination of the 
reform of aviation regulatory policy in the European Community. The examination will 
discuss:
• the interaction between the stakeholders and their environment;
• the demands which led the system to introduce new outputs; and
• the operation of the feedback loop to assess the reaction of the societal 
system to the new authoritative allocations.
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The stakeholders in this regime often have overlapping roles, for example 
stakeholders in one group make demands on the system, stressing it and wanting it to 
modify its usual sphere of allocations. They also play a part in the political 
mechanisms which bring about the new outputs. The stakeholders in this regime can 
be grouped under the following headings:
• The European Community, made up of:
The Council of Ministers 
The European Commission 
The European Court of Justice 
The European Parliament 
The Member States
• The Regulators;
• The Airlines;
• Consumers; and
• Consumer Representatives.
These stakeholders can fit into one system or more systems. In this sense, systems 
can be viewed as being made up of a cluster of other systems.
5.7.1 Intra-Societal Environment
The intra-societal environment of the European aviation sector pre-regulatory reform 
consisted of a complex system of bilateral agreements between the governments of 
pairs of countries that outlined the flying rights between specific points. Within this 
environment the industry was characterised by cartels and duopoly agreements 
between 'flag carriers', each protected by its national government and with little 
incentive to compete. There were a series of restrictive agreements on:
• control of route entry;
• control of capacity;
• fares charged; and
• the pooling of revenues.
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Regulation was controlled by each Member State's national government. Until 1986 
when British Airways was privatised, each Member State's flag-carrier airline was 
either wholly or partially owned by the State. Services could be provided only by the 
carriers named in bilateral agreements, almost invariably the flag-carriers of the 
signatory governments. A web of duopolies dominated the European aviation system 
and competition was negligible.
5.7.2 Inputs
Demands to stress this regime and hence produce a new set of authoritative 
allocations initially came from the inputs made by the European Commission, followed 
by some Member States and a consumer lobby.
The European Commission's role in this regime provides an example of the 
overlapping roles of stakeholders in a system. Any system is made up of a cluster of 
other systems as exemplified by the Commission's demands on the European 
Community, a system of which it is a part. From 1979 to 1992, the Commission 
produced a series of wants relating to liberalisation. Some were filtered by the 
gatekeepers (on these occasions the reluctant Member States) and did not become 
demands. Flowever, as the extra- and intra-environments changed, without 
movement towards the creation of an EC-wide single market, the political system 
became open and interacted with these influences. The wants became demands, they 
were placed on the political agenda and outputs were eventually produced.
Member States, part of the system of the European Community, made their own 
demands on the system. The Member States can be categorised into two distinct 
groups:
• those supporting the regulatory system as it existed, thus resisting change;
• those who wanted a more liberal approach to air transport regulation and 
demanded that the political system act accordingly.
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The majority of the Member States belonged to the first group and were firmly 
opposed to European Community involvement in air transport. Content with the 
protection that strict regulation afforded their flag carriers, these Member States were 
inevitably actively opposed to liberalisation and tried to thwart progress towards it.
Those who took the view that there was benefit to be gained by a relaxation of the 
rigidity of the post-Chicago world were, in the first instance, obliged to pursue their 
policies within a more limited framework. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the United 
Kingdom successfully renegotiated its agreements with Ireland, The Netherlands and 
Belgium in such a way that services to these countries and the traffic carried 
dramatically increased over a very short period, if these developments had not 
occurred when they did, convincing the countries concerned that there would be gains 
from a more generalised form of liberalisation, the Commission would have found it 
much harder to achieve the momentum for change which occurred in the second half 
of the decade.
For its part, the consumer lobby wanted free markets in which competition could 
occur. Its input was made through individual political systems, such as national 
governments, and then taken to the transnational political system of the European 
Community. There is, however, little evidence of any real pressure from consumers 
for liberalisation of European air services until the mid-1980s. Neither the UK's Air 
Transport Users Committee, founded in 1973 to advise the Civil Aviation Authority on 
its statutory duty
... to further the reasonable interests of air transport services
(Civil Aviation Authority, UK, 1973, Doc. 3920)
nor the Federation of Air Transport Users Representatives in the European 
Community (FATUREC), the pan-European grouping whose creation it inspired in 
1983, took much interest in the details of liberalisation process until the pattern had 
already been set by the adoption of the EC's ‘first package’ in December 1987. 
Although subsequently their involvement became much more active, it cannot be said 
that users brought any real pressure to bear on the development of policy at the 
formulation stage.
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There was predictably little pressure for change from the airlines, with the notable 
exception of the British industry. Although this was dominated by British Airways (itself 
the result of a merger between two state-owned companies, British Overseas Airways 
Corporation and British European Airways in 1972), there had been throughout the 
post-war period a succession of often short-lived other carriers with ambitions to 
operate international services. These ambitions were formally recognised, and given 
added impetus, by the government's promulgation in 1968 of a multi-airline policy. 
The privatisation of British Airways in 1986 provided a further stimulus to the UK 
industry to press for an opening up of the European market.
5.7.3 The Extra-Societal Environment
The external environment often provides disturbances to the system, disturbances 
being all activities that can displace or expect to displace a system from its current 
pattern of operations. A series of activities which occurred in the external environment 
of the European aviation sector stressed the system of regulation.
Starting in 1979 with the publication of a Memorandum on Air Transport Services, the 
Commission took the lead in attempts to break down the system of bilateralism and 
replace it with a regime concurring with the Treaty of Rome's fundamental aims. The 
publication of this Memorandum focused attention on the fact that the system of air 
transport regulation in Europe was fundamentally at odds with the European 
Community's philosophy of a common market and in particular with the Treaty of 
Rome's aim of abolishing all barriers to the free circulation of services between 
Member States. The environment was characterised by a desire to extend the 
Treaty's common transport policy to include transport by air.
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The decision to create a single market between the Member States by the end of 
1992, permitting freedom of movement of goods, persons, capital and services and 
breaking down the physical, technical and fiscal barriers also strained the European 
aviation system of regulation. In addition, there was a push for liberalisation in Europe 
by the US dereguiators who were from the outset determined to extend their new 
'competitiveness' around the world, wherever American airlines were flying. 
Accordingly, they set about finding ways to liberalise the bilateral agreements between 
the United States and the principal countries of western Europe.
5.7.4 The Political System
According to Easton (1965a, p13), the interactions which constitute political systems 
are not always clearly delineated. This assumption is highlighted in the instance of 
the European political system which processed the inputs from the various 
stakeholders. The European Community's political system is complex, made up of 
the institutions and the Member States who have specific national representation in 
the Council of Ministers. Thus some of the stakeholders making inputs and 
demanding change were also members of the political system which was responsible 
for bringing about the change.
The reaction of the European Community's political system to inputs has produced 
outputs in the form of regulations and directives. This political system interacted with 
the external environment, considered the demands made by the relative stakeholders 
and produced a new set of authoritative allocations.
The original wording of Article 84(2) of the Rome Treaty was such that it was long 
argued that the Treaty did not apply to air transport. For the first 20 years of the 
Community's existence the Commission appeared to accept this. Nonetheless, 
following its 1979 Memorandum on Air Transport Services, the purpose of which was 
to stimulate a debate on the creation of a common air transport policy for the 
Community, the Commission issued a series of formal proposals covering tariffs, 
inter-regional air services and application of the Treaty's competition rules. In the 
event, the only concrete outcome was the adoption of a diluted inter-regional air 
services directive in 1983. However, from the mid-1980s, two influences combined to 
change the situation.
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The first arose from the Commission's publication in March 1984 of a second air 
transport memorandum entitle Progress Towards the Development of a Community 
Air Transport Policy. The memorandum declared that
... the growth of consumer criticism of the system in Europe, the effect of the 
recession on airline finances and the development of deregulated air transport 
in the US [have] combined to stimulate a debate on whether the present 
European air transport system best serves the interests of the consumer or, in 
the long run, of the airlines themselves; and whether indeed the system is 
compatible with the Treaty of Rome.
(Memorandum 2 of the EEC, Progress Towards the Development of a 
Community Air Transport Policy)
The proposals submitted with the Memorandum gave an opening for the Dutch and 
British governments, during their Presidencies of the Council in 1986, to press 
forward with the first package of liberalisation, starting a process which ultimately 
became unstoppable. Their conviction that the Treaty extended to air transport was 
given judicial foundations by the judgement of the European Court of Justice in the 
Nouvelles Frontieres case in 1986, when the Court ruled that the Treaty's competition 
rules (Articles 85-90) did indeed apply to all sectors of the economy.
The second was the negotiation in parallel with work on the 'first package' of the 
Single European Act. The Act adjusted those parts of the Treaty of Rome referring to 
aviation and shipping, thus setting the stage for further progressive movement to full 
liberalisation in the EC's air transport market on 1 January 1993.
This interaction produced a new set of allocations. However, Easton (1979) notes 
that rejection of a proposal or inaction is also a form of output and should be 
recognised as such. In the reform of the European aviation regime, both types of 
output were produced. Certain elements of the political system did reject inputs, 
whilst simultaneously other elements of the political system reacted to the same 
demands and produced outputs that would change the operations of the system. This 
illustrates the disharmony that can exist in one political system. Easton (1965a, p.vii) 
notes that the outputs of a system will never be satisfactory to all the stakeholders and 
that the system must not only allocate values but also must induce most of the 
members to accept the rules.
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5.7.5 The Outputs
The political system produced a new set of authoritative allocations in the form of the 
three packages of liberalising measures from 1987 to 1992. The third and last 
package allowed any EC carrier fulfilling prescribed criteria the right both to an air 
operator's certificate and an air operating licence. Start-ups and existing airlines were 
free to fly anywhere they wished within the Community, determining capacity and 
frequency and charging fares as they saw fit.
5.7.6 The Feedback
If a system is to persist through time, it must obtain adequate feedback about its 
performance and thus the maintenance of any new system is dependent upon the 
feedback loop. In the case of EC liberalisation the feedback from the outputs is hard 
to judge in quantitative terms because of the short time scale between the 
implementation of the last outputs and the time of writing. However, Easton (1965a, 
p373) notes that in most social systems, even if they are comprised of only a few 
people, there is a high possibility that there will be a large number and variety of 
feedback loops. In this instance there have been a variety of feedback loops, some 
positive and others negative.
The negative feedback has largely originated in the member States owning flag- 
carriers and has manifested itself as a national political issue. Losses incurred due to 
a combination of factors meant that drastic action was needed to make these carriers 
efficient and put them in a position to compete with potential rivals which the new 
system would allow to come onto their profitable and hitherto protected routes. To be 
more efficient, airlines' managements recognised that a reduction in the workforce 
was necessary. With State-owned carriers the workforce belongs to the public sector, 
and if the State causes unemployment a political issue is immediately created. Easton 
(1965a, p412) notes that where political conditions permit, criticism of the authorities 
may take the form of violent demonstrations, strikes and refusal to pay taxes.
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In 1993, the workforce of Air France responded by taking strike action and brought all 
the major French airports to a halt and generally disrupted European air transport. In 
1994, the maintenance staff of the Irish state owned carrier, Aer Lingus, also took 
strike action and brought Dublin's airport to a standstill.
More generally, the threat of reduced employment and its political implications caused 
a group of Member States, led by France, to demand that the authorities ‘roll back the 
tide of liberalisation’ and allow airlines to be protected from competition by their 
national government. These Member States argued that the new competition was a 
handicap and threatened airline survival. (See Table 5.2 for the yearly cumulative net 
income and losses of flag-carriers during 1990-92).
Table 5.2
Cumulative Net Income & Losses of EC Flag Carriers -1990/92 (US$m)
CARRIER 1990 1991 1992
Aer Lingus 8.300 -18.500 -195.600
Air France -132.100 -121.146 -617.000
Alitalia -81.700 -27.900 -11.900
BA 169.600 687.300 297.700
Iberia -137.700 -346.800 -339.800
KLM -346.900 66.200 -319.000
Lufthansa 9.400 -257.700 -250.400
Luxair * * 600.000
Olympic -164.300 -133.900 -224.800
Sabena -205.700 -68.600 11.700
SAS -144.800 -239.000 -127.400
TAP -15.300 -38.000 -199.800
* Figures not available
(Source: Compiled by author using data from Airline Business and ICAO 1994.)
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Easton (1965b, p25) asserts that the survival of a system is not only dependent upon 
the feedback but that it must be abie to take measures that regulate its future 
behaviour. Such regulation may call
...for simple adaptation to a changing setting in the light of fixed goals or 
transform them entirely.
Thus the authorities receiving the feedback responded in June 1993, six months after 
implementation of the full liberalisation programme in Europe. Abel Matutes, the 
European Commissioner for Transport, reacted to the feedback from industry and 
various Member States by appointing a Comite des Sages and gave them six months 
to make a diagnosis of the industry's situations and to make recommendations for its 
industry's future.
The major recommendations made by the Comite des Sages were as follows:
No Rollback
There could be no question of reversing the movement towards liberalisation. The 
Comite argued that the crisis experienced by the industry was not as a result of the 
liberalisation but as a result of the failure to implement it. There recommendation, 
therefore, was that it be implemented and that the European Union draw all the 
inferences.
No More S tate A id (except one last time)
The Comite would prohibit financial injections into air carriers and airport handling 
services if they are incompatible with normal commercial practices. According to the 
Treaty, State aids that distort competition are incompatible with the common market 
and the Comite believed that they would inevitably have this effect. The Comite was, 
however, willing for State aid to continue for a limited period under strict conditions.
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Mergers and Alliances
Mergers and alliances were potentially ways of improving competitiveness. The 
Commission should object to such arrangements only if their aim was to create a 
dominant position or if they rendered effective competition in a given market 
impossible.
Rem ove Infrastructure Bottlenecks
The Comite recommended proceeding by stages toward a single air traffic 
management system relying on satellite-based technologies and an improvement in 
airport infrastructure in order to increase capacity.
Improve the Financial Environment and Harmonise to Reduce C osts
Member Governments should bring taxes and charges down to acceptable levels in a 
transparent manner and under common European rules.
External Policy
The Comite recommended that a common external air transport policy be adopted as 
a matter of urgency.
Commenting on these recommendations, Naveau (1994, p7) makes an observation 
that highlights the interaction of overlapping systems. He suggests that if the 
recommendations of the Comite are followed, an industry restored to profitability in an 
expanding market will eventually create more jobs than will have been lost during its 
period of adaptation to a more competitive commercial environment. However, he 
admits:
Let us recognise that this is a little theoretical in view of the immediate 
problem. Liberalisation should not come up against its only real obstacle, the 
employment issue, which brings politics back into the picture when we thought 
they had been excluded.
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5.7.7 Maintenance of the System
In order to maintain the system of liberalisation the authorities assimilated the 
feedback, both negative and positive. Positive feedback does not necessarily require 
action, it denotes that at least some of the players are supportive of the system and 
no change is required. Negative feedback comes from players who do not support 
the system and need to see change in order to give their support in the future. In the 
light of the recommendations presented by the Comite des Sages, the Commission 
authorities produced an action programme to adjust the system. The programme 
incorporated many of the Comite's recommendations:
1. to accommodate the dissatisfied players;
2. to ensure maintenance of the system.
Thus, Easton's thesis that feedback and reaction to it are necessary for the 
maintenance of any system clearly applies to the liberalisation of air services in 
Europe.
5.8 CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE EASTONIAN SYSTEMS 
THEORY TO DEREGULATION OF THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
Although there is a predisposition in this research and in the literature to make direct 
comparisons between the deregulation processes in the USA and the EC, such 
comparisons need to be tempered by an understanding of some fundamental 
differences between the motivations, aims and processes involved. Unlike the US 
deregulation process, the EC deregulation process involves a deep and diverse set of 
supra-national and national political agendas. These often irreconcilable agendas are 
reflected by the diversity of national attitudes concerning, for example, the role of 
subsidies and the effects of deregulation upon unemployment. While the current UK 
government is dominant and forceful in demanding increased deregulation with little 
consideration of its effect on employment, the French government tends to allow 
employment consequences to constrain its decisions.
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Varying types of political influence have had the effect of making the consequences of 
deregulation in the USA and the EC starkly different. In the United States, the 
'Darwinian* competitive arena has fostered a degree of competitive intensity which has 
led to numerous exits and new entrants, while in the European Community the 
'Political/Liberalisation' arena has so far been much more benign.
From the above analysis it should be clear that the Eastonian systems analysis model 
provides a comprehensive but essentially linear and sequential approach to the 
deregulation process in the airline industry. While this approach is necessary, 
especially in terms of its accommodation of the political dimensions of the process, it 
is nonetheless insufficient for a comprehensive analysis of the process. For a 
comprehensive approach, the Eastonian analysis must be complemented by a static 
appraisal of the effects of deregulation upon, the intensity of competition in the pre- 
and post-deregulation eras. The methodology chosen to carry out this measurement 
is the classic Porter model of competitive strategy which is considered next.
5.9 THE COMPETITIVE STRATEGY MODEL AND AVIATION DEREGULATION
This research is concerned with the effects of deregulation upon the airline industry. A 
fundamental dimension of this issue is the measurement of the consequent 'degree of 
competition', i.e. in the post-deregulation era, how much more competitive is the airline 
industry? This section considers what is meant by 'degree of competition' and sets out 
a classic theoretical model of competition which will be the framework upon which the 
airline industry-specific research instrument of Chapter 6 will be based.
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5.10 THE CONCEPT OF THE DEGREE OF COMPETITION
Classic economics would assert that the degree of competition that prevails in any 
industry is determined by the interplay of supply and demand with price being the sole 
mechanism for adjustment as the economic system homeostatically strives for 
equilibrium. In this model, competition tends to be driven by excess supply or insufficient 
demand or both. Although from a theoretical perspective this model provides many 
useful constructs in understanding the competitive dynamics of an industry, its practical 
utility is somewhat limited. However, the model been comprehensively expanded and 
made amenable to practical application by Porter and this model is now considered.
5.11 THE PORTER MODEL OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGY
Competitive developments and strategic moves in the airline industry as it has moved 
from regulation to deregulation can be analysed using Porters competitive strategy 
framework (see Figure 5.6).
Figure 5.6 The Five Competitive Forces that Determine Industry Profitability
POTENTIAL
ENTRANTS
p _ _
Threat of Substitute 
products or services
SUBSTITUTES
157
Chapter 5 - Theoretical Framework for Deregulation of the Aviation Sector
Thus the industry can be analysed under the following two headings:
MAJOR FORCES
the threat of new entrants 
the threat from substitutes 
the power of buyers
high volume / low cost
differentiation
focus
GENERIC STRATEGIES
the power of suppliers 
the degree of rivalry
Porter asserts that the competitive climate that exists in any industry is not a matter of 
luck or good fortune:
The intensity of competition in an industry is neither a matter of coincidence nor 
bad luck,
but rather is due to
...its underlying economic structure and goes well beyond the behaviour of 
current competitors.
He maintains that the degree of competition in any industry can be analysed through 
examining the five major forces:
1. Barriers to entry discourage potential new entrants from moving into the 
industry to the extent that they are weak or non-existent and do not perceive 
the market to offer them opportunities to earn profits.
2. Substitutes of products or services which perform a similar function to those 
provided by the industry tend to take market share away from the focal 
organisation if they are perceived to offer higher value to buyers.
(Porter, 1980, p.3).
(Porter, 1980, p3)
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3. Buyers compete with the industry by forcing down prices, bargaining for higher 
quality or more services, and playing competitors against each other - all at the 
expense of industry profitability.
4. Suppliers take their share of the 'industry profit cake' to the extent that they are 
powerful enough to dictate price and other transaction conditions to their own 
benefit. I
5. Rivalry among existing firms is the traditionally perceived competitive force. It 
intensifies when one or more competitors feel under pressure to improve their 
market position or see an opportunity to do so.
A combination of these forces influence the potential profits of any industry and their 
strengths will tend to be different in every industry:
Not all industries have the same potential. They differ fundamentally in their 
ultimate profit potential as the collective strength of the forces differs.
(Porter, 1980, p3)
Companies need to construct a strategy allowing them to combat and/or utilise these 
forces to their own advantage. The five competitive forces highlight the fact that 
competition in an industry goes well beyond the established players and stakeholders:
Customers, suppliers, substitutes, and potential entrants are all “competitors" to 
firms in the industry and may be more or less prominent depending on the 
particular circumstances. Competition in this broader sense might be termed 
extended rivalry.
(Porter, 1980 p4)
Each of the above five forces is now considered in greater detail and in relation to the 
airline industry.
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5.11.1 The Threat of Entry
When new competitors enter an industry, they automatically make it more competitive 
as there are immediately more 'players' competing in the market. In addition, overall 
capacity is increased. Consequently, the players will utilise strategies such as price 
competition, promotions and advertising to obtain market share. Therefore, from the 
incumbents' perspective an effort should be made to combat this threat.
The strength of the threat of entry is contingent upon two important factors: the barriers 
to entry built by the incumbents and the anticipated reaction from those incumbents. 
Generally, the higher the entry barriers and the likelihood of strong antagonistic and 
counteractive action by existing competitors, the more the threat of entry will be 
reduced. There are seven main barriers to entry:
1. Economies of scale;
2. Product differentiation;
3. Capital requirements;
4. Switching costs;
5. Access to distribution channels;
6. Cost disadvantages independent of scale; and
7. Government policy
Each of these seven barriers are discussed below:
Economies of Scale: Economies of scale causes the unit cost of a product or service 
to decline as the ‘absolute volume per period increases’. This concept works as a 
barrier to entry by compelling the new entrant either to enter on a large scale and risk 
adverse reaction from incumbents or to enter on a small scale and accept a cost 
disadvantage.
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Product Differentiation: Product differentiation implies brand identification and 
customer loyalties based on advertising, customer service and product differences:
Differentiation creates a barrier to entry by forcing entrants to spend heavily to 
overcome existing customer loyalties.
(Porter, 1980, p9)
Capital Requirements: Large capital investments provide a barrier to entry, especially 
if the investment is to be spent on unrecoverable up-front advertising and/or market 
research:
Even if capital is available on the capital markets, entry represents a risky use 
of that capital which should be reflected in risk premiums charged to the 
prospective entrant; these constitute advantages for on-going firms.
(Porter, 1980, p10)
Switching Costs: These are costs which consumers of a particular product or service 
bear when they switch to an alternative supplier. For example, in the context of the 
airline industry, the costs of switching from aircraft manufactured by Boeing to 
McDonnell Douglas may be so high that it 'locks in' the Boeing customers. The major 
element in these costs is not the actual cost of the aircraft but other associated costs 
such as spares and training of staff.
Access to Distribution Channels: New products must be able to displace 
incumbents by using techniques such as special price deals, promotions and intense 
selling efforts, all of which reduce present or future profits. Obviously, the more limited 
the channels for selling a product/service and the greater the control which existing 
companies have over these channels, the tougher entry will be:
Sometimes this barrier to entry is so high that to surmount it a new firm must 
create an entirely new distribution channel...
(Porter, 1980, p11)
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Cost Disadvantage Independent of Scale: Some competitors will always incur cost 
disadvantage, independent of scale. For example, in the airline industry, operating a 
peripheral service from a point that is remote from a hub will always put the airline 
concerned at a disadvantage.
Government Policy: The last major entry barrier is government policy. Governments 
control entry into particular industries by requiring licences and/or that specific 
standards be met:
...trucking, railroads, liquor retailing, and freight forwarding are obvious 
examples.
(Porter, 1980, p13)
Government policy can also be subtle and impose less obvious forms of control on 
particular firms:
The government also can play a major indirect role by affecting entry barriers through 
controls such as air and water pollution standards and safety regulations.
(Porter, 1980, p92)
5.11.2 The Threat of Entry In the Airline Industry
Historically, the airline industry has been one of the world's most regulated industries:
Probably no other world-wide economic activity of comparable magnitude is more 
thoroughly regulated, less free of official constraint and guidance than is world air 
transport.
(Lissitzyn, 1968)
This degree of regulation has been a universal characteristic of the industry from its 
earliest days. Indeed, Sawers maintains that governments regulate in order to
...increase the share in air traffic of their country's (generally state-owned) 
airlines rather than to promote an efficient industry that meets the demands of 
the consumer.
(Sawers, 1987, p 10)
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Before deregulation, government regulation of the airline industry had been so 
pervasive that the barriers to entry were almost impenetrable. Under regulation, 
governments froze the structure of the airline industry: prices were harmonised, then 
fixed and national airlines were restricted to particular quid pro quo routes, effectively 
denying customer choice. So rigorous was the regulation that between 1958 and 1978 
no new scheduled carriers entered the US domestic system (Breyer, 1992; Pickreli, 
1991).
The US Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 signalled the start of the era of competition in 
the airline industry. Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the new competitive era in 
which airlines would operate was reflected in the erosion of entry barriers. Between 
1978 and 1993, there were 112 new entrants in the domestic US market (see Chapter 
4, Section 4 for the number of new entrants and survivors).
With deregulation and the reduction of entry barriers, many new entrants came into the 
market and oversupply of sen/ices quickly developed. Because of the huge capital 
investment required to operate in this industry, capacity utilisation became a primary 
concern of all carriers. In a classic PIMS manner, - PIMS argues that investment 
intensity is the largest single cause of profit problems (See Buzell & Gale, 1990) - 
price became the primary competitive weapon as firms fought punitive and often 
pyrrhic battles to maintain load factors.
In general, the airlines have subsequently found it difficult to erect sustainable barriers 
to entry which would guarantee them attractive returns. Indeed, the erosion of entry 
barriers was the overwhelming competitive dynamic in the post deregulation period. 
This in turn caused firms to increase their investment intensity and led to loss making 
and over-capacity. Table 5.3 below highlights the losses incurred by the eleven 
biggest carriers in the USA and the EC 'flag-carriers' from 1990 to 1992. The injurious 
effects of this overcapacity were exacerbated by shifting power from the airlines to their 
buyers, an issue which is considered next.
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Table 5.3 Net Income & Losses of Major US Airlines -1990/92 (US$m)
CARRIER 1990 1991 1992
America West -74.7 -213.8 -131.8
American -76.8 -239.9 -935.0
Continental -1,236.4 -305.7 -125.3
Delta -154.0 -239.5 -564.8
Northwest -10.4 -3.1 -383.0
Pan Am -638.1 -283.1 -
Southwest 47.1 26.9 103.9
TWA -237.6 48.2 -239.8
United 95.7 -331.9 -957.1
USAir -410.7 -305.3 -1,230.0
(Source: US General Accounting Office, 1993.)
5.11.3 The Threat of Substitutes in the Airline Industry
The availability of substitutes places a ceiling on the price that can be charged for 
goods or services. Emergence of a substitute may bring new firms with different cost 
structures into the competitive arena. A substitute will often increase the power of the 
buyer and reduce the power of the seller. Generally speaking, in order for a competitor 
to check or neutralise the power of substitutes, the company must reduce price, 
improve quality and make the product more accessible and convenient. Customarily, 
the greater the number of alternatives for a product or service, the greater the threat of 
substitutes. Porter suggests that there are two substitutes which should be monitored 
most closely:
Those products that are providing a better performance/price standard than the 
industry standard. Products produced by industries earning high profits.
(Porter, 1980, p2)
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In the pre-deregulation era, it could be argued that transportation substitutes existed in 
the form of rail, road and sea. However, none of those services could have been 
considered as valid alternatives for air travel as differences in the journey time were so 
great. Consequently, genuine substitutes did not exist. However, since the introduction 
of the French TGV (Train a Grande) in 1981 and the extension of the high speed 
network throughout Europe, there is now a realistic substitute to air travel between city 
centres 300 to 350 kilometres apart (Institute of Air Transport Report, 1991).
Journey Time
Research (Association of European Airlines, 1990) shows that when there is a choice 
of travel mode, i.e. air, rail, car and boat, a number of key factors tend to influence 
user's decisions, namely: journey time, convenience of schedule and price. Improved 
journey times on European railways have made rail a major substitute for air travel, 
time being the primary factor influencing the choice of mode. Where the distances 
between large cities are relatively short, the introduction of the high speed train is likely 
to increase the popularity of rail over air. This is illustrated by the degree of substitution 
that has taken place between the TGV and air travel (see Table 5.4).
Table 5.4 Changes in Travel Patterns -1981/84: 
Air, Rail & Road Between Paris and Lyon
MODE 1981(%) 1984(%)
Air 21 7
Rail 47 74
Road 32 19
TOTAL 100
(Source: Air Inter, 1993.)
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Since September 1981, when the TGV commenced operations between Paris and 
Lyon, progressive savings of train journey times have been achieved and the effect 
has been significant. By 1984, the absolute volume of air traffic had dropped by 54%, 
whereas prior to the introduction of the TGV in 1981 air traffic had been increasing by 
8.7% per annum.
This pattern was also replicated on the Paris-Geneva link which began operating in 
1982 and resulted in the airline route share of 61% falling to 42.5% within two years. 
Thus the high speed train has already emerged as a strong substitute for air travel and 
its influence will increase as the European networks are extended (see Table 5.5).
Table 5.5 Projected High Speed Railtrack (Km) 
in the European Community in 1994 and 2010
Year High Speed Railtrack (Km)
1994 13,000
2010 24,000
(Source: Compiled by the author using data from European Commission, DGVII.)
The future impact of this threat is of great concern to airlines and already there are 
many examples of competitive reaction. For example, in February 1994, British 
Midland introduced a £69 return fare for the London-Edinburgh route that matched the 
Intercity Rail return saver ticket. This move is likely to be repeated by other airlines 
competing for city-to-city commuters.
In passing, it should be noted that the strategy of 'deterring' rail competition is likely to 
be unsuccessful because of the enormous investments which are now being made in 
the railway infrastructure. Total expenditure by the European Community, including 
Switzerland, will be 180 bn Ecus by the year 2010 (European Commission, DG VII, 
Brussels, 1994).
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Convenience of Schedule
As the European high speed train network is developed, so will the number of rail 
services increase, as shown in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 Comparing TGV Services and Air Services
Paris - Lyon Daily Direct Frequencies
Year TGV Time (Hr.Min) TGV Air
Winter 82/83 2.36 13 10
Winter 83/84 2.0 18 9
Winter 84/85 2.0 20 6
Winter 85/86 2.0 24 11
(Source: Association of European Airlines, 1990.)
Price
Substitutes place a ceiling upon the price that can be charged for a service. The 
pricing consequences of the high speed train as a substitute for air travel are well 
documented. Table 5.7 shows comparative fare structures for rail and air on selected 
air routes.
Table 5.7 Comparing 1993 Air & Rail Fares: 
London - Manchester & Paris - Lyon Routes
1993 Prices (FFr 8.10 = £1) Air Fare 1st Rail Fare
London -Manchester £85.00 £65.00
Paris - Lyon £93.30 £46.60*
* pius a small compulsory registration charge.
(Source: Compiled by the author using data from British Rail and SNCF.)
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5.11.4 Bargaining Power of Buyers
The greater the power of the buyers, the more they can adversely affect an industry's 
profitability and scope for strategic manoeuvre. Porter (1980, p24) found that the 
power of a buyer group seems to be strongest when:
• it is concentrated or purchases large volumes relative to seller sales;
• the products it purchases represent a significant fraction of the buyer's costs 
or purchases;
• the products it purchases from the industry are standard or undifferentiated;
• it faces few switching costs;
• it earns low profits;
• buyers pose a credible threat of backward integration;
• the industry's product is unimportant to the quality of the buyers' products or 
services; and,
• the buyer has full information.
The strength of the buyer group vis-a-vis the supplier group will vary from industry to 
industry.
Buyers in the airline industry can be divided into two major categories:
1. Corporate Buyers: travel agents, tour operators and large company travel 
managers (serving both the public and private sectors).
2. Individual Buyers: individual flyers who book on an individual basis, normally 
through travel agents or directly from the airlines.
Although there is great deal of heterogeneity in the purchasing requirements of each 
group, it has tended to be the case that the additional power which the corporate 
buyers have accumulated has also been enjoyed by individual buyers. Consequently, 
in this section no distinction is made between these two buyer groups.
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5.11.5 Buyer Power
Pre-deregulation buyer power was extremely limited. In the USA, neither travel agents 
nor individual buyers had any influence on the fares charged because two-thirds of the 
bookings were made directly with the airlines. Moreover, in the case of bookings made 
through the automated Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) provided by airlines, 
travel agents received the same sales commission irrespective of which carrier was 
booked. However, from 1978-1986, airline payments to travel agents rose sharply as a 
cost per revenue passenger mile (RPM) and as a percentage of total operating costs. 
During a period in which total costs per RPM increased by only 35 per cent, the 
commission to the bulk purchasers (travel agents) rose by 143 per cent and the 
percentage of commission payments in total costs rose by 83 per cent from 4.7 per 
cent in 1978 to 8.6 per cent in 1986. These changes are set out in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8 Travel Agent Commissions
AIRLINE COMMISSION PAYMENTS TO AGENTS
Year Commission Costs per RPM (US cents) Commission as a % 
of Total Costs
1978 0.416 4.7
1979 0.478 4.8
1980 0.663 5.2
1981 0.820 5.8
1982 0.850 6.2
1983 0.907 7.0
1984 0.994 7.6
1985 0.993 7.6
1986 1.009 8.6
(Source: IATA, 1987.)
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An additional way of measuring the increasing power of buyers is to study the actual 
percentage commissions paid by US airlines to agents over this period. In 1978, the 
average rate of commission paid was 8.3 per cent, but had increased to over 10 per 
cent by 1986. Even this understates their increase in power as the share of total sales 
through agents in 1978 was 57 per cent, and by 1986 it had increased to almost 80 per 
cent.
Post-deregulation buyer power in Europe was greatly enhanced by two major 
influences: the strategies of the airlines and the actions of governments and consumer 
bodies such as the Air Transport Users Councii (AUC) in the UK and the Federation of 
Air Transport User Representatives in the European Community (FATUREC). Details 
showing these forces are seen in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9 Factors Causing an Increase in Buyer Power
AIRLINE FORCES GOVERNMENT AND CONSUMER FORCES
Investment Intensity: Overcapacity Application of EC Competition Law
Entry of 'Rogue' Players Promotion of Competition by National 
Governments: e.g. U.K.
Variety of Airline Strategies Growth of Consumer Bodies: e.g. AUC, 
FATUREC.
Standard Products
Low Switching Costs
Product Often Unimportant to Buyer
Buyer Has Full Information
(Source: Compiled by author using Porter, 1980, p42.)
Responding to buyer demands for lower prices, new carriers have cut prices and have 
won buyers away from the incumbents. Figure 5.7 shows that price is even more 
important than flight schedules in influencing choice of airline.
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Figure 5.7 Factors Influencing Choice of Airline
(Source: Mori & Wagonit Survey, 1994.)
In order to retain or win back market share, the incumbents have reacted by matching 
their competitors' fares. This enhanced buyer power is clearly illustrated in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10 Fare Structures on Selected Routes Having A Third Carrier:
Post-Deregulation
ROUTE CARRIER FARE 28.10.92 FARE 06.06.93*
Heathrow - Paris BM £256 £240
BA £316 £240
Air France £316 £240
Heathrow - Amsterdam BM £236 £204
BA £274 £204
KLM £274 £204
Heathrow - Frankfurt BM - £330**
BA £366 £364
Lufthansa £366 £364
Post-Deregulation.
British Midland started this route in March 1993.
(Source: Compiled by author using data from BA, BMA and Lufthansa CRS.)
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5.11.6 The Power of Suppliers
The power of suppliers tends to be the mirror image of buyer power. Thus, powerful 
suppliers can, through their supplying policies, have significant effects on ther 
profitability of the companies they are supplying. Suppliers tend to be relatively 
powerful when the industry:
• is dominated by a few companies and more concentrated than the industry it 
sells to;
• is not obliged to contend with another substitute product for sale to the 
industry;
• has products that are an important input to the buyer's business;
• has products that are differentiated or has built up switching costs; and
• poses a credible threat of forward integration.
5.11.7 The Power of Suppliers in the Aviation Industry
Suppliers in the aviation industry can be divided into two groups:
1. General Suppliers of products and services to the industry without reference 
to any particular airline; and
2. Specific Suppliers of specific products and suppliers to specific airlines.
General suppliers provide the services which all airlines need to operate and include 
the following:
• Air traffic control
• Airport facilities
• Police and security
• Immigration
• Customs and excise
• Supporting travel infrastructure
• Regulatory licensing bodies
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Specific suppliers provide goods and services which are purchased by individual 
airlines from individual firms or governments. These products include:
• Aircraft and associated equipment;
• Aircraft consumables, i.e. food, clothing, linen, etc; and
• CRS systems.
In the pre-deregulation era, it could be argued that the power of general suppliers was 
almost absolute because no airline could operate without the approval of the various 
licensing authorities. This power was manifested at many levels: global, inter-regional, 
national, regional and finally at the level of the individual airline. Supplier power in the 
post-deregulation industry, although weaker than before, is still a major profit pressure 
on all airlines, especially the smaller and newer ones. This power can be categorised 
under classic Porter headings as in Table 5.11.
Table 5.11 Dimensions of Supplier Power
DIMENSION OF SUPPLIER 
POWER
Licences & 
Safety
Airport
Facilities
Fuel Ground
Handling
CRS
Highly Concentrated X X X X X
No Substitutes x X
Not Another Important Customer X X X X X
Supplier Product Important X X X X X
Supplier Product Differentiated X X X
Supplier Switching Costs X X X X
Threatens Forward Integration
Government as a Supplier X X
(Source: Adapted from Porter, 1980.)
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Suppliers o f Licences
Civil aviation is a global industry and its safety standards are regulated on a worldwide 
basis. The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was established after 
World War Two as an intergovernmental body to perform this coordinating role.
ICAO establishes detailed specifications for standards and procedures, but it is the 
national governments of the 140 individual members who enforce these regulations. In 
the UK, the Civil Aviation Authority's (CAA) mission states that its primary purpose is
...to maintain and where possible improve existing standards of safety.
(CAA Civil Aviation Policy Document No. 535,1992)
The rigour, hence the power, of their licensing is seen in the Authority's more detailed 
regulations, excerpts from which are set out below. The CAA states that it will:
1. provide and manage a safe air traffic control system in the UK;
2. set standards for and monitor the airworthiness and operational safety of all 
UK registered aircraft;
• ensure the maintenance of high levels of safety in the:
• operation of UK aerodromes;
• licensing of UK air crew; air traffic controllers and maintenance 
engineers;
• UK design, manufacture of overhaul of aircraft, engines and 
equipment.
(CAA Civil Aviation Policy Document No. 535,1992)
The conditions for granting an Air Operators Certificate under the European 
Community's legislation are as follows:
• Ownership must be by EC nationals;
• Financially sound operations must be obvious;
• Safety requirements must be met.
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The regulation also includes rules on the country of registration for aircraft operated by 
EC carriers. In general, liberalisation has allowed greater freedom in the use of 
equipment registered in other EC Member States and in the transfer of aircraft from 
one EC register to another. However, the supplier of licences still retains power by 
allowing Member States to restrict the use of owned or leased aircraft registered in a 
non-EC country.
Suppliers o f Airport Facilities
The price which air carriers must pay for airport and air traffic control facilities is 
controlled by the supplier. Whilst the airlines, acting together in the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), may try to restrain landing fees or en route navigation 
charges in particular countries, individual airlines have almost no power to negotiate 
better rates.
As airport charges are a function of the airport's variables costs and government policy 
regarding recovering costs or generating profits, they tend to vary significantly from 
airport to airport as illustrated in Table 5.12.
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Table 5.12 Airport Charges -1990: Landing plus Passenger Fees* (US$)
AIRPORT Aircraft Type
Boeing 747 MD 80
Manchester (peak) 8,157 2,190
Manchester (off-peak) 7,035 1,725 |
Heathrow (peak) 6,477 3,080
Frankfurt 6,470 1,524
Tokyo-Narita 6,305 1,062
Montreal 5,238 1,769
Amsterdam 5,147 1,321
Paris 4,758 1,109
Zurich 4,568 1,230
Rome/Milan 4,030 1,188
New Dehli/Bombay** 3,297 384
Buenos Aires** 2,732 338
Cairo 2,343 727
Singapore** 1,876 254
Rio de Janeiro** 1,754 295
Bangkok** 1,513 220
Kuala Lumpur** 1,320 184
New York 1,297 219 '
Heathrow (off-peak) 1,221 795 i
Caracas** 1,140 192
Hong Kong (peak)** 1,022 356
Nairobi** 529 72
San Francisco 490 80
* Based on 70% seat factor
** Excludes passenger charge because it is paid direct by passenger to airport. 
(Source: IATA Airport and En-route User Charges Manual, 1991.)
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The Suppliers o f Computer Reservation S ystem s
Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) provides immediate access to flight information, 
seat availability and fares. The nature of these is such as to allow a small number of 
privileged suppliers - major airlines - to achieve considerable market dominance by 
promoting their own services and by selling their systems to other carriers.
Although there are a number of CRS systems, the market has tended towards 
domination by a small number of players. For example, the USA is dominated by two 
players: SABRE, owned by American Airways which in 1986 had 35% of the market 
and Appollo, owned by United, which at that time had 25% of the market (Warded, D., 
1987 and Feldman J., 1987). Not only does a CRS enhance the relative power of the 
owning airline, but it also gives power over non-CRS owning airlines who have little 
choice but to assign their seat reservation functions to one of the CRS suppliers.
Finally, the power of the CRS supplier is also considerable outside the airline industry 
itself, particularly in relation to travel agents, and is exercised through the provision of 
additional services, e.g. car rental and hotel reservations. Evidence of the necessity 
for travel agents to use a CRS is evidenced by the growth of their participation: only 5 
per cent of US travel agents used CRS in 1977, but this had increased to 95 per cent 
by 1987 (Feldman, J., 1987).
The Suppliers o f Fuel
The costs of fuel supplies have a major effect upon airline costs and the variations in 
costs between airlines and where they fuel-up can be considerable. Airport aviation 
fuel prices are determined by the companies supplying the fuel and the national 
government concerned. Although the prices of crude oil and refined fuel tend to be 
similar globally, the distribution and handling costs vary considerably, leading to 
considerable variation in supplier prices.
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Governments influence fuel prices through such measures as: duties, tax and price 
fixing to conform with government policy. For example, during the 1970s oil crises the 
US and Australian governments maintained the price of domestic crude refined 
products below world levels. The extent of variations in fuel prices is illustrated in 
Table 5.13.
Table 5.13 Variations of Fuel Prices per US Gallon 
(US$ exclusive of duties/taxes)
AIRPORT (US$)
London 1.70
Manchester 1.70
Entebbe (Uganda) 1.45
Manila 1.00
Singapore .95
Brazil* .84
* Posted fuel price was 84 cents at all Brazilian airports because of Government policy. 
(Source: Shell, 1990.)
In general, suppliers of fuel are in powerful positions as they can impose escalation 
clauses in fuel supply contracts. These clauses permit fuel prices to move in response 
to changes in the price of crude oil in addition to price adjustments due to fluctuations 
in supply and demand.
The Supply o f S lots
Take-off and landing-slots control the competitive potential of airlines: they determine 
every airline's scope of operations. The increase in the number of airlines and traffic 
since deregulation has led to a major increase in the demands for slots and runway 
capacity.
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Betts and Gardner have commented:
Congestion at such busy airports as Heathrow or Frankfurt could squeeze out 
new entrants because of the lack of available take-off and landing slots. At the 
same time, airlines with a dominant position will have an important competitive 
advantage.
(Betts and Gardner, Financial Times, 24 June 1992)
In addition, Lockwood (1992) has emphasised the importance of slots as a success 
determinant:
The slots... are the key to any air service. Those who hold them will not give 
them up without a fight.
(Lockwood, 1992, p50)
Smaller carriers and new entrants generally regard the restriction of slots by the major 
players as a primary barrier to their development. Table 5.14 shows that the British 
Airways group of carriers has approximately three times the number of slots as the 
British Midland group and approximately 70 times as many as Virgin Atlantic at 
Heathrow. Physical restrictions would indicate that slot shortages will be a permanent 
bottleneck on the development of new entrants.
Table 5.14 Incumbents & New Entrant Slot Allocations:
London's Heathrow Airport - Summer 1992
TOTAL SLOTS NUMBER
233,185
% TOTAL 
100.0
% UK TOTAL x VS
UK Airlines 128,741 55.2 100.0
British Airways 87,661 37.6 68.1 73
Brymon 1,380
Dan Air 1,260
SUB-TOTAL 90,301 38 ? 70.2 75
British Midland 30,667 13.2 23.8 26
Manx 1,360
SUB-TOTAL 32,027 13.7 24.9 27
Virgin Atlantic 1,200 .5 .9 1
(Source: Virgin Atlantic Presentation to the AUC, Summer 1992.) 
Key: VS = Virgin Atlantic
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Conclusions on the Power o f Suppliers
This section has shown that supplier power in the aviation industry is both diverse and 
in the case of all but the biggest airlines, extremely strong. Moreover, particularly 
because of increasing congestion at airports, it is difficult to see ways in which the 
industry could effectively control this power.
5.11.8 The Intensity of Rivalry Among Competitors - Jockeying for Position
Rivalry among those already in the market place adopts the form of 'jockeying for 
position' -employing methods such as price competition, promotions for product 
introduction, vigorous advertising campaigns and increased customer service. Porter 
(1980, p.95) suggests that intense rivalry is related to a number of factors:
Numerous or Equally Balanced Competitors: Where competitors are numerous or 
are roughly equal in size of power, there is always likely to be more competition than in 
situations where one firm dominate.
Slow Industry Growth: Slow industry growth precipitates fights for market share 
between firms determined to expand.
High Fixed or Storage Costs: Where fixed costs are high or when a product is 
perishable, there is likely to be strong price competition.
Lack of Differentiation or Switching Costs: Where a product or service lacks 
differentiation and/or switching costs are low, competition is likely to be intense.
Capacity Augmented in Large Increments: This situation arises where economies 
of scale necessitate that capacity must be added in large increments:
...capacity additions can be chronically disruptive to the industry supply/demand 
balance, particularly where there is risk of bunching capacity additions.
(Porter, 1980, p19)
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Diverse Competitors: The rivals are diverse in strategies, origins and 'personalities'. 
They have different ideas about how to compete and habitually run head-on into one 
another in the process.
High Strategic Stakes: industries get caught up in rivalry if a number of companies 
have high stakes in achieving success.
High Exit Barriers: Exit barriers are high when there are very specialised assets or 
management loyalty to a particular business. Consequently, companies keep 
competing even though they may be earning low or negative returns on investment.
When exit barriers are high, excess capacity does not leave the industry, and 
companies that lose the com petitive battle do not give up. Rather, they grim ly 
hang on and, because o f their weaknesses, they have to resort to extreme 
tactics. The profitability o f the entire industry can be persistently low as a result.
(Porter, 1980, p21)
Shifting Rivalry: The elements that determine rivalry can and do change - industry 
growth often changes because of industry maturity.
As an industry matures its growth rate declines, resulting in intensified rivalry, 
declining profits, and (often) a shake-out
(Porter, 1980, p2 1 )
5.11.9 The Degree of Rivalry in the Aviation Industry
The airline industry, like most industries, claims that since deregulation it has faced 
unique and unprecedented levels of rivalry resulting in the severe profit erosion set out 
in Tables, 5.2 and 5.3. These tables show the effects of intense rivalry while Table
5.15 considers the causes of the rivalry: all the classic causes of rivalry are present to 
a significant degree.
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Table 5.15 Classic Causes of Rivalry in the Airline Industry
GENERIC CAUSES OF RIVALRY APPLICABILITY TO THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Numerous/Equally Balanced 
Competitors
Similar Competitor Structure in EU Countries & the 
Big 10 in the USA.
Slow Industry Growth EU Average Growth Rate 1992/93 -0.5% 
US Average Growth Rate 1992/93 -1 .2%
High Fixed Costs Average Price Boeing 757 -1992/93 $42m
Lack of Differentiation Comparable Services & Prices on Many Routes
Lumpy Capacity Augmentation Average Price Boeing757 - 1992/93 $42m
Diverse Competitors Major Differences Between Airlines in Structure, 
Scale, Missions, Goals & Objectives.
High Strategic Stakes National Prestige
High Exit Barriers Expensive Dedicated Assets
(Source: Adapted from Porter 1980, p19)
A consequence of this intense rivalry is that many airlines have sought strategies to 
structurally redefine their operations and increase their power in their markets through 
the active pursuit of strategic alliances and cross-shareholdings while simultaneously 
extending customer choice.
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Table 5.16
Examples of Cross Shareholdings in the European Airline Industry
CARRIER SUBSIDIARIES/TRADE INVESTMENTS
Aer
Lingus
80% Aer Turas Teoranta, 25% Futura, 49% Pegasus, 100% Aer Lingus 
Commuter and 100% Irish Helicopters.
Air France 75% Air Inter, 95% Air Charter, 51% Air Berlin, 33.1% SABENA, 11.5% CSA, 
3.48% Air Madagascar, 12.77% Air Mauritius, 1.5% Austrian Airlines, 25% 
Cameroon Airlines, 6.25% Corse Mediterranne, 28.5% Middle East Airlines, 
35% Aeropostale, 3.97% Royal Air Maroc and 5.6% Tunis Air.
Alitalia 100% ATI, 45% Avianova, through ATI, 45% Eurofly, 27.6% Air Europe, 
through Eurofly and 30% Malev.
BA 100% British Asia Airways, 100% Caledonian Airways, 100% BA Regional, 
49.9% TAT, 49% Deutsche BA, 49% GB Airways, 33% Air Russia, 25% 
Quantas, 24.6% US Air and 49.9% The Plimsoll Line (owner of Brymon 
European).
Iberia 100% Aviaco, 100% Binter, 100% Viva, 45% Viasa, 35% Ladeco and 30% 
Aerdineas Argentinas.
KLM 100% KLM Cityhopper, 20% Northwest, 14.9% Air UK, 80% Transavia 
Airline, 40% ALM and 35% Martinair.
Lufthansa 100% Condor Flugdienst, 100% German Cargo, Services, 100% Lufthansa 
City Line, 49% Euro Berlin, 40% Sun Express, 26.5% Lauda Air (through 
Condor), 24.5% Cargolux and 13% Luxair.
Luxair 24.5% Cargolux.
Olympic 100% Macedonian Airlines.
Sabena 71.4% Sobelair, 79% DAT and 49% DAT Wallonie.
SAS 40% Airlines of Britain Holdings (owners of British Midland) and 43% Lans 
Chile.
TAP 22% Euroair.
(Source: Compiled by author using data from the Associated 
European Airlines Yearbook,~\993.)
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5.12 CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF PORTER’S COMPETITIVE
STRATEGY MODEL TO THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
Whatever the shortcomings, the Porter model of competitive strategy provides a 
rigorous and well verified methodology for assessing the degree of competition that 
prevails in any industry and in particular in the aviation industry, as has been shown. 
Perhaps its greatest attributes are its:
• comprehensiveness, i.e. it is concerned not just with a single industry but 
with the broader set of stakeholder influences which impinge upon the 
industry;
• measurability, i.e. it facilitates the objective measurement of the intensity of 
competition;
• analytical contribution, i.e. it enables those dominant competitive pressures 
to be isolated and measured; and
• prescriptiveness, i.e. the Porter analysis will provide a template for 
competitive success for the various stakeholders in the airline industry by 
providing effective strategic agendas.
184
C h a p te r  6  - R e s e a rc h  M e th o d o lo g y
Chapter 6 - Research Methodology
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the research problem in the light of the literature review and of 
the theoretical framework analyses of deregulation of the airline industry in the USA 
and the European Community. It examines the hypotheses which are necessary to 
test the research issue and identifies research approaches which contribute to 
resolving the problem identified.
6.2 Research Problem.
Review of the literature leads to the conclusion that regardless of the type of 
'regulatory reform1 - deregulation, liberalisation or privatisation - the common 
overriding objective of each of the respective processes is the creation of free markets 
which allow competition. Deregulation of air transport in the USA did lead to increased 
competition in an industry where competition was previously limited. There is no norm 
or model by which to predict the actual outcomes of deregulation in every industry but 
the experiences of the American air transport sector deregulated in 1978 do provide a 
benchmark by which to compare the competitive outcomes in the European 
Community after the 'regulatory reforming1 process of liberalisation in the iate 1980s 
and early 1990s. Competition in the USA post-deregulation was manifested by a 
number of measurable results and using the American experience as a model 
provides a benchmark against which a comparison can be made with the outcomes in 
the European Community post-liberalisation.
The theoretical analysis of deregulation using the Eastonian (1965a) political system 
framework provides a helpful analysis of the research problem. The emphasis in the 
political systems analysis is on how political life is perceived, rather than on explaining 
how particular outcomes are produced; it highlights the importance of communication, 
perceptions, attitudes, motivations and beliefs of the various stakeholders in the 
industry concerned.
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Of greatest significance is the role of the heuristic feedback loop in the maintenance 
of the deregulation system; it emphasises the influence stakeholders have on the 
outcomes of the process and how by responding to feedback the authorities can 
revise the system of deregulation to ensure that it is maintained, even if in a 
somewhat modified form. Thus the continuance of the deregulated air transport 
system in the European Community is dependent upon reaction to the feedback from 
the stakeholders in the Member States. The reaction to the "feedback" by the 
European Commission, although the liberalisation process has been maintained, is 
perceived by stakeholders to have distorted and hindered any real competition.
Utilisation of Porter's model of competitive forces as an analytical framework for the 
examination of the deregulation process focused on the intensity of competition pre- 
and post- deregulation in the air transport sector in the European Community and it 
examined the strategies adopted by companies to gain competitive advantage. Porter 
(1985) discusses how a company can create and sustain such an advantage, 
asserting that an action is strategic
...only if it affects the com petitive position o f a firm  or the structure o f its
industry.
Porter (1985, p.4)
Firms need to analyse the environment of their market place before developing a 
strategy for competitive advantage. Porter (1985, p.4) presents a generic template 
both for assessing the competitive intensity that prevails in any industry and also for 
developing generic strategies for the players in any industry. The present project 
tailors this approach to the airline industry and the model will be considered for its 
usefulness in providing a framework by which to structure the analysis, his five forces 
model affording a mechanism for examining both the competitive environment and the 
intensity of competition.
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Thus the research question is three dimensional:
• to assess the competitive outcomes in the European Community's air 
transport sector post deregulation as compared with the measurable 
outcomes evident post deregulation in the US air transport sector.
• to analyse the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, motivations of the stakeholders 
in the European Community air transport industry and their perceived 
influence on the formulation, implementation and maintenance of air 
transport deregulation policies in the European Community.
• to measure the intensity of competition by an examination of the five major 
competitive forces: ‘entry barriers’, ‘supplier power’, ‘buyer power’, 
‘substitution threat’ and ‘intensity of rivalry’ in the European Community's air 
transport sector post-deregulation and to analyse the competitive strategies 
adopted by firms operating in the newly created competitive environment.
The research problem is to investigate the extent to which liberalisation of the EC 
airline industry has affected the intensity of competition in the industry, the competitive 
strategies adopted by those competing in the industry and the influence of the 
stakeholders on air transport liberalisation policies.
6.3 BROAD HYPOTHESES
The literature reviewed and the theoretical frameworks analysed suggests a broad 
hypothesis.
When there is a fundamental structural change in the competitive terrain 
of an industry, those competitors who are most sensitive to the 
conditions and who formulate and implement generically appropriate 
strategies are most likely to enjoy superior returns.
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Three general hypotheses have been developed.
Hypothesis 1 The intensity of competition in an air transport sector which has 
undergone a regulatory reforming process, such as deregulation, is 
greater than in an air transport sector which has not.
Related Hypotheses to test the intensity of competition:
H1.1 There w ill be an increase in the number o f new start-up airlines after the 
deregulation o f an a ir transport system than before the deregulation o f an a ir 
transport system.
H1<2 There w ill be more routes operated by airlines after the deregulation o f an a ir
transport system than before deregulation o f an a ir transport system.
H1.3 There w ill be an increase in the number o f discount fares available after the
deregulation o f an a ir transport system than before the deregulation o f an a ir
transport system.
Although, it could be argued that independent variables other than deregulation may 
have an impact, research studies (see Dempsey, 1978; Levine; 1965, Morrison & 
Winston, 1986) in the United States suggest that the effect of deregulation has been 
of such a magnitude and its correlation with increasing competitiveness such that 
other external influences can be accorded a combined minimal weight and their 
influence ignored.
Hypothesis 2 A system which does adjust to stakeholder inputs and feedback, as 
measured by Easton's model of political systems analysis, will be 
more likely to survive than a system which does not respond to 
stakeholder input.
Related Hypotheses to test perceptions/ attitudes on the reaction to the feedback from 
senior airline executives and their stakeholders in Member States of the European 
Community on airline deregulation:
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H2.i Senior executive stakeholders in the industry are more inclined to view  
approval o f State subsidies by the European Commission as a means o f 
addressing individual Member States' social/economic/employment problems 
rather than as a means o f sustaining competition within the industry.
H2.2 Member States which own airlines are perceived by senior executive 
stakeholders as being more reluctant to oppose the granting o f State subsidies 
to a ir carriers than Member States which do not own an airline.
H2.3 Airlines in receipt o f State subsidies are perceived by airline senior executives 
in the European airline industry to be less efficient than airlines which do not 
receive State subsidies.
H2.4 The granting o f State subsidies to State owned airlines is more likely to be 
perceived by senior executive stakeholders in the EC a ir transport sector as a 
means o f preventing com petition rather than as a means o f prom oting 
competition.
Hypothesis 3 In newly created competitive environments companies which have 
adopted strategies as defined by Porter's model will have lagged 
returns which are superior to those of companies which have not 
adopted such strategies.
Related hypotheses to test the competitive strategies adopted by airlines:
H3.1 Airlines that have followed generic strategies o f High Volume/Low Cost or 
Differentiation or Focus have enjoyed higher returns than those o f airlines 
which have not.
H3.2 Airlines which have reduced buyer power have had higher returns than those 
o f airlines which have not.
H3.3 Airlines which have reduced supplier power have had higher returns than 
those o f airlines which have not.
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H3.4 Airlines which have erected barriers to entry have had higher returns than 
those o f airlines which have not.
H3.5 Airlines which have reacted best to substitute services have had higher returns 
than those o f airlines which have not
In the above hypotheses the dependent variable is the lagged returns of the airlines. 
Although the existence of multicollinearity among the independent variables is 
possible, in the analysis stage statistical tests will be carried out to ascertain its 
magnitude and then to accommodate its influence.
6.4 OPERATIONAL HYPOTHESES
Oppenheim (1992, p.23), notes by that defining variables in operational terms allows 
measurement in the fieldwork to take place. The definition of a variable will not 
depend on ‘a dictionary but on the internal logic of the inquiry’ (Oppenheim, 1992, 
p.23). Thus pilot work in defining variables was necessary in order to ensure that the 
interpretations used in the study would be comprehensible to the respondents. Review 
of the literature provided many of the variables in the first instance and use of official 
documentation such as European Community legislation and consultation with major 
airlines, start-up airlines and the CAA (UK) led to the refinement and verification of the 
variables utilised in this study.
In many of the hypotheses the independent variable - the ‘cause’ or predictor whose 
effects are being studied - will be the same, i.e. deregulation, while the dependent 
variables - the results, the effects, the gains or losses produced by the impact of the 
independent variable - will relate to the predicted outcomes.
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Table 6:1 below summarises the independent and dependent variables in each of the 
hypotheses.
Table 6.1: Independent and Dependent Variables
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES DEPENDENT VARIABLES
HYPOTHESIS 1 and
Hi .i H1.2H1.3H1.4
Deregulation of air transport in the 
European Community.
Intensity of competition:
Increase in the number of new entrants. 
Increase in the number of start up airlines. 
Increase in the number of routes served. 
Increase in the number of discounted fares.
HYPOTHESIS 2 and
H2.I H2.2 H2l3 H2.4
Stakeholder feedback.
Awarding State aid.
State owned airlines' support for State 
aid.
Airlines receiving State aid.
System remains intact:
Economic/social problems are addressed. 
Inefficient practices are present. 
Competition is distorted.
HYPOTHESIS 3 and
H3.I H3.2 H3,3 H3<4 H3.5
Reduce supplier power. 
Reduce buyer power. 
Erect barriers to entry. 
React to substitutes.
Lagged returns:
Superior returns.
The definitions of the independent and dependent variables set out below represent a 
distillation of alternatives presented in the literature review (see chapter 4).
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6.4.1 Independent Variables
Independent Variable 1: Deregulation While there has been much previous 
reference in this study as to the definition of ‘deregulation’, the term will be used in the 
context of the hypotheses as meaning ‘the culmination of a gradual process of 
liberalisation of the European Community air transport system to which the Member 
States committed themselves in 1986’.
Source: CAA (UK) 1993, CAP 623, p.1
Independent Variable 2: Stakeholder Feedback Utilisation of Easton s model of 
political systems analysis allowed numerous stakeholders in the airline industry to be 
identified. Using Porter's (1980) categorisation those groups which are deemed to 
have a ‘legitimate’ interest in the industry are classified into: competitors (airlines), 
suppliers to airlines, buyers from airlines and substitutes for air travel.
Using the Eastonian model of political system analysis, it is only the negative 
feedback from these stakeholders post-deregulation that is considered. The positive 
feedback does not require action. Its purpose is to denote that at least some of the 
stakeholders are supportive of the system, while the stakeholders not in favour of the 
system need to see change in order to give their support in future.
Negative feedback to the outputs of liberalisation was manifested in the losses the 
airlines incurred (see chapter 5 above) coupled in 1993 with requests to the European 
Commission to halt the process. The requests were repeated in evidence given to the 
Comite des Sages - a body set up under the auspices of the European Commission 
(DG VII) to investigate the heavy losses experienced by the air transport sector in the 
European Community. Under the Chairmanship of Herman de Croo, stakeholders 
were invited to give their ‘feedback’ on liberalisation of air transport in the EC. Most 
noticeably negative feed back came from Member States which owned a ‘flag carrier’ 
airline. Of particular significance were the submissions made by witnesses from Italy, 
France and Belgium, each of whose flag carriers, Alitalia, Air France and Sabena 
respectively, experienced heavy losses and blamed them on the increased 
competition that resulted from liberalisation. Examples of the negative feedback are 
presented below:
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Negative Feedback from  Italy: Pointing to the results of excess capacity in the 
market. Mr Bisiganni, the Managing Director of Alitalia, said that:
...it is now time that capacity coordination was freed from the stigma o f 
illegality. It cannot be wise that in an enforced absence o f dialogue, each 
airline plans and buys aircraft for the same potential traffic.
He also claimed that a fares war was ‘pushing the industry into a very dangerous 
downward spira l’ and that
...the only way to avoid it is that o f fixing minimum and maximum levels to be 
controlled with a very rapid and flexible mechanism that could help to prevent 
the always more frequent dumping actions.
(Source: Annex to Comite des Sages Report, January 1994.)
Negative Feedback from  France: The President of Air France, Jacques Attali shared 
this analysis of the industry's difficulties and offered similar solutions:
The real problem for airlines is a combination o f over-capacity and the suicidal 
price wars they are waging amongst themselves... The Commission should ... 
rethink its com petition policy to make it more flexible. Greater flexib ility in fare- 
pricing decisions and inter-airline consultation would seem to be absolutely 
necessary ... The Community ought to review the fare-pricing and capacity 
safeguard clauses contained in the third package in order to make their 
triggering and implementation more flexible. Sim ilarly, consultation and 
cooperation between airlines should be facilitated in respect o f operating 
schedules, so that capacity can be trimmed more rapidly through jo in t 
agreements or code sharing.
(Source: Annex to Comite des Sages Report, January 1994.)
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Negative Feedback from  Belgium: Sabena's written submission to the Comite des 
Sages contained more precise proposals:
Currency imbalances and fluctuations in the EC result in directional fare 
imbalances and differences in cost structure between Member States and thus 
in unequal opportunities for airlines to compete in the internal m arket 
Therefore, the Council o f M inisters should adopt a Council Regulation 
providing fo r autom atic fares adjustment [whereby] a devaluation o f a Member 
State's currency o f 3% or more w ill give rise to an autom atic increase... to the 
same extent in the fares levels applied from that Member States to other 
Member States unless the fares levels from that Member State are already 
higher...than the levels to that country.
(Source: Annex to Comite des Sages Report, January 1994.)
Independent Variable 3: State-Owned Airline A State-owned airline is one in which 
a Member State's government has a financial stake in the national airline. Source: 
CAA (UK) 1993, CAP 623, p.5
With the exception of the UK, where BA has been privatised since 1987, every other 
Member State of the European Community has a national airline which is either partly 
or wholly owned by the State under the above definition.
Independent Variable 4: State Aid Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome does not 
distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or 
aims, but defines them in relation to the effects. Although State aid is most frequently 
regarded as intervention by way of capital injection to help an airline's financial 
structure, in their document VI l/C/2-881/94/Rev 2 the European Commission 
recognises that State aid may also be ‘in the form o f exclusive rights concessions’. 
However, the reduction or the deferral of fiscal contributions does not constitute State 
aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty and Article 61 (1) of the EEA 
Agreement
...unless it confers a com petitive advantage to specific undertakings to avoid 
having to bear costs which would norm ally have had to be m et out o f the 
undertakings' own financial resources, and thereby prevent m arket forces from  
having their norm al effect.
(see Court of Justice, case 301/87, France v. Commission, (1990) ECR 307 (Boussac 
case), ground 41 at 362).
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A report on State aids in the aviation sector prepared by the Commission in 1991- 
1992 (see Doc. SEC. (92) 431 final) revealed several direct aids aimed at supporting 
air services, mostly domestic, by covering their operating losses. In this study the term 
‘State aid’ will be taken to cover any action by a State which gives competitive 
advantage to a Member State's ‘flag carrier’ thereby preventing market forces from 
having their normal effect.
Source: Communication From the Commission: Application of Articles 92 and 93 of 
the Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to State Aids in the Aviation Sector. 
VI l/C/2-881/94/Rev 2,15.11.1994.
Independent Variable 5: State-Owned Airlines in receipt of State Aid Six of the
State owned airlines in the European Community have received State aid in the form 
of capital injections from 1991 to 1994. The Commission stresses that
capital injection does not involve State aid when the public holding is to be 
increased, provided the capital injected is proportional to the number o f shares 
held by the authorities and goes together with the injection o f capital by a 
private shareholder. The private investor's holding m ust have real economic 
significance.
(European Commission Document VIl/C/2-881/94/Rev 2).
This interpretation of ‘what State aid is not’ will not be regarded in this study as some 
Member States which have provided capital injections and have indicated that they will 
eventually ‘privatise’ their ‘flag carriers’ have not yet shown any evidence of moving 
down the private sector route.
For the purposes of this study all the following State owned airlines will be regarded 
as having received State aid, given that Article 222 of the Treaty is neutral with regard 
to property ownership and the European Commission cannot impose the privatisation 
of the airline as a condition of the State aid. Table 6.1 below shows the recipients of 
‘State aid’ and the amounts they received.
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Table 6.2: Recipients of State Aid
A ir l in e M e m b e r  S ta te D a te A m o u n t  o f  
"St a t e  A id "
Sabena Belgium August 1994 $1,800m
Iberia Spain May 1992 $1 ,200m
Aer Lingus Ireland December 1992 $ 250m
TAP Air Portugal Portugal July 1994 $1 ,100m
Olympic Greece July 1994 $2,300m
Air France France July 1994 $3,700m
(Sources: Sabena, Iberia and Aer Lingus, TAP, Olympic and Air France cases:
Official Journal of the European Communities.)
Generic Competitive Strategies: The following independent variables will be defined 
using the accepted Porter model that is the seminal work upon which this aspect of 
the research is based (see Dess & Davis, 1984, Miller & Friesen, 1986, Bluell,1985).
Independent Variable 6: High Volume/ Low Cost According to Porter (1980, p.35) 
high volume/low cost strategies require aggressive construction of efficient-scale 
facilities, vigorous pursuit of cost reductions from experience, tight cost and overhead 
control, avoidance of marginal customer accounts, and cost minimisation. Having a 
low cost relative to competitors yields the firm above-average returns in its industry. Its 
cost position gives the firm a defence against rivalry from competitors, because its 
lower costs mean that it can still earn returns after its competitors have competed 
away their profits through rivalry.
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Independent Variable 7: Differentiation This independent variable refers to 
differentiating the product or service offered by the firm, creating something that is 
perceived industry wide as being unique. In this study the term 'differentiation' will be 
used to describe the strategies adopted by airlines to make their services different 
from those of their competitors.
Independent Variable 8: Focus Focus refers to concentration of an airline on a 
particular buyer section of the aviation market. An airline could for example adopt a 
strategy to serve only a niche of the wider air transport market by offering high cost 
superior service or a low cost ‘no frills’ service on all routes. The strategy rests on the 
premise that if a particular sector of the market is served very well the airline will also 
benefit.
Independent Variable 9: Reducing Buying Power As outlined in Chapter Four the 
buyers of airline services considered in this study are :
• tour operators
• travel agents
• corporate buyers
The power of the buyer can be reduced or altered in accordance with Porter (1980, 
pp.24-27). Buyers of airline services can have their power reduced if the airline can 
find:
• buyers who do not purchase large volumes of services relative to the 
airline's sales.
• buyers whose purchases do not represent a significant fraction of their 
costs.
• buyers who need to purchase the airline's differentiated products.
• buyers who have high switching costs.
• buyers who are profitable.
• buyers who do not pose a credible threat of backward integration.
• buyers who depend on the quality of airline service to enhance their own 
products.
• buyers who do not have full information about demand, actual market 
prices and supplier costs.
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Independent Varaible 10: Reducing Supplier Power: Suppliers to the airline 
industry are numerous. This work will focus on those already mentioned in Chapter 
Four who supply:
• fuel
• airport facilities
• in-flight food
• CRS systems
According to Porter (1980, pp.27-29) the power of suppliers can be altered or 
reduced. Thus an airline will enhance its position if it can find:
• a supplier group which is not dominated by a few companies and which is 
not more concentrated than the airline which is being supplied.
• a supplier group which is obliged to contend with other substitute products 
for sale to the airline.
• a supplier where the airline is an important customer.
• a supplier where the product is not an important input to the airline's
business.
• a supplier group which has undifferentiated products.
• a supplier group which has high switching costs.
• a supplier group which does not pose a credible threat to forward 
integration.
Independent Variable 11: Erecting Barriers to Entry: According to Porter (1980. 
pp.7-13) firms can enhance their competitive position by strategies aimed at making 
entry by competitors more difficult. Airlines can erect such barriers to entry by 
adopting one or more of the following strategies:
1. gaining scale advantage
2. establishing differentiated products/services.
3. increasing the capital requirement for operations.
4. establishing customer switching costs.
5. locking in distribution channels.
6. modifying government policy.
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Independent Variable 12: Reaction to Substitutes: The variable ‘substitute’ refers 
to a mode of transport that can compete with the airplane in terms of time, schedule 
and price. It was shown in Chapter 5 that the only realistic substitute mode of travel is 
the European high speed train. This conclusion was based on a study by the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA), Air Transport Report, 1991, in which the two 
modes of transport were compared on journey time, convenience of schedule and 
price.
Airlines may react to substitute means of travel by at least matching the price, the 
quality and the time cycle of the alternative for a similar service. Porter (1980, p.23) 
suggests that substitutes limit the potential returns of an industry by placing a ceiling 
on the price firms in the industry can profitably charge.
6.4.2 Dependent Variables
Intensity of Competition is defined by the measurable outcomes that were evident 
post-deregulation in the USA i.e. an increase in the number of:
• new entrants
• start-up airlines
• routes served
• discounted fares.
(See Gialloreto, 1988, p 18, Brenner et al, 1985 pp131-133; and Dempsey and Gotez, 
1992, p186).
These dependent variables are defined using official terminology. As this is universally 
recognised by all the stakeholders in the air transport sector in the European 
Community, there will be no dispute as to their definition.
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Dependent Variable 1: New Entrants: A new entrant is defined by the European 
Community as:
• ‘an air carrier requesting slots at an airport on any day and holding or 
having been allocated fewer than four slots at that airport on that day, or
• an air carrier requesting slots for a non-stop service between two 
Community airports where at most two other air carriers operate a direct 
service between these airports or airport systems on that day and holding 
or having been allocated fewer than four slots at that airport on that day for 
that non-stop service’.
As the definition of a ‘new entrant’ is so closely linked to ‘slot’ allocation it is useful to 
define this concept also.
A slot is: the scheduled time o f arrival or departure available or allocated to an
aircraft movement a t an airport.
(Source: Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for 
the allocation of slots at Community airports, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, No L 14, 22.1 1994, p.2.)
Dependent Variable 2 : Start-Up Airlines: ‘Start up’ airlines are often confused with 
‘new entrants’. This confusion stems from the fact that as ‘start up’ airlines they are 
also new entrants on routes they serve. In this study the term ‘start up’ will refer to any 
airline registered in a Member State of the European Community which commenced 
commercial operations on or after 1 January 1988 and whose name appears on any 
European Community airport timetables oh or after that date.
Dependent Variable 3: Routes: ‘Routes’ are not defined in European Community 
legislation, but the meaning of the term can be inferred from the definition of ‘flight’ as 
a ‘departure from a specified airport towards a specified destination’ by air.
(Source: Council Directive No. 87/601/EEC of 14 December 1987 on fares for 
scheduled services between Member States, Official Journal of the European 
Communities No. L374 of 31 December 1987, p13.)
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Dependent Variable 4: Discounted Fares: Discounted fares can only be defined in 
terms of the basic fare as this is the benchmark from which the discount is derived. 
Basic fare means the
...low est fu lly flexible fare...which is offered for sale a t least to the same extent 
as that o f any other fu lly flexible fare offered on the same a ir service.
The dependent variable ‘discounted fare’ means any fares offered for sale at a 
discount from the basic fare as defined above. These fares are always subject to 
restrictive conditions eg. no changes of reservation are allowed, only 50% of the fare 
is refunded if the ticket is cancelled before the outward journey is made, a Saturday 
night must intervene between the outward and return flights.
(Source: Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2409/92 of 23 July 1992 on fares and rates for 
air services, Official Journal of the European Communities No. L 240, 24.08.92, p.16.)
Dependent Variable 5: Survival of the the Political System: Easton (1965a, p366) 
maintains that a system is more likely to survive if it adjusts itself to accommodate 
stakeholder feedback. Many State owned airlines incurred financial losses and the 
restructuring strategies necessary to accommodate deregulation increased that 
burden. Under ‘ordinary’ commercial circumstances these airlines would have been 
allowed to go bankrupt. The anticipated single aviation market was in danger of losing 
some of its main competitors, but ‘any rollback of liberalisation ... would be 
inappropriate and self-defeating. It would render the global competitiveness 
impossible’. (Comite des Sages Report 1994, p.22).
The Comite des Sages Report (1994, p. 17) notes, that the European deregulated air 
transport was at ‘crossroads’. Many of these loss-making national ‘flag carriers’ 
requested State subsidies, and faced with a possible collapse of the system, the 
European Commission allowed six Member States to give financial assistance to their 
respective national airlines between 1992 and 1994.
201
C h a p te r  6  - R e s e a rc h  M e th o d o lo g y
State aids may be considered when this aid sen/es the Community's interest 
in a restructuring that leads to competitiveness. In this context, support fo r the 
transition o f an a ir carrier to commercial viability may be in the Community's 
interest if the position o f com petitors is safeguarded.
(Comite des Sages Report 1994, p.22)
Thus the stakeholder feedback on the deregulated system has been accommodated 
and the system seems likely to survive.
Dependent Variable 6: Addressing Social/Economic Problems in Member 
States: The scope of the social/economic problems that might result from 
deregulation is vast but Naveau (1994, p.7), commenting on the realistic possibilities 
of the recommendations of the Comite des Sages being implemented by all the 
Member States, highlights one problem which has affected nearly all the ‘flag carriers’ 
since the implementation of deregulation. He cites deregulation as having one
‘real obstacle, the employment issue’.
This view is shared by Michael Spicer, MP for Worcestershire South, in a House of 
Commons Select Committee hearing on 17 March 1994 on ‘Air Traffic Liberalisation’:
The airlines on the continent are state owned, ... and are greatly supported 
and highly restricted... If they had been in the private sector, four o f the seven 
m ajor national carriers would have had to go into liquidation. There is not 
much doubt about that. By common consent, A ir France would have gone into 
liquidation some time ago as would Iberia, Aer Lingus and Sabena.
When airlines in the private sector are financially threatened they go into liquidation 
or adopt strategies that help them to become more efficient and adjust to the situation. 
Those owned by the State continue to operate inefficient practices and with a 
workforce that remains intact.
When British Airways found itse lf financially threatened, it had to shed 20,000 
jobs and radically improve its efficiency. For continental airlines, it was loss- 
making business as usual...
(Spicer, House of Commons Select Committee, 17.03.94. p.1090)
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Dependent Variable 7: Inefficient Practices: The recommendation in the Comite 
des Sages Report, January 1994 that State aid should only be granted to nationally 
owned airlines if they agreed to become more ‘efficient’ leads to the assumption that 
State owned airlines in receipt of State aid operate ‘inefficient’ practices. These 
‘inefficient’ practices are clearly defined in relation to this specific industry and it is this 
‘official legislative’ definition of ‘inefficient’ practices that will be adopted in this study. 
Inefficient practices in State owned airlines are defined as:
‘low labour productivity’"- (Comite des Sages Report, January 1994, p. 14.)
Dependent Variable 8: Distrorted Competition: There are many ways in which 
competition can be distorted in the airline industry. New entrants argue that they 
cannot compete because of poor airport infrastructure leading to difficulties in 
acquiring take off and landing slots, check-in desks, aircraft parking space etc. 
Competitive distortions of this nature are the result of a lack of airport facilities and not 
of a national governments policy to protect its national airline. However, there is 
agreement in official reports and in legislative literature that State owned airlines in 
receipt of State aid do distort competition. State aid invariably involves access to 
finance on terms that would not normally be available to commercial concerns and 
thus allows delays in reducing overcapacity and permits uneconomic pricing policies 
to continue. (Source: Comite des Sages Report, January 1994 pp.21-22).
Spicer (House of Commons Select Committee, 17.03.94. p.1090) notes that when 
financially threatened, ‘the continental airlines were able to compete in a predatory 
manner against companies that have made themselves efficient without any State 
aid’.
Dependent Variable 9: Lagged Returns: Lagged returns refer to the returns that 
accrue after the strategy has been implemented for at least one year (see Dhrymes, 
1970).
Dependent Variable 10: Superior Returns: Returns for the industry will confirm to 
normal distribution, superior returns will be those which are above average (see 
Dhrymes, 1970).
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6.5 RESEARCH APPROACH
The research problem is three dimensional and thus requires a multi-dimensional 
approach. The research problem is concerned with:
• measuring the expected outcomes post-deregulation;
• examining the perceived influence of a political system on the expected 
level of competition post-deregulation; and
• analysing the level of competition and the competitive strategies adopted by 
companies operating in a newly deregulated industry.
Table 6.2 below provides a summary of the hypotheses to be tested, the objectives of 
testing and necessary analytical tools in order to answer the research problem.
Table 6.3: The Hypotheses, Objectives of Testing and Research Tools.
H y p o t h e s is  t o  b e  T e s t e d O b je c t iv e  o f  t e s t in g A n a l y t ic a l
T e c h n iq u e
Hypothesis 1 
+
H1.1, H-,.2, Hi.3, and
To obtain quantitative measures 
of the level of competition post 
liberalisation in the EC.
Library Based 
Research:
Findings will be 
validated by expert 
witnesses
Hypothesis 2 
+
H2.1, H2.2, H2.3, and H2.4,
To analyse the influences, 
perceptions, beliefs, attitudes 
and motivations of the 
stakeholders in the EC 
liberalisation process.
Qualitative
Research:
ln-depth interviews
Hypothesis 3 
+
H3.1. H3 2, H3.3f H3.4i and H3.5.
To measure the intensity of 
competition in the industry post 
liberalisation in the EC and to 
assess the competitive 
strategies adopted by a 
representative sample in each 
of the five forces.
Quantitative and
Qualitative
Research:
Questionnaires and 
in-depth interviews 
with key personnel 
regarding the findings 
of the questionnaire.
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A variety of research methods were considered and appraised as vehicles to test the 
above hypotheses and answer the research problem. These were:
• Secondary research - pre-established data sources from which certain 
conclusions could be drawn.
• In-depth interview revelations of respondents' perceptions, beliefs, 
attitudes, motivations on a specific issue.
• Survey/questionnaire- a systematic collection of data from samples and 
statistical analysis.
• Case study- detailed examination of a specific social entity of a set of social 
phenomena, and generally of an exploratory nature.
These research methods can be categorised into qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Qualitative techniques are concerned with ‘soft’ data, beliefs, feelings, 
perceptions and motivations. Quantitative techniques are necessary to collect ‘hard’ 
data, i.e. the numbers involved in one activity, company characteristics, behaviour 
patterns of firms and strategic models adopted by companies.
Previous methodological approaches applied to this area of research post­
deregulation in the USA have concentrated almost exclusively on quantitative 
methods. However, Blankart (1992, p212) argues that the exclusive use of a logical- 
empiricist methodology
...is  o f little  help in explaining regulation.
Dominant use of quantitative methods ignore that
...in  an individualistic world, human self-interest is likely to be a leading 
principle underlying regulatory decision.
(Blankart 1992, p212)
Dymsza (1984, p10) argues that ‘response bias’ can be another feature of using 
quantitative questionnaires and that by using qualitative techniques such ‘bias’ could 
be eradicated.
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On the other hand, advocates of quantitative methods insist that problems of this 
nature originate from defective survey design and utilisation of inappropriate statistical 
techniques and maintain that more 'stringency' is necessary (Stoetzer, 1992; Muller, 
1983; and Blankart, 1992).
These dissenting perspectives on methodology emulate the much wider discussion on 
the nature of research and the rudimentary discrepancies between ‘positivist’ and 
‘methodological’ traditions. The main tenets of these alternatives are compactly 
combined by Easterby-Smith et a /(1991, p27) in Table 6.3 below.
Table 6.4 ‘Positivist’ v ‘Phenomenological’ Paradigms.
P o s it iv is t  p a r a d ig m P h e n o m e n o l o g ic a l
p a r a d ig m
Basic beliefs: The world is external and objective 
Observer is independent
Science is value-free
The world is socially 
constructed and subjective 
Observer is part of what is 
observed
Science is driven by 
human interests
Research should: focus on facts
look for causality and fundamental 
laws
reduce phenomena to simplest 
elements
formulate hypotheses and then test 
them
focus on meanings
try to understand what is
happening
look at the totality of each 
situation
develop ideas through 
induction from data
Preferred methods 
include:
operationalising concepts so they 
can be measured
taking large samples
using multiple methods to 
establish different views of 
phenomena
small samples investigated 
in depth or over time
(Source: Easterby-Smith etal, Management Research 1991, p.27.)
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Whilst they suggest that economy and speed in data collection and ease of analysis 
are the advantages of quantitative methods, this approach inclines to be rigid and not 
fully productive in yielding an understanding of processes and the generation of 
theories neither does it provide guidance for policy-makers.
Quantitative methods are suitable for testing hypotheses and ascertaining the 
reliability of data (Me Cracken, 1988). However, they gauge the frequency of 
phenomena rather than explaining how or why they occur (Easterby-Smith et al, 
1991).
On the other hand, many phenomenological approaches and associated qualitative 
methods can be more demanding in terms of resources and analytical skills needed to 
interpret the data (Jones, 1981, p.29). Moreover, their reliability is often questioned 
because of the ‘soft’ nature of the data, the potentially subjective influence of the 
researcher and the lack of well formulated methods of analysis (Miles and Haberman, 
1984; Griggs, 1986). Nevertheless, qualitative methods do provide a way of 
examining the process of change over time and often provide in-depth perspectives. 
(Me Cracken 1988, Easterby-Smith e ta l 1991).
Research in management, marketing and policy-making has traditionally utilised 
quantitative techniques regardless of the fact that many of the issues are inherently 
behavioral (see Easterby-Smith et a l (1991, p.1). However, data from Smith (1975) 
suggest that increasingly management and market researchers are of the view that in 
practice quantitative and qualitative methodologies are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Smith (1975) advocates fusing data from diverse sources and using 
different methods in order to facilitate the authentication of each set through a 
procedure known as ‘methodological triangulation’.
Strauss and Corbin (1990) infer that qualitative data might actually help to explain 
quantitatively-derived findings. Smith (1991) asserts that by combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods the inherent disadvantages of each can be reduced because 
such a combination is likely to be more representative and holistic.
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Furthermore, Easterby-Smith et a / (1991) encourage utilisation of an ‘appropriate mix’ 
of techniques, maintaining that this will provide more robust perspectives on the 
phenomena being studied but also decreases the danger of producing irrelevant 
findings and inappropriate conclusions. Hence, the present research will use a 'mix' of 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies.
The research problem - that regardless of the type of ‘regulatory reform’ (deregulation, 
liberalisation or privatisation) there is a common overriding objective to create free 
markets which allow competition - and the related hypotheses to be tested in this work 
require a wider investigation rather than an exclusive use of either qualitative or 
quantitative methods. It is necessary to collect ‘hard’ data to test hypotheses which 
will determine associations between a large number of variables and measure the 
frequency and type of phenomena. This aspect of the research will measure the 
intensity of competition post-deregulation and analysis will provide an evaluation of the 
competitive outcomes and the strategies adopted by firms in order- to compete. 
Additionally, collection of ‘soft’ data - beliefs, behaviours, perceptions and values - is 
required in order to understand and analyse the policy processes, the foundations of 
theories and maintenance of such policies. This aspect of the research will examine 
perceptions on the feasibility of the policies achieving the desired objectives.
6.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
6.6.1 Qualitative Methods
Hypothesis 2 and related hypotheses focus on the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions of 
industry stakeholders on the influence of a political system on the level of competition 
enjoyed by an industry post deregulation. Thus, qualitative methods of research will 
be used.
Hypothesis 2 A system which does adjust to stakeholder inputs and 
feedback, as measured by Easton's model o f political analysis, w ill be more 
like ly to survive than a system which does not respond to stakeholder input 
and feedback.
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Van Maanen (1983, p.9) defines qualitative methods as
...an array o f interpretative techniques which seek to describe, decode, 
translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, o f 
certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world.
Easterby-Smith et a l (1991, p.71) assert that the main techniques associated with 
qualitative methods are interviews, participant observation and diary methods.
Interviews
Easterby-Smith et al (1991, p.96) cite the in-depth interview as the most fundamental 
method of qualitative analytical research. Oppenheim (1992, p.65) identifies two kinds 
of interview:
1. exploratory interviews depth interviews, or free-style interviews (including 
group interviews);
2. standardised interviews such as used, for example, in public opinion polls, 
market research and government surveys.
‘Standardised interviews’ are more closely related to quantitative research as the 
tendency is to concentrate on collection of the ‘hard facts’, such as the number of 
people who hold a specific idea, feeling or belief as opposed to exploring what their 
perceptions are and why they have them.
However, the qualitative aspect of this research problem is more concerned with what 
Oppenheim (1992, p.67) describes as ‘ideas collection’. Hence, the ‘exploratory or in- 
depth interview’ appears to be the most appropriate method of gaining the necessary 
data in this research.
Burgess (1982, p. 107) summarises the importance of interviews;
[the interview] is ... the opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply to 
uncover new clues, open up new dimensions o f a problem and to secure vivid, 
accurate inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience.
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The qualitative aspect of this study is focused on attitudes, beliefs, perceptions of 
relevant stakeholders on:
• the political inputs in the formulation process of the air transport 
deregulation legislation;
• the importance of inputs from other stakeholders;
• the importance of inputs from stakeholders regarding the implementation of 
the legislation;
• the importance of feedback from stakeholders regarding the modifications 
of the legislation;
• the importance of inputs/feedback from stakeholders in achieving the 
desired outcomes of the legislation;
It is because of the intense qualitative nature of this aspect of the research that tests
of significance could not be applied and interviews were judged to be more
appropriate. Burgess (1982, p.45) notes that the main reason for conducting 
qualitative type interviews is to understand
...how  individuals construct the meaning and significance o f their situations ...
from the complex personal framework o f beliefs and values.
t
The use of the interview method in this instance appears to be appropriate in the light 
of the findings of Easterby-Smith et a l (1991, p.74), who write that interviews should 
be utilised as a means of data collection when:
1. it is necessary to understand the constructs that the interviewee uses as a 
basis for her opinion and beliefs about a particular matter or situation;
2. the step-by-step logic of a situation is not clear;
3. the subject matter is highly confidential or commercially sensitive;
4. the interviewee may be reluctant to be truthful about this issue other than 
confidentially in a one-to-one situation.
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To these could be added the fact that the interviewee will have unique opinions and 
perceptions which could not be measured by scientific type analysis. The type of 
qualitative interview used is important. Easterby-Smith et a l (1991, p.72) note that 
interviews can be ‘highly formalised and structured, or they can be akin to free- 
ranging conversation’. Interviews that are structured in nature are helpful in the 
analytical stage of the research (Jones 1985, p.47).
Sample interviews were conducted with some stakeholders - CAA (UK), air transport 
consumers groups in Ireland, UK and France - in order to verify the validity of the 
instruments. In these interviews the research questions relating to perceptions, 
beliefs, and feelings about European Community air transport deregulation were 
discussed. Arising from these discussions it was decided that a structured approach 
would be adopted. The interviews would be structured, using a ‘questionnaire’ topic 
guide to provide a framework. Me Cracken (1988, p.24) notes that the ‘framework 
questionnaire' when interviewing has several functions:
• it will ensure that all the terrain is covered for each respondent in the same 
order;
• it establishes channels for the direction and scope of discourse;
• it does not preempt the "open-ended" nature of the qualitative interview.
Thus the questionnaire would use open-ended questions as according to Oppenheim 
(1992, p.81) they are:
...im portant in allowing the respondents to say what they think and to do so
with greater richness and spontaneity
and from the pilot interviews conducted many of the respondents1 answers could be 
categorised, thus making analysis easier. Within each of the questions, the 
opportunity for exploratory, unstructured responses remains and answers which do 
not fit into any particular category will provide the creative and unique aspects of the 
research. Generally, the analysis would determine the categories, relationships and 
assumptions that inform the respondent's view of the world in general and the topic in 
particular.
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For the above reasons, the qualitative research aspect of this study would be 
conducted by using three sets of structured interviews with open ended questions:
• to analyse the feelings of stakeholders in the industry on the ‘system’ of air 
transport deregulation;
• to test the results of the analysis of the secondary data on the measurable 
outcomes of deregulation; and
• to discuss with key personnel in the industry the overall findings of ail the 
empirical research.
The qualitative aspect of the research would be complemented by appropriate 
statistical significance tests.
6.6.2 The Sample
Me Cracken (1988, p. 17) makes the point that in the case of quantitative research a 
‘sample’ of necessary type and size is needed to generalize to the larger population. 
In the qualitative case. However,
...the issue is not one o f generalisability. It is one o f access. The purpose o f 
the qualitative interview is not to discover how many, and what kinds of, 
people share a certain characteristic. It is to gain access to the cultural 
categories and assumptions according to which one culture construes the 
world...qualitative research does not survey the terrain, it m ines it.
For the major part of the qualitative research question respondents would be selected 
on the basis of their ‘cultural categories’, ie a representation of decision-makers 
involved in the formulation and implementation of the air transport deregulation 
system. Porter's (1980) generic classification of stakeholders in an industry would be 
used as a means for identifying the sample. Thus it would be divided into four groups:
1. suppliers
2. buyers
3. substitutes
4. competitors
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This sample outlined below is representative of the universe of stakeholders as each 
respondent in each category has an authoritative and expert knowledge of their 
professional domain.
Suppliers: Included in this group are the following:
1. Head of Air Transport Policy Unit, Directorate General for Transport (DG 
VII), the European Commission, Brussels.
2. Director for Competition, Directorate General - Competition (DG IV), the 
European Commission, Brussels.
3. Deputy Secretary, Aviation, Shipping, International, Department of 
Transport, UK.
4. Director of Economic Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, UK.
5. Marketing Director, Belfast International Airport.
6. Director, Corporate Marketing, Amsterdam Airport.
7. Cargo Consultant.
8. Legal adviser to an independent medium-sized UK carrier which competes 
directly with a non-state owned major carrier.
9. Airports Director, BAA pic., London.
10-Secretary General; Duty-Free Confederation.
11.President of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations 
(IFALPA), Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
12.Executive Secretary, Board of Airline Representative in the United Kingdom 
(BARUK).
Buyers: Included in this group are:
• Chairman of the Federation of Air Transport User Representatives in the 
European Community (FATUREC), Brussels, Belgium.
• Director General of the Air Transport Users Council (AUC), London.
• Chairman of the Air Transport Users Committee (ATUC), Ireland.
• President of the International Airline Passenger Association (IAPA)
• President of the World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC)
• Secretary of Aviation Committee of the Association of British Travel Agents 
(ABTA).
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Substitutes: Included in this group are:
1. Managing Director of N.I. Railways
2. Managing Director of ‘Eurostar’ - Channel Tunnel
Competitors: Included in this group are:
1. Chief Executive of a wholly State owned airline.
2. Deputy Vice President of a partly State owned airline.
3. Chief Executive of a privately owned airline.
4. Economic adviser of a relatively new privately owned airline.
6.7 DATA ANALYSIS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
The data acquired from the stakeholder interviews will be analysed using a chi-square 
test to indicate:
if a relationship exists between the various stakeholder groups a t a 95% 
confidence level.
Further discussions on the data analysis, the sample, the questionnaire used in the 
interviews and the interview techniques are contained in Chapter 7.
6.8 QUANTITATIVE METHODS
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 and related sub-hypotheses are mostly concerned 
with hard data. Thus quantitative methods of research wili be used to address this part 
of the research problem.
Hypothesis 1 The intensity o f com petition in an a ir transport sector which has 
undergone a regulatory reform ing process, such as deregulation, is greater 
than in an a ir transport sector which has not.
Hypothesis 3 In newly created competitive environments companies which 
have adopted strategies, as defined by Porter's model, w ill have lagged 
returns which are superior to those o f companies which have not adopted 
such strategies.
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Easterby-Smith et a l {1991, p.116) distinguish four methods of gathering quantitative 
data: interviews (such as opinion polls, multiple question surveys), questionnaires, 
tests/measures, and the use of secondary sources such as databanks.
6.8.1 Interviews
Quantitative interviews are mostly used in market research to gather ‘hard’ data. The 
interview consists of a series of precisely worded questions and factual answers are 
anticipated. When the answer is less precise, four or five alternatives are provided into 
which the imprecise answer is supposed to fit. Each alternative response will have a 
numerical code, so that the whole interview can be recorded as a series of numbers. 
The quantitative interview is restrictive in the type of data that can be collected. It is 
usually used and associated with opinion polls conducted by large consumer 
organisations in order to supply statistical data on a limited number of issues. 
Although this interview method does have its place in quantitative research it is not 
sufficiently in-depth to provide the quality of data needed for the quantitative aspects 
of this study.
6.8.2 Tests/Measures
In most cases tests and measures take the form of a series of written questions with 
yes/no answers. Patterns are then established, and the answers given by an 
individual can be compared with the patterns of answers given by past respondents to 
measure whether the response is ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ in the statistical sense. These 
tests are clearly designed to measure human behaviour at individual level and thus 
they are not a suitable instrument for testing the intensity of competition in a specific 
industry and analysing the strategies adopted by ‘company types’ in a deregulated 
era.
6.8.3 Secondary Sources
A wide variety of secondary sources are available in the form of reference books, 
published articles and computerised data bases. Other forms of secondary 
information may be published sets of accounts or publicised strategic plans.
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In this research secondary sources of information are unlikely to give a 
comprehensive picture of the intensity of competition in any specific period or of the 
strategies adopted by airlines post-deregulation, although data bases do have a 
significant value for analysing the measurable competitive outcomes after a regulatory 
reforming process. The measurable outcomes of the deregulation of the US air 
transport sector were as follows:
1. increase in the number of new entrants onto routes;
2. increase in the number of start up airlines in the industry;
3. increase in the number of available routes; and
4. increase in the number of discount fares.
These outcomes provide a model as to what to expect from a similar regulatory 
reform process in the same industry in the European Community. Originally, these 
‘hard facts’ were to be measured by means of a comprehensive questionnaire 
administered to as many airlines as possible. Pilot testing of that questionnaire 
highlighted the impracticability of these questions in this context.
• The airlines used in the pilot test could only comment on their own status i.e 
whether they were a new entrant/ start up or not.
• The respondents in the pilot test could only provide information on their own 
new routes.
• Profitability figures were not forthcoming either through unwillingness or 
lack of knowledge.
From the pilot test it was apparent that the quality of data that could be collected from 
seeking this information in questionnaire format would not be sufficient to address the 
research question. It was specific to the respondent concerned and thus not 
comprehensive enough to present an overview of the situation and to allow for a 
credible comparison to be made between deregulation in the USA and in the 
European Community.
It was however concluded that the outcomes noted in the United States could be 
ascertained in the European Community post-deregulation by an examination of 
databases held by the European Commission and the UK Civil Aviation Authority.
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It was suspected that analyses of data from secondary sources in these specific areas 
would be unlikely to give a comprehensive picture of the intensity of competition in this 
industry post-dereguiation in the European Community. So the analysed secondary 
data will form the basis of a short questionnaire to be administered to expert 
witnesses in the EC air transport sector.
6.8.4 Questionnaires/Surveys
Competition between firms is one of the more important characteristics for 
determining company strategies, particularly for companies operating in a newly 
competitive environment. Previous research indicates a variety of variables which may 
be used to identify the intensity of competition and competitive strategies. Porter 
(1985) identifies forty four variables to measure five competitive forces:
• entry barriers;
• supplier power;
• buyer power;
• substitution threat; and
• intensity of rivalry.
Companies encountering a newly deregulated environment establish different 
competitive strategies. One comprehensive and detailed questionnaire will be used to 
examine the intensity of competition and the competitive strategies used by firms in 
the European Community's airline industry post-dereguiation. The questionnaire will 
examine the effect upon the nature of competition in the airline industry pre- and post- 
dereguiation.
The questionnaire will be completed:
• by airline carriers established before the introduction of the first 
liberalisation legislation in 1987; and
• by start up carriers ie. those which commenced operation post- 31 
December 1987.
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In addition to using the questionnaires for measuring the intensity of competition and 
analysing the competitive strategies adopted by companies involved in the industry 
another purpose is to obtain data on the firms' characteristics.
Previous research has indicated that the characteristics of company positions may 
serve as important factors for their strategic operations. The following variables were 
identified to measure company characteristics:
1. Ownership structure of the company
2. Size of company before and after deregulation, indicating total number of 
employees, total assets (number of aircraft in fleet), annual sales volume.
3. Operational history (age)
4. Service types provided.
5. Distribution of buyers/suppliers/substitutes.
The questionnaire is quite long and ease of completion is paramount. Wherever 
possible companies will be asked to tick responses, and attitudinal questions use 
numerical rating scales rather than seeking verbal answers. This will not only help 
respondents, but also will produce statistically usable data. The instrument is pre- 
coded to allow this data to be analysed utilising SPSS software and the hypotheses to 
be tested using appropriate statistical tests such as ANOVA and Chi-square.
6.8.5 Pre-Testing and Validating the Questionnaire
Firstly, drafts were sent to the Civil Aviation Authority (UK) to ensure that details 
concerning the types of service outlined in the document were accurate and that 
airline respondents would recognise the listed services and fare types. Following the 
pilot test, a number of changes were made to the questionnaire to measure the 
intensity of competition before and after deregulation, eg. in addition to asking for 
current company characteristics, questions were included concerning characteristics 
in 1988. The issues covered included employment, number of aircraft and use of 
computer reservation systems (CRS). See Appendix III for a copy of the questionnaire 
used. The relationship between Hypothesis 3 and the questions on the questionnaire 
is presented in Table 6.4 below.
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Table 6.5 Relationship of Questionnaire with Hypotheses
Question
Number
information Relationship with Hypotheses
Q.1 Company characteristics H3 H3.1H3.2H3 3H3.4H3 5
Q.2 Company characteristics H3 H3.1 H3.2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.3 Company characteristics H3 H3.1H3.2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.4 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.5 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.6 Scale of operations in 1988 H3 H3.iH3.2H3,3H3.4H3.5
Q.7 Scale of operations in 1993 H3 H3.1H3.2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.8 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.9 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.10 Scale of operations (turnover) H3 H3.1H3.2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.11 Scale of operations (personnel) H3 H3,iH3,2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.12 Scale of operations (personnel) H3 H3.1 H3.2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.13 Scale of operations (personnel) H3 H3.iH3.2H3,3H3,4H3.5+ H 2.1
Q.14 Scale of operations (assets) H3 H3.iH3.2H3,3H3.4H3.5
Q.15 Scale of operations (assets) H3 H3.1H3.2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.16 Scale of operations (assets) H3 H3.1H3.2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.17 Scale of operations (assets) H3 H3.iH3.2H3.3H3.4H3,5
Q.18 Returns (dependent variable) H3 H3.lH3,2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.19 Returns (dependent variable) H3 H3.1H3.2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.20 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.21 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.22 Company characteristics H3 H3.1H3.2H3.3H3.4H3.5
Q.23 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.24 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.25 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1H3.2
Q.26 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.27 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.28 Generic strategies adopted H3 H3.1
Q.29 Responsiveness to buyer/ HVLC,D,F. H3 H3.1H3.2
Q.30 Generic strategies adopted/marketing H3 H3.1H3.2
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Question
Number
Information Relationship with Hypotheses
Q.31 Generic strategies adopted/suppliers H3 H3.1H3.3
Q.32 Measures buyer power -correlate with returns H3 H3.2
Q.33 Measures buyer power H3 H3.2
Q.34 Measures buyer power H3 H3.2
Q.35 Measures buyer power H3 H3.2
Q.36 Measures buyer power H3 H3.2 '
Q.37 Measures buyer power H3 H3.2
Q.38 Measures buyer power H3 H3.2
Q.39 Measures supplier power - correlate with returns H3 H3.3
Q.40 Measures supplier power H3 H3.3
Q.41 Measures supplier power H3 H3.3
Q.42 Measures supplier power H3 H3.3
Q.43 Measures supplier power H3 H3.3
Q.44 Measures supplier power H3 H3.3
Q.45 Measures supplier power H3 H3.3
Q.46 Measures supplier power H3 H3.3
Q.47 Measures supplier power H3 H3.3
Q.48 Measures supplier power H3 H3.3
Q.49 Knowledge about competitors and strategies 
used to erect barriers
H3 H3.4
Q.50 Competitor knowledge H3 H3.4
Q.51 Competitor knowledge H3 H3.4
Q.52 Competitor knowledge H3 H3.4
Q.53 Competitor knowledge H3 H3.4
Q.54 Competitor knowledge H3 H3.4
Q.55 Competitor knowledge H3 H3.4
Q.56 Competitor knowledge H3 H3.4
Q.57 Information on substitutes H3 H3.5
Q.58 Reactions to substitutes H3 H3.5
Q.59 Information on substitutes H3 H3.5
Q.60 Information on substitutes H3 H3.5
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Figure 6.1 Relationship of Hypothesis 3 to Questionnaire
Generic 
Strategies 
Adopted 
(HVLC, D, F)
Q.4 • Q.5 
Q.8 • Q.9 
Q.20 - Q.31
Measuring
Buyer
Power
Q.32 - Q.38
Reaction to 
Substitutes
Q.57 - Q.60
HYPOTHESIS 3
Barriers to 
Competitors
Q.49 - Q.56
Measuring
Supplier
Power
Q.39 • Q.48
6.8.6 The Sample
This empirical aspect of the research problem will be conducted at the firm level. The 
literature reviewed highlighted that the airlines operational in the EC could be classified 
under the following headings:
• Part/Wholly State Owned Airline (Flag carrier)
• UK Owned Public Company (pic)
• Non UK Owned Public Company (pic)
• UK Privately Owned
• Non UK Privately Owned
• New Entrant
2 2 1
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Discussions with the Directorate General for Transport (DG VII) of the European 
Community confirmed this categorisation. Thus it was imperative that the final sample 
was representative of these groups.
6.8.7 Administration of the Instrument
As far as possible personal contact will be made with key personnel in each of the 
categories to:
• ensure that the questionnaire when received will be completed; and
• ensure that the questionnaire will be answered by one appropriate person.
In other companies where no personal contact could be established, a cover letter will 
be posted with the questionnaire inviting the most appropriate personnel to complete 
the documentation.
Further discussions on the sample used, the pilot test of the questionnaire and the 
administration of the questionnaire are contained in Chapter 7.
6.8.8 Measures of Competitiveness to be Used in the Industry Survey
The traditional view of competitiveness which economists often advance is that it is 
largely determined by costs and prices relative to competitors. Although this view 
admits to the existence of non-price factors, they are often excluded from the 
economic analysis.
The increasing importance o f non-price competition has been stressed by 
many writers since the 1930s. Product changes and advertising have become 
the main com petitive weapons. Despite this development economists have 
largely ignored product changes and have concentrated on models o f pure 
price equilibrium, in which the product is given and price is adjusted by the 
firm  in its attem pt to maximise p ro fit or attain other goals. Economic theory has 
predom inantly been price theory.
(Koutsoyiannis, 1982, p.9)
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Attributing competitive prowess to costs and prices alone is too narrow a perspective, 
although Carroll (1985, p. 12) suggests that there are two major reasons why this view 
should still command support:
• It is d ifficu lt to measure non-price factors such as quality, design, degree o f 
vertical integration, im pact on promotion etc.
• Frequently the only readily-available industry data is in aggregate form fo r the 
economy as a whole and this type o f data w ill usually comprise: costs, prices 
and volumes by product category.
This research takes a broader view of competitiveness and starts with the following 
assumptions:
1. The competitiveness of an industry or sector is the sum of the competitiveness 
of the individual airlines which comprise the sector. Consequently, insights into 
competitiveness will oniy be gained at the level of the firm.
2. Competitiveness is complex and is determined by factors other than price. 
Factors such as relative service quality, degree of capital intensity, degree of 
vertical integration, power of buyers, power of suppliers, the availability of 
substitutes and the threat of new entrants, ail help in some way to determine 
how competitive a firm is.
3. Although, theoretically, an accepted measure of effectiveness is ‘the ability to 
gain market share’ (see Koutsoyiannis, 1982, and Carroll, 1985), pilot 
investigations revealed that in practice this measure would be difficult to apply 
to the air transport industry. Thus pilot research indicated that respondents 
frequently:
• did not know their own market shares;
• did not know the market shares of their competitors;
• did not know if they were gaining from their competitors or losing;
• were not always able to measure market share because they were 
not sure that they were comparing like service with like sen/ice; and
• were not always willing to disclose their level of profitability.
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Since there may be potential difficulties involved in using the above measure, it was 
decided that competitiveness should be judged on the basis of three complementary 
measures:
• Net profit before tax
• Sales per employee
• Sales per pound of assets
These measures were chosen because it was believed that for most analysis a set of 
measures would provide a more comprehensive and accurate estimates of 
competitiveness than a single measure. Thus it was anticipated that competitiveness 
would not always be reflected in all measures ‘moving’ in similar directions. For 
example, if a respondent airline was engaged in a strategy which involved a period of 
relatively high capital investment combined with the shedding of labour, it might be the 
case that during this period the measures Net Profit Before Tax and Sales Per Pound 
of Assets could be moving in a negative direction while the Measures Sales per 
Employees could be moving in a positive direction. Use of the three measures helps 
to accommodate such movements. The measures that were used were selected on 
the basis of their potential utility in measuring competitiveness:
• each of the measures are standard indexes which are used extensively in 
industry analyses,
• their availability: it was felt that most respondents would have the data 
required for the measures to be readily available, although it was 
recognised that the 1988 data might require some time to find and this was 
provided for in the time allowed for responses to be returned.
• their objectivity: for two of the measures - Sales per Employee and Sales 
per Pound of Assets - it was believed that respondents would be willing to 
disclose the true figures.
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The rationale behind the adoption of each of the particular measures is given below. 
Net Profit Before Tax
Although the pilot investigations revealed that this measure was unlikely to generate a 
comprehensive or an accurate response, it was nonetheless adopted because a direct 
positive correlation is frequently found to exist between Net Profit Before Tax and 
competitiveness, i.e. for comparable companies (comparable in terms of Size, 
Structure, Activities, Products and Markets) those which have above average Net 
Profit Before Tax are considered to be more competitive than those which are not.
Sales Per Employee
This measure was adopted for the following reasons:
1. For comparable companies (as defined above) those which are generating 
the highest levels of Sales per Employee are using their employees most 
effectively. Consequently those airlines which had above average Sales per 
Employee were considered to be above average in their competitiveness.
2. Pilot investigations revealed that most respondents would be willing to 
declare the value of their Annual Sales and also their Numbers of 
Employees.
Sales Per Pound of Assets
This was used as a third measure of competitiveness for the following reasons:
1. For comparable companies (as outlined above) those which are generating 
the highest levels of Sales per £ of Assets are using their competitiveness.
2. Pilot investigations revealed that most respondents would be willing to 
declare the value of their Annual Sales and also the value of their Assets.
In summary, the above three measures represent an effort to measure 
competitiveness in a multidimensional fashion.
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6.8.9 Objectives o f th is Questionnaire
The objective of this questionnaire is to analyse the intensity of competition in the 
airline industry in the Member States of the European Community and the structural 
forces which are shaping it.
Analysis of the Field Research at industry Level.
The research will be analysed in the following major sections:
Section 1: The Overall Structure of the Airline Industry in the European
Community;
Section 2: The strategies followed by airlines;
Section 3: The airlines' relationships with customers;
Section 4: The airlines' relationships with suppliers;
Section 5: The airlines' knowledge about existing competitors;
Section 6: The airlines' knowledge about major new competitors;
Section 7: The airlines' knowledge about realistic substitutes.
6.8.10 Data Analysis
The data will be analysed using statistical techniques and will included the following: 
The Mean, Mode, Median, Range, Frequency, Percentage and Standard Deviation 
will be employed in most analyses: the function is to ascertain performance variations, 
eg. average profitability of different classes of carriers and Analysis of Variance will be 
used to calculate variance between different groups eg. variance different classes of 
carriers.
Chi-Square tests will be used to test nonparametric variation between expected and 
observed outcomes, eg. largest carriers are always most profitable, stakeholders 
belonging to one group will have similar perceptions on the role of the European 
Commission in liberalisation. Use of Pearson Correlation Coefficient will test the 
degree of association between various variables, eg. relationship between size and 
performance.
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Superior Performing Software Systems (SPSS)
A computerised data analysis software package will be used (SPSS). This 
programme originally designed especially for the analysis of social science data will 
be used because of its capacity to handle with ease all the data analysis procedures 
described above.
The Level of Significance
Although a variety of degrees of certainty for various problems can be employed, it is 
customary to set the level of significance at .05 or .01, which means that the null 
hypotheses is to be rejected if the sample outcome is among the results that would 
have occurred no more than 5 per cent or 1 per cent by chance. Based on pilot 
investigations and the variety of data that this questionnaire wiil yield, the level of 
significance adopted will be .05 per cent. Similar studies - Barrett, (1985) on airline 
efficiency; Forsyth, Hill and Trengrove, (1986) on the economic efficiency of airlines 
post deregulation and Ramsden (1985) on employees efficiency in airlines - and the 
research literature (Sekaran, 1992, Siegel and Castellan, 1988, and Frankfort- 
Nachmias and Nachimas, 1992) indicate this to be appropriate.
6.8.11 Validation o f Findings
All the findings resulting form the library based and empirical research will be 
complemented by validation by senior industry stakeholders. Given the multi­
dimensional nature of the research problem, a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods has been adopted as the most appropriate approach to addressing 
the research issue.
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Chapter 7 - Research Findings
This chapter analyses the secondary and empirical research. The findings are 
presented under the following sections:
• Findings on Secondary Source Research
• Findings on Stakeholder Interviews
• Findings on Airline Based Survey
7.1 FINDINGS ON SECONDARY SOURCE RESEARCH
7.1.1 Introduction
The aim in this section is to compare the early outcomes of liberalisation in the EC 
with the most significant outcomes in the USA following deregulation in 1978 (see 
chapter 4 on the literature review). These may be summarised as:
• the establishment of a large number of start-up airlines;
• an increase in the availability of discounted fares;
• an increase in the number of passengers travelling on such fares; and
• an increase in the number of routes operated.
All these developments were regarded as demonstrating that there was increased
competition in the market-place. The question is whether similar outcomes can be 
observed in the European Community.
7.2 DATA COLLECTION
Although it originally seemed likely that quantitative data on developments within the 
EC post liberalisation would be relatively easy to obtain, this was not the case. The 
two most obvious potential sources were the Directorate General for Transport of the 
European Commission (DG VII) and the UK Civil Aviation Authority. Both were known 
to be collecting data as a basis for their own analyses but proved unwilling to make it 
available other than at a prohibitive cost, saying that they themselves paid heavily for 
the bought-in information. It may be surmised that the true reason was that they did 
not wish a third party to pre-empt their own conclusions, due to be published in both 
cases shortly after the completion of this study.
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7.2.1 Data on Start-Up Airlines and New Routes
In the face of this setback, it was decided to seek material from a commercial source. 
Reeds Business Publications have data bases from which it would have been possible 
to extract information illustrating two measures of increased competition, namely the 
number of new entrants and the number of new routes operated in each year from 
1988. However, this data is held in such a way that it would have required at least five 
man-days work to produce the material required for this study, at a cost of at least 
£300 per man-day and possibly considerably more. This cost was also prohibitive.
It was accordingly necessary to seek the information piecemeal, using whatever 
sources appeared to offer some hope of contributing to an overall picture.
Avmark Aviation Economist publishes an annual survey of ‘European Jet Capacity’ 
from which it was possible to assess the growth of EC carriers year-by-year over the 
period 1988-1993. Similarly, Airport Co-ordination Limited, the organisation 
responsible for the allocation of slots at Heathrow Airport, were willing to make 
available for a fee schedules of all slots allocated in the summer seasons of 1988 and 
1993. A manual analysis of this data from the world's busiest international airport 
produced an admittedly incomplete picture of the extent to which new routes had been 
introduced by European carriers over the period. This picture was complemented and 
verified by a questionnaire administered to a sample of frequent air travellers from the 
member organisation of FATUREC - ( the Federation of Air Transport User 
Representative in the European Community). FATUREC, with active representation 
from eleven Member States, is the only consumer group in the EC dealing exclusively 
with air transport issues and is formally consulted by the Commission as an expert 
witness at regular meetings held in Brussels.
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7.2.2 Data on Discounted Fares
Comprehensive information on the increase on the extent of discounting also proved 
impossible to obtain. However, there is some data which makes possible a broad 
comparison between US and European experience. In a paper delivered to a Royal 
Aeronautical Society symposium in April 1988, Lee R. Howard found that only about 
10 per cent of US domestic passengers used full fares in 1987 as compared to 52 per 
cent before deregulation nine years earlier. Comparisons could be made in the United 
Kingdom, as data is published annually by the Civil Aviation Authority in ‘UK Airlines - 
Annual Operating, Traffic and Financial Statistics’. Comparable information for other 
Member States has not been located but again it was considered reasonable to verify 
and complement the UK findings with qualitative data from expert representatives of 
air transport user organisations in the EC - FATUREC.
The short questionnaire to this sample of air transport users asked if they thought 
more discounted fares were available at their national airports since the 
implementation of the full liberalisation programme on 1 January 1993.
7.3 START-UP AIRLINES SINCE 1988
H1.1 There w ill be an increase in the number o f new start up airlines after 
the deregulation o f an a ir transport system than before the 
deregulation o f an a ir transport system.
Table 7.1 addresses Hypothesis u  lists the jet airlines registered in the EC Member 
States which were operating over the period 1988 to 1993.
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Table 7.1: EC Jet Airlines Operating over the period 1988 -1993
Name of Airline 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Aer Lingus X X X X X X
Aero Lloyd - X X X X X
Aigle Azur - - - - - -
Air Europe X X X X X -
Air Europe Express - X - - - -
Air Europe Scandinavia - X - - - -
Air France X X X X X X
Air France Asie - - - - - -
Air Inter X X X X X X
Air Littoral - - X X X X
Air Meuse - X X X
Air Portugal TAP X X X X X X
Air UK X X X X X X
Air 2000 - - - - - -
Alinord X X - - -
Alisarda X X X - - -
Alitalia X X X X X X
ATI X X X X X X
Atlantic Airways X X X X X X
Aviaco X X X X X X
Binter Canaries - - X - - -
Birmingham European X X X X -
Britannia X X CP CP CP X
British Airways X X X X X X
British Asia Airways - - - - - X
Table 7.1 continued
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Table 7.1: EC Jet Airlines Operating over the period 1988 -1993
Name of Airline 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
British Island Airways X ! - - - -
British Midland Airways x X X X X X
British Mediteranean - - - - - X
British World CP CP CP CP CP X
Business Air - - - - - X
Capital - X - - - -
City Air Scandinavia - - - - X -
CityJet - - - - - X
Conti-Flug - - - - - X
Corse Mediterranee x X X X X X
Dan Air X X X X X -
Delta AT X X X X X X
Deutsche BA - - - - X X
Euralair - - - - X X
Euroair - - - - - X
Euro Berlin - X X X X X
Europe AS X - - - - -
GB Airways X X X X X X
German Wings - X - - - -
Hamburg Airlines - - X - - -
Iberia X X X X X X
Jersey European - - - - - X
KLM X X X X X X
KLM Cityhopper - - - X X X
LA Regonais - - - - X -
Lauda - - X X X X
Linjetflyg X X X X X -
LA Canarias - X - - - -
Loganair X X X X X X
Table 7.1 continued
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Table 7.1: EC Jet Airlines Operating over the period 1988 -1993
Name of Airline 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
LTU - - - - - X
Lufthansa X X X X X X
Lufthansa Cityline - - - - X X
Luxair X X X X X X
Maersk Air X X X X X X
Maersk Air Ltd - - - - - X
Manx Airlines X X X X X X
Meridiana Italy - - - - X X
Meridiana Spain - - - - X -
Monarch X CP CP CP CP X
NLM X X - - - -
Olympic X X X X X X
Orion X - - - - -
Portugalia - - - - X X
Ryanair X X X X X X
Ryanair Europe X - - - - -
Sabena X X X X X X
SAS X X X X X X
South Eastern European - - - - - X
TAT European - - - - X X
TATransregional X X X X - -
T ranavia X X CP CP CP CP
UTA X X X X X -
Virgin Atlantic X X X X X X
Viva Air - - - - X X
Total per Year 40 46 44 42 51 53
(Source: Table Compiled by Author using Material from The Avmark Aviation Economist, 
August 1988, August 1989, August 1990,September 1991, September 1992, September 1993 
and September 1994)
Note: CP - Airline operating charter passenger services only.
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Tables 7.2 to 7.10 lists by Member State scheduled airlines operating in December 
1994 which were not operating in July 1992. The data covers only domestic routes 
within and international routes between the 12 Member States.
Table 7.2: Scheduled Airlines Operating in Belgium in December
1994 which were not operating in July 1992
Base Member State Airline Market
Belgium VLM Belgium/ International
Belgium Eurobelgian Airlines International
(Source: OAG Flight Schedule of BACK information Services)
Table 7.3: Scheduled Airlines Operating in Denmark in December
1994 which were not operating in July 1992
Base Member State Airline Market
Denmark Muk Air Domestic/ International
Denmark Sun-Air Domestic/International
(Source: OAG Flight Schedule of BACK information Services)
Table 7.4: Scheduled Airlines Operating in Ireland in December 1994
which were not operating in July 1992
Base Member State Airline Market
Ireland CityJet UK & Domestic
(Source: OAG Flight Schedule of BACK information Services)
234
C h a p te r  7 - R e s e a rc h  F in d in g s
Table 7.5: Scheduled Airlines Operating in France in December 1994
which were not operating in July 1992
Base Member State Airline Market
France Kyrnair Domestic
Challeng'air
E.A.S. Domestic/International
C.A.E.
Air Normandie
(Source: OAG Flight Schedule of BACK information Services)
Table 7.6: Scheduled Airlines Operating in Germany in December
1994 which were not operating in July 1992
Base Member State Airline Market
Germany LGW Domestic
Rheinland Air Services
EastWest Airlines
Cologne Air Transport
Air Strauing
SAL Saxonia
Condor Flugdienst Domestic/International
OLT
Interot
EastWest Airlines
(Source: OAG Flight Schedule of BACK information Services)
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Table 7.7: Scheduled Airlines Operating in The Netherlands in
December 1994 which were not operating in July 1992
Base Member State Airline Market
The Netherlands VLM Nederland International
(Source: OAG Flight Schedule of BACK information Services)
Table 7.8: Scheduled Airlines Operating in Italy in December 1994
which were not operating in July 1992
Base Member State Airline Market
Italy Aliadriatica Domestic
Int. Flying Service
Air Dolomiti Domestic/International
Genavia
(Source: OAG Flight Schedule of BACK information Services)
Table 7.9: Scheduled Airlines Operating in Spain in December 1994
which were not operating in July 1992
Base Member State Airline Market
Spain Air Europa Domestic
Spanair
Air Nostrum
Swiftair
(Source: OAG Flight Schedule of BACK information Services)
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Table 7.10: Scheduled Airlines Operating in The United Kingdom in
December 1994 which were not operating in July 1992
Base Member State Airline Market
Knight Air Domestic
Genesis
IOS Skybus
Eagle Aviation
Teesside Aviation
Euro Direct Airlines Domestic/I nternational
Air South West
ATS Vulcan
Love Air
Air Mediterranean
(Source: OAG Flight Schedule of BACK information Services)
7.3.1 Analysis of the Number of Start-Up Airlines Since 1988
Table 7.1 indicated that from a low point in 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, 
there was a significant growth in the number of European jet airlines during the 
following two years as the industry responded to the new opportunities provided by 
liberalisation.
An even more striking picture emerges from tables 7.2 to 7.10, although it should be 
noted that many of the airlines created in the period mid-1992 to end-1994 are using 
turbo-prop equipment to fly a small number of often purely domestic routes. However, 
the fact that this can happen is itself in some instances a direct result of the 
liberalisation process.
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7.4 PASSENGERS TRAVELLING ON DISCOUNTED FARES
hfi.2 There w ill be an increase in the number o f discounted fares available 
after the deregulation o f an a ir transport system than before the 
deregulation o f an a ir transport system .
The data presented in Table 7.11 below addresses the above Hypothesis 1>2. showing 
the percentages of passengers travelling on full and discounted fares on UK 
scheduled services in each of the years 1988 to 1994.
Table 7.11: The Percentage of Passengers Travelling on Full Fares
and Discounted Fares on UK Scheduled Airlinesduring the 
period 1988 to  1994
Year of Travel % of Passengers 
Travelling on Full Fares
% of Passengers Travelling 
on Discounted Fares
1988 42 58
1989 43 57
1990 41 59
1991 39 61
1992 36 64
1993 34 66
1994 32 68
(Source: CAA UK Annual Operating, Traffic and Financial Statistics 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1994)
The percentage of passengers travelling on full fares fell from 42 per cent in 1988 to 
32 per cent in 1994.
This quantitative finding for the UK is validated by the results of the qualitative 
questionnaire administered to the members of FATUREC. The results on this 
question are in Table 7.12 below.
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Table 7.12: Have the opportunities for travelling on Discounted Fares
Increased from  your National Airport since 1 January 1993.
No. of
Respondents
% of Respondents
Opportunities for travelling on 
discounted fares have increased
23 100
Opportunities for travelling on 
discounted fares have not increased
0 0
(Source: Field Studies)
7.4.1 Conclusions on the Findings on the Increase in 
Discounted Fares Since 1988
Whilst it is likely that the growth in travel on discounted fares has been greater in the 
United Kingdom than elsewhere, the evidence points strongly to a possibility that over 
the first decade of liberalisation the developments of discounting in Europe will prove 
to be even greater than in the USA in the ten years following deregulation.
Until the first EC liberalisation package of December 1987, European airlines were 
very restricted in the discounts they could offer. With the progressive introduction of 
pricing freedom in the three packages, the percentage of discounted fares within total 
sales has greatly increased in the UK, as the data shows. The qualitative research 
conducted with user representatives in other Member States strongly reinforces this 
finding.
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7.5 ROUTES OPERATED BY EC AIRLINES BEFORE 
AND AFTER LIBERALISATION
H1.3 There w ill be more routes available after the deregulation o f an a ir 
transport system than before the deregulation o f an a ir transport 
system.
In 1988 (summer season) there were 20 EC airlines operating out of London 
Heathrow and in 1993 (summer season) there were 28. Table 7.13 below shows the 
number of routes operated by the EC airlines for both years.
Table 7.13: Number of Routes Operated by EC airlines from
London Heathrow in 1988 and 1993.
A irline N u m b e r  o f  R o u t e s  
fr o m  H ea t h r o w , 1 9 8 8
N u m b er  o f  R o u t e s  fro m  
Hea t h r o w , 1 9 9 3
Air France 17 7
Alitalia 6 8
British Airways 135 140
British Air Ferries 1 0
Brymon Airways 3 2
British Midland 15 27
British Island AW 1 0
Britannia 1 1
Dan Air 2 0
Aer Lingus 4 6
GB Airways 1 4
Iberia 11 6
Manx 2 1
KLM 4 3
Air Liberte 1 0
Luxair 1 1
Lufthansa 7 9
SAS 2 8
Sabena 2 2
TAP Air Portugal 3 4
(Source: Table complied by present author using data from Airport Coordination Ltd.)
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Table 7.14 shows the airlines which were not operating from London Heathrow in 
1988 but were flying from the airport in 1993.
Table 7.14: Airlines and the Number of Routes Operated from
London Heathrow in Summer 1993.
A ir l in e N u m b e r  o f  R o u te s  fr o m  H e a t h r o w  1993
Air 2000 3
Corsair 1
Eurobelgian 1
EuroBerlin 2
Ryanair 1
Viva 3
Intra European 1
Monarch 1
Olympic 2
Air UK 2
Regional Airlines 1
Virgin Atlantic 6
(Source: Table complied by present author using data from Airport Coordination Ltd.)
The above finding is complemented by results from the questionnaire administered to 
the members of FATUREC. The results are presented in Table 7.15 below.
Table 7.15: Has the Number of Routes available at your
Local Airport increased since Liberalisation?
No. of Respondents % of Respondents
The Number of Routes Has 
Increased
21 91
The Number of Routes Has Not 
Increased
2 9
(Source: Field Studies)
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7.5.1 Conclusions on the Number of Routes Operated by EC Airlines  
Before and After Liberalisation
The number of routes operated by EC carriers from Heathrow has increased little over 
the period from 229 in 1988 to 247 in 1993 but this should not be taken to imply that 
the aims of liberalisation have been frustrated.
Heathrow is the busiest international airport in the world and the scope for providing 
additional services is severely restricted by a lack of runway and terminal capacity. 
Moreover, the EC's regulation on slot allocation of 1993 gave new entrants priority 
access to 50 per cent of slots in the pool, and as a result much of the new activity at 
this airport subsequently has consisted in the provision of once-a-day services by third 
country airlines to hitherto unserved destinations. The possibilities open to incumbent 
carriers and to EC new entrants, have thus been greatly constrained and partly in 
reaction to this, British Airways - by far the largest operator at Heathrow - has greatly 
increased the range of services it offers from Gatwick, its second London hub. Given 
the physical limitations at Heathrow, and a method of slot allocation which makes it 
easier for third country new entrants than for EC carriers to begin operating there, it is 
not surprising that as many as a dozen Community airlines were able to operate from 
this airport in 1993 that had not been there in 1988.
Although it is not possible to acquire comparable quantitative data for continental 
airports, the qualitative research conducted with members of FATUREC suggests the 
development of new routes from continental airports post-liberalisation has been 
greater than from Heathrow.
7.6 CONCLUSIONS ON THE SECONDARY SOURCE RESEARCH
The evidence collected in the secondary source research on developments in Europe 
since 1988 indicates that liberalisation has resulted in the creation of a significant 
number of new airlines, in a large increase in the percentage of passengers travelling 
on discounted fares and in an increase in the number of routes being operated. In the 
case of the last finding, the quantitative data cannot be taken as fully representative 
since it relates only to activities at Heathrow, an airport which like a number of the 
other major European hubs is capacity-constrained.
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It can safely be assumed from other evidence that without these constraints, both the 
number of EC carriers operating from Heathrow and the number of routes served 
would have been considerably higher - an assumption which is confirmed by 
information obtained from Airport Coordination Limited on the number of requests for 
slots which they had to refuse in 1993.
The qualitative data obtained from interviews with members of user organisations in 
other Member States is all consistent with these findings.
7.7 ANALYSIS OF STAKEHOLDER VIEWS
7.7.1 Introduction
In introducing the three liberalisation packages, the European Commission's intention 
was to create a free market and thus lead to increased competition in the European 
Community air transport sector. Review of the literature suggests that this has been 
not achieved. This present project asserts that this "failure" has in part occurred 
because the European Commission has reacted to the negative 'feedback' from the 
stakeholders to the outputs from the European Community's political system. Easton 
(1965a, px) identifies stakeholder as components of a parapolitical system and as 
such able to influence it.
7.7.2 Feedback
The feedback loop allows a flow and a reaction to the outputs by those making the 
inputs. A mechanism is provided by the feedback capacity for information from the 
system's environment to be assimilated and transmitted back into the system relevant 
to its continuing existence and activity (Almond and Coleman 1960, p.11 ).
Easton (1965b, p.vii) also asserts that feedback is essential for the maintenance of 
any poiitical system:
If a system  [...] is to persist through time, it m ust obtain adequate feedback  
about its p a st performances...
Easton (1965b, p.25)
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However it is not enough for a system to acquire feedback, it is essential to respond 
to the feedback of stakeholder in order to conserve a political system.
... it m ust be able to take m easures that regulate its future behaviour.
Easton (1965b, p.25)
7.7.3 Stakeholder Feedback
There was conflicting feedback from some European airlines to the European 
Commission's outputs presented as three packages of liberalising measures from 
1987 to 1992. Airlines which welcomed the chance to compete in an open market 
were positive in their response. Negative feedback to the policy of liberalisation was 
manifested in the huge financial losses the airlines incurred (see Chapter 5 for details) 
coupled with written requests by some airlines to the European Commission to halt 
the liberalisation process. France, Belgium and Italy in written submission to a 
European Commission sponsored forum called for the liberalisation process to cease 
(See Chapter for a fuller discussion).
Easton (1965a) suggests that the response of the system to support loss can happen 
by
...making structural changes in regime arrangements.
Easton (1965a, p321)
The literature suggests that the European Commission appears to have made 
‘structural changes in regime arrangements’ by allowing State subsidies to be granted 
to some state owned airlines. Although the system of liberalisation has been retained, 
senior executive stakeholders in the EC air transport sector perceive this action as 
granting some airlines an unfair competitive advantage over others and thus distorting 
the liberalisation objective of achieving open and free markets and increased 
competition.
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7.8 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
Hypothesis 2  was formulated in order to test the attitudes and perceptions of senior 
executive stakeholders in the EC air transport industry on the European Commission's 
apparent reaction to the feedback of the liberalisation system as a means of 
sustaining it.
H2 A system  which does adjust to stakeholder inputs and feedback as  
m easured  by  Easton's m odel o f political system s analysis, will be  more 
likely to survive than a system  which does not respond to stakeholder 
input
Four related hypotheses were developed to test this general hypothesis.
H 2.1 Senior executive stakeholders in the airline industry are more inclined 
to view approval o f State subsidies by the European Commission as a 
m eans o f addressing individual M ember S ta tes' social, economic, 
employment, problem s rather than as a m eans of sustaining 
competition within the industry.
H 2.2 M em ber S ta tes which own airlines are perceived b y  senior executive  
stakeholders a s  being more reluctant to oppose the granting o f State  
subsidies to air carriers than M ember S ta tes which do not own an 
airline.
H 2.3 Airlines in receipt o f State subsidies are perceived by  senior executives  
in the European airline industry to be less efficient than airlines which 
do not receive State subsidies.
H 2.4 The granting o f State subsidies to State-owned airlines is more likely to 
b e  perceived by  senior executive stakeholders in the EC air transport 
sector a s  a m eans o f preventing competition rather than a s  a m eans of 
promoting competition.
7.9 DATA COLLECTION METHOD
The main aim of this section of the study was to determine what thoughts, 
perceptions, beliefs and attitudes senior executive stakeholders in the European 
Community's air transport sector had on the European Commission's reaction to 
negative feedback on the liberalisation process. The study also aimed to reveal what 
impact this action has made on achieving the European Community's overall aim of 
creating free markets in which competition can occur.
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As the research question was concerned with ‘soft data’, it was decided that 
qualitative interviews would be used as this method of data collection facilitates an 
appraisal of perceptions. Van Mannen (1983, p.9) reinforces this perspective:
The label ‘qualitative m ethods’ has no precise meaning in any o f the social 
sciences. It is a t b e s t an umbrella term covering an array o f interpretative 
techniques which s e e k  to describe, decode, translate and  otherwise com e to 
term s with the meaning not the frequency o f certain more or less naturally 
occurring phenom ena in the social world.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted, allowing the respondents the opportunity 
to express their feelings on the situations rather than focus on quantitative responses. 
Interviews were based on a semi structured questionnaire which focused on these 
specific areas:
• the function of an airline ;
• the efficiency of an airline;
• the competitive aspect of State subsidies granted to some airlines;
• the reasons for the European Commission allowing State subsidies to be 
granted;
• the reactions of Member States to the issue of State subsidies;
• the occurrence of competition in the air transport sector in the European 
Community; and
• the constraints on competition occurring in the air transport sector in the 
European Community.
In order to examine the quality and accuracy of the data and to ensure the reliability 
and validity of the measuring instruments a pilot study was undertaken.
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7.10 THE PILOT STUDY OF STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONNAIRE
The pilot study was conducted in late November/eariy December 1994 and lasted 
three weeks. Its purpose was to:
• test the design of the interview schedule;
• confirm that the questions were clear;
• ascertain whether the questions were logically sequential and 
comprehensive;
• test that the interview would yield data that would answer the research 
problem;
• test the validity of the measuring instrument;
• ensure that respondents could talk freely; and
• test the suitability of the method chosen to record the data.
The importance of including a pilot study in the research design is highlighted by 
Seidman (1991, p.30):
I urge all interviewing researchers to build into their proposals a pilot venture in 
which they try out their interviewing design with a small num ber o f participants. 
They will learn whether their research structure is appropriate for the study  
they envisaged. They will com e to grips with som e o f the practical aspects o f 
establishing access, making contact, and conducting the interview. The pilot 
can alert them to e lem ents o f their own interview technique that support the 
objectives o f the study and those that detract from those objectives.
The interview schedule was tested on a sample of seven highly informed stakeholders 
in the air transport sector but although their comments and suggestions were taken 
into account, they were not considered for the actual study as they were not key 
decision makers. The pilot sample included:
• an academic from a specialised aviation educational institution;
• two aviation consultants;
• a recently retired airport director;
• the managing director and editor of a specialist economic aviation 
professional journal; and
• the economist of the UK Air Transport Users Council.
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Two methods of recording the interviews were tested during these pilot interviews: the 
tape recorder and writing detailed notes during and immediately after the interviews. 
Using a tape recorder proved to be unsuccessful. It was difficult to introduce the tape 
recorder as a natural part of the interview. It was regarded as intrusive and inhibited 
the flow of conversation.
The second method, whereby notes were taken during interviews and a complete 
record of them made immediately after the interview was completed proved much 
more successful. Patton (1987, p.139) notes that it is essential to accumulate 
accurate quotations as much as possible:
With practice and training, an interviewer can learn to u se  notes for later 
expansion into more com prehensive detail o f what was said  in the interview. 
To do this with accuracy and reliability m eans reviewing interview notes  
immediately following the interview.
The pilot interviews proved to be important as they affirmed the relevance of the main 
topics discussed in the interview. As a result of these interviews two questions were 
reconsidered, one was removed completely and the second was amalgamated with 
another.
7.11 SAMPLING PROCEDURES
7.11.1 Identification of the Sample
Porter's (1980) generic classification of stakeholder in an industry was used as a 
template for the identification of a sample. Thus it was divided into four groups:
• buyers
• suppliers
• substitutes
• competitors
248
Chapter 7 - Research Findings
A proportional stratified random sample was selected Which it was believed reflected 
principle stakeholder influence on the airline industry in the EC. The actual 
stakeholder being chosen because they:
b
• were representative of the population of stakeholders
• had access to senior executive ie, big decision makers.
Semi-structured personal interviews (see Appendix II for interview questions) were 
conducted between 18 December 1994 and 16 March 1995 with a sample of 22 
senior major executives of stakeholder organisations.
Interviews were conducted in the stakeholders' workplace, thus involving substantial 
amounts of time and travel throughout the European Community.
Tables 7.16: 7.17: 7.18 and 7.19 detail the category, interviewee, date and place of 
interview.
Table 7.16: Summary of Interviews Conducted with Buyers in the
European Air Transport Sector
STAKEHOLDER - BUYERS INTERVIEWEE DATE & VENUE
World Travel & Tourism Council Geoffry Lipman: 26.01.95
(WTTC) President London
International Airline Passenger Hans Krakaeur: 10.02.95
Association (IAPA) President of European 
Policy
Lisbon
Federation of Air Transport Users Charles Flocard: Chairman 06.03.95
Representatives in the European 
Community (FATUREC)
Paris
Air Transport Users Council, UK (AUC) John Parr: 09.03.95
Director General London
Air Transport Users Committee, Tadgh Kearney: 09.03.95
Ireland, (ATUC) Chairman Dublin
Association of British Travel Agents Susan Parsons: 10.03.95
(ABTA) Secretary of Aviation 
Committee
London
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Table 7.17: Summary of Interviews Conducted with Suppliers in the
European Air Transport Sector
STAKEHOLDER -SUPPLIERS INTERVIEWEE DATE & VENUE
Board of Air Representatives in the 
UK (BARUK)
Brian Madge: 
Executive Secretary
08.12.94 
Heathrow Airport, 
London
Aviation Lawyer Richard Venables:
Lawyer for many UK airlines
04.01.95
London
European Commission, 
Directorate General for 
Competition (DG IV)
John Temple-Lang: 
Director
13.01.95
Brussels
European Commission, 
Directorate General for Transport 
(DG VII)
Frederik Sorensen:
Head of Air Transport Policy
25.01.95
Brussels
Civil Aviation Authority UK (CAA) Barry Humphreys:
Head of Air Services Policy and 
Industry Affairs
26.01.95
London
Belfast International Airport Uei Hoey: Marketing Director 02.02.95
Belfast
Amsterdam Airport, Schiphol Wim de Mann:
Director, Corporate Marketing
08.03.95
Amsterdam
Cargo Supplies Vic Attwood: 
Consultant
09.03.95
London
Department of Transport UK Russell Sutherland, CB:
Deputy Secretary, Aviation, 
Shipping, International, Dept, of 
Transport, UK.
10.03.95
London
BAA pic Richard Everitt: 
Director of Strategy & 
Compliance
10.03.95
London
International Federation of Air Line
Pilots Associations
(IFALPA)
Captain L.H.D. Bakker: 
President
17.01.95
Amsterdam
Duty Free Confederation Barry Goddard: 
Secretary General
10.03.95
London
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Table 7.18: Summary of Interviews Conducted with Substitutes in the
European Air Transport Sector
STAKEHOLDER - SUBSTITUTES INTERVIEWEE DATE & VENUE
N.I. Railways Sam Shaw: 14.03.95
Managing Director Belfast
Eurostar Peter White 13.03.95
Customer Services Manager London
Table 7.19: Summary of Interviews Conducted with Competitors in the
European Air Transport Sector
STAKEHOLDER - COMPETITORS INTERVIEWEE DATE & VENUE
Ryanair Michael O'Leary: 12.01.95
Chief Executive Dublin
Aer Lingus Larry Stanley: 12.01.95
Chief Executive Dublin
Virgin Atlantic Airways Hugh Welburn: 19.01.95
Economic Advisor London
KLM Royal Dutch Airways Simon Van Dijk: 17.02.95
Deputy Vice President Amsterdam
7.12 DATA ANALYSIS
Interviews with senior executive stakeholders yielded both quantitative and qualitative 
data. Analysis of the data thus required tabulation of responses followed by statistical 
analysis.
Patton (1987, p.146) notes that there is no right way to organise qualitative data:
The analysis o f qualitative data is a creative process. There are no formulas, 
a s in statistics. It is a process demanding intellectual rigour and a great deal o f 
hard, thoughtful work. Because different people m anage their creativity, 
intellectual endeavour and hard work in different ways, there is no right way to 
go about organising, analysing, and interpreting qualitative data.
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However, general patterns were evident in the responses given in the interviews, thus 
it was possible to group and categorise the results on the basis of content. 
Contingency tables were formulated for each set of answers, and a standard 
spreadsheet chi-square programme was used to analyse the data. Chi-square tests 
were conducted to ascertain the degree of association between each stakeholder 
group in each set of responses.
7.12.1 Hypothesis 2.1
H2.i Senior executives stakeholder in the European air transport sector are 
inclined to view approval o f State subsidies b y  the EC's executive 
branch, the European Commission more a s  a m eans o f addressing  
individual M em ber State 's social/economic problem s than as  
addressing the issue o f competition.
Questions 1 and 2 were designed to test H2.i . These questions ask stakeholders for 
their opinions as to the function of an airline and why the European Commission has 
allowed State subsidies to be granted to some airlines. Table 7.20 shows the 
respondents' views on the function of an airline.
Issue: The Functions of an Airline
Table 7.20: What is the function of an airline?
Responses No.
Suppliers
No.
Buyers
No.
Subs.
No.
Comps.
Totals
Provide service for 
public
6 4 2 3 15
Provide employment 7 3 0 3 13
Promotion of tourism 4 1 0 1 6
Make a profit 4 2 2 1 9
Totals 21 10 4 8 43
(Source: Field Studies)
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HYPOTHESIS H0: There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and  their
perception o f the function of an airline.
HYPOTHESIS H}: There is an association betw een stakeholder groups and their
perception of the function o f an airline.
CONCLUSION:
%2 = 5.008 (df = 9) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their perception of the functions of an 
airline.
COMMENT:
This implies that there is no difference in the perception between groups and their 
perception of the function of an airline.
The two highest responses yielded answers which revealed a high degree of 
‘nationalism’. 35% of the stakeholder responses were that the function of an airline 
was to ‘provide services for the public,’ ‘public’ being for the most part regarded as the 
‘nationals’ of the respondents' Member State, whilst the second biggest response 
(30%) perceived an airline as ‘providing employment’. The stakeholders regarded 
airlines as:
• an extension of public employment;
• having a close relationship with central government; and
• a means of boosting the national economy.
One senior executive stakeholder said:
...in the p a s t when unem ploym ent figures rose, airlines were \encouraged1 to 
take on more sta ff - whether they were needed  or not.
Therefore, traditionally at least airlines have not for the most part been regarded as 
commercial enterprises (oniy 21 % responses indicated that the function of an airline 
was to make a profit), but as providers of air transport services and employment for 
the nationals of the Member State concerned.
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ISSUE: The European Commission allowing State subsidies to be
granted to some State-owned airlines.
Table 7.21: In your opinion why has the European Commission
allowed State subsidies to be granted?
Responses No.
Suppliers
No.
Buyers
No.
Subs.
No.
Comps.
Totals
Political pressure 
(economic & social)
8 4 0 4 16
Strong pressure groups 2 0 1 2 5
Contain unemployment 4 2 1 1 8
Maintain competition 1 1 0 2 4
Totais 15 7 2 9 33
(Source: Field Studies)
HYPOTHESIS H0:
HYPOTHESIS H1
There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and their 
opinion as to why the European Commission allowed state  
subsidies to be granted to som e airlines.
There is an association betw een the stakeholder groups and  
their opinion a s  to why the European Commission allowed 
state subsidies to be granted to som e airlines.
CONCLUSION:
X2 = 6.847 (d f=  6) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their opinion as to why the European 
Commission allowed State subsidies to be granted to some airlines.
COMMENT:
Once again membership of a particular stakeholder group does not appear to have an 
influence on their opinion as to why the European Commission allowed State 
subsidies to be granted to some airlines.
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There was a strong consensus on why the European Commission had permitted state 
subsidies to be granted to some State-owned airlines. The three highest responses 
are closely linked. Some 88% of the responses were that the European Commission 
had responded to pressure from national governments and pressure groups (trade 
unions) and because they wished to contain unemployment: One former ‘flag carriers’ 
preparing for privatisation reduced its workforce by 30,0000.
Only 12% of the responses given regarded State subsidies as necessary to maintain 
competition:
State ow ned carriers have for so  long operated on a non-commercial basis; 
profits and efficiency were not a priority. If State aid had not been  granted they  
never would have an opportunity to reorganise, becom e efficient or even try to 
com pete on a commercial basis.
Another stakeholder said:
In m any instances the S tate-ow ned com pany was undercapitalised in the first 
instance. In the case  o f A er Lingus it was no more than equity, o f which there 
was a deficit; politically it su ited  the Government to call it state aid; had they  
not there would have been  a queue o f State com panies asking for equity they  
felt w as not there to begin with.
It appears that in some instances there may be 'justification,' however, the amount 
and purpose of the State subsidy granted was questioned by one stakeholder.
It [State aid] has been  justified on a political basis. The air carriers them selves  
argue that they are asking for no more than a private investor would invest in 
his own company. This is not always the case; som e am ounts that have been  
granted are unreasonable. Countries which have strong governm ent 
involvement in the public sector also have a strong voice in the European 
institutions - in places where it matters.
Thus, although some respondents perceive State subsidy as being necessary to 
maintain competition, there is an overwhelming perception that its primary justification 
is political.
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7.12.2 Hypothesis 2.2
H 2.2 M em ber S ta tes which own airlines are perceived b y  senior executive  
stakeholders a s  being more reluctant to oppose the granting o f State  
subsidies to air carriers than M ember S ta tes which do not own an 
airline.
Questions three and four were designed to test H 2.2
Issue: Member States opposing the granting of State subsidies to State-
owned airlines.
Table 7.22: In your opinion why have some Member States opposed
the granting of State subsidies to ‘flag carriers’?
Responses No.
Suppliers
No.
Buyers
No.
Subs.
No.
Comps.
Totals
Anti-competitive 7 5 1 2 15
Do not have a "flag 
carrier"
2 0 1 1 4
Not in competition with 
a State carrier
2 0 0 1 3
Totals 11 5 2 4 22
(Source: Field Studies) 
HYPOTHESIS H0:
HYPOTHESIS H1:
There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and their 
opinion a s  to why som e  M ember S ta tes opposed  the granting 
o f S ta te subsidies to ‘flag carriers’.
There is an association betw een the stakeholder groups and  
their opinion as to why som e M ember S ta tes opposed  the 
granting o f State subsidies to ‘flag carriers’.
CONCLUSION:
X2 = 4.693 (df = 6) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their opinion as to why some member 
States opposed the granting of state subsidies to ‘flag carriers’.
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COMMENT:
Again there appears to be no association between membership of any one particular 
stakeholder group and perceptions about Member State opposition to the granting of 
state subsidies.
Answers to this question confirm show that there is a very strong feeling (68% of the 
responses) among stakeholders that State subsidy is anti-competitive and thus 
confirm responses given to the previous question. This view is reinforced by the 
Comite des Sages report which notes that:
...all the ca ses  subm itted during the last three years have involved carriers that 
are State-owned. This is itself is a potentially significant distortion of 
competition betw een State-ow ned and privately ow ned airlines.
(Comite des Sages Report, 1993, p.21)
Table 7.23: In your opinion why have some Member States not
opposed the granting of state subsidies to ‘flag carriers’?
Response No.
Suppliers
No.
Buyers
No.
Subs.
No.
Comps.
Totals
Recipient of state subsidy 7 2 0 3 12
Applicant for state subsidy 0 1 1 2 4
Potential applicant for state 
subsidy
8 4 1 2 15
Totals 15 7 2 7 31
(Source: Field Studies)
HYPOTHESIS H0: There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and their
opinion a s  to why som e M ember S ta tes do not oppose the 
granting o f State subsidies to ‘flag carriers’.
HYPOTHESIS Ht : There is an association betw een the stakeholder groups and
their opinion a s  to why som e M em ber S ta tes do not oppose  
the granting o f State subsidies to ‘flag carriers’.
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CONCLUSION:
X2 = 7.403 (d f = 6) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their opinion as to why some member 
States do not oppose the granting of State subsidies to ‘flag carriers’.
COMMENT:
Again there appears to be no association between stakeholder membership and 
perceptions on why some Member States do not oppose the granting of State 
subsidies to some ‘flag carriers’.
There is a universal impression amongst stakeholders that opposition to State 
subsidies has been muted by governments' recognition that their airlines have either 
received or will need to seek such aid: in other words, nearly all Member States assert 
that their airlines have the same needs.
7.12.3 Hypothesis 2.3
H 2.3 Airlines in receipt o f state subsidies are perceived by  senior executives  
in the European airline industry to be less efficient than airlines which 
do not receive State subsidies.
Questions four, five and six were designed to test H2.3.
Issue: Airline efficiency
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Table 7.24: How is airline performance and efficiency measured?
Response No.
Suppliers
No.
Buyers
No.
Subs.
No.
Comps.
Totals
Return on capital invested 1 1 1 1 4
Technical efficiency 0 1 0 0 1
Revenue per passenger 
KM
7 2 2 2 13
Profit/Loss 5 2 1 3 11
Passenger satisfaction 0 1 0 0 1
Totals 13 7 4 6 30
(Source: Field Studies)
HYPOTHESIS H0: There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and their
opinion a s  to how  the performance and  efficiency o f an airline 
should be  m easured.
HYPOTHESIS H i: There is an association betw een the stakeholder groups and
their opinion a s  to how  the performance and efficiency of an 
airline should be measured.
CONCLUSION:
%2 = 8.784 (d f — 12) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their opinion as to how the performance 
and efficiency of an airline should be measured.
COMMENT:
Again there appears to be no association between stakeholder membership and 
perceptions as to how an airline's efficiency should be measured.
259
Chapter 7 - Research Findings
Taken together, the responses put a premium on financial success and accord 
virtually no importance to technical efficiency or passenger satisfaction. Responses 
are in marked contrast with those to earlier questions and show that whilst 
government policies are perceived to be shaped by factors which have little to do with 
objective standards, views on airline performance are to a very large extent 
determined by traditional criteria.
This is reinforced by one stakeholder's comment that:
Traditionally State-ow ned airlines have been regarded a s  helping public 
relations, tourism, welfare and social provisions, making a profit is very far 
down the list.
Table 7.25a: List the five most efficient airlines in the European Community.
The responses for this question are given in table 7.25a below. As can be seen in 
many of the cells there is no response at all or else the number or responses is low. In 
order to preserve the integrity of the Chi-square tests a number of rows were 
combined as per Table 7.25b and the significant test was carried out on this data set. 
(Note: In Table 7.25a respondents whose responses were combined have an 
asterisk).
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Table 7.25a: What are the most efficient European airlines?
AIRLINES No. No. No. No. Total
Suppliers Buyers Subs. Comps.
Braathens * - - - 1 1
British Airways 9 5 2 4 20
British Midland 6 4 1 1 12
Crossair* - 1 - - 1
Iceland Air* 1 - - - 1
KLM 6 2 1 3 12
Liendenflung* - 1 - - 1
LTU* 1 1 - - 2
Lufthansa 5 4 2 3 14
Lufthansa Express 1 - - - 1
SAS* 1 1 - 1 3
Swiss Air* 1 2 1 1 5
Air UK* 6 1 2 1 10
Aer Lingus* - - - 1 1
Ryanair* 4 - 1 1 6
Britannia 1 - - - 1
Monarch 1 - - - 1
Totals 42 23 10 17 92
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.25b: The most efficient European airlines (Combined Responses).
Response No. No. No. No. Totals
Suppliers Buyers Subs. Comps.
British Airways 9 5 2 4 20
British Midland 6 4 1 1 12
KLM 6 2 1 3 12
Lufthansa 5 4 2 3 14
Combined Responses 16 8 4 6 34
Totals 42 23 10 17 92
(Source: Field Studies)
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HYPOTHESIS H0: There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and their
opinion as to which are the five m ost efficient European 
airline.
HYPOTHESIS H} : There is no association betw een the stakeholder groups and
their opinion as to which are five m ost efficient European 
airlines.
CONCLUSION:
X2 = 2.566 (d f~  12) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their opinion as to the five most efficient 
European airlines.
COMMENT:
Again there appears to be no association between stakeholder membership and 
perceptions about the most efficient airlines in Europe. See comment for Table 26.
Table 7.26a: In your opinion list the five least efficient airlines in the European 
Community.
The responses for this question are given in table 7.26a below. As can be seen in 
many of the cells there is no response at all or else the number or responses is low. In 
order to preserve the integrity of the Chi-Square tests a number of rows were 
combined as per Table 7.26b and the significant test was carried out on this data set. 
(Note: In Table 7.26a respondents whose responses were combined have an 
asterisk.)
Issue: List the 5 least efficient airlines in the European Community.
id
id
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CONCLUSION:
%2 = 2.940 (d f= 12) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their opinion as to the five least efficient 
European airlines.
COMMENT:
Again there appears to be no association between stakeholder membership and 
perceptions about the efficient airlines in Europe.
It is striking that the four airlines most frequently cited as being amongst the most 
efficient are either totally or partially in the private sector, whilst the five most 
frequently named as being amongst the least efficient are all State-owned and in 
receipt of large amounts of State subsidy.
Table 7.27 : In your opinion has State subsidy improved the
efficiency of the recipients?
Response No.
Suppliers
No.
Buyers
No. Subs. No. Comps. Totals
Improved efficiency 2 0 0 1 3
No change 7 4 1 3 15
Reduced efficiency 2 1 1 0 4
Totals 11 5 2 4 22
(Source: Field Studies)
HYPOTHESIS H0: There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and their
perceptions o f improved efficiency and recipients o f State  
subsidy.
HYPOTHESIS H i: There is an association betw een the stakeholder groups and
their perceptions o f improved efficiency and  recipients o f State  
subsidy.
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CONCLUSION:
%2 = 3.610 (df = 6) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their perceptions of improved efficiency 
and recipients of State subsidy.
COMMENT:
There appears to be no association between stakeholder membership and 
perceptions about the efficient airlines in Europe.
Two thirds of the respondents judge State subsidy has had no impact on the 
efficiency of the recipients, whilst a majority of the remaining respondents consider 
that it has actually had an adverse effect on efficiency.
One respondent noted that whilst recipients are trying to become more efficient,
...new  strategies are need ed  and these do not happen overnight: A  complete 
reorganisation is necessary.
Another stakeholder takes a more pessimistic view:
Carriers which have received State aid have not y e t n eed ed  to becom e more 
efficient, they feel they can rely on their respective S ta tes to continue propping 
them up.
A third respondent has the same perception:
Airlines which have received State subsidy have not slim m ed down their 
operations. Knowing they can depend  on their own national governm ents to 
support, they have not becom e competitive. They do not face the commercial 
prospect o f bankruptcy.
Table 7.28: In your opinion what has the effect been on EC airlines
which have not received state aid?
Responses No.
Suppliers
No.
Buyers
No.
Subs.
No.
Comps.
Totals
improved efficiency 10 3 2 3 18
No change 1 2 0 1 4
Totals 11 5 2 4 22
(Source: Field Studies)
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HYPOTHESIS H0: There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and their
perceptions o f improved efficiency and non recipients o f State  
subsidy.
HYPOTHESIS Hi : There is an association betw een the stakeholder groups and
their perceptions o f improved efficiency and non recipients o f 
State subsidy.
CONCLUSION:
%2 = 2.781 (d f = 3) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their perceptions of improved efficiency 
and non recipients of State subsidy.
COMMENT:
There appears to be no association between stakeholder membership and 
perceptions about the efficient airlines in Europe.
Responses to this question suggest that from the airlines' point of view, there are 
positive advantages in not receiving State subsidy. There is a perceived requirement 
to become more efficient in order to keep ahead of rivals who do receive support from 
their governments.
One respondent said:
Airlines which have not received State aid have been  forced to becom e even  
more efficient than before. They will be  better off economically and their 
efficiency levels will be higher and remain higher because  their State aided  
competitors have not ye t been  forced to be competitive - but it will happen.
A chief executive of one airline said:
It has been  advantageous to us not to receive State aid. W e have been  forced 
to cut costs and reduce employment, a s  a result we are able to offer much  
lower fares than our competitors.
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7.12.4 Hypothesis 2.4
H2.4 Airlines in receipt o f State subsidies are perceived by  senior executive 
stakeholders in the European airline industry a s  being more likely to 
distort competition than airlines not in receipt o f State subsidies.
The following questions were designed to test H2.4.
Issue: Competition, positive and negative initiatives.
Table 7.29 What major regulatory initiative since 1988 has had the 
greatest positive influence on the EC airline industry?
Response No.
Suppliers
No.
Buyers
No.
Subs.
No.
Comps.
Totals
1st liberalisation package - - - - -
2nd liberalisation package - - - - -
3rd liberalisation package 4 2 1 0 7
All 3 packages 7 3 1 4 15
Privatisation of state owned 
airlines
1 0 0 0 1
Totals 12 5 2 4 23
(Source: Field Studies)
HYPOTHESIS H0: There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and their
perceptions about the major regulatory initiatives since 1988 
which has had  the greatest positive influence on the EC airline 
industry.
HYPOTHESIS H i: There is an association betw een the stakeholder groups and
their perceptions about the major regulatory initiatives since  
1988 which has had the greatest positive influence on the EC  
airline industry.
CONCLUSION:
X2 = 3.490 (d f = 6) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their perceptions about the major 
regulatory initiative since 1988 which has had the greatest positive influence on the 
EC airline industry.
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COMMENT:
There appears to be no association between stakeholder membership and 
perceptions about the major regulatory initiative since 1988 which has had the 
greatest positive influence on the EC airline industry.
There was a general consensus among respondents that the European Commission's 
regulatory initiative has been a positive influence on the EC airline industry.
Two thirds of the respondents considered that this influence has been cumulative, 
whereas all but one of the remainder thought that the last of the stage of the process 
alone had produced the most impact.
Two respondents commented as follows as follows:
The three packages have progressively produced for the first time a situation 
where airlines wishing to improve their competitive position can do so  free o f 
the shackles im posed b y  governm ent restrictions.
N ew  regulations from Europe have se t the conditions whereby a more open  
and competitive market can develop.
Table 7.30 In your opinion has competition in the EC aviation 
sector increased since liberalisation?
Response No.
Suppliers
No.
Buyers
No.
Subs.
No.
Comps.
Totals
More than expected - - - - -
In line with anticipation - - - - -
Less than anticipated 5 2 2 3 12
Much less than anticipated 3 2 0 0 4
Increasing 2 2 0 0 5
Only on routes with 2 or 
more carriers
2 1 0 2 5
Totals 12 7 2 5 26
(Source: Field Studies)
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HYPOTHESIS H0: There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and their 
perceptions on the increase in the level o f competition since  
1988.
HYPOTHESIS H i: There is an association betw een the stakeholder groups and
their perceptions on the increase in the level o f competition 
since 1988.
CONCLUSION:
%2 = 7.371 (d f = 9) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their perceptions on the level 
competition since 1988.
COMMENT:
There appears to be no association between stakeholder membership and 
perceptions on the increase in the level of competition since 1988.
See comment on Table 7.31
Table 7.31 : What has prevented competition from occurring
in the EC air transport sector?
Response No.
Suppliers
No.
Buyers
No.
Subs.
No.
Comps.
Totals
Infrastructure constraints 6 2 1 1 10
Continuing protectionism 8 2 1 3 14
Totals 14 4 2 4 24
(Source: Field Studies) 
HYPOTHESIS H0: There is no association betw een stakeholder groups and their 
perceptions on what has prevented  competition from 
occurring in the EC air transport sector.
HYPOTHESIS Hy : There is an association betw een the stakeholder groups and  
their perceptions on what has prevented  competition from 
occurring in the EC air transport sector.
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CONCLUSION:
X2 = 0.637 (df = 3) not significant at the 0.05 level, the H0 is accepted - there is no 
association between stakeholder groups and their perceptions on what has prevented 
competition from occurring in the EC air transport sector.
COMMENT:
There appears to be no association between stakeholder membership and 
perceptions on what has prevented competition from occurring in the EC air transport 
sector.
Although all respondents considered that the European Commission's regulatory 
initiatives have been beneficial for the airline industry (See Table 7.29), nearly two 
thirds (62%) of the views expressed were to the effect that the resulting increase in 
competition has been less or much less than the respondents had anticipated. In no 
case had expectations been exceeded.
In explaining why their expectations had not been met, 40% of respondents said that 
this was primarily because of infrastructure constraints, both at airports and in air 
space. A greater number (60%) thought that continuing protectionism was chiefly to 
blame.
This apparent paradox is explained by respondents' belief that in failing to enforce the 
Treaty of Rome's prohibition of State aids, the European Commission itself has done 
much to limit the competition it set out to promote.
7.13 CONCLUSIONS ON THE FINDINGS OF THE STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS
Although superficial observation of the results may appear to suggest that there are 
considerable differences of view as between stakeholder groups, every chi-square 
test conducted has shown that these differences are not statistically significant at the
0.05 level.
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There is indeed a consensus that whilst the EC airline industry has been given 
sufficient regulatory freedom to compete freely, political pressures both at EC and 
national levels have been such that the Community's liberalisation policy has so far 
produced less change in the market place than its proponents had hoped and a great 
majority of respondents had anticipated.
Underlying the resistance to change has been a long-standing tradition, particularly in 
continental Europe, that State-owned airlines existed as much to provide a public 
service in the widest sense, including the creation of employment, as to provide 
efficient and profitable transport services. It is widely recognised that as a result, many 
of the airlines concerned cannot exist in the newly liberalised environment without 
continuing State aid.
Some of those concerned regard this as acceptable, claiming that the State aid 
amounts to no more than would be invested by private shareholders whilst others 
regard it as a necessary concomitant of insufficient capitalisation in the first place. 
Those taking this view are thus reluctant to accept that state aid is per se  anti­
competitive.
On the other hand, there is also widespread recognition that State aid has allowed 
inefficiencies to develop over time and that the carriers concerned are inherently less 
competitive than those airlines which have had to stand on their own feet, it is 
striking, that whilst the four airlines considered by respondents to be most efficient are 
all wholly or partly in private ownership, the five most frequently named as being least 
efficient are all State-owned and in receipt of State subsidy.
Thus, it is not surprising that from the airlines' point of view there is a perception that 
there are positive advantages in not receiving State subsidy and that the EC's 
liberalisation policy is beneficial in forcing all carriers to become more competitive - 
those who are not in receipt of State aid because they have to keep ahead of those 
who are and those who are, because to continue in business on a long-term basis 
they will eventually be obliged to bring their costs into line.
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There is accordingly a consensus that notwithstanding early attempts by some 
Member States to ‘roil back’ liberalisation - a classic case of Easton's negative 
feedback - the policy will remain in being even if, in response to the feedback, the 
Commission has been obliged to agree to further grants of State aid which it is 
generally accepted distort the policy to some extent.
7.14 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THE AIRLINE SURVEYS
7.14.1 Introduction
The overriding objective of liberalisation in the European Community's air transport 
sector was to establish a free market between Member States in which competition 
would occur and increase. It is assumed that airlines operating within this liberalised 
market have responded to this newly created competitive environment by adopting 
strategies to gain competitive advantage.
7.15 The Research Problem
The research problem is to determine if competition has increased within the 
European Community air transport sector and to analyse the strategies adopted by 
airlines in the newly liberalised environment. The following hypothesis was developed:
Hypothesis 3 In newly created competitive environments companies which have 
adopted the generic strategies, as defined by Porter's (1980) model, 
will have lagged returns which are superior to those of companies 
which have not adopted such strategies.
Related hypotheses to test the competitive strategies adopted by airlines post 
liberalisation were developed.
H3t1 Airlines that follow generic strategies o f High Volume Low Cost or 
Differentiation or Focus will enjoy higher returns than those o f airlines that 
have not.
H3 .2  Airlines which have reduced buyer pow er will have higher returns than those  
of airlines which have n o t
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H3 .3  Airlines which have reduced supplier power will have higher returns than those  
of airlines which have not.
H34 Airlines which have erected barriers to entry will have higher returns than 
those o f airlines which have not.
H3.5 Airlines which have reacted b es t to substitute forms o f travel will have higher 
returns than those o f airlines which have not.
7.16 DATA COLLECTION METHOD
A questionnaire was designed to obtain data on the airlines' background; their generic 
competitive strategies, their relationships' with their buyers, their relationships' with 
their suppliers, their perceptions' about their competitors, the new competitors 
entering the industry, their reactions to substitute forms of travel. It was designed to 
elicit general information at the start and become increasingly specific with regard to 
core issues (i.e., number of buyers for best route, major competitors on best route, 
new geographical markets identified since liberalisation). Basic information provided 
an overall profile of the airline - age, size, ownership, geographical markets, types of 
services operated. Financial data - profit/loss, turnover, assets - for 1988, the period 
just before liberalisation and 1993, the period just after the implementation of the last 
liberalisation package, permitted the changes in ‘the performance indicators of 
competitiveness’ before and after liberalisation to be monitored.
As anticipated in Chapter 6 many airlines had difficulty in supplying the financial data 
relating to 1988. Where this data was not available from the airlines themselves every 
effort was made to obtain it from other sources, eg. past annual reports, past financial 
reports and The Top World Airlines Company Guide.
In most cases the financial data for 1993 was available for the assets and sales but 
some airlines were reluctant to give profit/loss accounts for this year. This can be 
explained by the fact that regardless of the confidentiality assurance some 
respondents regarded this data as commercially sensitive and feared that it might go 
‘astray’. Again as for 1988 every effort was made to obtain this information from the 
sources above and in most cases the efforts met with success.
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A full set of financial data was not furnished by every airline but as the survey analysis 
was not dependent on a single measure of competitiveness, the data available was 
more than adequate to allow a reliable assessment of competitiveness to be made.
With regards to the ‘soft’ data the survey yielded, it must be highlighted that these are 
the uncorroborated opinions of the respondents; however, these opinions were 
deemed acceptable for analysis because:
• the respondents of the questionnaires were mainly senior executives in
their respective airlines and their opinions although personal would
influence and dictate company policy; and
• conclusions drawn from analysis of the airlines questionnaire were
validated by senior independent industry experts.
The questionnaire was structured as follows:
Section 1 - The Overall Structure of the Industry (Q1 - Q19)
• Ownership, age, size (by number of employees and turnover)
• Financial data (assets, profit/loss, turnover)
• Routes operated
• Fare types and specialisation
• Geographical markets
Section 2 - The Strategies Followed by Airlines (Q20 - Q31)
• Pricing strategies
• Responsibility for setting prices
• How prices are set
• Quality relative to competitors
• Measuring and ensuring quality
• The influence of marketing
• Methods of following market trends
• Methods of promotion employed
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Section 3 - A irlines’ Relationships With Buyers (Q32 - Q38)
• Number of large customers
• Customers having alternative suppliers
• Customer profitability
• Customer information
• Meetings with customers
• Sales terms most frequently used
Section 4 - A irlines’ Relationships With Suppliers (Q39 - Q48)
• Operating costs
• Alternative suppliers for fuel
• Alternative suppliers for in-flight food
• Alternative suppliers for CRS
• Alternative suppliers for landing
• Meetings with suppliers
• Sales terms most frequently agreed
Section 5 - Knowledge About Existing Competitors (Q49 - Q51)
• Respondents' strengths relative to major competitors
• Competitors' strengths relative to respondents
• Identification of major competitors
Section 6 - Information on Major New Competitors (Q52 - Q55)
• Routes which have attracted new competitors
• Home location of new competitors
• Structure and activity of major new competitors
• Strategy of new entrants
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Section 7 - Information on Substitutes to  Air Travel (Q56 - Q60)
• Identification of substitute forms of travel
• Location of routes where substitutes operate
• Substitutes fares in comparison to respondents' fares
• Substitute total travel time in relation to respondent
• Respondents' reaction and strategy to substitutes
The instrument was pre-coded to allow this data to be analysed utilising SPSS 
software.
7.17 THE PILOT STUDY
A number of steps were taken to validate the questionnaire. First, drafts were sent to 
members of the Civil Aviation Authority in the UK to ensure that the fare types and 
route classifications were accurate.
Secondly, the most suitable dates to test before and after liberalisation were 
discussed with DG VII, and it was decided that 1988 and 1993 would be the most 
appropriate. 1988 because it was the first year there was a consistent policy applied to 
intra European Community air traffic following adoption of the first package of 
liberalising measures. Whilst 1993 was the first year of virtually total liberalisation 
throughout the European Community.
Thirdly, the questionnaire was pilot tested on four airlines which did not meet ail the 
essential criteria, i.e. their fleets were too small. The pre-test revealed that the first two 
sections of the questionnaire, especially those questions that required answers from 
1988 were difficult to find, although it was decided to retain these questions in order to 
allow comparisons to be made before and after the liberalisation process where 
possible. It was recognised at this stage that there would be difficulty getting this 
information in the actual survey. There was a general reluctance to give profit/loss 
figures even though some of these figures (i.e. limited companies) were in the public 
domain.
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Some airlines expressed an em barrassm ent because they had made losses in 1993, 
despite the fact the global industry made losses of US$35 billion over a three year 
period up to 1993. It was decided that every effort would be made to obtain this data 
in the actual survey but that the analysis would not rely on this ‘measure of 
competitiveness’ exclusively. In the pre-test it was acknowledged that respondents 
were ready to give information on turnover and assets wherever possible. Apart from 
the difficulties in getting accurate information for 1988 and the question concerning 
profit/loss, the pilot revealed no significant problems concerning content validity or 
structure of the questionnaire and the terms used.
Data obtained was comprehensive and ‘fit for the purpose’ and with the exception of 
those problems already mentioned above there was no evidence that respondents 
had difficulty with any of the other questions.
7.18 SAMPLING PROCEDURES
7.18.1 Identification of the Sampling Frame
The choice of airlines was based on secondary sources namely worldwide and British 
airline directories.
• Flight World Airline Directory
• Interavia Airline Directory
• Directory of Holders Operators Certificate (CAA, UK)
• Avamark International
• World Airways Guide
• Top World Airlines: A Company Guide
These directories provided lists of more than six hundred domestic and international 
airlines offering either scheduled or charter services in public transport category 
aircraft. A total of 487 were European, of which 167 were registered in the European 
Community. From this number 48 were wholly or predominantly charter carriers, 3 
were covered by a parent carrier, 20 had thee aircraft or fewer, 19 with aircraft of less 
than 30 seats and 9 carried cargo only.
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Thus a sample of sixty eight was identified which met the following criteria:
• Airline registered in a Member State of the European Community
• Airline offered scheduled services
• Fleet size is greater than five aircraft
• Aircraft in fleet had more than 30 seats
Airlines which met the criteria could be classified under the following categories:
• Part State Owned Airline (Flag-carrier).
• UK Owned Public Company (pic)
• Non UK Owned Public Company (pic)
• UK Privately Owned
• Non UK Privately Owned
• New Entrant
Given this classification it was important that the sample should reflect each of these 
classifications in order that a full representation of the air transport industry in the 
European Community was included.
7.18.2 Respondent Sample
Postal questionnaires were sent out to the identified sample in early December 1994. 
The questionnaire was accompanied by a letter explaining the purpose of the study 
and guaranteeing confidentiality. The letter also indicated that each respondent airline 
would receive a summary copy of the findings. A date in early January 1995 was set 
as the last date for returns, the questionnaire and correspondence was addressed by 
name to the managing director or in the case of large airlines the commercial director. 
33% of the total respondents returned completed questionnaires within one week. 
After the cut off period, each airline was telephoned to enquire if they had received the 
questionnaire and if they needed any help in completing it.
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There was generally a helpful response and at this stage the reasons for non 
completion of questionnaires were identified:
‘Commercially Sensitive’ Three airlines coming under the same holding 
company took a collective decision not to complete the questionnaire as they 
regarded it as being commercial sensitive thus effectively ruling out this group.
‘Time Constraints5 For the most part it was discovered that many
respondents were put off by the fact that the questionnaire appeared very long 
or that they ju st did not ge t round to filling it in.
‘Non Receipt’ It was also revealed that some of the managing
directors/commercial directors had not actually received the questionnaire and 
that it had been lost in the organisation.
Airlines were at this stage asked if they would be prepared to participate in the 
questionnaire, once a commitment had been established it was decided that rather 
then delay the process where airlines agreed that the questionnaire would be 
administered personally. This method involved extensive travel and financial 
resources but it did meet with success and a further 12 questionnaires were 
completed using this mode.
Where it was not possible to make an appointment, a reminder letter and another 
copy of the questionnaire was sent out in mid January, this met with limited success. 
From the identified sample of sixty eight some 28 airlines responded to the
questionnaire. The total number of useable responses was twenty one and was
representative of each of the ownership classifications outlined above. Table 7.32 
below shows the status of respondents.
(See Appendix IV for actual respondents).
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Table 7.32 Respondents and Their Status
Status Number
Approached
Number of 
Responses
Number of
Useable
Responses
State Owned/Flag Carrier 11 7 6
UK Owned Public Company 1 1 0
Non UK Public Owned Company 5 1 1
UK Privately Owned Company 30 10 7
Non UK Privately Owned Company 11 5 4
New Entrant 10 4 3
TOTALS 68 28 21
This database was deemed to be acceptable in light of other studies in this field:
Barrett (1985), for example analysed the labour productivity for US and EC airlines for
1982 using a database of 18 European airlines. Additionally, he does not distinguish 
between scheduled and charter carriers. Ramsden (1985) measures productivity of 
EC airlines for the year 1983 using a database of 14 airlines. Forsyth, Hill and 
Trengrove (1986) examined the economic efficiency of 17 international airiines for 
1983. Their sample however, is limited to 4 EC airlines.
7.19 DATA ANALYSIS
Analysis of the data was conducted following an orthodox Porter approach. Thus it 
was conducted in the following seven stages.
7.19.1 The Structure of the Findings
This analyses of the airline surveys are presented in five sections:
• The overall structure of the industry;
• The Strategies followed by Airlines;
• Airlines' Relationships with Buyers;
• Airlines' Relationships with Suppliers;
• Airlines' Knowledge about Existing Competitors;
• Airlines' Knowledge about Major New Competitors, and
• Substitutes to Air Transport.
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The analyses of each section will have the following format.
Introduction: this gives information on the aspect of the industry being analysed.
The Statistics: this provides a statistical representation of the aspect of the industry 
being analysed.
The Issue: This considers the influence that the aspect of the industry being analysed 
can have upon competitiveness.
Conclusion: this presents the conclusion reached on the Issue.
Comment: when an issue appears to have a particular significance or the result is 
unexpected, a comment may be included.
7.19.2 Statistical Tests on Analysis
The empirical data is analysed using Cross-Tabulations, Pearson's Coefficient, 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient, Mode, Rankings and Frequency 
Distribution. Statistical tests allowing decisions to be made on whether observed 
frequencies are essentially equal to or significantly different from frequencies 
predicted by a theoretical model are applied to the analyses wherever possible.
%2 tests are used wherever appropriate to examine the differences or associations 
between the factors under investigation. However, Easterby-Smith e t al {1991, p130) 
highlight the limitations in the use of chi-square tests: that no more than 20 % of cells 
should have expected frequencies of less than 5 and none of them should have 
expected frequencies of less than 1. With these limitations in mind it should be noted 
that although %2 tests have been applied to every cross-tabulation in the following 
analysis, in almost every case the cells have an expected frequency of < 5, thus 
limiting the reliability of the %2 tests.
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Easterby-Smith e t al (1991, p128) cite correlation statistics as the most commonly 
used demonstrations of similarity. Thus, in many instances in the airline survey 
analysis correlations are used to demonstrate the similarities or differences in data. 
(Correlation coefficients vary between -1 and +1, which indicate total negative and 
positive correlations respectively, and the mid-point, zero, indicates no relationships 
whatever).
The degree of association in the bivariate distributions was ascertained using 
coefficients of correlations as measures. Two types of correlation coefficient were 
employed.
• The Pearson Correlation Coefficient (or the Product Moment Correlation 
Coefficient) (see Owen and Jones, 1977, p384), was used to measure the 
degree of association between sets of cardinal data.
• The Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient was used to measure the 
degree of association between sets of ranked (ordinal) data and sets of 
cardinal data.
In both sets of analyses, significance tests were not employed because of:
I. Sample Size was too small;
II. t tests assume the existence of a normal population; and
III. Significance in correlation analyses does not prove the cause and effect 
relationship.
As the ‘rankings’ and the ‘reasons’ are not independent variables expected 
frequencies can not be computed and so, in this case, a statistical test of significance 
cannot be applied.
As the frequency distribution is not assumed to have any particular distribution 
(parametric or non-parametric) no statistical test of significance can be applied. 
Ranking is used to analyse some of the empirical data.
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7.20 SECTION A: THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY
The objective of this section is to provide an overview of the industry from the 
perspective of competitive structure. It is therefore the ‘first cut’ of the analyses and in 
addition to providing the overview, it should also enable the industry to be segmented 
into significant strategic groups which will be further analysed in Section B.
7.20.1 An Analysis of Airline Structure, Activities, Services Provided, 
Geographical Markets, Customer Types and Degree of Satisfaction.
This section provides a broad, largely external, analysis of respondents' operations 
under the headings given above. Where available this information is given for two 
dates, 1988 and 1993. Thus the tables show competitive structural changes before 
and after liberalisation.
7.20.2 Year Trading Commenced and Its Influence
1. The Statistics: Table 7.33 shows the year trading commenced for each 
respondent. It is striking that nearly half (48 per cent) of the respondents stated up in 
the last fifteen years, a period in which liberalisation was first in prospect, and 
subsequently implemented.
Table 7.33: The Year Trading Commenced
Year Trading Commenced Frequency Percentage
Before 1940 2 9.6
Before 1950 2 9.6
Before 1960 1 4.8
Before 1970 1 4.8
Before 1980 5 24.0
Before 1990 5 24.0
After 1990 5 24.0
Total 21 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
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2. The Issue: The issue to be considered here is: Does the year an airline's trading 
commenced have an have an impact on its competitiveness?
Table 7.34a provides a cross-tabulation of Year Trading Commenced and Net Profit 
Before Tax in 1993 and Table 7.34b provides a cross-tabulation of Year Trading 
Commenced and Loss 1993.
Table 7.35 provides a cross-tabulation of Year Trading Commenced and Sales per 
Employee in 1993.
Table 7.36 provides a cross-tabulation of Year Trading Commenced and Sales per 
Pound Asset in 1993.
Table 7.34a : Cross-tabulation of Year Trading Commenced and 
Net Profit (£m) Before Tax in 1993.
Profit £m 
1993
pre
1940
pre
1950
pre
1960
pre
1970
pre
1980
pre
1990
post
1990
Row
total
%
total
1 < 5 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 4 50.0
5 < 10 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 25
10 < 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 < 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 12.5
50 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 12.5
Row Total 0 1 1 0 3 1 2 8
% Total 0 12.5 12.5 0 37.5 12.5 25.0 100*
(Source: Field Studies)
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Table 7.34b : Cross-tabulation of Year Trading Commenced and Loss 1993.
Loss £m 
1993
pre
1940
pre
1950
pre
1960
pre
1970
pre
1980
pre
1990
post
1990
Row
total
%
total
1 < 5 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 5 45.5
15 < 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 9.1
50 <150 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 9.1
150 <200 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9.1
200 < 250 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 18.2
250 + 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 9.1
Row Total 2 2 1 0 1 4 1 11
% Total 18.2 18.2 9.1 0 9.1 36.4 9.1 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
%2 = 18.33 (df = 16), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
Table 7.35 Cross-tabulation of Year Trading Commenced and 
Sales per Employee in 1993.
Sales per 
Employee 
£m 1993
pre
1940
pre
1950
pre
1960
pre
1970
pre
1980
pre
1990
post
1990
Row
total
%
total
0.1 <0.10 0 1 0 0 4 0 2 7 36.2
0.10 <0.13 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 4 21.4
0.13 <0.20 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 7 36.2
150+ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5.26
Row Total 2 2 1 1 5 5 3 19
% Total 10.6 10.6 5.26 5.26 26.3 26.3 15.78 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
%2 = 15.008 (df = 12), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association 
between the variables.
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Table 7.36 Cross-tabulation of Year Trading Commenced and 
Sales per Pound Asset in 1993.
Sales per £ 
Assets £m
pre
1940
pre
1950
pre
1960
pre
1970
pre
1980
pre
1990
post
1990
Row
total
%
total
0.5 < 2.50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 43.2
2.50 < 5.0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 28.4
5.0 < 10.0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 21.6
10.0 <35.0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 7.1
Row Total 2 1 1 2 3 3 2 14
% Total 14.2 7.1 7.1 14.2 21.6 21.6 14.2 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
%2 = 8.25 (df = 12), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
3. Conclusion: There are no relationships between these variables, the %2 is not 
significant.
4. Comment: These findings may be rather significant in that they suggest that 
airlines which commenced operations in recent years have performed better in all 
three measures of competitiveness for the year 1993 than the ‘established’ airlines, 
which are for the most part the traditionally ‘state-owned flag carriers’.
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7.20.3 Company Structure and Its Influence
1. The Statistics: Table 7.37 shows the types of company that prevail in the industry. 
There is a fairly even balance between UK and non UK airlines represented in the 
survey.
Table 7.37: Company Structure
Structure Frequency Percentage
Non-UK Owned Public Company 2 9.6
Wholly/Part State Owned Company 6 28.8
UK Privately Owned Company 7 33.6
Non UK Privately Owned 6 28.8
Total 21 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: The major issue to be considered is: Does the type of company 
structure influence its competitiveness?
There are ten responses to this question for 1988 because out of the 21 respondents 
seven commenced operations after 1988 and two of the respondents began 
operations in 1987 and broke even and two did not answer this question.
Table 7.38a provides a cross-tabulation of Company Structure and Percentage Net 
Profit Before Tax in 1988 and it shows that Non UK Public airlines and part State 
owned carriers performed better than others. Only one airline declared a loss in 1988, 
this is not surprising given that this was a very good year for the air transport sector 
globally.
Table 7.39 provides a cross-tabulation of Company Structure and Sales per Employee 
for 1988. Table 7.40 provides a cross-tabulation of Company Structure and Sales per 
Pound Asset in 1988.
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Table 7.38a: Cross-tabulation of Company Structure and 
Net Profit £m Before Tax 1988.
Net Profit 
1988 (£m)
Non UK 
Public
State
Owned
UK
Private
Owned
Non
UK
Private
Row
Total
%
Total
1 <7 0 0 0 2 2 22.2
7< 10 0 0 0 1 1 11.1
10 <23 0 0 1 0 1 11.1
23 <32 0 2 0 0 2 22.2
32 <116 1 0 0 0 1 11.1
>116 0 2 0 0 2 22.1
Column
Total
1 4 1 3 9
% Total 11.11 44.44 11.1 33.3 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
%2 = 19.50 (df = 12), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
Table 7.38b: Cross-tabulation of Company Structure and 
Net Loss £m Before Tax 1988.
Net Loss 1988 (£m) Non UK Private Row Total %
8 1 1 100
Column Total 1 1
% 100 100
(Source: Field Studies)
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Table 7.39 Cross-tabulation of Company Structure and 
Sales £m per Employee for 1988.
1988 Sales per 
Employee (£m)
Non UK 
Public
State
Owned UK Private 
Owned
Non UK 
Private
Row
Total
%
Total
0 < 0.4 0 1 0 2 3 20.0
0.41 < .07 1 1 0 0 2 13.3
.071 < .08 0 3 0 1 4 26.7
.081 < .09 0 0 1 1 2 13.3
.091 <.11 0 0 1 0 1 6.7
.111 < .12 1 0 0 0 1 6.7
.121 < .15 0 0 0 1 1 6.7
.15 + 0 1 0 0 1 6.7
Column Total 2 6 2 5 15
% 13.4 40.2 13.4 33.5 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
X2 = 16,542 (df = 12), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association 
between the variables.
Table 7.40: Cross-tabulation of Company Structure and
Sales per Pound Asset in 1988.
1988 Sales per £ 
Assets (£m)
Non UK 
Public
State
Owned
UK Private 
Owned
Non UK 
Private
Row
Total
%
Total
0 < 1 .0 0 0 2 1 1 4 33.3
1.1 <2 .0 2 3 0 0 5 41.6
2.1 < 2.50 0 1 0 1 2 16.7
2.51 < .5.30 0 0 1 0 1 8.3
Column Total 2 6 2 2 12
% 16.7 50.1 16.7 16.7 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
X2 = 11.40 (df = 9), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
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The same cross-tabulations are provided in the next three Tables: Table 7.41, Table 
7.42 and Table 7.43 using financial data for 1993 in order to assess the impact of 
liberalisation.
Table 7.41 a: Cross-tabulation of Company Structure and 
Net Profit Before Tax 1993.
Net Profit 
1993 (£m)
Non UK 
Public
State
Owned
UK
Private
Owned
Non
UK
Private
Row
Total
%
Total
1 < 7 0 0 0 4 4 66.7
7 < 10 0 0 0 0 0
10 < 23  * 0 0 0 0 0
23 < 3 2 0 0 0 0 0
32 < 116 1 0 0 0 1 16.6
>116 0 0 1 0 1 16.6
Column Total 1 0 1 4 6
% Total 16.6 0 16.6 66.7 100*
* Sum of Total may not add up to 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
%2 = 12.00 (df = 6), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
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Table 7.41 b: Cross-tabulation of Company Structure and Loss 1993.
Net Profit 
1993 (£m)
Non UK 
Public
State
Owned
UK
Private
Owned
Non
UK
Private
Row
Total
%
Total
1 <7 0 1 0 0 1 9.1
7< 10 0 1 2 0 3 27.3
10 < 44 0 1 1 0 2 18.2
44 <150 0 1 0 0 1 9.1 '
150<185 0 1 0 0 1 9.1
185<195 0 0 1 0 1 9.1
195 <225 1 0 0 0 1 9.1
225 + 0 1 0 0 1 9.1
Column Total 1 6 4 0 11
% 9.1 54.6 36.4 0 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
Source: Field Studies
X2 = 6.264 (df = 12), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
Table 7.42: Cross-tabulation of Company Structure and
Sales per Employee for 1993.
1993 Sales per 
Employee (£m)
Non UK 
Public
State
Owned
UK Private 
Owned
Non UK 
Private
Row
Total
%
Total
0 < 0.4 0 1 0 0 1 5.5
0.41 < .07 0 1 0 0 1 5.5
.071 < .08 0 1 1 0 2 11.1
.081 < .09 0 0 1 1 2 11.1
.091 <.11 0 0 0 3 3 16.5
.111 <.12 0 0 1 0 1 5.5
.121 <.15 1 3 1 0 5 28.0
.15 + 1 0 1 1 3 16.5
Column Total 2 6 5 5 18
% 11.1 33.6 28.0 28.0 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
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X2 = 12.375 (df = 9), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
Table 7.43: Cross-tabulation of Company Structure and
Sales per Pound Asset in 1993.
1993 Sales per£ 
Assets (£m)
Non UK 
Public
State
Owned
UK Private 
Owned
Non UK 
Private
Row
Total
%
Total
0<1.00 0 1 0 0 1 7.1
1.1 <2.0 1 3 0 1 5 35.7
2.51 < 5.0 0 1 2 1 4 28.6
5.1 <7.0 0 0 1 0 1 7.1
7.1 < 9.0 0 1 1 0 2 14.3
9.0 + 0 0 1 0 1 7.1
Column Total 1 6 5 2 14
% 7.1 43.0 35.7 14.3 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
X2 = 9.178 (df = 12), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
3. Conclusion: Only one airline declared a loss in 1988 whilst all the wholly/partially 
owned State carriers showed a profit. The situation changed in 1993; more than half 
of the airlines made a loss which included all the State-owned carriers.
4. Comment: In 1988 State-owned airlines performed better than others. This is not 
surprising given that the bilateral legislation provided them with monopoly or duopoly 
status on the most profitable routes. These airlines were protected from competition; 
however, the EC liberalisation process (starting in December 1987) allowed for the 
first time competitors with low-cost structures to enter into the market, and operate on 
any route of their choice thus forcing the incumbents to compete with cut-price 
competitors in order to retain their market share.
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7.20.4 Company Activity and Its Influence
1. The Statistics: Table 7.44 shows the main activities in which respondents are 
engaged. The greatest percentage of respondents (38.1%) operated on intra- 
European Community routes. The surprising aspect is the comparatively small 
number of carriers operating purely domestic services.
Table 7.44: Main Activities Of Respondents
Main Activity Frequency Percentage of Respondent 
Total
Long Haul International 6 28.8
Intra-European Community 8 38.4
Other European Services 2 9.6
Domestic Services 2 9.6
Interlining traffic 1 4.8
Other 2 9.6
Total 21 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: The major issue to be considered is: Do the types of activities in which 
a company engage influence its competitiveness?
Tables 7.45, 7.46, and 7.47, provide cross-tabulations of Company Activities and 
Percentage Net Profit Before Tax in 1988, Sales per Employee in 1988 and Sales Per 
Pound of Assets in 1988.
In order to compare changes that have occurred after the implementation of 
liberalisation, similar Tables are presented for 1993. Thus Tables 7.48a,7.48b 7.49, 
and 7.50, provide cross-tabulations of Company Activities and Percentage Net 
Profit/Losses Before Tax in 1993, Sales per Employee in 1993 and Sales Per Pound 
of Assets in 1993.
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Table 7.45: Cross-tabulation of Main Activities of Respondents 
and Net profit (£m) Before Tax 1988
Net Profit 
£m 1988
Long Haul 
International
Intra
EC
Other
European
Other Row
Total
%
Total
1 <7 0 3 0 0 3 33.3
7 < 10 1 0 0 0 1 11.1
10 <23 1 0 0 0 1 11.1
23 <32 0 0 0 1 1 11.1
43< 116 1 0 0 1 2 22.2
116 + 1 0 0 0 1 11.1
Column Total 4 3 0 2 9
% Total 44.4 33.3 0 22.2 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
%2 = 13.5 (df = 8), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
Table 7.46: Cross-tabulation of Company Activities and 
Sales per Employee in 1988.
1988 Sales 
per Employee 
(£m)
Long Haul 
International Intra-EC
Other
Europe
Other Row
Total
Row
%
0 < .4 0 1 1 0 2 14.3
0.41 < .07 2 0 0 0 2 14.3
.071 < .08 1 2 0 1 4 28.6
.081 < .09 1 1 0 0 2 14.3
.091 <.11 0 1 0 0 1 7.1
.111 <.12 0 0 0 1 1 7.1
.121 <.15 1 0 0 0 1 7.1
.15 + 0 1 0 0 1 7.1
Column Total 5 6 1 2 14
% 35.7 42.9 7.1 14.3 100
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
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%2 = 12.639 (df = 12), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association 
between the variables.
Table 7.47: Cross-tabulation of Company Activities and
Sales Per Pound of Assets in 1988.
1988 Sales per 
£ Assets 
(£m)
Long
Haul
Inter.
Intra-
Europe
Comm.
Other
Europe
Other Row
Total
%
0<1.00 2 0 1 0 3 27.6
1.1 <2.0 2 1 0 2 5 46.0
2.1 < 2.50 0 2 0 0 2 18.4
2.51 < .5.30 0 1 0 0 1 9.2
Column Total 4 4. 1 2 11
% 36.8 36.8 9.2 18.4 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
X2 = 11.733 (df = 9), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
Table 7.48a: Cross-tabulation of Companies Activities 
and Net Profit (£m) Before Tax in 1993.
Net Profit 
£m 1993
Long Haul 
International
intra EC Other
Europe
Other Row Total %
Total
1 <7 1 0 0 0 1 16.7
7<  10 0 3 0 0 3 50.1
10 <23 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 <32 0 0 0 0 0 0
43< 116 0 0 0 1 0 16.7
166 + 0 1 0 0 1 16.7
Column Total 1 4 0 1 5
% Total 16.7 16.7 0 16.7 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
X2 = 12.00 (df = 9), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
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Table 7.48b: Cross-tabulation of Companies Activities and Loss (£m) in 1993.
Net Loss £m 
1993
Long Haul 
International
Intra
EC
Other
Europe
Domes­
tic
Other Row
Total
%
Total
1 <7 2 2 0 0 0 4 36.4
7 < 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 <23 0 0 0 1 0 1 9.1
23 <32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
43 < 116 0 0 0 0 1 1 9.1
166 + 3 1 1 0 0 5 45.5
Column Total 5 3 1 1 1 11
% Total 45.5 27.3 9.1 9.1 9.1 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
X2 = 23.76 (df = 12), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association between 
the variables.
Table 7.49: Cross-tabulation of Company Activities
and Sales per Employee in 1993.
1993 Sales per 
Employee (£m)
Long Haul 
International
Intra
EC
Other
Europe
Dome­
stic
Other Row
Total
%
0 < .4 0 0 1 0 0 1 5.9
0.41 < .07 0 1 0 0 0 1 5.9
.071 < .08 1 1 0 0 0 2 11.8
.081 < .09 0 1 0 1 0 2 11.8
.091 <.11 0 1 0 0 0 1 5.9
.111 <.12 1 0 0 0 0 1 5.9
.121 <.15 3 2 0 0 1 6 35.3
.15 + 0 1 1 0 1 3 16.7
Column Total 5 7 2 1 2 17
% 29.4 41.2 11.8 5.9 11.8 100
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
X2 = 17.623 (df = 16), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association 
between the variables.
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Table 7.50 : Cross-tabulation of Company Activities and
Sales Per Pound of Assets in 1993.
1993 Sales per 
£ Assets 
(£m)
Long
Haul
Inter.
Intra
EC
Other
Europe
Domestic Other Row
Total
%
0<1.00 0 1 0 0 0 1 7.7
1.1 <2.0 1 0 1 0 2 4 30.8
2.51 < 5.0 1 3 0 0 0 4 30.8
5.1 <7.0 0 1 0 0 0 1 7.7
7.1 < 9.0 1 0 0 1 0 2 15.4
9.0 + 0 0 1 0 0 1 7.7
Column Total 3 5 2 1 2 13
% 23.1 38.5 15.4 7.7 15.4 100
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
%2 = 16.286 (df = 16), no significance at the 0.05 level. There is no association 
between the variables.
3. Comment and Conclusion: As expected, those airlines which operated on Long - 
Haul International and Intra-European routes were superior for all three measures for 
1988.
The 1993 data shows that these two activities were also superior for two of the 
measures of competitiveness i.e. Sales per Employee and Sales per Pound of Assets 
but not so for Profits.
This can be explained by the fact that although the market was recovering from 
recession and the long term effects of the Gulf conflict increased competition made it 
hard to earn profits.
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7.20.5 Companies’ Fare Types and Their Influence
1. The Statistics: Table 7.51 shows how respondents' sales were split according to 
Fare Types in 1988 and in order to make a comparison before and after liberalisation 
Table 7.52 shows how respondents' sales were split according to Fare Types in 
1993. Table 7.53 shows the Best New Fare Types that respondents have introduced 
since 1988.
Table 7.51: Percentage of Sales for Each Fare Type 1988 (Mean)
Fare Type Mean
First Class 12.75
Business Class 28.22
Full Fare Economy 37.08
Discounted Economy 36.64
Block Bookings 35.57
Other 1 41.67
Other 2 11.00
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.52: Percentage of Sales for Each Fare Type 1993 (Mean)
Fare Type Mean
First Class 9.25
Business Class 22.60
Full Fare Economy 29.94
Discounted Economy 42.20
Block Bookings 24.71
Other 1 27.00
Other 2 18.00
(Source: Field Studies)
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Table 7.53: Best New Fare Since 1988
Fare Type Frequency Percentage
Mid Class 1 4.8
Business Class 1 4.8 !
Single Class Fare 1 9.5
Economy Fare 1 4.8
Deeply Discounted Fare 8 38.1
Cruise Charter 1 4.8
No New Fare Type 8 38.1
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.53 shows that the ‘Deeply Discounted’ fare scored the highest frequencies of 
those airlines which did introduce a new fare type. European Community airlines were 
not in a position to offer such fares before 1988 and the fact they subsequently did so 
in such large numbers is in itself an indication of increased competition.
2. The Issue: The issues here are:
1. Does fare type specialisation improve competitiveness?
2. Has this changed post liberalisation?
This was measured by finding the degree of correlation between the extent to which 
airlines specialised in a fare type and its effect upon the measures of competitiveness. 
The results for 1988 and 1993 are as follows.
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Table 7.54: Pearson Correlation Coefficients b e t w e e n  the Degree of Fare Type 
Specialisation (% Sales in one fare type category) a n d  Sales per Employee, 
Sales per Pound Assets and Net Profit before Tax for 1988.
Correlation Coefficient
Fare Type Sales per 
Employee
Sales per Pound of 
Assets
Net Profit Before 
Tax
First Class 0.22 -0.87 -0.18
Business Class -0.48 -0.15 0.22
Full Fare Economy 0.29 -0.12 -0.25
Discount Fare -0.01 -0.23 -.01
Block Bookings -0.36 -0.35 1.0
Other 0.85 -0.70 1.0
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.55: Pearson Correlation Coefficients b e t e w e e n  the Degree of Fare Type 
Specialisation (% Sales in one fare type category) a n d  Sales per Employee, 
Sales per Pound Assets and Net Profit before Tax for 1993.
Correlation Coefficient
Fare Type Sales per 
Employee
Sales per Pound of 
Assets
Net Profit 
Before Tax
First Class -0.97 -0.14 *
Business Class -0.27 -0.58 *
Full Fare Economy 0.31 -0.51 0.01
Discounted Fare -0.02 -0.23 -0.45
Block Bookings -0.37 0.35 -0.50
Other 0.65 -0.89 1.00
* correlation cannot be calculated 
(Source: Field Studies)
3. Conclusion: As can be seen, the three measures of performance do not move 
synchronously. However, it is noteworthy that two fare types - full fare economy and 
‘other’ which includes deeply discounted fares and whole plane charter rates - 
performed well in terms of Sales per Employee in both years whilst ‘other’ yielded high 
profitability in 1993.
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7.20.6 New Geographical Markets
1. The Statistics: Table 7.56 shows the Best New Geographical Markets which 
respondents have entered since 1988.
Table 7.56: Best New Geographical Market in Terms
of Sales Growth since 1988.
New Geographical Market Frequency Percentage
UK 4 19.2
Ireland 2 9.5
East Europe 1 4.8
Caribbean 1 4.8
Beirut 1 4.8
USA 1 4.8
France 1 4.8
North Africa 1 4.8
Spain 1 4.8
No new geographical market 8 38.1
Total 21 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: The issue here is simply to determine if there is any trend in new 
geographical markets into which airlines are entering.
3. Conclusion: As can be seen nearly two-thirds of the respondents have entered a 
new market since the onset of liberalisation.
4. Comment: It is striking that the UK and Ireland have provided so much scope for 
growth when, in the case of the UK particularly, these markets had already been 
liberalised to some extent before 1988.
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7.20.7 Conclusions on the Overall Structure of the Industry.
There is a considerable degree of variation in the European Community air transport 
industry along the axes of definition which were used above. Although it is difficult to 
draw conclusions on the basis of the evidence presented above, the following are 
worthy of note:
Year Trading Commenced:
Before liberalisation ‘traditional’ established airlines were most successful. Post 
liberalisation new competitors with low cost structures have had more success.
Company Structure/Ownership:
Again, it is clear that before liberalisation state owned carriers were the most 
successful. Post liberalisation, ‘Non UK Privately Owned’ airlines have had superior 
returns in terms of profit.
Company Activities and Fare Types:
‘Long Haul International’ and ‘Intra-European Community’ routes produced the best 
results by all three measures of competitiveness both in 1988 and 1993, except in 
terms of profitability in the latter year.
‘Full Fare Economy’ and ‘Deeply Discounted’ fares do most to boost company 
profitability but airlines also secure goods profits from ‘special offers’.
Best New Geographical Market:
It appears that in terms of sales growth the best new geographical market has been 
the United Kingdom.
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7.21 AN ANALYSIS OF THE SIZES OF THE COMPANIES AND THEIR 
FUNCTIONAL COMPOSITION.
This section provides summaries of, first, the size and, secondly, the functional 
composition of the airlines which were interviewed. In the analyses inferences on the 
effects of these influences were drawn.
7.21.1 Company Size
1. The Statistics: Table 7.57 to 7.58 show the average sizes of respondents' 
companies measured in units of Sales, Assets and Number of Employees for both 
1988 and 1993.
Table 7.57 : Company Size: Total Value of Sales in 1988 (£m) and 1993 (Mean)
Company Size Mean
Total Value of Sales in 1988 (£m) 3,278.53
Total Value of Sales in 1993 (£m) 4,779.44
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.58: Total Assets (£m) in 1988 and 1993 (Mean)
Total Assets (£m) Mean
1988 6,477.25
1993 6,428.60
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.59: Total Labour Force in 1988 and 1993 (Mean)
Total No. Employees Mean
1988 7291.75
1993 7345.83
(Source: Field Studies)
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2. The Issue: There is no competitiveness issue here. The objective of this part of 
the analysis is simply to obtain an impression of the size of the airlines surveyed in 
this study.
3. Conclusion: There is enormous variation in company size on all measures and 
this would seem to suggest that strategies aimed at improving the competitiveness of 
the industry must take proper cognisance of this variety, indicating that it is likely that 
the strategic group to which an airline belongs may have important consequences.
7.21.2 Functional Composition 
The Labour Force
1. The Statistics: Table 7,60 shows the breakdown of respondents' labour force 
under the headings of Flight Deck, Cabin Crew, Marketing and Sales, Engineering 
and Maintenance and Management.
Table 7.60: The Breakdown of Labour Force (Mean)
Labour Force in 1993 Mean
Flight Deck 586.00
Cabin Crew 1393.00
Sales and Marketing 2379.14
Engineering and Maintenance 1945.56
Management 65.75
Other 2074.57
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: There was no issue of competitiveness here. This table was included 
simply to identify the breakdown by category of the respondents' labour force.
3. Comment: What is perhaps most significant is the relatively large number of 
personnel who are engaged in Marketing and Selling, but perhaps this was only to be 
expected given the dependence of this industry on selling ‘perishable products’.
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7.21.3 Finance: Profit/Loss
Table 7.61 shows the average Net Profit Before Tax and Losses which companies 
had in 1988 and 1993.
Table 7.61: Average Net Profit (£m) in 1988 and 1993
(Mean and Standard Deviation)
Mean Standard Deviation
1988 211.22 547.46
1993 94.00 *
* coefficient cannot be computed 
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.62: Average Company Losses (£m) in 1988 and 1993
(Mean and Standard Deviation)
Mean Standard Deviation
1988 8.00 223.79
1993 104.36 116.96
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Has liberalisation has an impact on the profit levels of airlines?
3. Conclusion: Although there are of course very many factors determining airline 
profitability, what is striking about these results is how greatly the airlines' position 
deteriorated between 1988 and 1993. The average profits of airlines in the black were 
more than halved whilst loss-makers saw their loss increase thirteenfold.
4. Comment: On the basis of these figures, increased competition following 
liberalisation would seem to have had a very marked impact on airline profitability. Of 
the thirteen respondents operating profitably in 1988, eleven (84%) made a loss in 
1993; five of the six State-owned respondents were loss-making in the latter year.
305
Chapter 7 - Research Findings
7.21.4 Fleet Size
(1) The Statistics: Table 7.63 shows the breakdown in fleet size for 1988.
Table 7.63: Fleet Breakdown In 1988
Aircraft Type Mean
400+ 5.00
300-399 6.17
299-300 17.00
200-299 27.90
100-199 4.33
50-99 7.50
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.64: Fleet Breakdown in 1993
Aircraft Type Mean
400+ 6.33
300-399 9.80
299-300 22.33
200-299 34.23
100-199 12.17
50-99 10.40
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: The issue is: Does the breakdown of fleet that a company has 
influence its competitiveness?
Table 7.65 shows the correlation between assets and the measures of 
competitiveness.
306
Chapter 7 - Research Findings
Table 7.65: Spearman’s Ranked Correlation Coefficients b e t w e e n  the
Influence of Assets Type a n d  Sales per Employee, Sales 
per Pound of Assets and Net Profit before Tax 1988.
Correlation Coefficient
Fleet Size Sales per 
Employee
Sales per Pound of 
Assets
Net Profit 
Before Tax
400+ -1.00 -1.00 1.00
300-399 -0.75 0.13 0.69
299-300 -0.22 -0.13 -0.05
200-299 -0.26 -0.46 -0.31
100-199 0.27 -1.00
50-99 - - -
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.66: Spearman’s Ranked Correlation Coefficients b e t w e e n  the
Influence of Assets Type a n d  Sales per Employee, Sales 
per Pound of Assets and Net Profit before Tax 1993.
___________  Correlation Coefficient
Fleet Size Sales per 
Employee
Sales per Pound of 
Assets
Net Profit 
Before Tax
400+ -0.63 -0.81 0.50
300-399 -0.66 0.37 0.58
299-300 -0.51 0.10 0.26
200-299 -0.10 -0.18 -0.13
100-199 0.32 -0.05 0.77
50-99 - - -
(Source: Field Studies)
3. Conclusion: The tables show a fair degree of consistency in performance in 1993 
as compared with 1988. It is particularly striking that the only aircraft type to score 
positively in terms of Sales per Employee was the 100-199 seater, whilst the best 
performers in terms of Net Profit before Tax were aircraft with over 300 seats. This 
suggests that specialisation on long-haul routes and short point-to-point or feeder 
services is likely to prove a successful strategy.
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7.21.5 Conclusions on the Sizes of Companies and their Functional Position
The research has revealed an industry which is decidedly heterogeneous in the size 
of its companies and there is also considerable heterogeneity in their functional 
compositions.
Labour Force: It is not surprising that the biggest category in the labour force is 
Sales and Marketing given the dependence of this industry on the sales of a 
‘perishable product’.
Finance: It is significant that the industry profits have decreased significantly since 
1988 and the losses have increased dramatically.
Aircraft Fleet Size: The most profitable size aircraft to operate are those with seats of 
400+ or those with seating capacity of between 100 and 199. The most efficient 
aircraft in terms of Sales per Employee are the 100-199 seaters.
7.22 SECTION B: THE STRATEGIES FOLLOWED BY AIRLINES.
7.22.1 The Theoretical Background
The objective of this section is to establish the fundamental strategies that airlines in 
the industry believe they pursue and then to assess the level of competitiveness 
achieved through their adoption of particular generic strategies. Given the application 
of Porter's model of competitive strategy to the air transport sector in Chapter 5, 
strategies were classified into a limited number of broad types using Porter's (1985) 
categorisation of:
• Overall Cost Leadership/High Volume;
Strategies which rely upon price a s  the primary competitive weapon
• Differentiation; and
• Focus.
Strategies which rely upon another weapon such a s  quality.
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This particular categorisation was chosen because:
1. There have been extensive empirical investigations (see Dess & Cavis, 
1984, pp. 467-488; Hall, 1980, pp 75-85; Hamrick, 1986, pp. 213 -230; 
Miller & Friesen, 1986, pp. 37-55, and Karnani, 1976, pp. 63-75) into the 
validity of this method of categorisation and into the circumstances where 
the adoption of such strategies leads to success.
2. There appears to be evidence from PIMS studies (Schoeffler, 1980) that 
those firms which strongly pursue one of the above generic strategies tend 
to generate superior returns on investment.
7.23 THE GENERIC STRATEGIES FOLLOWED BY COMPANIES
7.23.1 Pricing Strategies
1. The Statistics: Table 7.67 and 7.68 show that a significant majority of airlines set 
the prices for their services at levels which are average for the industry or lower than 
average.
Table 7.67: Airline Prices Relative to Competitors
Prices Relative to Competitors Frequency Percentage
Low Price 6 28.6
Average Price 10 47.6
High Price 1 4.8
Other 4 19.0
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
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Table 7.68: Airline Prices for Biggest Selling Fare Type Relative to Competitors.
Rating Of Airline Price Relative to Competitors Frequency Percentage
Very much higher
Slightly higher 8 38.1
About the same 9 42.9
Slightly lower 3 14.3
Very much lower 1 4.8
Total 21 100*
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
The statistics would appear to indicate that most airlines believe that price has a 
significant bearing on users' choice of carrier.
2. The Issue: Does the pricing strategy followed by an airline influence its 
competitiveness? This issue is addressed in Table 7.69 which shows how airlines' 
perceptions about their prices correlated with the measures of competitiveness.
Table 7.69 Spearman’s Ranked Correlation Coefficients b e t w e e n  
Respondents' Perceptions of Their Prices Relative to 
Competitors a n d  Sales per Employee, Sales per 
Pound Assets and Net Profit before Tax for 1988 and 1993.
___________________________   Correlation Coefficient
Relative Price Sales per Employee Sales per Pound of Assets Net Profit 
Before Tax
1988 -0.25 -0.27 -0.37
1993 -0.24 -0.29 - 0.00
(Source: Field Studies)
3. Conclusion: There appears to be no strong relationship between the measures of 
competitiveness and pricing perceptions. Thus, it appears that as price declines profit 
and performance increase. It appears that low prices confer competitive advantage,
i.e. as price declines profits and performance increase.
4. Comment: There is no conclusive evidence as to what is an optimal pricing 
strategy.
310
Chapter 7 - Research Findings
7.23.2 Why Customers Buy Air Services
1. The Statistics: Table 7.70 shows respondents' perceptions as to the factors 
determining why customers buy airlines services ranked in order of importance.
Table 7: 70: Reasons Why Customers Buy Airline Services,
Ranked in Order of importance.
Reasons Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Frequency 8 5 2 1 1 1 - -
Brand Name 4 2 4 1 2 2 2 -
Service Delivery 1 5 3 5 3 2 1 -
Punctuality 0 6 3 3 1 2 2 -
Frequent Flier 
Programme
0 0 3 2 3 1 3 -
Advertising/
Marketing
0 0 2 4 4 4 1 -
Low Price 5 1 2 2 2 3 2 1
Other 4 2 1 0 1 - -
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: What are the principal factors influencing a buyers' choice of airline?
3. Conclusion: The table shows the value which airlines attribute to frequency of 
service as a factor to determine customers' purchasing decisions, with thirteen 
respondents ranking it as the first or second most important reasons for choice. No 
other factor even achieved half this score.
4. Comment: Although ‘frequency’ is commonly held to be of prime importance to 
business flyers, it is surprising that punctuality - a related factor - is accorded a much 
lower importance. The disparity between the scores for brand name and 
advertising/marketing is also paradoxical. The ‘other’ category which received four 
first rankings and two second included:
• providing services from a regional airport;
• airline's reputation of safety;
• flag carrier status;
• special promotional offers (eg. two for the price of one); and
• serving a particular niche market.
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7.23.3 The Most Important Person Involved In Fare Setting
1. The Statistics: Table 7.71 shows the title of the manager who has major 
responsibility for setting prices.
Table 7.71:Title of individual(s) with Overall Responsibility for Setting Prices
Title Frequency Percentage
Chief Executive/Chairman/Managing Director 5 24
Head of Network 1 4.8
Commercial Director/Manager 9 43.2
Marketing manager/Director 4 19.2
Minister of Commerce 1 4.8
Product Manager 1 4.8
Total 21 100*
(Source: Field Studies)
* Sum of Total is more than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
As can been seen the person most frequently cited as having the ultimate 
responsibility for setting prices is the Commercial Manager/Director, it is interesting to 
note that in one case - a State-owned airline - the responsibility is not that of the 
airline personnel but of a government department indicating that governments have 
little regard for the competitiveness of State carriers.
2. The Issue: The issue was simply to ascertain who had major responsibility for 
setting prices.
3. Conclusion and Comment: This response appears to reflect a view which is 
common in many industries (see Koutsoyiannis, 1982, p.9): that price is the 
fundamental competitive weapon and that because of its importance decision making 
should rest with senior personnel having a direct responsibility for the company's 
financial results.
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7.23.4 How the Prices are Set
1. The Statistics: Table 7.72 shows how respondents set price.
Table 7.72: How Respondents Set Price
Ranked Values
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
What the market will bear 12 2 2 - 1 - -
IATA Tariff co-ordination 0 2 2 - 2 2 -
Target level of Profits 0 3 5 4 - - -
Gain Market Share 1 6 3 - 2 2 -
Contribution costing 0 3 1 4 1 - -
Combination of the above 6 1 2 - - - -
Other 2 - - 1 - 1 -
(Source: Field Studies)
This table shows that the predominant method of setting prices is ‘What the market 
will bear’ with a ‘Combination of the above ‘ in second place .
2. The Issue: Does the method employed for setting prices influence 
competitiveness?
Tables 7.73 and 7.74 show correlations which were found between the methods used 
to set price and the three measures of competitiveness for 1988 and 1993.
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Table 7.73 Spearman’s Ranked Correlation Coefficients b e t w e e n  
Ranked Method Used to Set Price a n d  Net Profit Before 
Tax, Sales per Employee and Sales per Employee for 1988.
Correlation Coefficient
Method Used to Set Price Net Profit 
Before Tax
Sales per 
Employee in 1988
Sales per 
Pound of 
Assets
What the market will bear 0.29 -0.22 0.85*
IATA tariff co- ordination 0.33 -0.71 0.70
Target level of profit -0.53 0.76 0.78
Gain market share 0.61 0.14 0.05
Contribution costing 0.25 0.61 -0.56
Combination of above -0.19 0.57 -0.26
Other 0.92 -0.98 ★
* coefficient cannot be correlated 
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.74 Spearman’s Ranked Correlation Coefficients b e t w e e n  
Ranked Method Used to Set Price a n d  Net Profit Before 
Tax, Sales per Employee and Sales per Employee for 1993
Method Used to Set Price Net Profit Before 
Tax
Sales per 
Employee
Sales per Pound 
of Assets
What the market will bear 0.32 -0.19 -0.26
IATA tariff co- ordination 0.35 -0.12 0.94
Target level of profit -0.42 0.56 -0.44
Gain market share 0.54 0.37 -1.00
Contribution costing 0.21 0.58 0.55
Combination of above -0.24 0.31 -0.50
Other 0.82 0.86 *
* coefficient cannot be correlated 
(Source: Field Studies)
314
Chapter 7 - Research Findings
3. Conclusion: From Table 7.73 it wiil be seen that whilst a majority of the 
correlations are positive, it is only in the case of Gain market share’ in 1988 and 
‘Combination costing’ in 1993 that this is true of all three measures of 
competitiveness.
4. Comment: Although no consistent pattern emerges from the above tables it is 
particularly striking that in both years those carriers which put a high emphasis on 
using ‘gain market share’ as a means to set prices scored best on Net Profit Before 
Tax.
7.23.5 Quality Strategies 1. - Quality Relative to Competitors
1. The Statistics: Table 7.75 shows that all but one respondent rated their own 
quality as equal or superior to that of their competitors.
Table 7.75 How Respondents Rate Their Quality Relative To Competitors.
Rating of Company Quality Relative to 
Competitors
Frequency Percentage
Very Much Higher 3 14.3
Slightly Higher 7 33.3
About the Same 10 47.6
Slightly Lower 1 4.8
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Do perceptions possessed by an airline regarding its quality influence 
its competitiveness?
Table 7.76 shows how airlines' perceptions about their quality correlated with the 
measures of competitiveness.
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Table 7.76 Spearman’s Ranked Correlation Coefficients b e t w e e n  
Respondents' Perceptions of Their Quality Relative to 
Competitors a n d  Sales per Employee, Sales per Pound 
Assets and Net Profit before Tax for 1988 and 1993.
Correlation Coefficient
Relative Quality Sales per Employee Sales per Pound of 
Assets
Net Profit 
Before Tax
1988 0.19 0.01 0.24
1993 0.15 -0.14 -0.51
(Source: Field Studies)
3. Conclusion: This Table shows that whilst the correlations between respondents' 
perceptions about their quality and the measures of competitiveness were all positive , 
if weak, in 1988, the situation had altered by 1993.0nce again suggesting that price 
rather differentiation may be the pricing leaver of competitiveness.
7.23.6 Quality Strategies H: Measuring and Ensuring Quality
1. The Statistics: As the issue of quality has received so much attention (see 
Schoeffler, 1980, Carroll, 1985 and Porter, 1980), an attempt was made to ascertain 
what airlines understood by quality. Table 7.77 shows the responses.
Table 7.77: How Respondents Measure Quality.
Method for Measuring Quality Frequency Percentage of 
Respondent Total
Premium Price 2 9.5
Feedback from sales staff 10 47.6
Feedback from customers 20 95.2
Statistical analysis 13 61.9
Internal Comparison with competing products 9 42.9
Other 3 14.3
Total 57* 271.4
* Total of responses is greater than 21 because many respondents indicted that they use more 
than one method for measuring quality. (Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: There is no competitiveness issue here, this information was included 
simply to show how airlines measure their quality of service.
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7.23.7 The Influence of Marketing
Commitment to marketing is often regarded as crucial to determine competitiveness, 
also commitment to marketing is often regarded as a means of product differentiation 
(Porter, 1980).
1. The Statistics: Table 7.78 to 7.79 show the manpower commitment to marketing 
that respondents have and how this trend has changed since liberalisation.
Table 7.78: Numbers of Respondents with a Sales Department in 1993
Have a Marketing/Sales Dept. Frequency
Yes 20
No 1
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Has the size of sales/marketing departments changed in size since 
liberalisation?
Table 7.79: Size of Marketing/Sales Department (Mean) in 1988.
Mean
No. of Staff Employed in Marketing/Sales 
Dept. 1988
1494.50
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.80: Size of Marketing/Sales Department (Mean) in 1993.
Mean
No. of Staff Employed in Marketing/Sales 
Dept. 1993
1099.88
(Source: Field Studies)
317
Chapter 7 - Research Findings
3. Conclusion: Table 7.78 shows that 95 per cent of respondents had a 
Marketing/Sales Department in 1993. However, it is clear from Tables 7.79 and 7.80 
that the average numbers employed in this activity actually fell between 1988 and 
1993.
4. Comment: Given the importance of marketing in the air transport industry, it is 
highly surprising that the strength of marketing departments was on average reduced 
over the period. The explanation is no doubt that the reduction was a result of 
companies' perceived needs in a more competitive environment, to save on labour 
costs. Whilst this is perhaps, the easiest area to make immediate savings, the long­
term effects can only be harmful to the development of the business.
7.23.8 Methods of Following Market Trends
Pilot investigations revealed that many airlines believed that sensitivity to market 
trends was a vital requirement for success in this industry.
1. The Statistics: Table 7.81 shows how airlines followed market trends.
Table 7.81: How Respondents Follow Market Trends.
Method for Following Market Trends Frequency Percentage of 
Respondent Total
Feedback form sales/marketing staff 18 86.4
General Media Coverage 13 62.4
Trade Publications 16 76.8
Personal Contact with Bulk Buyers 9 43.2
Other 6 28.8
Total 62*
* Sum of responses is greater than 21 because many respondents indicated that they use more 
than one method for following market trends. (Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: No attempt has been made to determine the effect of different ‘mixes’ 
on competitiveness. Rather the intention was to show the diversity of methods used 
by airlines to assess market trends.
318
Chapter 7 - Research Findings
7.23.9 Types of Promotion Employed
There is considerabie evidence to show (see Schoeffler, 1980 and Bluell, 1985) that 
promotion can be instrumental in determining the success of products and 
companies. This section attempts to gauge this influence on the airline industry in the 
European Community.
1. The Statistics: Table 7.82 shows the rankings that respondents gave to the 
different types of promotion employed.
Table 7.82 Types of Promotion Employed by Respondents 
(Frequencies of Ranked Values)
Ranked Values
Rank 1 2 3 4 Not Ranked
Sales Staff 8 5 8 - 0
Advertising 5 10 3 2 1
Special Customer 
Promotions
7 5 8 - 1
Other 1 1 - 2 17
(Source: Field Studies)
(2) The Issue: Does commitment to a particular type of promotion influence 
competitiveness? Table 7.83 shows the degree of correlation between each method 
of promotion employed and the measures of competitiveness.
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Table 7.83 Spearman’s Ranked Correlation Coefficients b e t w e e n  
Ranked Promotion Types Employed a n d  Sales per 
Employee, Sales per Pound Assets and Net Profit before 
Tax (£m) for 1993.
Correlation Coefficient
Promotion Types 
Employed
Sales per Employee Sales per Pound of 
Assets
Net Profit 
Before Tax
Sales staff 0.28 -0.25 -0.28
Advertising -0.06 -0.11 0.24
Special Customer 
Promotions
-0.30 0.38 0.062
Other 0.60 0.23 *
* coefficient cannot be computed 
(Source: Field Studies)
(3) Conclusion: Table 7.82 shows that there are widely differing views amongst 
respondents as to the most effective means of promotion. It is hardly surprising 
therefore that the figures in Table 7.83 do not allow one to draw any very firm 
conclusions. Attention should, however, be drawn to the positive correlations between 
‘Advertising’ ‘Special Customer Promotions’ and the measures Sales per Pound of 
Assets and Net Profit Before Tax, which do suggest that these do have a moderately 
strong influence on competitiveness.
7.23.10 Methods of Distribution Employed
As in the case of promotion there is considerable evidence (Schoeffier, 1980 and 
Bluell, 1985) to show that commitment to distribution can have a considerable 
influence on competitiveness. This section attempts to assess this influence.
1. The Statistics: Table 7.84 shows the rankings that respondents gave to different 
types of distribution employed.
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Table 7.84: Types of Distribution Employed by Respondents
(Frequencies of Ranked Values)
Ftanked Values
Method of Distribution 1 2 3 4
Travel Agent 15 4 0 0
Tour Operator 6 5 5 0
Direct Sales to Public 0 7 5 0
Telephone Sales 0 5 8 1
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Does commitment to a particular type of distribution effect 
competitiveness?
Table 7.85 shows the degree of correlation between each method of distribution 
employed and the measures of competitiveness for 1993.
Table 7.85: Spearman’s Ranked Correlation Coefficients b e t w e e n
Ranked Distribution Types a n d  Sales per Employee, Sales 
per Pound Assets and Net Profit (£m) before Tax for 1993.
Correlation Coefficient
Methods of Distribution Sales per 
Employee
Sales per Pound 
of Assets
Net Profit Before
Tax
Travel Agent -0.11 0.59
Tour Operator 0.28 -0.30 0.31
Direct Sales to Public -0.25 -0.07 0.37
Telephone Sales 0.36 0.58 -0.86
(Source: Field Studies)
3. Conclusion: Table 7.84 shows the overwhelming dependence of respondents on 
sales through travel agents. Not surprisingly, as indicated by Table 7.85, this results in 
a negative measure of effectiveness as regards Sales per Employee - the airlines 
being compelled to deal with many small agents as well as the multiples - but a 
strong positive correlation between Travel Agents’ and the measure Sales per Pound 
of Assets. Conversely there are positive correlations between the methods Tour 
Operators’ and ‘Direct Sales to the Public’ and the measure Sales per Employee.
4. Comment: Use of direct sales to the public and tour operators as methods of 
distribution increase profitability.
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7.24 CONCLUSIONS ON THE STRATEGIES FOLLOWED BY AIRLINES
The issue of pricing and quality strategies is a fundamental one for the industry. 
Although the results of this survey are not sufficiently clear to make unequivocal 
recommendations, there are a number of strategy characteristics which typify the 
most competitive airlines. In summary these are:
Pricing Strategy: Airlines which operate low price strategies are more competitive 
than others.
Pricing Methods: Airlines which put a high emphasis on ‘gaining market share’ score 
best on Net Profit Before Tax.
Commitment to Marketing: One of the most striking findings, given the importance 
of filling aircraft seats was that (on average) respondents reduced the size of their 
marketing departments between 1988 and 1993.
Customer Choice: Customer choice is strongly influenced by frequency and low 
price.
Promotions Employed: Advertising and using special customer promotions 
increases profitability and increases sales.
Distribution: ‘Direct Sales to the Public’ and use of Tour Operators’ as methods of 
distribution increase profitability. Use of ‘Telephone Sales’ and ‘Travel Agents’ boosts 
sales. ‘Telephones Sales’ and using Tour Operators’ are the most efficient ways to 
use staff. No one method of distribution was superior in all three measures of 
competitiveness.
This section has emphasised the importance which respondents attach to setting 
prices: it is a major strategic decision taken by top management. However, this study 
has also revealed the importance of using other complementary instruments i.e. it 
shows that pricing strategies are likely to be most effective when they are part of a 
broader marketing strategy which incorporates decisions on promotion, advertising, 
distribution frequencies and quality of service.
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7.25 SECTION C: AIRLINES’ RELATIONSHIPS WITH BUYERS
7.25.1 The Theoretical Background
The objective here was to ascertain both the nature and the competitive 
consequences of the strategic relationships that exist between European Community 
airlines and the buyers of their services. The idea behind the analysis of these 
relationships is that, in general, the more powerful the industry's buyers are to the 
airlines, as a consequence the greater will be their ability to impose iow prices and/or 
quality improvements. Additionally it was hoped that this analysis would reveal the 
economic effects which different types of relationships have on different buyer groups. 
It should be noted that in this section just one measure of competitiveness was used: 
Net Profit Before Tax in 1993. This was because it was felt that the relationships 
between airlines and their buyers would be essentially financial in nature and this 
measure would therefore be the most appropriate.
7.26 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND ITS BUYERS
7.26.1 Buyer Groups and Their Influence
1. The Statistics: Table 7.86 shows the main buyer groups (based on value of sales) 
which respondents serve.
Table 7.86: Main Buyer Groups
Nature of Buyer Frequency Percentage
Individual Consumer 1 4.8
Travel Agent 11 52.4
Tour Operator 6 28.6
Corporate Buyer 1 4.8
No Response 2 9.5
Total 21 100*
* Sum is greater than 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
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2. The Issue: There was no competitiveness issue here, the table is included in order 
to highlight the nature of the buyers in this industry in the European Community.
3. Conclusion: More than half of the respondents identified the Travel Agent’ as a 
main buyer of their services.
7.26.2 The Influence of the Number of Buyers
1. The Statistics: Table 7.87 shows the number of major buyers respondents had, 
where a major buyer is defined as one who takes five per cent of more of the airlines' 
services.
Table 7.87: Number of Major Buyers (Those Taking More than 5% or
More of Respondents Services) (Mean)
Mean
Number of Large Buyers 8.44
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Does the number of major buyers that an airline has influence its 
competitiveness?
Table 7.88 shows the Correlation that was found between the number of major buyers 
which respondents had and Net Profit Before Tax in 1993.
Table 7. 88: Pearson Correlation Coefficient b e t w e e n  Number of Major
Buyers a n d  Net Profit Before Tax 1993.
Correlation, Coefficient
Net Profit Before Tax (£m)
Number of Major Buyers 0.27
(Source: Field Studies)
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3. Conclusion: The correlation between the measure of competitiveness Net Profit 
Before Tax and the number of major buyers is positive but not strongly so. This would 
seem to indicate that it pays airlines to have more rather than fewer major buyers and 
it also seems to indicate that when an airline becomes locked in’ to just a small 
number of buyers, these buyers may be powerful enough to extract superior terms, 
(for themselves), with a consequent adverse effect upon the competitiveness of the 
airline.
4. Comment: This result was expected: a fundamental determinant of buyer power is 
the proportion of an airline's output purchased by a buyer: generally the greater 
proportion purchased, the greater the relative power of the buyer.
7.26.3 The Influence of a Single Large Buyer
1. The Statistics: Table 7.89 shows the percentage of respondents' sales which 
went to their largest buyer.
Table 7.89: Percentage of Sales Going to Largest Buyer (Mean)
Mean
Percentage of Sales going to Major Buyer 46.26
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: This issue is similar to the last one: if an airline sells a large proportion 
of its output to just one buyer does this affect competitiveness?
Table 7.90 shows the correlation between the percentage of sales to the single 
largest buyer and the measure of competitiveness Net Profit Before Tax.
Table 7.90: Pearson Correlation Coefficient b e t w e e n  Percentage of
Sales Going to Largest Buyer a n d  Net Profit Before Tax 
(£m) 1993.
Correlation Coefficient
Net Profit Before Tax (£m)
Percentage of Sales going to Large Buyer -0.47
(Source: Field Studies)
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3. Conclusion: The correlation is negative, but not strongly so. This finding appears 
to confirm what was found in Table 7.88 above: namely that those airlines which are 
most strongly linked to single buyer score lowest on the Net Profit Before Tax 
measure.
4. Comment: Airlines which have a small number of large buyers may be 
disadvantaged in relation to competitors who have a larger portfolio of buyers and it 
may be worth their while considering how to broaden their portfolio of buyers. Also, 
those airline which are considering a strategy of differentiation through concentrating 
on selling to a small number of buyers should adopt this strategy only after the most 
rigorous analysis of the competitive implications of the consequent buyer power that 
will ensue.
7.26.4 The influence of Buyers Having Alternative Suppliers
1. The Statistics: Table 7.91 shows the number of alternative airlines that 
respondents believed their largest buyer had for the services which they operated.
Table 7.91: Number of Alternative Airlines Which Respondents
Believe are Available to Largest Buyer
Number of Alternative Airlines Frequency Percentage
None 4 19.0
One 3 14.3
One and Less than Three 6 28.6
Three + 7 33.3
No Response 1 4.8
Total 21 100*
* Total is greater than 100 due to rounding up of figures.
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: If buyers have a large number of alternative airlines available to them 
does this influence their power over their current suppliers?
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Table 7.92 shows the correlation between Net Profit Before Tax and the number of 
alternative airlines available to buyers.
Table 7.92: Pearson Correlation Coefficient of Number b e t w e e n
Alternative Airliners Available to Largest Buyer a n d  Net 
Profit (£m) Before Tax 1993
Correlation Coefficient
Net Profit (£m) Before Tax 1993
Number of Alternative Airlines Available to 
Largest Buyer
0.47
(Source: Field Studies)
3. Conclusion: The correlation is positive for the measure Net Profit Before Tax 
indicating that when buyers have a number of alternative suppliers, it does not appear 
to have a negative effect on competitiveness.
4. Comment: This result is extremely surprising: it had been anticipated that when 
buyers had a number of alternative suppliers, their bargaining power would be such 
as to have an adverse effect upon airlines. There would seem to be two possible 
explanations for this. One is that even though buyers may have alternative suppliers 
available, they do not use them because they have built up strong relationships with 
the airlines concerned. This explanation would, however, seem unlikely, given that 
switching costs would be low if they decided to change suppliers. A more likely 
explanation would seem to be that the large buyers' place most of their business on 
busiest routes and that here, even if a number of suppliers are operating, there is not 
sufficient total capacity to make switching easy.
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7.26.5 The Influence of Buyer Information
1. The Statistics: Table 7.93 shows the types of information which respondents 
believe that buyers have about their operations.
Table 7.93: Types of Information Which Respondents Believe Buyers Possess
Buyers have information on Frequency Percentage of respondent total
Overall Demands for Service 12 57.1
Prevailing Prices 13 61.9
Your Profitability 5 23.8
Total 30*
* Sum is greater than 21 because many respondents believed buyers had information on more 
than one issue.
(Source: Field Studies)
7.26.6 The Influence of Sales Terms
1. The Statistics: Table 7.94 shows the sales terms most frequently used between 
respondents and buyers.
Table 7.94: Most Frequently Agreed Set of Sales Terms Between
Respondents and Buyers
Agreed Sets of Sales Terms Frequency Percentage
Payment in 7 days 1 4.8
One month's credit 5 23.8
Two month's credit 0 0
BSP 13 61.9
No Response 2 9.5
Total 21 100*
* Sum is greater then 100 due to rounding up of figures. 
(Source: Field Studies)
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2. The issue: There are two issues here: First, what are the most commonly agreed 
prevailing sales terms in the industry and secondly, what are the effects of the sales 
terms upon Net Profit Before Tax.
Table 7.95 shows a correlation between the speed of payment between respondents 
and their buyers with Net Profit Before Tax 1993.
Table 7.95: Pearson Correlation Coefficient b e t w e e n  The Speed of
Payment Between Respondents’ a n d  their Buyers with Net 
Profit Before Tax 1993
Correlation Coefficient
Net Profit Before Tax (£m) 1993
Speed of Payment Between Respondents and Buyers -0.34
(Source: Field Studies)
3. Conclusion: Table 7.94 shows that the most widely used method of payment is 
the BSP (Bank Settlement Plan) method operated by the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA). The correlation which is negative, appears to suggest that the 
disciplines which the this system imposes has an adverse effect on competitiveness.
7.27 CONCLUSIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE INDUSTRY 
AND ITS BUYERS
This study has shown that the nature of the linkages which develop between airlines 
and their buyer do influence competitiveness. In summary the main findings are:
Number of buyers: The greater the number of buyers that an airline has the better 
for the airline.
Number of Competitors Supplying Each Buyer: When buyers have a large number 
of alternative suppliers this does not appear to affect the competitiveness of the 
airlines.
329
Chapter 7 - Research Findings
Buyer Information: Buyers have most information on the overall demand for types of 
services and prevailing prices.
Sales Terms: BSP is the most frequently used sales terms, these do have a 
significant negative impact on the level of competitiveness that an airline enjoys.
It is clear from these findings that buyers have considerable information on airlines 
operations and have considerable freedom to switch suppliers, however, surprisingly 
this does not seem to have a negative impact on airlines competitiveness.
7.28 SECTION D: AIRLINES’ RELATIONSHIPS WITH SUPPLIERS
7.28.1 The Theoretical Background
The objective here was to ascertain both the nature and the competitive 
consequences of, the strategic relationships that obtain between the airlines in the 
European Community and the suppliers of services to them. The analysis aims to 
ascertain if the more powerful the industry's suppliers are relative to the airlines, the 
more will the airline profitability be adversely affected by their power to charge 
excessive prices, demand speedy payment, offer inferior quality and provide inferior 
service.
It should be noted that in this section just one measure of competitiveness was used: 
Net Profit Before Tax. This was because it was felt that the relationships between 
airlines in the European Community and their suppliers would be essentially financial 
in nature and this measure would therefore be most appropriate.
The analysis below investigates the relationship between the industry and its 
suppliers.
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7.29 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDUSTRY AND ITS SUPPLIERS
7.29.1 The Influence of Operating Costs
1. The Statistics: Table 7.96 shows the average breakdown of respondents' 
operational costs.
Table 7.96: Average Percentage of Respondent's Operational Costs
Operational Costs Average %
Fuel 10.15
Airport Landing Charges 9.15
CRS Systems 3.32
in-fiight Food 3.41
Advertising/Promotion 3.94
Other 33.0
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Does the proportion of operational costs that an airline has influence its 
competitiveness ?
The correlation between operational costs and the measure of competitiveness Net 
Profit Before Tax is shown in Table 7.97.
Table 7.97: Pearson Correlation Coefficient b e t w e e n  Respondents'
Operational Costs a n d  Net Profit Before Tax 1993
_____________________    Correlation Coefficient
Operational Costs Net Profit Before Tax
Fuel -0.40
Airport Landing Charges -0.69
CRS System 0.28
in-fiight Food 0.27
Advertising/Promotion -0.16
Other *
* coefficient cannot be correlated 
(Source: Field Studies)
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3. Conclusion: Table 7.96 shows that the single biggest component of respondents' 
operational costs is fuel, closely followed by airport landing charges, it should be 
noted, however, that ‘other’ unidentified costs, presumably predominately crew costs, 
made up a bigger share than these two combined.
4. Comment: Table 7.97 shows that fuel suppliers (who are in an oligopolistic 
position at airports) and the airports themselves (which except in the case of the 
largest centres, eg. London with its four airports are monopoly suppliers) are in a very 
strong position to affect airline competitiveness. Conversely, the positive correlation 
for CRS Systems (owned by airlines) and ln-flight Food (many airlines own their own 
catering suppliers) show that these relationships have a positive effect on 
competitiveness of the airlines concerned. This was to be expected.
7.29.2 The Influence of the Number of Suppliers
1. The Statistics: Table 7.98 shows the average number of operational suppliers 
that respondents had classified according to the six classes of suppliers.
Table 7.98: Average Number of Operational Suppliers
Service supplied Average Number of Suppliers
Fuel 13.47
Airport Landing Charges 29.53
CRS Systems 5.12
In-flight Food 11.19
Advertising/Promotion 7.60
Other 18.0
. coefficient cannot be computed 
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Does the number of suppliers that an airline has influence its 
competitiveness? Table 7.99 shows the correlation that was found between the 
number of suppliers which respondents had and Net Profit Before Tax.
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Table 7.99: Pearson Correlation Coefficient b e t w e e n  Respondents'
Number of Suppliers for Operational Services a n d  Net 
Profit Before Tax 1993
Number of Suppliers for Operational 
Services
Net Profit Before Tax
Fuel -0.23
Airport Landing Charges -0.22
CRS System -0.51
In-flight Food -0.29
Advertising/Promotion -0.24
Other *
* coefficient cannot be computed 
(Source: Field Studies)
3. Conclusion: Table 7.98 shows that respondents have a large number of suppliers 
for each of the categories identified. This is in part a function of the international 
nature of the business: for instance, the larger an airline's network, the larger will be 
the number of different airport charges it will pay. Table 7.98 shows that in those 
areas where an airline has greater control over its operation - CRS systems, 
advertising and promotion - the number of suppliers is less. Nevertheless, it is striking 
that in every identified category the power of the supplier has a negative effect on 
competitiveness.
7.29.3 The Influence of the Size of Fuel Suppliers
1. The Statistics: Table 7.100 shows the size of respondents, by turnover, in relation 
to their largest supplier of fuel.
Table 7.100: Turnover of Respondents Relative to Largest Fuel Supplier
Size of Turnover Frequency Percentage
Smaller 15 71.4
About the Same Size 3 14.3
Larger 2 9.5
Do not know 1 4.8
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
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2. The Issue: Does the size of an airline relative to the size of its largest fuel supplier 
have any competitive influence?
Table 7.101 shows the correlation between company size and the size of the main 
fuel supplier for the measure of competitiveness Net Profit Before Tax.
Table 7.101: Pearson Correlation Coefficient b e t w e e n  Company Size 
Relative to Respondents' Largest Supplier of Fuel a n d  Net 
Profit Before Tax 1993
Correlation Coefficient
Net Profit Before Tax
Company Size by Turnover Relative to 
Respondents' Largest Supplier of Fuel
-0.33
(Source: Field Studies)
3. Conclusion: The information given in Tables 7.100 and 7.101 serves only to 
confirm the conclusions drawn in the preceding section.
7.29.4 The Influence of Having Alternative Fuel Suppliers
1. The Statistics: Table 7.102 shows the number of alternative fuel suppliers that 
respondents believe they have.
Table 7.102: Number of Alternative Fuel Suppliers Available to Respondents
No. of Alternative Fuel 
Suppliers
Frequency Percentage %
None 3 14.3
1 4 19.0
2-4 10 47.6
5-9 4 19.0
No Response 1 4.8
Total 21 100*
* Sum is greater than 100 due to rounding up. 
(Source: Field Studies)
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Table 7.103: Number of Alternative In-flight Food Suppliers 
Available to Respondents
No. of Alternative in-flight Suppliers Frequency Percentage %
None 2 9.5
1 4 19.0
2-4 11 52.4
5-9 3 14.3
No Response 1 4.8
Total 21 100*
* Sum is greater than 100 due to rounding up. 
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.104: Number of Alternative CRS Suppliers Available to Respondents
No. of Alternative CRS Suppliers Frequency Percentage %
None 8 38.1
1 2 9.5
2-4 4 19.0
5-9 3 14.3
No Response 4 19.0
Total 21 100*
* Sum is greater than 100 due to rounding up.
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: If airlines have a relatively large number of suppliers available does this 
reduce supplier power and hence boost airlines' competitiveness?
Table 7.105 shows the correlation between the numbers of alternative suppliers and 
the measure of competitiveness Net Profit Before Tax.
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Table 7.105: Pearson Correlation Coefficient b e t w e e n  Number Of
Alternative Suppliers of Fuel Available To Respondents 
a n d  Net Profit Before Tax
Correlation Coefficient
Net Profit Before Tax
Number of Alternative Fuel Suppliers Available to 
Respondents
0.20
Number of Alternative In-flight Food Suppliers 
Available to Respondents
0.43
Number of Alternative CRS Available to 
Respondents
-0.27
(Source: Field Research)
3. Conclusion: Tables 7.102 to 7.104 show that it is comparatively rare for an airline 
to have a choice between more than four suppliers in the three principle categories of 
bought-in services. The correlations shown in Table 7.105 are, however, moderately 
positive in the case of fuel and in-flight catering supplies, indicating that in this industry 
that restricted choice of suppliers does not necessarily have an adverse effect on 
competitiveness. The reverse is the case for CRS supplies, a result which suggests 
that those airlines - a minority - which own or part-own a CRS system do have a 
significant advantage.
4. Comment: These results were unexpected. Theoretically, the fewer the number of 
alternative suppliers that airlines have, the greater would be their power. The answer 
to this apparent paradox may again lie in the international nature of the industry: 
whereas an individual airline may have a very restricted choice of suppliers at any one 
airport, at each airport there will be a large number of airlines relative to the number of 
suppliers of any particular service. Thus, the airlines collectively will be in a stronger 
position relative to those suppliers than they are individually.
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7.29.5 The Influence of the Criteria Applied in Selecting a Supplier and 
Airline/Supplier Relationships
(1) The Statistics: Table 7.106 shows the main criteria applied by respondents when 
selecting a supplier. Table 7.107 shows the types of information which respondents 
believe suppliers possess and Table 7.108 highlights the types of regular meetings 
which respondents have with their suppliers.
Table 7.106: Main Criteria Applied By Respondents In Selecting A Supplier
Main Criteria Frequency Percentage of Respondent Total
Price 21 100
Quality 18 85.7
Service/Delivery 20 95.2
Availability 13 61.9
Other 3 14.3
Total 75*
*Sum of responses is greater than 21 because many of the respondents indicated that they 
apply more than one criterion in selecting a supplier.
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.107 Types of Information Which Respondents Believe 
Suppliers Possess.
Suppliers have Information On: Frequency Percentage of Respondent Total
Overall Demand for Your types of 
Services
16 76.2
Prevailing Prices for Your Services 3 14.3
Your Costs 1 4.8
Your Profitability - -
Not Known 1 4.8
Totai 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
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Table 7.108: Types of Regular Formal Meeting Respondents 
Have With Suppliers.
Purpose Of Meeting Frequency Percentage of Respondent Total
Quality Standards 17 81.0
Service Levels 16 76.2
Pricing & Payments Policy 16 76.2
Other 3 14.3
No such meeting 3 9.5
Total 55*
*Sum of responses is greater than 21 because many of the respondents indicated that they had 
formal meeting with suppliers to discuss more than one issue.
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: What criteria do airlines adopt in choosing suppliers and what is the 
nature of their relationships with them?
3. Conclusion: The answers to these questions are as expected, although it is 
striking that in an industry for which much information is readily available, so few 
respondents believed their suppliers to know about their own prices and costs.
7.29.6 The Influence of Sales Terms
1. The Statistics: Table 7.109 shows the most frequently agreed sales terms 
between respondents and suppliers.
Table 7.109: Most Frequently Agreed Set Of Sales Terms 
Between Respondent and Supplier.
Most Frequently Agreed Set of Sales Terms Frequency Percentage
Payment in 7 Days 1.0 4.8
One Month's Credit 18.0 85.7
Two Month's Credit 1.0 4.8
Other 1.0 4.8
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
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2. The Issue: There are two issues here: first, what are the most commonly 
prevailing payment terms in the industry and secondly, what are the effects of the 
sales terms upon the measure of competitiveness Net Profit Before Tax ?
Table 7.110: Pearson Correlation Coefficient b e t w e e n  The Speed Of 
Payment Between Respondents and Their Suppliers a n d  
Net Profit Before Tax 1993
Correlation Coefficient
Net Profit Before Tax
Speed of Payment Between Respondents and 
Suppliers
0.008
{Source: Field Studies)
3. Conclusion: Table 7.110 shows that the correlation was mildly positive indicating 
that there is some benefit to be derived from stretching the payment period.
4. Conclusion: Most payments are made within the normal credit period (one month) 
that obtains in this industry. However, it seems to be the case that those respondents 
who have paid later have enjoyed some competitive advantage, although the 
relationship is not strong. It should be highlighted however, that the ‘payment of 
suppliers’ is a fundamental element in commercial relationships with them, and any 
stretching of the payment beyond the normal payment period may jeopardise other, 
and perhaps more important, commercial relationships.
7.30 CONCLUSIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AIR TRANSPORT 
INDUSTRY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS SUPPLIERS
The results of this section have shown that the relationships which evolve between 
airlines in the European Community and their suppliers do influence competitiveness. 
In summary these are:
Operational Costs: Suppliers of fuel and airport facilities - landing charges - strongly 
influence competitiveness of an airline.
Number of Suppliers: Having a large number of suppliers helps competitiveness.
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Size of Suppliers Relative to Airline: Using smaller suppliers has little influence on 
competitiveness.
Number of Alternative Suppliers: Having a choice of alternative suppliers improves 
competitiveness.
The Criteria to be Applied when Selecting a Supplier: All respondents base the 
selection of their suppliers on price and then on service/delivery.
Supplier Information: Meeting between airlines and their suppliers focus largely on 
quality standards, service levels and price.
Sales Terms: Most airlines pay their suppliers in one month or less. Results suggest 
that benefits are experiences by those airlines which are able to stretch the payment 
period with their suppliers.
7.31 SECTION E: AIRLINES’ KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EXISTING COMPETITORS
7.31.1 The Theoretical Background
Having, or developing, an effective competitive company in any industry requires 
developing a strong and profitable position which can be sustained against the 
changing matrix of competitive pressures exerted by the competition. A fundamental 
requirement is to have knowledge about the goals, strengths, weaknesses, 
capabilities, resources and strategies of existing competitors.
Thus an attempt is made in this section to obtain a broad picture of the nature of 
respondents' major competitors and to gauge the effects of particular competitor 
characteristics.
It is important to note that the information about respondents' competitors came from 
the respondents themselves and thus that all the results of this section are likely to 
contain an element of subjectivity.
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7.31.2 Respondents’ Strengths Relative to Major Competitors
(1) The Statistics: Table 7.111 shows the major strengths that respondents believe 
that they possess relative to their major competitors, whilst Table 7.112 shows what 
strengths they believe these competitors have relative to themselves.
Table 7.111: Respondent's Perceptions Of Company Strengths 
Relative to Major Competitors.
Ranked Frequency
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Closeness to 
Customer/market
6 4 1 5 1 1 1
Access to low cost finance 1 - - 1 1 - 1 - 2
Government support - 1 - - 1 1 - - -
Access to government 
financial help
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
High Quality Management 3 - 3 1 2 1 1 - -
High Quality Labour Force - 3 2 4 1 2 - - -
Lower Wage costs - 2 1 1 - - - 1 -
Higher Productivity 1 4 3 - 1 2 1 - -
Code Sharing Agreement 
with Larger Carrier
- 1 2 - 2 - - - -
Provider of Feeder 
Service
3 - - - - - - 2 1
Franchisee of airline in 
home country
2 ■ r 1 1 1 - - - -
Franchisee of airline in 
another country
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technical superiority 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 - -
Superior Marketing - - 2 2 1 - 2 3 -
Other 1 1 1 1 - - - - -
(Source: Field Studies)
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Table 7.112: Respondent's Perceptions Of Competitors 
Strengths Relative to Themselves.
Ranked Frequency
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Closeness to 
Customer/market
1 1 2 - 2 1 - -
Access to low cost finance 1 - 3 1 - - - 1
Government support 2 5 2 3 1 - - 1
Access to government 
financial help
2 2 2 - - 1 - - 1
High Quality Management 1 2 - - 3 - - - -
High Quality Labour Force - 2 1 2 - - - - -
Lower Wage costs 6 - 1 - - - - - -
Higher Productivity 1 - 5 1 - 1 1 - -
Code Sharing Agreement 
with Larger Carrier
1 1 - - - - 1 1 -
Provider of Feeder 
Service
- - - 1 - - - - -
Franchisee of airline in 
home country
- 2 - - - - - - -
Franchisee of airline in 
another country
1 1 - 1 - - - - -
Technical superiority - - - 1 1 - - - 1
Superior Marketing 5 2 2 1 - - - - -
Other - 1 - - - - 1 - -
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Do airlines feel themselves to be in a strong or weak position relative to 
their competitors?
3. Conclusion: Given the numbers of values and respondents it would be very 
surprising if any realistic conclusions across the board could be drawn from these 
tables.
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4. Comment: There are nevertheless some very striking features of these tables. 
Table 7.111 shows how much value respondents put on their perceived closeness to 
their customers/markets and how little strength by comparison they believe their 
competitors have in this respect. A similar comment could be made about the quality 
of management. Conversely, no airline is prepared to recognise that it draws any 
competitive advantage from access to government financial help whilst fourteen 
consider that to a greater or lesser extent their competitors draw competitive 
advantage from such aids.
7.31.3 Who are Respondents’ Major Competitors?
1. The Statistics: Table 7.113 lists ail airlines which respondents believe are their 
major competitors on their most profitable routes, whilst Table 7.114 indicates their 
most profitable routes which have attracted competition.
Table 7.113: Name of Respondent's Largest Competitor 
On Most Profitable Route.
Name of Largest Competitor Frequency Percentage
Aer Lingus 2 9.5
Air France 2 9.5
Airtours Internationa! 1 4.8
British Airways 4 19.0
Charter 2 9.5
Cityflyer Express 2 9.5
Delta 1 4.8
Eastern 1 4.8
Middle East Airlines 1 4.8
No Response 5 23.8
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
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Table 7.114: Respondent's Most Profitable Route 
Which Has Attracted Competition
Route Frequency Percentage
Dublin - London Standsted 2 9.5
Rome - New York 1 4.8
London Gatwick - Dublin 1 4.8
London - Gibraltar 1 4.8
Frankfurt - London Heathrow 1 4.8
Beriut - London Heathrow 1 9.5
Southampton - Paris 1 4.8
Madrid - Malaga 1 4.8
Lyon - Madrid 1 4.8
Lyon - Pau 1 4.8
Manchester - Palma 1 4.8
Guernsey - London Gatwick 1 4.8
No Response 7 33.3
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: There is no competitiveness issue. The purpose of these questions 
was purely to elicit factual information.
7.32 CONCLUSIONS ON AIRLINES’ KNOWLEDGE ABOUT EXISTING 
COMPETITORS
The findings of this section have shown that all the respondents believe that to a 
greater or lesser extent they have particular strengths relative to their competitors. 
Similarly, respondents highlighted strengths which they believed their competitors 
possessed relative to themselves. In summary the main findings of this section are:
Respondents’ Strengths Relative to Major Competitors:
Results indicate that ‘closeness to customer/market’ confers competitive advantage.
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Competitors’ Strengths relative to Respondents’:
Perceived competitor strengths which are most common among members of the 
industry are ‘lower wage costs’ and ‘superior marketing’.
Respondents’ Major Competitors:
Although the objective of this part of the study was to obtain some indication of 
respondents' competitors, it is perhaps interesting that most competitors are either UK 
of European Community based. This is not surprising given the system of bilateralism 
that still exists between EC Member States and third countries.
What are the Routes Which Attract the Most Competition:
The most profitable routes which attracted the most competition were very varied 
although it is interesting that six (50 per cent) of those listed had a London airport one 
end of the route.
7.33 SECTION F: INFORMATION ON MAJOR NEW COMPETITORS:
7.33.1 The Theoretical Background
A flood of major new competitors were ‘to be expected’ in the European Community 
air transport sector post liberalisation (Doganis, 1992); (Williams, 1993). Thus, the 
objective here was to determine if new competitors had actually entered the market. A 
secondary aim was to ascertain the nature of these new competitors, in terms of 
routes operated, home base locations, structures of ownership and strategies 
adopted.
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7.33.2 The Routes Which Have Attracted New Competitors
1. The Statistics: Table 7.115 indicates the extent to which respondents' most 
important routes have attracted new competition since 1988.
Table 7.115: Respondent's Most Important Route Which Has 
Attracted New Competitors Since 1988.
Routes To Frequency Percentage of Respondent Total
UK 5 23.8
Ireland 2 9.8
Japan 1 4.8
Germany 1 4.8
Lebanon 1 4.8
France 1 4.8
Spain 1 4.8
Gibraltar 1 4.8
Jersey 1 4.8
Guernsey 1 4.8
Eastern Europe 1 4.8
Morocco 1 4.8
India 1 4.8
Tunisia 1 4.8
Total 19 100
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Are there any particular routes which have been particularly attractive 
to new competitors?
3. Conclusion: The routes most frequently cited have been to the United Kingdom. 
Of the other destinations mentioned, only Ireland appears more than once.
4. Comment: London is often described as 'the aerial crossroads of the world', 
offering scope for the development of much interline traffic. The results from this 
question were thus entirely predictable.
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7.33.3 The Home Airport Location of Major New Competitors
(1) The Statistics: Table 7.116 shows the home airport location of new major 
competitors.
Table 7.116 : Home Airport Location of New Competitor.
Home Airport Location Frequency Percentage
London (UK) 5 23.8
Dublin (Ireland) 2 9.5
Manchester (UK) 1 4.8
Belfast (UK) 1 4.8
Southampton (UK) 1 4.8
Rome (Italy) 1 4.8
USA 1 4.8
No Response 9 42.9
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Is there any airport location which has attracted more new entrants 
than others?
3. Conclusion: Although there was a relatively low response rate, the picture which 
emerges reflects the answers given to the previous question.
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7.33.4 The Structure of and Activities of Major New Competitors
1. The Statistics: Table 7.117 and 7.118 show the structures and 
activities of major new competitors.
Table 7.117: Company Structure of Major New Competitors
Company Structure Frequency Percentage
Independent Carrier 10 47.6
Code Sharing Agreement with a larger carrier 4 19.0
Provides a feeder service for a large carrier 1 4.8
Has a franchising agreement with a larger carrier 2 9.5
Other 3 14.3
Do not know 1 4.8
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.118: Size of New Major Competitor Relative to 
Respondent's Own Airline.
Size of New Competitor Frequency Percentage
Much Larger 8 38.1
About the Same 2 9.5
Much Smaller 3 14.3
Do Not Know 7 33.3
No Response 1 4.8
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Is there any particular structure or activity which characterises major 
new competitors?
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3. Conclusion: The only firm conclusions to be drawn from these tables would 
appear contradictory to some extent. The first is that nearly half the new competitors 
mentioned by respondents are independents. Secondly, eight respondents of the 
sixteen who have given a precise response indicate that their major new competitors 
are bigger than they are - a surprising fact when all but one of the major European 
airline are State-owned. The only conclusion to be drawn is that British Airways has 
made more aggressive use of the freedoms provided by liberalisation than State- 
owned carriers on the continent.
7.33.5 The Strategy of New Entrants
(1) The Statistics: Table 7.119 shows the generic strategies which respondents 
believe new entrants are following.
Table 7.119: Basis of New Entrants' Strategy
New Entrants' Strategy Frequency Percentage
Low Price 7 33.3
High Volume - -
High Quality 1 4.8
Quality and Price 4 19.0
Not Known 3 14.3
Non Response 6 28.3
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: is there a particular strategy which characterises new entrants?
3. Conclusion: A low response prevents any firm conclusions but the reliance shown 
by those airlines which did respond on low price would seem to indicate that the 
hopes vested in liberalisation will prove eventually to have been justified.
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7.34 CONCLUSIONS ON INFORMATION REGARDING NEW COMPETITORS 
Routes Which Have Attracted New Competitors:
Routes to the United Kingdom appear highly attractive, no doubt reflecting London as 
a major interlining hub.
Home Locations of Competitors:
Sixty six per cent of new competitors cited have their home base in the United 
Kingdom.
Structure of New Competitors:
Paradoxically the findings indicate that major new competitors tend on the one hand 
to be independent and on the other, larger than the incumbents.
Strategy of New Entrants:
Respondents believe that the generic strategy most commonly adopted by new 
entrants is one of overall cost leadership.
7.35 SECTION G: INFORMATION ON SUBSTITUTES TO AIR TRANSPORT
7.35.1 Theoretical Background
The literature suggests that the only realistic alternative to air travel in Europe is the 
European High Speed Train (See Chapter 5) This section analyses respondents' 
replies on the alternatives to air transport, identifies which routes attract substitute 
forms of travel, and compares the alternative form of transport with air transport on 
the basis of total journey time and fares charged.
This section also records the strategies that airlines have adopted to combat 
competition from alternative forms of transport.
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Table 7.120: Realistic Substitutes To Air Transport
Intra-European Community Routes Frequency Percentage
Boat/Ferry 4 18.2
Train 9 45.0
Channel Tunnel 2 9.5
Car 2 9.5
Coach 1 4.8
Not Known 3 14.4
Total 21 100*
* Sum is greater than 100 due to rounding up. 
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.121: Forms of Substitute Travel on Intra-Community Routes
Domestic Routes Frequency Percentage of Respondent Total
Boat/Ferry 3 14.3
Train 11 52.4
Coach 4 19.0
Car 8 38.0
Total 26*
* Sum is greater than 21 as respondents indicated more than one form of substitute travel. 
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7.122: Forms of Substitute Travel on Other European Routes
Other European Routes Frequency Percentage
Boat/Ferry 1 4.8
Train 1 4.8
Car - -
Coach - -
Not Known 19 91.5
Total 21 100*
* Sum is greater than 100 due to rounding up. 
(Source: Field Studies)
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2. The Issue: Is there any form of substitute travel more significant than any other?
3. Conclusion: These three tables all indicate clearly that the respondents believe 
that the High Speed Train and the private car offer the oniy significant competition to 
their European services and that this competition is reduced almost to nothing on ail 
routes extending outside the European Community.
7.35.2 Fares and Times on Substitute Forms of Travel
1. The Statistics: Table 7.123 compares fares on alternative forms of travel as 
perceived by the respondents and Table 7.124 shows a comparison of total journey 
times in relation to air transport.
Table 7.123: Fares on Substitute Forms of Travel in Relation to Air Transport
Fares on Substitute Forms of Travel Frequency Percentage
Higher 2 9.5
Lower 10 47.6
About the Same 3 14.3
No Response 6 28.6
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
Table 7:124 Total Journey Times of Alternative Forms of Travel 
in Relation to Air Transport
Total Journey Time Frequency Percentage
Faster 1 4.8
Slower 12 57.0
About the Same 3 14.3
No Response 5 23.9
Total 21 100
(Source: Field Studies)
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2. The issue: How do fares and total journey times on alternative forms of travel 
compare with air transport?
3. Conclusion: respondents' replies show, as anticipated, that they perceive 
substitute forms of travel to be competitive in price but not in journey time.
7.35.3 Airlines’ Reaction to Alternative Forms of Travel
1. The Statistics: Table 7.125 shows the various ways which airlines have reacted to 
competition from alternative forms of air transport.
Table 7.125 : Reaction to Substitutes Forms of Travel
Reaction to Substitute Forms of Air Transport Frequency Percentage
Lower air fares 9 42.9
increased Frequencies 3 14.3
Improved Quality of Service 1 4.8
Aggressive Marketing 1 4.8
Cancelled air service on the route 1 4.8
No Response 6 28.6
Total 21 100*
* Sum of total is greater than 100 due to rounding up. 
(Source: Field Studies)
2. The Issue: Have airlines reacted to what they perceive to be competition from 
alternative forms of transport?
3. Conclusion: Given the low perceived threat from alternatives, it is not surprising 
that respondents' reactions have been muted however, it may be assumed that fares 
have been reduced and frequencies increased by airlines on short busy routes such 
as Brusseis-Paris where competition from rail is strong.
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7.36 CONCLUSIONS ON THE SUBSTITUTES TO AIR TRANSPORT 
Realistic Substitutes:
As expected the train remains the most realistic substitute to air transport, followed by 
the boat/ferry and the private car.
Routes Which Attracted Substitute Forms of Travel:
The ‘Intra-European Community’ routes were those which attracted the most 
competition from substitute forms of travel. Airlines operating ‘Other European’ routes 
do not have any threat from substitute forms of travel.
Fares and Times on Substitute Forms of Travel:
Fares on substitute forms of travel are lower. Total travel time on alternative forms of 
travel is slower.
Airlines’ Strategies to Combat Competition from Alternative Forms of Travel:
Airlines have adopted a variety of strategies to combat competition from alternative 
forms of travel, the most common one being the reduction of fares to match those of 
the substitute. Thus, allowing the substitute forms of travel to put a ceiiing on the fares 
they can charge. Airlines have also increased their frequencies.
7.37 CONCLUSIONS ON THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRY SURVEY
The questionnaire addressed to the industry required airlines to provide information 
needed to address the research problem, including data not only on their own 
structure and operations but also about their perceptions of competitors and their 
relationships with buyers and suppliers. Their replies have been analysed and 
conclusions drawn topic by topic in previous parts of this section. The aim here is to 
draw some more general conclusions and it should be noted that in the interests of 
presenting a concise overall picture, many of the less substantial conclusions have 
been omitted.
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The survey revealed an industry which is varied in the size and structure of the 
individual airlines which comprise it. There can be no doubt that in the EC post­
liberalisation period particularly, airlines can be successful whatever their size and it 
must therefore be inferred that the prime determinant of success is good 
management. One of the more surprising findings, therefore, is that in an industry 
supplying a perishable product - the seats available on a particular route at a 
particular time - respondents to the survey reduced, the size of their marketing 
departments between 1988 and 1993.
Another finding, which makes the reduction in marketing effort even more surprising, 
is that industry profitability declined significantly over the period covered by the survey, 
with those airlines which were loss makers in 1988 doing particularly badly, it is not 
appropriate to attribute this exclusively or even mainly to the impact of regulatory 
change. The period covered by the study was the most difficult experienced by the 
industry since the end of World War Two, primarily because of an unprecedented 
combination of factors: an aircraft buying spree followed by an international recession 
exacerbated by a public loss of confidence before, during and after the Guif conflict. 
These factors inevitably had a more important, if shorter term, effect on profitability 
than liberalisation, but it is clear that liberalisation also played a part.
As highlighted by the literature review in Chapter 4 liberalisation provides 
management with increased freedom to develop strategies and to react to events. 
Replies to the questionnaire showed that customer choice is strongly influenced by 
frequency of service and by price and that those airlines choosing low price strategies 
and which put a high emphasis on gaining market share performed relatively well 
during the period. It should be noted that pre-liberalisation, these companies would 
have had little if any opportunities to follow such policies. Thus, if liberalisation has not 
yet fundamentally changed the airline landscape in Europe, it must already have had 
an impact on the future structure of the industry. The fact that ‘traditional’ state owned 
carriers were the most successful before liberalisation, whereas recently competitors 
with lower cost structures have had more success, corroborates this conclusion.
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The increasing diversity of the industry - a worldwide, not a specifically European 
phenomenon - also shows in the replies given by airlines to questions about other 
airlines. All respondents believed that to a greater or lesser extent they have particular 
strengths which single them out from their competitors whilst accepting that these 
competitors have strengths which they have not. There was a consensus that 
‘closeness to the market’ and ‘superior marketing skills’ are of particular importance, 
although it is also noteworthy that a number of respondents considered that their 
competitors benefited from lower wage costs. Whilst keeping total under control is of 
course a prime responsibility of management, the fact elements outside management 
control - such as traditional trade union power and high social security charges - vary 
from country to country will inevitably have an important effect on industry structure in 
the long run.
Early signs maybe apparent in what the survey revealed about new competitors, in 
that two thirds of those cited by respondents had their home base in the United 
Kingdom, where employers' social security contributions are considerably lower than 
in many other Member States. This fits well with respondents' belief that the generic 
strategy most commonly adopted by new entrants is one of overall cost leadership.
Replies to questions about substitute forms of transport also showed the importance 
of tight cost control. Rail was shown to be the only substitute of any real significance, 
but only on relatively short intra-Community routes. It is also clear, however, that 
where competition from rail is a real threat, airlines are obliged to reduce fares and 
that on those routes where they cannot match rail fares the latter put a ceiling on what 
the airlines can charge.
As was expected, the survey showed that airlines are close both to their buyers and 
suppliers. None of the more detailed findings about relationships between airlines and 
their suppliers were in any way surprising, it is, however, striking that whereas buyers, 
were shown to have considerable freedom to switch their business from one airline to 
another, this does not appear to have a negative effect on airline competitiveness.
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Chapter 8 - Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This project has analysed competition in a recently ‘deregulated5 European 
Community industry - air transport. The study embraced:
• a review of the literature on the concepts of regulation and deregulation 
genetically and specifically in relation to air transport;
• an examination of the interaction of the various components of the air 
transport sector using Easton's (1965) model for analysing systems;
• an application of Porter's (1980) model of competitive strategy to categorise 
the regulatory changes in the air transport sector and the impact these 
changes might have on competitiveness in the European industry; and
• the development of a model of competitive behaviour in the air transport 
industry.
8.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
8.2.1 Theoretical Aspects
A review of the literature of a previously deregulated air transport system - USA in 
1978 - was undertaken. The aim of this review was to trace the reasons why and how 
the aviation industry was deregulated in the United States and to examine the extent 
to which the US experience is perceived to have influenced the formuiators of policy in 
the European Community. A second aim was to assess the extent to which the early 
outcomes of liberalisation in Europe have mirrored events in the USA post­
deregulation.
The literature reveals that whilst deregulation produced great changes in industry 
structure and behaviour, the resuits over a period were different from those predicted 
by the principal proponent of deregulation - Alfred Khan. Whilst there was initially an 
influx of start-up carriers, creating greatly increased competition and lower prices, low 
levels of profitability led to many mergers and acquisitions with the industry ultimately 
regrouping into ten large carriers.
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Helped by the adoption of the hub and spoke systems and drawing benefit from their 
control of computer reservation systems and their introduction of frequent flier 
programmes, these airlines collectively achieved an almost total control of the 
domestic market. Nevertheless in the last few years, a second round of efficient, low- 
cost new entrants has sprung up to challenge the majors, following the strategies 
successfully adopted by ‘Southwest Airlines’ in the 1980s.
The literature also shows that the European Community's approach sought to avoid 
many of the unwelcome outcomes experienced in the USA. From the start the EC 
adopted a gradualist approach, emphasising the virtues of increased competition but 
providing safeguards against the market chaos which had occurred in the United 
States. Since the final phase of liberalisation was introduced as recently as 1 January 
1993, most of the literature reflects on what liberalisation is expected to achieve rather 
than on what has actually happened. There is, however, an emerging consensus that 
the outcomes in Europe will not differ greatly from those in the United States, with the 
European industry consolidating into a small number of mega-carriers pursuing very 
similar strategies to those adopted by the American airlines. This conclusion was 
confirmed by the President and CEO of Swissair in an interview with the current 
researcher on the findings of this study.
A s  we all know, the fundamental drivers of change within the industry remain 
the sam e. A t the level o f an individual airline operations, two particular factors 
driving concentration are increasingly important:
Many airlines lack critical m a ss  in important functions, and accordingly suffer  
cost disadvantages;
So m e  European airlines are getting m uch stronger than the rest in important 
marketing areas. The gap in m arket pow er betw een the leaders and laggards 
is growing.
M ost national carriers will still be around in 2000, but they will be  integrated 
into airline system s.
(Otto Loepfe, President and CEO, Swissair: interview, Montreal, 24 April 
1995).
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However, it is recognised that there will be a continuing role for small-scale niche 
carriers operating a limited number of routes.
The conclusion to be drawn from the literature is that whilst the methods adopted in 
the United States and in the EC may have differed, the predicted outcomes in Europe 
are sufficiently close to the actual outcomes in the USA for the American experience 
to be used an a benchmark for an assessment of liberalisation in Europe, particularly 
as regards:
• an increase in the number of start-up airlines;
• an increase in the number of routes operated; and
• an increase in the number of passengers travelling on discount fares.
8.2.2 The Research Framework
Although there is no single theoretical approach to regulatory reform which would 
have been adequate for the study of airline deregulation, the literature review showed 
that Easton's (1965a) systems theory and Porter's (1980) theory of competitive 
strategy together would together furnish a useful analytical framework for this 
research. Thus, these two approaches used together provided a comprehensive 
theoretical scaffolding for a study of regulatory reform in the aviation industry.
8.2.3 The Easton Model
The Eastonian approach is essentially linear and sequential and it is thus well adopted 
to an analysis of the political aspects of deregulation. It does not, however, provide a 
basis for measuring the intensity of competition unleashed by this process.
Application of Easton's (1965a) model of political systems to the air transport industry 
highlighted the importance of the heuristic feedback loop for the maintenance of the 
liberalisation process. It was used to assess the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and 
feelings of the industry regarding the liberalisation process.
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From this analysis four research findings emerged:
• the approval of State subsidy by the European Commission to airlines 
resulted from political pressure and was perceived as a means of 
addressing social/economic/employment problems in the respective 
Member States;
• Member States in possession of ‘flag carriers’ were reluctant to oppose the 
granting of State subsidy;
• airlines receiving State subsidy were regarded as being inefficient; and
• State subsidies were regarded as being anti-competitive.
The reaction of the Commission to the negative feedback on the liberalisation 
programme - a programme designed to allow competition to flourish - appeared to 
produce a variety of muted results. Airlines in some Member States appeared to 
remain protected from the free markets and thus large parts of the industry, even in a 
liberalised environment, remain uncompetitive.
8.2.4 The Porter Model
A complementary framework is provided by Porter's approach, which is founded on an 
analysis of the five major competitive forces which operate in all industries and on the 
generic strategies which individual companies can adopt to gain or lose competitive 
advantage.
An examination of the ‘deregulated’ air transport sector using Porter's competitive 
model yielded the other research issues of the thesis. Thus, the degree of competition 
in the EC air transport industry post-deregulation was analysed through an 
examination of the five fundamental competitive forces:
• the new entrants;
• the power of buyers;
• the power of suppliers;
• the degree of rivalry; and
• the threat of substitutes.
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8.2.5 The Research Methodology
The research problem was three-dimensional requiring both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ data and 
a ‘mix’ of quantitative and qualitative approaches.
• Library based research complemented by qualitative interviews yielded 
information on the measurable outcomes of liberalisation in the EC as 
suggested by the US experience.
• Qualitative interviews with stakeholders in the industry - suppliers, buyers, 
rivals and substitutes - produced data on the beliefs, feelings, attitudes and 
perceptions of key players regarding the actions taken by the European 
Commission to maintain the liberalisation process,
• A survey administered to the industry containing both quantitative and 
qualitative questions provided data on the strategies adopted by airlines in 
the new competitive environment in relation to suppliers, buyers, 
competitors, new entrants and substitutes.
8.3 VALIDATIONS OF THE FINDINGS
This section summarises the major findings of the three broad research areas and 
where possible these findings are complemented by objective and independent 
validation by senior industry stakeholders.
All the independent validation interviews on the findings of this study were 
personally conducted by the current researcher on the dates and at the venues 
specified below. (See Appendix V)
BROAD RESEARCH AREA 1: The intensity of competition in an air transport sector 
which has undergone a regulatory reforming process, such a s  deregulation, is greater 
than in an air transport sector which has not.
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Conclusions from Broad Research Area 1
Findings from this area of research indicated that liberalisation of the EC air transport 
sector has produced an environment in which competition has intensified. The 
conclusions from the library-based research on developments in Europe since 1988, 
indicated that liberalisation has resulted in the creation of a significant number of new 
airlines, in a large increase in passengers travelling on discounted fares and in an 
increase in the number of routes being operated. Although this research has been 
limited to experience in the United Kingdom, it is confirmed by interviews with 
members of user organisations in other Member States.
Conclusion 1: There are more new entrants, more discounted fares and
more routes available as a result of liberalisation in the EC.
Independent Validation 1
Prices have decreased  by  one third and the num ber o f passengers travelling 
has increased b y  one third. Liberalisation does not m ean competition. It has  
created an environment where competition can happen. Competition is only 
possible when som eone else is entitled to compete.
(Hermann de Croo, Chairman of the EC Comite des Sages, former Chairman 
of the Council of EC Transport Ministers and Belgian Minister for Transport, 
Chairman of the IATA High Level Symposium 1995: interview: 25 April 1995, 
Montreal).
Independent Validation 2
Deregulation and liberalisation o f airlines increases competition and allows - 
even  prom otes - the entry o f new  airlines. It is now happening in Europe. In 
the United S ta tes, new  low-fare entrants have doubled their m arket share  
betw een  1992 and  1994 - from 6.0 per cent in 1992 to 12 .7per cent today.
(Pierre Lortie, President, Bombardier Regional Aircraft Division: interview, 24 
April 1995, Montreal).
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Independent Validation 3
This is not surprising, it follows the pattern o f USA deregulation. Consum ers 
have benefited m ostly from discounted fares and the advantages and benefits 
are not universal throughout all the fare structures. But it is true there are more 
discounted fares availabie.
(Robert Papkin, Attorney at Law, Washington D.C.,specialising in air transport: 
interview, 23 April 1995, Montreal)
Independent Validation 4
These results are to be  expected. The pressures o f liberalisation touches all 
airlines whether m anagem ent want it or not. Liberalisation is happening and  
m anagem ent and airlines that want to survive have to adapt to that 
environment. That m eans giving the custom ers want they want, more services 
and cheaper fares.
(Michael Levine, Executive VP Marketing and International, Northwest Airlines, 
former Professor of Aviation Law at the University of Chicago, adviser to the 
Carter administration on the deregulation of US Air Transport: interview, 25 
April 1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 5
The level o f competition that is occurring is about right. It should be step-by- 
step. If things happen too rapidly a s  in the US, the results might b e  disastrous.
(Lord Clinton-Davis, Former EC European Commissioner for Transport and 
currently Shadow Minister for Transport in House of Lords: interview, 25 April 
1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 6
The changes which have transformed the airline industry started in the mid  
1970s and  they have modified the rules o f the gam e: the Airline Deregulation 
Act o f 1978 which ended  40 years o f governm ent-m anaged competition has  
unleashed very poten t economic forces. Similar changes are now  happening  
in Europe, forcing changes in the regulatory framework and  economic  
environment. The num ber o f new  low-cost carriers is increasing and  forcing 
fares down.
(Paul L. Gretch, Director, Office of International Aviation, US Department of 
Transportation, Washington DC: interview, 19 April 1995, Washington DC).
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independent Validation 7
Competition did increase in the US after deregulation and o f course you  can 
expect the sam e to happen in Europe. However, our reporting requirements 
on financial and  operational details have done more for com petitiveness than 
deregulation. W e issued  the first Air Travel Consum er Report in 1987. By  
referring to these reports airlines can s e e  ways in which they can improve their 
competitiveness. This m ay  be viewed a s  interfering or intervening in air 
transport policies or strategies but we are only telling them what passengers  
expect.
(Hoyte B. Dekker, Jr., Assistant Director for Consumer Affairs, US Department 
of Transportation: interview, 19 April 1995, Washington DC).
Independent Validation 8
The European single aviation market is emerging a s  a reality. The 
liberalisation process is gradually bringing benefits to travellers in terms of 
greater choice and lower fares. Indeed, competition on European trunk routes 
is increasing, regional airlines are creating new  routes and increasing 
frequencies, and fares are beginning to decrease.
(The Right Honourable, Neil Kinnock, European Commissioner for Transport: 
interview, 2 June 1995, London).
BROAD RESEARCH AREA 2: A system  which does adjust to stakeholder inputs and  
feedback, a s  m easured  b y  Easton's m odel o f political sy s tem s analysis, will be more 
likely to survive than a system  which does not respond to stakeholder input.
Conclusions from Broad Research Area 2
The purpose of the stakeholder interviews was to assess the outcomes they expected 
from the EC's attempts to create increased competition in the Community's air 
transport sector.
As noted above, the literature suggests that this is unlikely to be achieved to the full 
extent hoped by its formulators. Although superficially the interviews may appear to 
suggest that there are considerable differences between the stakeholder groups, 
there is in fact a broad consensus amongst them that this is indeed the case.
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However, the reasons underlying this consensus differ from those advanced by many 
research studies. The stakeholders take the view that whilst the EC industry has been 
given the regulatory freedom to compete, the aims of liberalisation have been 
frustrated by a resistance to change on the part of individual national governments.
Conclusion 1: Stakeholders believe that the lack of competition in the air
transport sector in the EC is the responsibility of national 
governments and the European Commission. 
Independent Validation 1
Even though liberalisation has brought down the barriers that have prevented  
competition, other competitive barriers are being erected  b y  som e national 
governm ents. The m ost effective It is what we call ‘false capacity’. This is 
happening in France at Orly airport.
The host governm ent has im posed an environmental limit on airlines wanting 
to use  this airport, but it does not im pose similar limitations at other less  
attractive airports.
W e are denied the opportunity to operate there and provide the kind of 
competition that is m eant to be allowed. Air France remains in a very powerful 
position. Alitalia in Italy is protected in exactly the sam e way.
(Tim Walden, Industry Affairs Manager, British Midland: interview, 10 May 
1995, London)
Independent Validation 2
This does not surprise me. Air transport in the EC is still politically sensitive. 
Countries in Europe feel victimised, Kinnock talks about agreem ents betw een  
the US and the EC in order to open up the skies, but we know  nothing m uch is 
going to happen.
The European Commission spends a lot o f time trying to convince individual 
M em ber S ta tes o f the commercial value o f deregulation. The Commission  
com es to the US, talks to us about opening up the EC-US m arket in a very 
positive way, we wait for the outcom es, but when they go back to Europe they  
g e t their legs cut off by  national governm ents -it is still national politics!
(Paul L. Gretch, Director, Office of International Aviation, US Department of 
Transportation, Washington DC: interview, 19 April 1995, Washington DC).
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Independent Validation 3
We are headed  towards a more competitive globalised environment but the 
reality o f liberalisation can only be achieved if it remains the goal and aim o f 
national policy in every M em ber State, but as your findings indicate this is 
currently not the case.
(Assaid Kotaite, President of the Council of ICAO: interview, 24 April 1995, 
Montreal).
Independent Validation 4
The legal framework is now  in place and in economic term s the Single Market 
is generating a num ber o f changes which will benefit users but also the air 
carriers. From now  on carriers should consider the whole Community a s  their 
hom e market. Unfortunately, too few  do so  today and, a s a result, we are 
currently assessing  the remaining obstacles to the effective functioning o f the 
internal aviation market and at the sam e  time evaluating the n e e d  for further 
action.
(The Right Honourable, Neil Kinnock, European Commissioner for Transport: 
interview, 2 June 1995, London).
Conclusion 2: Stakeholders regard State aid as anti-competitive.
The explanation of this resistance to free markets is perceived to lie in the history of 
the aviation industry in Europe. There has been a long-standing tradition that flag 
carriers - all State-owned except in the UK - exist as much to provide a public service 
in the widest sense as to provide efficient and profitable transport services. It is widely 
recognised that as a result, many of them cannot exist in the newly-liberalised 
environment without continuing State aid, that the governments concerned will be 
under a compulsion to provide such aid and that the EC will be forced to acquiesce in 
its granting.
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Independent Validation 1
State aid is anti-competitive, but dem ands on national budgets are increasing, 
and in the long run support for carriers will dwindle. Economically governm ents  
will not be  able to continue supporting their own fiag-carriers.
(Jeffrey Shane, Partner, Wilmer Cutter Pickering, Washington DC, former 
Assistant Secretary of State, US Department of Transportation, USA: 
interview, 25 April 1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 2
National governm ents not the EC decide what is happening in Europe. The 
USA se e k s  an agreem ent with the EC but the US has not been  able to find 
anyone at the other side o f the table.
The Commission has agreed to State aid to keep  the liberalisation process  
alive even  if by  doing so  they diluted it.
(Paul L. Gretch, Director, Office of International Aviation, US Department of 
Transportation, Washington DC: interview, 19 April 1995, Washington DC).
Independent Validation 3
The European Commission were held to ransom by  the political pressures  
from within and  outside the Community over the granting o f S ta te subsidy. Of 
course they knew  that granting State subsidies in the huge am ounts that were 
allowed would not help the com petitiveness o f the industry.
The pressure started within France, the unions influenced the politicians and  
the politicians pressurised their fellow countryman Deiors, who then put 
pressure on those he could influence in the Commission.
Kinnock [the current Com missioner for Transport] will not be able to say  no to 
Iberia's latest request - the political pressure is still too great.
(Lord Clinton-Davis, Former EC European Commissioner for Transport and 
currently Shadow Minister for Transport in the House of Lords: interview, 25 
April 1995, Montreal).
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Independent Validation 4
There is still the problem of national pride and the reluctance of the EC to stop 
national subsidies, an action which would rapidly accelerate the process of 
competition.
(Otto Loepfe, President and CEO, Swissair: interview, 24 April 1995, Montreal) 
Independent Validation 5
Ownership and State subsidies have distorted competition. The European 
Commission has allowed approximately $20 US per 100 passenger kilometre 
since 1991.
(Mike Ambrose, Director General, European Regional Airlines Association: 
interview, 25 April 1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 6
It was a bad decision to allow so much State aid. The European Commission 
allowed it and the Comite des Sages did not totally outlaw it. The Comite des 
Sages and the Commission are authors of their own misfortune.
(Tim Walden, Industry Affairs Manager, British Midland: interview, 10 May 
1995, London)
Independent Validation 7
State aids are obviously a vexed issue. The difficulties encountered by several 
European flag carriers during the crisis of 1991-1993 led to massive State 
aids, mainly in the form of capital injection. Six major cases were treated by 
the Commission which authorised the aids while imposing conditions.
The Commission policy was clarified in detail in new guidelines published last 
December. These guidelines essentially codify the various tests applied in 
previous decisions. They also introduce the principle that a second aid might 
only be granted for restructuring to a particular airline in the event of 
exceptional, unforeseeable circumstance external to the Company.
(The Right Honourable, Neii Kinnock, European Commissioner for Transport: 
interview, 2 June 1995, London).
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Conclusion 3: Stakeholders believed that the Commission allowed State aid
to be granted as a means of compensating for the 
unemployment that would inevitably result.
In order to compete with the new low-cost new entrants, the established airlines would 
inevitably have to cut back their labour force. For the governments of State-owned 
airlines creating unemployment was a political and not a commercial problem. 
Nevertheless, the stakeholders are also broadly of the view that eventually the State- 
owned carriers will become more efficient and will be obliged to bring their costs into 
line with those of their competitors and that the policy of liberalisation will remain in 
being.
Independent Validation 1
The airline business is not like any other business. Airlines function like state 
agencies, they are not efficient, they are directed by politicians. They enjoy 
positive discrimination, lower taxes for example. They are not efficient 
because they have acquired too many personnel and they have endured too 
many strikes.
The granting of State aid to airlines was one way of compensating them for 
what the Community was taking away. National airlines were protected from 
competition. Now, with liberalisation the States are no longer masters in their 
own shop. High unemployment is not good for the government or the 
economy.
State aid is not just financial injections by governments, it is much more 
complicated. Lufthansa was made by their government to buy their aircraft 
from Airbus. It was costly for Lufthansa, but it was still cheaper than the 
government granting a subsidy to Airbus.
When Lufthansa was partly privatised the government paid all the retirement 
charges for those being made redundant - is that not State aid?.
State aid is one way of making a sick industry better after it has experienced 
the liberalisation it didn't want. It will give the airlines a chance to become 
more efficient and competition will happen.
(Hermann de Croo, Chairman of the EC Comite des Sages, former Chairman 
of the Council of EC Transport Ministers and Belgian Minister for Transport, 
Chairman of the IATA High Level Symposium 1995: interview, 25 April 1995, 
Montreal).
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Independent Validation 2
A reduction in the number of people employed in State-owned airlines is 
imperative. In order to be more competitive airlines have to stop ‘false 
employment’. Reduction in employment will discourage inefficient work 
practices.
(Lord Clinton-Davis, Former EC European Commissioner for Transport and 
currently Shadow Minister for Transport in the House of Lords: interview, 25 
April 1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 3
Industry consolidation will happen, as this is a response to liberalisation. 
Unemployment is a direct consequence of this. We have cut back on all staff, 
including sales staff.
(Otto Loepfe, President and CEO, Swissair: interview, 24 April 1995, 
Montreal).
Independent Validation 4
Deregulation or liberalisation will reduce the number of people employed in the 
industry. US deregulation reduced the number employed in official offices as 
well as on the ground and in the air. The functions continue at the Department 
[of Transportation] but at a lower level. The Consumer Affairs Department has 
reduced from 130 to 14 since deregulation. Member States' governments do 
not want this to happen in Europe.
(Hoyte B. Dekker, Jr., Assistant Director for Consumer Affairs, US Department 
of Transportation: interview, 19 April 1995, Washington DC).
Independent Validation 5
Each airline which looks at liberalisation does so from its own position - 
financial, geographical and political. The efficient, the strong and the 
competitive see liberalisation as an opportunity and become more efficient. 
The weak and the non-competitive see it as a threat and become more 
inefficient.
(Mike Ambrose, Director General, European Regional Airlines Association: 
interview, 25 April 1995, Montreal).
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Independent Validation 6
For competition to become a reality, there is a continuing need for significant 
structural change. Several airlines have made efforts and workforces have 
been reduced and that has ended the need for State aid. Iberia are waiting for 
a decision on their latest application for State aid. They will have to face up to 
the changing culture in Europe. Some members of the Spanish government 
want the European Commission to do the things that they are afraid of or do 
not want to do themselves.
Unemployment is inevitable. Iberia do not realise that it would be better not to 
get State aid, restructure and lay off 3,000 employees next week, than not to 
restructure, remain inefficient, uncompetitive and be forced to lay off 17,000 
next year when they will forced out of the market. State aid will not help them 
to become more competitive, nor in the long run it will help their employment 
situation.
(The Right Honourable, Neil Kinnock, European Commissioner for Transport: 
interview, 2 June 1995, London).
Conclusion 4: Stakeholders believed that competition is also constrained
by lack of adequate infrastructure.
Independent Validation 1
We all complain about the lack of slots, traffic rights and other restrictions. 
These problems can seriously restrict freedom of action and growth potential.
(Otto Loepfe, President and CEO, Swissair: interview, 24 April 1995, Montreal)
Independent Validation 2
Liberalisation will be a myth unless the infrastructure is given the attention it 
deserves.
(Jeffrey Shane, Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering, Washington DC, former 
Assistant Secretary of State, US Department of Transportation, USA: 
interview, 25 April 1995, Montreal).
371
Chapter 8 - Conclusions and Recommendations
Independent Validation 3
There is no doubt that a healthy demand for air transport persists. IATA 
passenger forecasts show an annual growth of 6.6 per cent with at least 150 
million international passengers forecast for the year 1998. These figures tell 
us that people will continue to want or need international air transport. And yet, 
we live in an age of official indifference towards aviation infrastructure and wild 
pollution claims from self-appointed gurus. It seems that there is a strong need 
to remind the decision-makers of the world and in particular the politicians of 
what people want.
(Pierre J. Jeanniot, O.C., Director General, International Air Transport 
Association (IATA): interview, Montreal, 25 April 1995).
Independent Validation 4
Competition has been modest, it is not as strong as anticipated. Infrastructure 
problems and slot allocation have been influential in this creating this situation. 
The Commission do intend to address the whole area of slot allocation and the 
transparency in granting slots to airlines.
(The Right Honourable, Neil Kinnock, European Commissioner for Transport: 
interview, 4 June 1995, London).
BROAD RESEARCH AREA 3: In newly created competitive environments companies 
which have adopted strategies as defined by Porter's model will have lagged returns 
which are superior to companies which have not adopted such strategies.
Conclusions from Broad Research Area 3
Whilst the questionnaire administered to the airlines did not touch specifically on their 
attitudes to the liberalisation policy as such, the overall impression created by the 
replies is consistent with the views of the stakeholders as outlined above. The 
questionnaire examined the generic strategies that airlines have adopted in the newly 
liberalised conditions. Most of the world's airlines have operated in a government- 
controlled environment since the industry's inception which defined and limited their 
strategic roles.
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An airline's approach to the market - its route structure, the traffic flows it serves and 
its positioning - has been heavily influenced by the aviation policies of its own 
government and the governments with jurisdiction over the points served from its 
home base,and by the bilateral rights those policies generated. Governments in turn 
generally undertook to protect airlines from the full effects of marketplace competition. 
The liberalisation process in the EC means that in principle airlines now have control 
over their own commercial strategy and role. The survey revealed an industry which is 
exceedingly heterogeneous in the size and structure of the individual airlines which 
comprise it. It showed also that airlines can be successful whatever their size and by 
implication that the prime determinant of success is good management in deciding 
appropriate strategies, rather than any more specific attitudes.
Conclusion 1 : The most commercially successful airlines have adopted
one of Porter's generic strategies. 
Independent Validation 1:
The primary purpose of liberalisation was to stop protecting the industry from 
competition and make travel affordable for people of modest means. That is 
happening. However, this exercise has demonstrated that where management 
got the strategy right, concentrating on the fundamentals, particularly on 
rigorous and consistent control of costs, the financial results for the airline 
have been positive.
(Pierre Lortie, President, Bombardier Regional Aircraft Division: interview, 24 
April 1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 2:
To survive commercially in a liberalised environment, an airline must clearly 
define its strategic role, and must adapt itself to that role. But most airlines do 
not have a completely free choice of strategic roles. Rather their choices can 
be severely limited by history, geography, infrastructure and commercial 
realities, and not just by governments. Liberalised environments can expose 
this fact fairly dramatically and expensively.
(Michael Levine, Executive VP Marketing and International, Northwest Airlines, 
former Professor of Aviation Law at the University of Chicago, adviser to the 
Carter administration on the deregulation of US Air Transport: interview, 25 
April 1995, Montreal).
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Independent Validation 3
In a liberalised environment, an airline has substantial control over its own 
commercial strategy and role. At the same time, governments are less willing 
to protect airlines from market forces.
(Pierre J. Jeanniot, O.C., Director General, International Air Transport 
Association (iATA): interview, Montreal, 25 April 1995).
Independent Validation 4
Liberalisation is making management act in a commercial fashion. They need 
a strategy to survive, let alone make a profit.
(Mike Ambrose, Director General, European Regional Airlines Association: 
interview, 25 April 1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 5
Liberalisation has brought increased competition and this competition has 
brought fares down. Airline managers can no longer depend on government 
and swim with the tide: they have to adopt a strategy.
(Hermann de Croo, Chairman of the EC Comite des Sages, former Chairman 
of the Council of EC Transport Ministers and Belgian Minister for Transport, 
Chairman of the IATA High Level Symposium 1995: interview, 25 April 1995, 
Montreal).
In addition to the need for airlines to adopt a strategy in order to compete successfully 
in the newly liberalised environment, findings from the airline survey indicated that 
airlines which operate low price strategies are more competitive than others.
CONCLUSION 2: A further conclusion is that customer choice, and thus
ultimately airline success, is strongly influenced by 
frequency of service and by price and that airlines which in 
the post-liberalisation period have pursued low price 
strategies and have a high emphasis on gaining market 
share have performed relatively well in the period.
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independent Validation 1
Liberalisation is here to stay and will continue. Airlines need to learn from 
outside the industry. There is a need to cut costs, develop strategies not just 
for survival but to make a profit. There is a need to remove the relationships 
between the airlines and politics for the industry to become more competitive.
(Assaid Kotaite, President of the Council of ICAO: interview, 24 April 1995, 
Montreal).
Independent Validation 2
Established airlines need to cut their costs to compete with the new entrants 
operating low-cost, low-fare services. New entrants have been able to 
negotiate with the labour force on terms that suit them. They have inherited a 
politically aware and union-ridden workforce that would strike rather than take 
a pay cut. Passengers want value for money, they will choose the cheapest 
fare on a route, invariably that will be the low-cost alternative. If established 
airlines do not change their cost strategies they will lose market share and if 
they match the low fares with their current strategies in place they will always 
be unprofitable.
(Hermann de Croo, Chairman of the EC Comite des Sages, former Chairman 
of the Council of EC Transport Ministers and Belgian Minister for Transport, 
Chairman of the IATA High Level Symposium 1995: interview, 25 April 1995, 
Montreal).
Independent Validation 3
Interestingly enough in our industry there does not seem to be any correlation 
between size and profitability. There should be, at least one would think.
In a highly competitive situation when yield is being externally driven the 
carriers that are most successful in controlling their unit cost will have the 
lowest break-even load factor and will remain the most profitable.
Lowering unit cost is paramount.
(Pierre J. Jeanniot, O.C., Director General, International Air Transport 
Association (IATA): interview, Montreal, 25 April 1995).
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Independent Validation 4
One must never forget that the primary purpose of an airline is not to fly 
aircraft, but to fly people. In this respect, the primary factor in quality of sen/ice 
is frequency.
(Pierre Lortie, President, Bombardier Regional Aircraft Division: Interview, 24 
April 1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 5
Cost plays a role in determining the success of an airline. We have seen that 
even major airlines with good route networks will be required to lower their 
costs to succeed. Shrewd identification of competitive advantage and stringent 
cost control are necessary preconditions of success.
(Michael Levine, Executive VP Marketing and International, Northwest Airlines, 
former Professor of Aviation Law at the University of Chicago, adviser to the 
Carter administration on the deregulation of US Air Transport: interview, 25 
April 1995, Montreal).
Opportunities to pursue low price policies have in the past been heavily restricted by 
the regulators. The fact that so much emphasis has been put by stakeholders on the 
removal of these restrictions is further indication that liberalisation is working to a 
greater degree than might at first appear to be the case.
CONCLUSION 3: The greater the number of buyers that an airline has, the
better for the airline. Buyers have most information on the 
overall demand for the types of services airlines offer and 
on prevailing prices.
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independent Validation 1
Travel agents, the biggest buyers of airlines services, are very powerful. The 
travel agency business used to be fragmentary, even within national 
boundaries. We are now witnessing tremendous concentration, not only within 
our national markets. We see for example, Amex and CarlsonA/Vagon Lit 
expanding on a global scale. We can easily envisage a scenario in which the 
largest travel agency would have 30 per cent market share in most European 
markets. This is in contrast to us airlines, which have large shares of our home 
markets but only small shares of the European or global market. There could 
be a real shift in power.
(Otto Loepfe, President and CEO, Swissair: interview, 24 April 1995, Montreal)
Independent Validation 2
Travel agents do have a lot of power over airlines. They can negotiate for the 
best price, affecting not just discounts but also flexibility of booking restrictions.
An airline should not rely on a small number of outlets. This is especially true 
for smaller airlines whose ability to establish and enforce pricing structures 
could be seriously be impaired.
(Mike Ambrose, Director General, European Regional Airlines Association: 
interview, 25 April 1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 3
Travel agencies are getting - indeed some already have - more access to 
specific information about our customers and their buying patterns and 
preferences, both individuals and corporations. This makes it easier for them 
to conduct very effective, precisely targeted micro-marketing. If we are not 
careful they could totally overpower the airlines.
(Michael Levine, Executive VP Marketing and International, Northwest Airlines, 
former Professor of Aviation Law at the University of Chicago, adviser to the 
Carter administration on the deregulation of US Air Transport: interview, 25 
April 1995, Montreal).
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CONCLUSION 4: Suppliers of essential operational services strongly
influence competitiveness and having a large number and 
choice of suppliers helps competitiveness. 
Independent Validation 1
This is not surprising. Those who have their own CRS are in a privileged 
position. If they have a CRS they have a licence to print money. No other 
business allows the host of a service to know where the competition is and 
who his competitors are, what services they provide and the fares they are 
charging.
(Robert Papkin, Attorney at Law, Washington D.C.,specialising in air transport: 
interview, 23 April 1995, Montreal)
Independent Validation 2
Traditionally, everybody did everything - catering, IT, maintenance, ground 
handling, ail the different functions that are necessary to run an airline. This 
was not just to show that they were ‘real airlines’; it was also a source of 
monopoly income.
Since Europe has been hit by deregulation, these functions have turned into 
burdens for the smaller airlines. New entrants have significantly lower cost 
levels and the larger service providers have economies of scale and scope.
So it is the small new entrants, I think that will be most at risk with suppliers.
(Otto Loepfe, President and CEO, Swissair: interview, 24 April 1995, Montreal)
Independent Validation 3
The deployment of the CRS allows the major airlines to control distribution. 
The owners of CRS systems are undoubtedly in a more powerful position than 
those who buy into the system.
(Pierre Lortie, President, Bombardier Regional Aircraft Division: interview, 24 
April 1995, Montreal).
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CONCLUSION 5: Airlines have adopted strategies to comhat competition
from alternative forms of travel, the most common one 
being the reduction of fares to match those of the 
substitute.
Independent Validation 1
Rail travel in Europe is good but, it should not always be seen as a threat. 
Often it provides a complementary service and sometimes rail provides a 
social service, going to places where planes would not be willing to go or could 
not go. I do not think it is really a threat.
(Lord Clinton-Davis, Former EC European Commissioner for Transport and 
currently Shadow Minister for Transport in the House of Lords: interview, 25 
April 1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 2
Rail may not be a great threat to air transport but there is no doubt that the 
subsidy to railways affects airline profits in Europe. Airlines would become 
more profitable if governments adopted the correct policies.
(Mike Ambrose, Director General, European Regional Airlines Association: 
interview, 25 April 1995, Montreal).
Independent Validation 3
Airlines often have to charge higher prices than rail, so the two cannot 
compete head-to-head on the same routes. They charge higher prices not 
because they want to, but because we live in an era where rail gets continuing 
subsidy and air transport gets nothing.
(Pierre J. Jeanniot, O.C., Director General, International Air Transport 
Association, (IATA): interview, Montreal, 25 April 1995).
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8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations evolved as a result of the findings and the 
conclusions of this research project. Whilst some are applicable specifically to the air 
transport sector in the EC, others do have implications in a more general sense for 
stakeholders of any deregulated industry and for any industry about to be 
deregulated.
State Aid:
General Recommendations: The research has shown that the regulatory 
protectionism enjoyed by State-owned companies from their national governments 
decreases when the industry is deregulated and that reliance upon State aid 
increases. In a competitive environment, access to finance should not be founded on 
ownership but should be equitable for all companies - both State-owned and privately 
owned alike - operating in the industry. This principle should be applicable to both the 
State-owned company and the Member State: a State which owns a company should 
neither privilege nor disadvantage the company by failing to assume the 
responsibilities of a commercially oriented stakeholder.
Specific Recommendations: Financial injections into airlines should be rejected if 
they are not in accordance with normal commercial practices and thus, in violation of 
the Treaty of Rome. The European Commission should strictly enforce Treaty 
provisions regarding State aids and provide a clear set of guidelines for evaluating 
any exceptional application of State aid. In particular, there should be a second round 
of aid only in the event of exceptional, unforeseeable circumstances external to the 
company. The Commission have stated this as a principle but have not yet attempted 
to define what these circumstances might be. They should be required to do so. An 
external element is that the 'exceptional, unforeseeable circumstance' should affect 
the EC industry as a whole. It should not be enough, for instance, that the currency of 
the Member State concerned has been devalued.
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The following conditions should be attached to all grants of State aid, whether for the 
first or second time.
• the airline should provide ‘a business plan', highlighting how the 'aid' will be 
used to make the airline commercially viable and thus putting it in a position 
to compete;
• the plan should be assessed by independent professionals - possibly from 
another Member State - on behalf of the European Commission;
• the results of this assessment should be made public along with the 
Commission's decision and the measures to be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the plan;
• implementation of the plan should be monitored by independent 
professionals; and
• there should be acceptable assurances that the competitive interests of 
other airlines will not be negatively affected.
Infrastructure:
General Recommendations: In the light of the significance the stakeholders 
attached to infrastructure in determining the level and existence of competition this 
area should be a primary consideration for the formuiators of policies and a priority in 
reviewing the current liberalisation legislation. Generally, deregulated industries 
should be aware of the importance of having equitable access to necessary 
infrastructure, thus, allowing all competitors, incumbents and new-entrants an equal 
opportunity to compete.
Specific Recommendations: There should be continuing pressure on governments, 
intra-European institutions and politicians (both national and EC wide) to provide 
infrastructure at the appropriate quality and price. Secondly, all airports should have a 
regulatory mechanism to ensure fairness in allocating scarce resources, such as slots 
and gates. Thirdly, infrastructure problems have caused competition to be stifled in 
some instances, particularly at the busy and profitable airports. Since slots are getting 
scarcer, airlines should allocate them to the most valuable flights thus, ensuring a 
considerable competitive advantage over rivals.
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Rationalisation of Labour Force:
General Recommendations: Usually the labour forces in deregulated industries are 
too large to permit effective competition with the cost-conscious new entrants. 
Established companies which incur high costs through ‘false employment’ need to 
rationalise their labour forces'.
Specific Recommendations: From the findings and conclusions it is clear that many 
of the larger and established airlines have cost disadvantages as a result of 
government imposed labour regimes. Deregulated larger established airlines must be 
allowed to reduce unit labour costs to the levels enjoyed by new entrants.
Adopting a Strategy:
General Recommendations: From the conclusions presented and the validation 
comments received, it is clear that successful competitors in any industry in a newly 
liberalised environment, must clearly define their strategic role, and must adapt to it. 
Deregulation unleashes potent competitive forces, and the most successful 
competitors are those that are most adroit at adapting to them.
In a liberalised environment company management must therefore manage for 
change; change should be viewed both as an opportunity and a threat. Success in an 
ever changing industry should address the following:
• an in-depth understanding of the dynamic forces moulding the 
environment;
• leadership which is prepared to seize change; and
• the flexibility to give the customer (whether corporate or individual) what 
they want in the new competitive environment.
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Specific Recommendations: The conclusions from the airline survey indicated that 
what the consumer wanted most was flexibility and low fares. Airlines should thus 
operate an appropriate mix of aircraft to meet those demands. Using only large 
aircraft seriously curtails flexibility. Operating smaller aircraft on low density routes 
provides an airline with the flexibility to right-size the equipment to the characteristics 
of each route. Success for an airline will increasingly depend on its ability to achieve 
the best fit between route requirements and the size of aircraft.
High Volume Low Cost Strategies:
General Recommendations: No single strategy will be sufficient for success in a 
deregulated industry but, shrewd identification of competitive advantage and stringent 
cost control are necessary preconditions of success. The conclusions from the 
research indicated that adopting a high-volume/low-cost (as defined by Porter, 1980) 
strategy was the most successful approach for significant players to employ in a newly 
deregulated industry.
Specific Recommendations: The primary purpose of liberalising the air transport in 
the EC was to expose the industry to competition and the findings from this research 
indicate that this has happened to varying degrees. It has also revealed that where 
management has concentrated on fundamentals, particularly on rigorous and 
consistent control of costs, the financial results have been positive. Labour and 
operational costs which represent about 40 per cent of total costs are a key to 
competitive success. So winning airlines are likely to be those who most successfully 
achieve a superior combination of low unit cost and large market share.
Addressing Supplier Power:
General Recommendations: In the light of the conclusions on the power of suppliers 
and the validations on the issue, it appears that in a newly deregulated environment 
companies should define their ‘core activities’ more thoughtfully and concentrate on 
being selective about which services they perform. Smaller companies should not try 
to provide all the functions necessary for them to operate: they would be better placed 
concentrating on the core business and ensuring that they had a large portfolio of 
suppliers from which to chose.
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Companies with subcritical functions should sell them, thus allowing them to achieve 
greater efficiency by outsourcing and to optimise three critical levers of competitive 
advantage: revenue enhancement, cost reduction and reduction of asset intensity.
Specific Recommendations: In catering, (inflight food) the largest incumbents are 
growing disproportionately. Airlines with subcritical catering operations should 
dispose of them and outsource, whilst those which are capable of doing so should 
invest in and expand their catering operations. In IT, the larger airlines could set up IT 
subsidiaries, sometimes in association with third-party IT companies. Examples of this 
already happening in the USA and EC respectively are Delta and ATT, or Lufthansa 
and EDS. Smaller airlines could benefit from this process either by outsourcing large 
parts of their needs or ‘hosting’ up with the IT operations of an alliance partner. By 
disposing of non-core flight operations airlines will increase their use of related service 
providers, whose cost structures are significantly lower than those of the airlines 
themselves. Airlines which preserve uncompetitive structures may be left with 
liabilities that they cannot afford in a highly competitive environment.
Addressing Buyer Power:
General Recommendations: Both the findings and confirmation by industry experts 
indicated that competitive advantage could be influenced by the power of buyers. 
Additionally, the study highlighted that linkages between companies and their 
customers are complex and careful selection of buyers using criteria other than price 
may yield competitive advantage. Thus, it appears that those companies which have 
the following types of relationships with their buyers may enjoy competitive advantage.
• Have a relatively large number of buyers;
• Provide their buyers with information about their own activities; and
• Have regular meetings with buyers to deepen ‘company-buyer’ 
relationships.
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Specific Recommendations: Travei agents are the biggest buyer of airline services 
and thus, potentially the most powerful. Airlines need to keep this power in check. The 
validation of this conclusion (by Otto Loepfe) indicated that travel agencies will 
challenge airlines for control of the customer franchise, and airlines will have to 
respond. It will be crucial for airlines to countervail this power. There are several ways 
airlines might do this:
• Airlines need to further strengthen their direct links with their customers, 
both individual and corporate. This may require even more effective loyalty 
programmes, which are more attractive both to frequent fliers and their 
companies.
• Airlines may need to co-operate with each other. There may well be some 
situations in which they find they have a common goal.
• Airlines will have to work with the travel agencies in such a way that each 
side can profit from each other, so that airlines are not dominated. 
Individual agencies could be influenced by offering them loyalty 
programmes.
• Airlines should investigate developing direct distribution - ‘ticketless travel’ - 
as a way of eliminating non-value-added cost and keeping the customer 
franchise.
8.5 SUMMARY ON CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings and conclusions from the library research for the most part concurred 
with the literature on deregulation as did the industry survey. Thus, industries about to 
deregulate or having just newly deregulated should expect similar patterns to emerge 
- an influx of new-entrants causing prices to fall and incumbents in the sector adopting 
strategies enabling them to successfully compete in the newly created competitive 
environment.
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However, the findings from the in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in the 
industry and the validations by industry experts indicated that despite the above 
conclusions - deregulation of an industry will increase competition - the level of 
competition was not as intense as they had anticipated or expected. In part this can 
be explained by the gradualist approach adopted by the formulators of the 
liberalisation policy, the European Commission (DG IV and DG VII), who from the 
outset stated that it was their aim to increase competition within the industry but on a 
step-by-step basis. However, the in-depth interviews with two principal formulators of 
the policy indicated that the level of competition following deregulation of the air 
transport system was even less than they had anticipated.
The main conclusion from the stakeholder interviews on this issue was that the 
national political power was stronger than originally foreseen. The strength of covert 
national political pressure is not alluded to in the literature on deregulation, nor is it an 
issue that the European Commission admits exists. Despite the attempts and desires 
to harmonise the actions of Member States of the European Community on many 
areas and on many levels, the fact remains that there is still significant heterogeneity 
in how Member States implement Community legislation.
The research indicates that the national political power was strongest on the weakest 
part of the liberalisation policy - the terms for the granting of State aids. This is 
because under the terms of Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome, State aid is not illegal in 
itself.
The article says only that aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition ... 
insofar as it affects trade between Member States shall be incompatible with the 
common market. Moreover, the article provides further loopholes, saying that a id ... to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State may be considered 
to be compatible with the common market as also may aid to facilitate the 
development of certain economic activities. These provisions give great scope for 
justification of special cases.
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This possibility was not considered at the formulation stage of this policy, neither was 
the inadequacy of the industry’s infrastructure anticipated as being a constraint to 
competition when the liberalisation packages were drafted. Both of these important 
issues were revealed through the stakeholder interviews and both were regarded by 
the stakeholders as major reasons for the less than widespread level of competition.
These conclusions have important implications for those industries about to 
deregulate and for future research into the consequences of deregulation in general. 
For industries about to deregulate, the covert political pressure (especially in an EC 
situation) must be recognised as a major factor determining the level of competition 
that may ensue post-deregulation.
From a research perspective future investigations into deregulation of industries 
should adopt mixed methodologies which incorporate both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques in order to obtain a more accurate view of the whole situation. These 
methods would enable researchers to obtain richer data and greater insights - factual 
and perceptual - into a highly complex process.
8.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This project suggests that future related research should be undertaken in the 
following areas:
• the existence of perceived political pressure in other EC industries that 
have been deregulated;
• the impact of political pressure in other deregulated EC transport sectors, 
eg. shipping and road transport;
• the scope for using this research as a template for other deregulated 
industries in the EC;
• the scope for extending the research to other regions - the USA, South 
America and Asia;
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• the development, through rigorous statistical analysis, of heuristic 
competitive analysis forecasting models; and
• the integration of this study with other studies of competitive behaviour to 
distinguish other primary determinants of success.
In addition, this study should be to be regularly replicated - perhaps every three years 
- to check developments;
8.7 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
This project has produced a study which incorporates both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. In addition the project's structure and subsequent outcomes have been 
rigorously verified by a representative sample of industry experts. However, bearing in 
mind the overall robustness of the project it is important also to consider a number of 
limitations which are inherent in this type of research. These limitations are set out 
below;
8.7.1 Theoretical Underpinnings
Although Easton's (1965a) political system's model is a widely accepted construct, the 
study revealed that the model could be improved by the introduction of a more 
rigorously structured and quantitative framework. Similarly, although the Porter (1980) 
model captured comprehensively the competitive terrain of the industry, it failed to 
accommodate the strategic intentions of significant players in the industry.
8.7.2 Sample Size
Although the sample was representative of the EC airline industry, a higher degree of 
statistical confidence would have been achieved had the sample size been larger in 
terms of types of airline and geographical location. However, the time required and 
resources needed to extend the sample would be considerable and beyond the scope 
of this work.
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8.7.3 Sectoral Analysis
As noted in Chapter 1, the EC’s liberalisation programme has embraced both the 
passenger and cargo sectors of the industry. It was considered inappropriate to deal 
with developments in the latter section in this study but their importance should not be 
under-estimated. They would provide much material for a separate study at a later 
stage,
8.8 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
This study has made the following contributions to scholarship:
• generated unique data from diverse sources which provide indices of firm 
performance in an era of deregulation;
• recognised that aggregate industry data is of limited use in assessing 
competition and competitive behaviour. Firm specific marketing and 
financial data is required and this study employed such data;
• recognised the need to create new firm specific market related data bases 
to monitor competitive strategies in deregulated industries;
• fused two theoretical models to produce quantitative (Porter) and qualitative 
(Easton) data. The empirical study has tested and accepted their 
applicability as a means of examining a newly deregulated industry;
• On the basis of this study the present author has published the following 
research papers and delivered the following conference papers:
Research Papers
'The Changing Pattern of Air Transport Regulation1, Public Money and 
Management, Vol 13, No.1 January - March 1993, Blackwell Business, Oxford.
'Market Entry Strategies in a Liberalised Air Transport Sector’, Ulster Papers in 
Public Policy and Management, No. 31, March 1994, ISSN 0964-1858 University of 
Ulster, Northern Ireland.
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Classical Competitive Strategy in Newly Deregulated Industries -Does it Apply?,
International Review of Strategic Management, Ed. D. Hussey, John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd, London 1995.
Conference Papers
‘Competitive Strategies in the Changing European Environment', Academy of 
International Business, UK AIB 21st Annual Conference, Manchester School of 
Management, 25 March 1994.
‘Competition in Europe - Does it Exist?' Farnborough College, 31 January 1995.
A further conference paper is to be delivered in October 1995: ‘Current Competitive 
Strategies in the Airline Industry with Special Reference to Europe and the US.’
15 th Annual International Strategic Management Society Conference, Mexico City 
15-18 October 1995.
8.9 THE IMPLICATIONS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION FOR OTHER INDUSTRIES
Few other industries have experienced a more global deregulation than the airline 
industry. The US Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 acted as a catalyst for global 
restructuring on an unprecedented scale. This study has shown that the effect of 
deregulation has been to expose the airline industry extreme competitive pressures. It 
has also demonstrated, that examining competition in the airline industry simply from 
the perspective of the competitive behaviour of the industry incumbents is too narrow, 
as figure 8.1 indicates. Study of the effects of deregulation of any industry must 
therefore recognise that there is a vector of incompatible interest groups affecting 
behaviour in the industry and a comprehensive rigorous predictive model of industry 
evolution thus requires a structure that weighted contributions of each of the influence 
groups.
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Figure 8.1 Competitive Behaviour and Airline Performance
Competitors
Governments
Deregulation in its various guises has been a predominant global ideology of the 
1980’s; (Jackson and Price, 1994, p viii) and continues to widespread in the 1990’s 
(Weyman-Jones, 1994, p 111). Deregulation policies have been implemented across a 
variety economies, industrialised, developing and Eastern European. Jackson and 
Price, (1994, p 10) argue that the ‘benefits’ of deregulation for any industry are the 
potential improvements in efficiency which come from greater competition. This study of 
a deregulated airline industry supports their argument: airlines in general have become 
more efficient once exposed to competitive pressures. It can be assumed that patterns 
similar to those traced in this study will be found in other deregulated industries.
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This assumption is reinforced by a number of studies which have reported cost 
savings and improved efficiency as a result of the deregulation of local authority 
services in the UK: Domberger et al (1986), and Cubbin et al (1987) for refuse 
collection; Ascher, (1987), and Domberger e ta l (1987) for hospital services. In a more 
recent study by the London School of Economics (9 May 1995), on London Bus 
deregulation, operators were shown to have become more efficient and costs to have 
dropped by 35 per cent between 1985 and 1993.
There is, however, a negative aspect which cannot be ignored. As in the aviation 
industry, the deregulation of these services has resulted in ‘a rapid and dramatic 
contraction in direct employment’ (O’Connell Davidson, 1994, p 174). Between 1979 
and 1989 the number of UK public sector employees fell by 1.2 million (Labour 
Research Department, 1990: 25), whilst SCAT (1990) estimates that more than 
70,000 jobs were lost as a direct result of privatisation and compulsory competitive 
tendering in the 1980’s.
Notwithstanding these social costs, it is hard to envisage that the pendulum will swing 
back in the foreseeable future, for as Alfred Khan has remarked:
‘Wherever competition is feasible it is, for all its imperfections, superior to
regulation as a means of serving the public interest.’
- Alfred Kahn.
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APPENDIX I
The EEC, the EC and the EU.
The European Union (EU) traces its origins to the Treaty of Paris (1951) creating the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In 1957 the six signatories to the 
Treaty - Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands - signed 
the two Treaties of Rome, setting up the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the European Atomic Energy (Euratom). The Single European Act of 1987 amends 
and complements these Treaties.
In 1992, the by now twelve Member States (the original six plus Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) signed the Treaty of Maastricht, 
establishing a European Union. The treaty establishing the EEC was amended in 
order to establish a European Community and provisions were adopted on a common 
foreign and security policy and on co-operation in the fields of justice and home 
affairs. Actions, taken in accordance with these provisions do not fail within the 
competence of the European Community.
Since all the legislation referred to in this study was adopted and came into effect 
before implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht, the terms 'European Community' or 
'EC' are used throughout in preference to 'European Union' or 'EU'.
The executive arm of the EC, previously known as The Commission of the European 
Communities' is now formally entitled 'The European Commission' and it is this term 
(or the more colloquial 'The Commission') which is used throughout this text.
APPENDIX II
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
NAME:
ORGANISATION:
DATE:
Q.1 What do you see as the function of an airline?
Q.2 How should performance of an airline be measured?
Q.3 How do you measure the efficiency of an airline?
Q.4 List the 5 most efficient airlines in the European Community?
1........................................................................................
2  .....................
 3................................................................................................
 4................................. ............. .................................................
 5................................................................................................
Q.5 List the 5 least efficient airlines in the European Community?
1................................................................................................
2..................................
 3................................................................................
 4................................................................................................
 5.................................................................................................
Q.6 What major regulatory initiative since 1988 has had the greatest
positive influence on the European Community airline industry since 
1988?
Q.7 What major regulatory initiative since 1988 has had the greatest
negative influence on the European Community airline industry since 
1988?
Q.8 What has the effect been upon the EC airlines which have received
State Aid?
Q.9 What has the effect of State Aid been upon airlines which have not
received such help?
Q.10 In your opinion why has the EC allowed State Aid to be granted?
Q.11 in your opinion why have some Member States opposed the granting
of State Aid to "flag carriers"?
Q.12 In your opinion why have some Member States not opposed the
granting of State Aid to "flag carriers"?
Q.13 Is competition occurring in the EC airline industry?
Q.14 What is preventing competition from occurring in the EC's airline 
industry?
Q.15 What is helping competition to take place in the EC’s Airline Industry?
APPENDIX III
COMPETITIVENESS IN THE AIR TRANSPORT 
SECTOR POST LIBERALISATION
A SURVEY
RESPONDENT’S NAME .....................................................................................
COMPANY ........................................................................DATE
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. The questionnaire is divided into several 
major sections and through it we hope to develop a comprehensive picture of the competitive 
structure of the airline industry.
SECTION I : COMPANY SIZE AND ACTIVITIES
Serial Number 
1 2
□  □
A. AGE, OWNERSHIP AND ACTIVITIES RECORD 9 m
1 . Year Trading Commenced: * 19 □  □  4.5
2. Indicate One Type of Structure Your Company Most Resembles:
Tick One : UK Owned Public Company. □  6/1
Non-UK Owned Public Company □  6/2
Part State Owned Company □  6/3
UK Privately Owned □  6/4
Non UK Privately Owned □  6/5
Other. Please state: □  6/6
3, Please Tick the Main Activities Your Companv Carries Out:
Long Haul International Services □  7/1
Intra-European Community Services □  7/2
Other European Services □  7/3
Domestic Services □  7/4
Other. Please state: □  7/5
B. SALES AND M ARKETING
4. List approximate Percentage of annual turnover for each of these 
Service Types in 1993:
Long Haul International Flights ^ ^  ^  % 8-9n ruIntra-European Community %  10-11
Other European _ ^  ^  %  12-13nn
Domestic Flights % 14-15nn
Domestic Interlinking Traffic *—“* * %  16-17n nOther. Please state:_________________________________  ■— * '— ■ %  18-19
5. Give Best New Route (Introduced since 1988) in terms of annual turnover :
 ____________________________________________________
Markets and Degree of Specialisation
6. List approximate percentage of turnover in 1988 in each of these Fare Types:
First Class   O  C j  %  22.23
Business Class ^  ^  % 24-25
Full Fare Economy ^  % 26-27
I J I I
Discounted Economy *"—* % 28-29n rinrBlock Bookings (Tour operators etc) * *— * %  30-31nnOther 1, Please state:________________________ _ '— ' % 32-33
Other 2, Please state:______________________  ^  %  34-35nn.
Other 3, Please state:_________ ' _____ ’   ^%  36-37
7. List approximate percentage of turnover in 1993 in each of these Fare Types
□ □ %
□  □  %
□  □  %
□  □  %
□ .□ %
Other 1, Please state:_______    □  □  %
□  □  %
□  □  %
First Class
Business Class
Full Fare Economy
Discounted Economy
Block Bookings (Tour operators etc)
Other 2, Please state: 
Other 3, Please state:
8. Give Best New Geographical Market, i.e. source o f business, since 1988 
in terms o f growth in turnover.
Best new geographical market □  □  %
9. Give Best New Fare Type (since 1988) in terms o f Growth in Turnover:
Fare Type:_________   □  □  %
Other Marketing Aspects
10. Company size:
a. Total Turnover (£m) in 1993: □  □ □ □ □ □ □
b. Total Turnover (£m) in 1988: □  □ □ □ □ □ □
C. PERSONNEL
Total Labour Force
11. (a) Total No. o f Employees (1988): 
(b) Total No.of Employees (1993):
□  □ □ □ □ □  
□  □  □  □  D  □
RECORD
40-41
42-43
44-45
46-47
48-49
50-51
52-53
54-55
56-57
58-64
65-70
71-76
38-39
1-3
12. Breakdown of labour force in 1988
F ligh t Deck
Cabin Crew
Sales and Marketing
Engineering and Maintenance
Management
Other. Please state
13. Breakdown of labour force in 1993 
Flight Deck 
Cabin Crew 
Sales and Marketing 
Engineering and Maintenance
Management
Other. Please state
D. ASSETS
Company Size
14. Total Assets in 1988 (£m)
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □
4-8
9-13
14-18
19-23
24-28
29-33
34-38
39-43
44-48
49-53
54-58
59-63
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 64-70
RECORD
15. Fleet Breakdown in 1988: Please state how many of each aircraft type there 
were in your fleet.
Seats 400+
300-399
200-299
100-199
50-99
0-49
□  □ □ □ □  W a a ^ M a f l  I m m h J  H  r u u i i i j u l  M M M H
□  □ □ □ □
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □
4-8
9-13
14-18
19-23
24-28
□ □ □ □ □ □ □16. Total Assets in 1993 (£m) L- —■*. —1 1 1---- 1 *— * 34-40
17. Fleet Breakdown in 1993: Please state how many of each aircraft type there 
were in your fleet
Seats 400+ □ □
300-399
200-299
100-199
50-99
0-49 D D D D D  eg.™
Profit Performance of the Company
18. Net profit in 1988.
or
loss in 1988. □  76 80
RECORD E  0 0  E 3 13
19. Net profit in 1993.
or
loss in 1993.
SECTION II : COMPANIES’ PERCEPTIONS ABOUT 
THEIR STRATEGIES
E. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRICE AND QUALITY STRATEGIES
Pricing Strategies:
20. Customers purchase our products because our prices, in relation
to our main competitors are:
Tick one only
Low Price D  14/1
Average Price O  14/2
High Price d  14/3
Other, Please State_______________________________    □  14/4
21. How do you set prices ?
Rank in order of importance. 1 : being the highest
What the market will bear l — l 15
(i.e. what competitors offer)
IATA tariff co-ordination D  16
Target level of profit   L I  17nGain market share •— 1 18nContribution costing •— 1 19n
Combination of the above *— * 20
Other, Please state_______________________________________________  L -J  21
22. - Who, in the company, has the most important say in setting prices?
Title: 22-23
23. For your biggest selling fare type, how would your rate your prices
in relation to your competitors ?
Tick one only.
Our prices are
Very much higher Q  24/1
Slightly higher ^  24/2
About the same O  24/3
Slightly lower O  24/4
Very much lower O  24/5
Other, Please state     ^  24/6
24. Customers purchase our products for the 
following reasons:
Rank in order of importance. 1 : being the highest.
Frequency 
Brand Name 
Service delivery 
Punctuality
Frequent Flier Programme 
Advertising/Marketing 
Low Price
Other, please state______________________
□ 25
d] 26
□ 1 27
□ I 28
□ 1 29
□ 1 30
□ 1,
□ 1 32
25. How do you measure the quality of your products?
Please Tick as many as you wish
Premium price O  33/1
Feedback from sales staff 0 . 34/1
Feedback from customers ^  35/1
. Statistical Analysis ^  36/1
Internal Comparison with competing products* ^  37/1
Other, please state_________________________________________ _  ^  38/
Tick one only.
Our quality is:
26. For your biggest selling fare type, how would
your rate your quality in relation to your competitors?
Very much higher □  39/1
Slightly higher □  39/2
About the same □  39/3
Slightly lower □  39/4
Very much lower □  39/5
Other, please state □  39/
Marketing, Selling And Distribution
27. Do you have a marketing/sales department?
Tick one only.
Yes □  40/1
No □  40/2
28. If so, how many staff were employed in the department?
M i n i m  □
29. How do you follow market trends?
Please List as many as you wish
Feedback from sales/marketing staff □ 53/1
General media coverage □ 54/1
Trade publications □ 55/1
Personal contacts with bulk buyers □ 56/1
Other, please state □ 57/
30. What types of promotion do you employ?
Rank in order of importance. 1 : being the highest.
□
Sales staff *—-■ 58
nAdvertising 59□Special Customer Promotions 60nOther,please state____________________________________________  ■— 1 61nNone I—J  62
31. Which methods of distribution do you use?
Rank in order of importance. 1 : being the highest.
Travel Agents 1—1 53
nTour Operators •— 1 64
Direct sales to public L J  55nTelephone Sales 1 6 6
  □  „
9
SECTIO N III : RELATIONSHIPS W ITH CUSTOM ERS
This section aims to ascertain the power of customers.
32. What is the nature of your largest customer?
(i.e. tour operator, travel agent, corporate buyer etc...).
□  □ 68-69
33. What is the approximate percentage of your sales going to 
your largest customer ?:
34. How many major (ie who take 5% or more of your sales) 
customers do you have?
(travel agents, tour operators, corporate customers etc...)
35. How many alternatives airlines could your largest 
customer find for your most profitable route ?
Tick one only.
None
One
1 and less than 3 
3+
Don’t know
36. Do your customers have information on ?:
Please List as many as you wish
Overall demand for your types of service 
Prevailing prices 
Your profitability
□ □ % 70-71
□  □ 72-73
□ 74/1
□  74/2
□  74/3
□  74/4
□  74/5
□  75/1
□  76/1
□  77/1
37. Do you have regular formal meetings with bulk buyers to discuss ?:
Please List as many as you wish
Quality improvement E 78/1
Advertising and promotion E 79/1
Other, please state '  E 80/
No such meetings. E 73/1
0 0 E3,RECORD *—> •—J 1-3
38. What are the terms of sale most frequently agreed between 
you and your bulk buyers ?:
Tick one only.
Payment in 7 days or less E 4/1
One months’ credit E 4/2
Two months1 credit E 4/3
Other,please state_______________________________________________  E 4/4
39. What percentage approximate of your costs are ?:
Fuel D D %  5.6
l l l lAirport Landing Charges *— %  7-8nnCRS Systems *— * —■* %  9-10
Inflight Food 1— 1 1— 1 %  1 1 - 12n nAdvertising/promotion • *— I %  13-14nn.Other, please state    ■— ■ ■— » %  15-16
40. How many suppliers do you have for ?:
Fuel □  □ 17-18
Airport Landing Charges L -J  l—J  \$jiq
CRS Systems □ □ 21-22 'i i nInflight Food l—J 1 — 1 23.24
Advertising/promotion □ □ 25-26nnOther, please state ________________________ _______ I— > ■— I 27-28
41. By turnover, is your company in relation to your largest supplier of fuel ?:
Tick one only.
Smaller □  29/1
About the same size d  29/2
Larger d  29/3
Do not know d  29/4
SECTION IV : R ELA TIO N SH IPS WITH SUPPLIERS
42. If you wished to change suppliers of fuel, how many realistic alternative 
sources would you have?
Tick one only.
None D  30/1
1 □  30/2
2 - 4  □  30/3
5 _ 9 □  30/4
10+ C  30/5
43. If you wished to change suppliers of inflight food, how many realistic 
alternative sources would you have?
Tick one only.
None □  31/1
1 □  31/2
2 - 4  □  31/3
5 - 9  □  31/4
10+ □  31/5
44. If you wished to change suppliers of CRS systems, how many realistic 
alternative sources would you have?
Tick one only.
None □  32/1
1 ... tn 32/2
2 - 4  □  32/3
5 - 9  1=1 32/4
10+ . Cl 32/5
45. What are the main criteria you apply in selecting a supplier?
Please Tick as many as you wish
Price □  33/1
Quality □  34/1
Service/Delivery □  35/1
Availability □  36/1
Other, please state      D  37
46. Do your suppliers have information on ?:
Tick one only.
Overall demand for your types of products. E  38/1
Prevailing prices for your products. E 38/2
Your costs. E 38/3
Your profitability. E 38/4
47. Do you have regular formal meeting with your suppliers to discuss any 
of the following?
Please List as many as you like.
Quality standards E 39/1
Service levels E 40/1
Pricing and Payments Policy E 41/1
Other.Please state:_____________________________________________  E 42
No such meetings E 43/1
48. What are the terms of sale most frequently agreed between you and 
your suppliers?
Tick one only.
Payment in 7 days E 44/1
One months’ credit E 44/2
Two months’ credit □  44/3
Other, please state__________________^__________________________  E  44/4
SECTION V : INFORM ATION ABOUT YOUR CO M PETITO RS.
49. What special strengths do you feel that your company has in relation 
to your major competitors?
Rank in order of importance. 1 being the highest.
Closeness to market/customer 
Access to low cost finance 
Government regulatory support 
Access to government financial help 
High quality management 
High quality labour force 
Lower wage costs 
Higher productivity
Code sharing agreement with a larger carrier
Providing a feeder service for a 
larger carrier from a small spoke 
airport to a large hub airport
Franchising arrangement with a 
larger carrier in your own country
Franchising arrangement with a 
larger carrier in another country.
Technical superiority
Superior Marketing
Other, please state____________________________________
Other, please state____________________________________
Other, please state___________________________
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□□
□
□
□
□
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 
61
What special advantages do you feel that your major competitors have over you? 
Rank in order of importance. 1 being the highest.
Closeness to market/customer — 1 62
Access to low cost finance ^  63□
Government regulatory support 64
Access to government financial help ^  65
High quality management ^  66
High quality labour force 57
□
Lower wage costs ^  68
□
Higher productivity 69
Code sharing agreement with a larger carrier ^  70
Providing a feeder service for a
larger carrier from a small spoke I |
airport to a large hub airport 71
Franchising arrangement with a | ”1
larger carrier in your own country *“ * 72
Franchising arrangement with a 
larger carrier in another country.
Technical superiority L -J  74
Superior Marketing L*JI 75
Other, please state____________________________________________  I— I 76
Other, please state  L J  77
nOther, please state  1 78
m m m t.RECORD »—11—11— i-3
For your largest capacity route in 1993 - (in terms of turnover) 
please give the name of your strongest competitor.
□  □Route : _______________________________________________   ' ' *——* 4-5
□  □- Name of Competitor :     1 i-—1,1 6-7
SECTION VI : INFORM ATION ON M AJOR NEW  COM PETITORS
A new competitor is one that has entered the market since 1988.For your most important 
routes (by turnover) indicate the characteristics of your new and most threatening major 
competitor.
52. Route:
□  □Home Airport Location________________________________________  8-9
□  □to Country 1 _________________________________________ l— 1 ■— 1 10 -11
nnto Country_2 _________________________________________  1— 1 1— 1 12-13
to Country_3 _________________________________________  l>—I 1-.—1 14-15
53. Competitors’ Structure
Please Tick as many as you wish.
The Competitor :
Is an Independent Carrier. d  16/1
Has a Code Sharing Agreement with a larger carrier. d  17/1
Provides feeder services for a larger carrier. d  18/1
Has a franchising agreement with a larger carrier. d  19/1
Other, please state  d  20/1
Don’t know . d  21/1
54. Size of this competitor in relation to your company:
Tick one only.
Much larger d  22/1
About same d  22/2
Much smaller d  22/3
Don’t know d  22/4
55. Basis of new entrant’s strategy: 
Please Tick one only
Low price □ 23/1
High volume □ 23/2
High quality □ 23/3
Quality and price □ 23/4
SECTION V : INFORMATION ON SUBSTITUTES TO AIR TRAVEL
56. Are there realistic substitute means of travel (eg, train, boat) to air 
transport on any of the following routes ?:
If so, please List.
Long Haul International Routes :
Intra-European Community Routes :
Other European Routes :
□  □
□  □
□  □
□  □
□  □
□  □
□  □  MmJI 1 i—mwi
□  □
□  □
24-25
26-27
28-29
30-31
32-33
34-35
36-37
38-39
40-41
Domestic Routes : □  □  
□  □  
□  □
42-43
44-45
46-47
57. Compared to your fares on routes where there are alternative forms 
of travel, are substitute fares:
Please Tick one only
Higher □ 48/1
Lower ’  □ 48/2
About the same □ 48/3
58. How do total journey times by alternative forms of travel compare withg the time taken 
by air ?:
Please Tick one only
Faster □  49/1
Slower □  50/2
About the same. d  51/3
59. How has your organisation reacted to substitute service ?:
60. Estimate in percentage terms the growth of substitute travel 
since 1988.
□ □1 ____________________________________________________  1---- 1 ' 1 52-53
? _____________dd 54-55
dd3 ______________________  ___________________________  1---- 1 1 1 56-57
dd 58-59
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APPENDIX IV
Airlines which participated in the Questionnaire
Aer Lingus 
Air Liberte 
Air Littoral 
Air UK 
Alitalia 
Brit Air
Britannia Airways 
British Mediterranean 
Brymon Airways 
Cityflyer Express 
Emerald European 
Eurodirect 
GB Airways 
Iberia
Jersey European Airways 
KLM Royal Dutch Airways 
Lufthansa 
Olympic Airways 
Regional Airlines 
Ryanair
Virgin Atlantic Airways
APPENDIX V
Summary of Validation Interviews Conducted with Expert Witnesses
O rganisation Expert  W itness Date  and V enue
Swissair Otto Loepfe, President and 
CEO
Montreal,
24 April 1995
Comite des Sages Hermann de Croo, 
Chairman
Montreal,
24 April 1995
Bombardier 
Regional Aircraft
Pierre Lortie, 
President
Montreal,
24 April 1995
US air transport lawyer, 
Washington DC
Robert Papkin, 
Senior Partner
Montreal,
23 April 1995
Shadow Minister for 
Transport in the House of 
Lords
Lord Stanley Clinton-Davis Montreal,
25 April 1995
US Department of 
T ransportation
Paul Gretch, Director of 
International Aviation
Washington DC, 
19 April 1995
US Department of 
Transportation
Hoyte B. Dekker, Assistant 
Director for Consumer 
Affairs
Washington DC, 
19 April 1995.
European Commission for 
Transport
Rt. Hon. Neil Kinnock, 
European Commissioner 
for Transport
London,
2 June 1995
British Midland Airways Tim Walden, Industry 
Affairs Manager
London,
10 May 1995
ICAO Assaid Kotatie, President 
of the Council
Montreal,
24 April 1995
Wilmer Culter Pickering, 
Washington DC
Jerfery Shane, 
former assistant secretary 
of State
Montreal,
25 April 1995
European Regional 
Airlines Association
Mike Ambrose, 
Director General
Montreal,
25 April 1995
IATA Pierre Jeannoit, OC, 
Director General
Montreal,
25 April 1995
Northwest Airlines Michael Levine, 
Executive VP Marketing 
and International
Montreal,
25 April 1995
